

more fully I am persuaded that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of the last than of the first scale."

"It has been already proved, that the members of the federal will be more dependent on the members of the State governments, than the latter will be on the former. It has appeared, also, that the prepossessions of the people, on whom both will depend, will be more on the side of the State governments than of the Federal Government. So far as the disposition of each, towards the other, may be influenced by these causes, the State governments most clearly have the advantage. But in a distinct and very important point of view, the advantage will be on the same side. The prepossessions, which the members themselves will carry into the Federal Government, will generally be favorable to the States; whilst it will rarely happen that the members of the State governments will carry into the public councils a bias in favor of the General Government. A local spirit will infallibly prevail in the members of the Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the Legislatures of the particular States. Every one knows that a great proportion of the errors committed by the State Legislatures, proceeds from the disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and paramount interests of the State, to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which they reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be imagined that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union and the dignity and respectability of its government, the objects of their affections and consultations? For the same reason that the members of the State Legislatures will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to national objects, the members of the Federal Legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects. The States will be to the latter what counties and towns are to the former. Measures will too often be decided according to their probable effect, not on the national prosperity and happiness, but upon the prejudices, interests and pursuits of the governments and people of the individual States. What is the spirit that has in general characterized the proceedings of Congress? A perusal of their journals, as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have had a seat in that assembly, will inform us, that the members have but too frequently displayed the character, rather of partisans of their respective States, than of impartial guardians of a common interest; that where on one occasion improper sacrifices have been made of local considerations to the aggrandizement of the Federal Government, the great interests of the nation have suffered on one hundred, from an undue attention to the

local prejudices, interests and views of the particular States. I mean not by these reflections to insinuate that the new Federal Government will not embrace a more enlarged plan of policy than the existing Government may have pursued; much less, that its views will be as confined as these of the State Legislatures; but only that it will partake sufficiently of the spirit of both, to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives of their governments. The motives on the part of the State governments, to augment their prerogatives by defalcations from the Federal Governments, will be overruled by no reciprocal predispositions in the members."

It has been said, and this book has been quoted as authority, that the General Government is a federal rather than a national government; that its influence operates upon the people only through the medium of the State institutions; that it does not operate directly and immediately upon the people; that it is not known to the people in that way. When we say that a government is national, we mean that it acts directly and immediately upon the people of the several States independent of their State organizations. Now, I will read what the Federalist says of the National character of our Government.

Mr. CLARKE. I said that it had both characters; that it was partly national and partly federal.

Mr. NEGLEY. This is what the Federalist says:

"From a comparison and fair construction of the several modes of expression, is to be deduced the authority under which the Convention acted. They were to frame a *national government*, adequate to the *exigencies of government*, and of the *Union*; and to reduce the articles of confederation into such form as to accomplish these purposes."

He argues in this way: The Senate of the United States is a federal feature. There the States are recognized. The House of Representatives is purely a national feature; because the members of the House are elected by the people without the instrumentality of the States. The election of the President is partly national and partly federal; but upon an examination of all its bearings, it is seen to partake more of the national than of the federal character. Since the amendment of the Constitution it has become altogether a national concern. Of course, we still use the form of electors; but practically we vote immediately for the President. Everybody knows for whom he is voting as President and Vice-President, while the vast majority of the voters do not know the electors. It is a mere form. Practically, therefore, the executive department of the Government is purely a national feature. Any one who is