shall be exercised in the mode that they themselves have agreed upon. That was the idea that presented itself to my mind some days ago, when I first read over this bill of rights. I have not put my amendment in the form that the people have not the right to alter or change their form of Government in any other mode, for that right has been exercised so frequently that I do not think it worth while to dispute it. I concede that right; but at the same time I think it should be accompanied by the declaration that all alterations of the Constitution should be made in the mode and manner which the people themselves have previously prescribed.

Mr. Negley. I think that the most conclusive argument against this limitation upon the ' unalienable right'' of the people of Maryland "to alter, reform or abolish their form of Government in such manner as they may deem expedient,'' has been adduced by the gentleman from Somerset, (Mr. Jones.) He has shown that the people of Maryland are so given to revolution, so firmly fixed in their determination to disregard all constitutional restrictions upon this right, that they will call Conventions and make Constitutions in violation of any law, or any provision which may be inserted in the organic and fundamental law of the State. Why, sir, he says that in 1850, in direct violation of the Constitution of 1776, they passed a law calling a Convention; and according to the thread of the gentleman's argument, that call and that Convention were as absolutely and unconditionally revolutionary as was the meeting of Mr. Dorr and his associates in the State of Rnode Island. That Convention had no authority of Constitutional law, and not having that authority, it was unconstitutional and revolutionary.

Mr. Jones, of Somerset. There was this difference between that Convention and the Rhode Island case: that Convention had the previous assent of the Legislative Department of Maryland; a most important difference and distinction.

Mr. Negley. Grant that it had the assent of the Legislative Department of Maryland; but that Legislature had no more right to legislate in that particular way than Mr. Dorr and his associates had a right to get up a revolution in Rhode Island, in their particular way. In point of fact there is absolutely no difference between the two cases, so far as the revolutionary principle is concerned. The one was a revolution entirely without the forms of law, and the other was a revolution, partly in compliance with law, but in the grand, moving, revolutionary element, it was in violation of law.

And according to the argument of the gentleman, the present Convention is in violation of law; in violation of the Constitution of 1851. We are then assembled here as a revolutionary body. And the people, or a majority of them, sanctioned the Constitution framed by that revolutionary Convention, and thereby made it legal. And what was that, but a recognition and assertion of the principle contained in this first article "that they (the people) have at all times the unalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their form of Government in such manner as they may deem expedient,'' whether in conformity with or in opposition to our Constitutional provisions and restrictions.

Now, sir, there are apparently three modes of revolution indicated by the discussion here to-day. There is a revolution in conformity to law, according to which the gentleman from Somerset (Mr. Jones) would have all revolutions take place in Maryland: or rather all reformations in the fundamental law. There is that mode of reformation; a reformation strictly in compliance with the fundamental law of the State. Then there is another form of reformation, or revolution, which was adopted in 1850, and which, according to the argument of the gentleman from Somerset is now again adopted; a revolution in reforming the fundamental law of the State, partly according to law, and partly not. The other was legal revolution; this is a revolution illegal in part. Then there is another form of revolution outside both of them; that is a revolution by force, which nobody doubts the right of the people to exercise. Indeed, I suppose nobody will question now the inalienable right of the people to resort to either of these three forms of revolution. And the facts adduced by the gentleman from Somerset show most conclusively the utter folly and absurdity of limiting this right resident in the people.

I admit, however, that there is not only apparently but substantially a contradiction between this first article and the 44th article of this bill of rights, and I think the 44th article should be made to conform to the first. I do not see how the Convention of 1850, after having passed the first article of the bill of rights, could at the end of that bill of rights have inserted this other article, because it is a direct denial and contradiction of the first article in part. I am opposed to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Somerset. I am opposed to this restriction. The history of the State of Maryland, the history of the country, show that there is no use in such restrictions.

Let us pass this article, acknowledging this inviolable right in the people. Is there are any danger in acknowledging that right? It is not an acknowledgment of the propriety of exercising it at all times and under all circumstances. It does not say to the people of Maryland—you better adopt the revolutionary and forcible right of reforming your government, rather than the legal and peaceable one. It is merely an acknowledgment, in an abstract way, of a fundamental