conclusive evidence upon the subjects to which they relate in other enquiries. Therefore upon an indictment for murder against a person who has been entered *non compos mentis* in the Registry, he would be allowed to acquit himself by the mere production of the Registry, as conclusive evidence against "all the world," that the question of his sanity had then been adjudicated, or the same Registry would be conclusive evidence of the same matter upon an inquisition *de lunatico inquirendo*, or the entry of bribery, or infamy, or alienage, or non-age would be equally conclusive upon those points respectively in any other form of enquiry. That such would be the inevitable result of the argument must be clear to any one who will consider it attentively, and that such a position can be sustained is impossible.

If a man were attempting to establish insanity as a defence, the Registry might be admitted as evidence tending to prove that in a certain investigation he had been considered *non compos* by certain persons; but this would be the utmost stretch to which the doctrine could be carried; and as a fact on the question of sanity, it would have not a particle of effect beyond the intrinsic value of the evidence produced before the Registers on the examination which induced them to make the entry. If it were shown that very slight evidence had been produced before them on the occasion, the co u jury would not consider the entry in the Registry as entitled to any degree of weight. If on the other hand it were shown that a regular inquisition against the party had been exhibited to the Registers, that inquisition when *again brought before* the *court or jury*, would undoubtedly weigh with them; but it would be the inquisition upon which the entry was founded and not the *entry of the Registers* which would be considered as having effect. The principle of law which makes a record of a competent tribunal evidence *between the same parties and upon the same questions* raised in that record, would exclude the registry as evidence upon the question of *qualification for office*. The question before the Registers was as to the right of the party *to vote*. In this case the enquiry is as to the *right to hold office*. The parties to the examination before the Registers were Judge Franklin and the Registers — here they are Judge Spence and Judge Franklin. The test of a person having been a party to the record is said to be whether he had a right to cross-examine on the former examination; but Judge Spence had no right to interfere by way of cross-examination when Judge Franklin was before the Register. We cannot think therefore, that upon any principle known to the law, the judgment of the Registers upon the right of Judge Franklin to vote can be considered as evidence entitled to any weight upon the present inquiry.