

General Assembly, in passing the Act of 1798. The Act of 1797, ch. 71, having added to the Chancellor's salary, in a dubious form, by giving the addition to him "as Chancellor and Judge of the land office," it was not perfectly certain, that the indicated character "as Chancellor," would, when qualified by the expression, "and Judge of the land office," draw after it the constitutional security to the whole or only to a part of this addition; and, therefore, to remove this doubt, *and to clear away all ambiguity, at the following session, by the Act of 1798, ch. 86, **652** the whole was given to the Chancellor, as Chancellor; manifestly with the intention of drawing over the whole salary, that constitutional guarantee and security which indisputably and rightfully belonged to such a salary when given to the Chancellor as Chancellor.

That this was the distinct understanding of those legislators who passed the Act of 1798, will be placed beyond all manner of doubt, by comparing the phraseology and allusions of the Act of 1792, with those of the Act of 1798. Prior to the year 1792, the Chancellor had received some additional compensation as Judge of the land office; and, it is to that, which the Act of that year refers by the expressions, "for all duties and services whatever prescribed or to be prescribed by law." In other words, that Legislature meant to say, that the Chancellor shall no longer be compensated in two different characters; the one part of the compensation to be secured according to the Constitution, and the other during pleasure; but, that the whole should be constitutionally given and secured to him as Chancellor. By the Act of 1797, ch. 71, a part of the Chancellor's compensation was given to him "as Chancellor and Judge of the land office." And, therefore, when, by the Act of 1798, ch. 86, the Legislature declare, "that the Chancellor shall be entitled to receive for all duties and services whatever prescribed or to be prescribed by law, an annual salary of twelve hundred and seventy-five pounds," they meant precisely the same thing, by those identical same words, that was meant by the Legislature of 1792; that is to say, that the whole of the Chancellor's compensation, as well that which had been constitutionally secured to him, as that which had been, until then, bestowed upon him during their pleasure, should all, henceforth, be secured to him during the continuance of his commission.

The last House of Delegates, in excepting the Act of 1797, ch. 71, from their general continuing law, evidently acted under the impression and belief, that whatever salary was given to the Chancellor, as Chancellor, was secured to him during the continuance of his commission. For, if they were not so impressed, why did they in express terms refuse to continue that law, which had never been continued; and, by its own limitation, had expired more than twenty years previous to that time? But seeing, that the addi-