justice, and to make it as little expensive as possible to the State and to suitors.

I am not accustomed to make vague statements as to what my constituents want in any matter, or what are their sentiments, or that sort of thing. I come here to use my best judgment, and I propose to do it. And, although I have had interviews with judges, attorneys, and citizens, I do not think this a proper place to detail such private conversation. Had I no reason to sustain my position, I might fall back upon that. At present, I shall not. It is true, I have no doubt, that a judge who has done business in a particular way, who has settled into a particular rut, may prefer to continue in that cider-mill round, to going out of it and taking a different course. I know that office-holders all over the State have a desire, almost without exception, that we shall make no invasion upon their particular offices, save to increase their salaries. But I submit that it is not a sufficient ground for the retention of the present system.

It is true that equity business—I will not make it a personal matter with the present judge—cannot be done in the superior court of Baltimore city. My colleague in one breath said the reason was that the judge of that court had other business which engrossed his time, and in the very next breath he said the judge sat there with his bailiffs only and nothing to do.

Mr. STIRLING. I can explain that perfectly well, if the gentleman will allow me. I was stating the facts.

Mr. STOCKBRIDGE. So am I stating facts. I will make the explanation myself. I do not require the gentleman's help. The jurisdiction conferred upon that court, its equity jurisdiction, is entirely concurrent with the circuit court. In every case which can go to the circuit court it is optional with the person bringing the suit to go into the circuit court or into the superior court. It has then jurisdiction in all replevin cases where the value of the article replevied is above $100, and in all magistrates' lien cases be the matter small or great, from $5 up to $50,000; and in all civil cases where the amount involved is above $500.

Let any gentleman, however, urgent his business, apply to that court for an injunction; and what is the result? The judge can say, and since this constitution has been in operation judges have said in most important and pressing cases: "Certainly you have the right to ask me to attend to this business if you choose, instead of going to the other court; and I am bound to attend to it; but I must attend to it when I can. I am in the trial of a case, and I may get through it next week or week after next; and then I will attend to your injunction matter." What is the result? Practically I say that is a denial of justice.

Then again, an attorney has an equity case in the circuit court which he wishes to bury up forever. What course shall he pursue to prevent its coming to trial? Time is the object for which he is fighting. He transfers it to the superior court. There are cases now buried up in that superior court just in that way, by persons desirous of getting them disposed of and transferred to that court for no other reason than to give them a sepulture almost without hope of resurrection before the crack of doom. If you are to try them you have to go through the same form, and the same amount of formality as in the court of appeals; have the record printed, have your brief prepared and printed, and go through the first trial from printed notes and a printed brief, and the delay and expense thereof, provided you can ever get the judge to consent to enter the trial of that cause.

I say, and I submit it to the calm judgment of gentlemen, that the system proposed is infinitely better than this. Where is the difficulty in assigning the entire equity jurisdiction to a single court which has indeed three judges, which will apportion the business, saying to A, yours is the administration of the criminal business of this court; and to B and to C, if you please, yours is the administration of the equity business?

It is inconceivable but they will adopt certain rules and regulations by which suitors coming on pressing business shall not go to B, and failing to get a reply from him, go to C, to dodge between the two courts and get a divided ruling on the subject. I cannot conceive of any judge fit to be upon the bench, that has not system, dignity, and character enough to prevent such a state of things.

Then as to coupling these jurisdictions, I am free to say it was for convenience only. It was the only coupling which did not seem to render more courts necessary. And I will say here that some of the most reputable and highly respectable members of the profession in the city of Baltimore have urged that all should be consolidated into one court. Only yesterday I received a letter from a highly intelligent gentleman who apologized for obtruding his advice, and urged in the most strenuous manner the importance of putting it all into one court with the same power of apportioning and distributing the business. What is the incongruity of coupling together these two jurisdictions? Every circuit judge throughout the State, outside the city of Baltimore, has both these jurisdictions, and in addition to that all the jurisdiction that is given to the other courts, in replevins, liens, and in all civil controversies, and actions for debt or damage, all of them are put into one hand. Here they are put into two distinct courts; and these courts are redivided, so that it is only when counsel is desired, and it