Hence I say that this article interprets itself
clearly, and it has reference to the degree of
supremacy, to the sphere of supremacy, it
addresses itself to the State law, or to that
portion of the State Constitution which may
be in conflict with this supreme law; it
means nothing more and nothing less. Now
will it not be said that this is a fair interpre-
tation, thus far, of this article? Will any
gentleman controvert the interpretation given
thus far of this article?
Where then is the conflict of opinion? It
arises in two forms; first, we are told by
those who favor the striking out, the word
''paramount," that we are surrendering the
rights of the States. And what other things
are we doing? We are not only surrender-
ing State rights, but we are converting this
Federal Government into a great; concentra-
ted, consolidated government.
According to my theory of interpreta-
tion, this is the very same condition of the
law that has existed ever since the formation
of the Constitution, And if, during the last
eighty odd years, the Government has not
been consolidated, the Government is still a
Federal Government, and has not been con-
centrated—except within the last two or three
years, allow ing gentlemen the privilege even
of that margin—surely it cannot be contended
that there is a greater probability, or a greater
likelihood, of these results flowing from a re-
declaration, or re-enactment, or the re-affirm-
ance of a principle of constitutional law, that
has existed from the formation of the Gov-
ernment?
Mr. BERRY, of Prince George's. I would
like to inquire whether this principle is in-
corporated in any organic law of any State
in this Union? Whether this is not the first
time in the formation of the organic law of
any State, that this principle is attempted to
be incorporated ?
Mr. RIDGELY. I wills answer my friend
with great pleasure. In the same terms and
spirit in which I spoke of the venerable names
of Jefferson and Madison, I would say that
Constitutions of other States are no authority
to me except so far as the reasons for their
various provisions address themselves to the
approval of my judgment. This principle
may or may not have been heretofore intro-
duced into State Constitutions. If it never
has been, it was, I suppose, because it was
thought to be a work of supererogation; that
it was a self-evident truth, arising out of the
very terms of the Constitution of the United
States, And as the crime of parricide in
ancient Rome was considered a crime so un-
natural and improbable that it was not ne-
cessary to pass any law punishing it, so in this
case it was not thought doubtless necessary to
make an enactment for that which was rest-
ing upon every man in the land. I consider,
as I have already said, that it would have
been an act of supererogation. |
And I consider now that the difficulty in
this controversy arises not out of the real
meaning of the words, but because the pecu-
liar words employed in this connection are,
at this particular time and juncture of
affairs, especially significant and rather
unacceptable and ungrateful to certain gen-
tlemen. If the Committee had inserted in
this Bill of Rights, the word "obedience"
instead of "allegiance," had said that ''para-
mount obedience" was due to the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States, we should
never have heard a word of this controversy.
It is not the idea, but the language in which
the idea is clothed, I think, that has the larger
influence in controlling opinions here, and
giving character and direction to this de-
bate. Now allegiance means nothing in the
world but obedience. There is a supreme
law of the land, and all other law is subordi-
nate to it; always admitting that this su-
preme law is within the sphere of the Consti-
tution. You have the supreme law when ad-
mitted to be constitutional law: and all other
law in this country, in conflict with it, in de-
rogation of it, is subordinate to it, and must
yield to it. That is the whole theory of this
article. Now, I would ask, does not the su-
preme law naturally draw with it supreme
obedience?
Taking the terms "obedience" and "alle-
giance" to be correlative terms, as meaning
one and the same thing, can you have a law
which is supreme, unless that law naturally
draws with it, and compels, and enforces su-
preme obedience? It would be an absurdity
to talk about a supreme law, unless there
was supreme obedience necessarily and insep-
arably attached to it. That I hold to be the
whole meaning of this article.
And I go further. I see nothing in it to
which the most conscientious State rights
man could object as long as he remains be-
neath our flag, and under the protecting arm
of this Government, secure in the enjoyment
of his life, liberty and property. I see nothing
in this article which would justify the most
stringent State rights man in withholding
his highest obedience to the supreme law of
the land. I know there is a theory, based
upon the old doctrine of State sovereignty,
that the highest obedience is due to the State.
And I believe upon that theory certain States'
lights men have declined to take an oath to
support the Constitution of the United States.
I am glad to find, however, that none of the
honorable members with whom I have the
honor to be associated here, have given that
construction lo their sense of public duty
but have cheerfully and promptly come up to
that requisition, and indorsed themselves in
this respect as giving obedience and allegi-
ance to the Constitution and laws of the Uni-
ted States.
Mr. BERRY, of Prince George's. Will my
friend allow me to correct him. I did not |
