so far as they had the power and could with any propriety go, he was willing to go. But, it appeared to him that the clause proposed to be instreet, was not a constitutional clause, and the Convention had not the authority, or any ground

of propriety, to insert it.

It had generally been supposed that the powers of this Convention were unlimited, but he thought that this clause engrafted on the Constitution would show that this Convention had transcended their powers. Now, it proposed either to prescribe a qualification for a vote in a Congressionad district; or it applied to the regulation of "the times, places, and manner of holding elections." One or the other. In either event, it would not be a violation of the Constitution of the United States. The first clause to which he would refer and ask the attention of the honorable chairman to, was that in relation to the House of Representatives.

"The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States; and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of

the State Legislature."

The other clause of the Constitution of the United States was:

"The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may, at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to

the place of choosing Senators."

Now, the first point to which he wished to call the attention of the Convention to, was this: if it was a regulation applicable to "the times, places, and manner of holding elections," it could only, in his opinion, be inserted by the Legislature, and not by this Convention. The Legislatures of the several States had the power to make those regulations, and the Legislatures alone. And, give him leave to say, that this was one of the most cardinal and important features in the Constitution of the United States, regulating the relations between the General and State Governments, and it was of infinite importance that that power should be preserved in its appropriate orbits, and that a State Convention should not be allowed to usurp powers which were necessary to exist as between the General and State Governments. This was a special power given to the several States, and being exercised by the Legislature, could not be exercised by any other authority. And, therefore, if it was a regulation in relation to "the times, places and manner of holding elections," it was a subject for the Legislature and not for a State Convention.

Ben, he supposed it to be prescribing a qualification: Now, let us regard it in that view. It was a qualification, and it therefore directed that a vote for a member of Congress should have the qualification of residing in the district from which the member was to be elected. Now, what power, he would ask, had this Convention

curred with the general objects of this bill, and tof Congress? Why, it had no direct power at all; it could not declare what should be the qualification of an elector of a member of Congress. The Convention had prescribed the qualification of an elector of a member of the House of Delegates, and having thus qualified him to vote for a member of the House of Delegates, they, at the same time qualified him to vote for a member of Congress. This was a right that could not be taken from him. The Constitution of the United States had declared that every man could vote for a member of Congress who could vote for a delegate. Had the Convention prescribed any such qualification of electors of members of Congress? None. Had not the Convention determined not to district the State? Undoubtedly it had. There rore, we had no such qualification of an elector of a member of the House of Delegates; and, consequently, if we had thus fixed the regulation in that respect, we had, also, in regard to members of Congress. He had merely suggested this objection.

> He hald the clause to be wholly unconstitutional. It could not be sustained. It would not be valid, if engrafted. It would be pronounced to be unconstitutional if brought before a judicial tribunal. But, he would not detain the Convention in adverting to the great political considerations that grew out of this subject, in regard to the relations between the State and General Governments. If there ever was a time when their powers should be kept within their several orbits, it was the present time. Look at the disposition now evinced by South Carolina to rise up against the Union of the States. She, or any other State might, to-morrow, call a Convention, and take into her own hands a power fatal to the Union; therefore, he hoped this Convention would steer clear of making any encroachment upon the powers of the Federal Government.

> Mr. Smith said, he hoped the proposition to strike out would not prevail. He could not see why immunities and privileges should be given to the citizens of Baltimore, and not the citizens of the other counties of the State. The whole question had already been fully and fairly discussed and decided by the Convention. He called upon the delegates from the counties to look into their rights—to examine the propriety of giving the citizens of Baltimore the privilege of passing from one Congressional District to another, while we could not go from one county to another without losing the privilege of voting. As he had just said, this question had been fully discussed before, and all the amendments and propositions connected with it had been voted down by a decided vote of this body. He repeated his hope that the motion to strike out would not prevail.

Mr. CHAMBERS made some remarks, which

will be given hereafter.

Mr. Howard would not attempt to add one word to the argument of the gentleman from Cecil, (Mr. McLANE,) because to his mind, it was conclusive. But, he wished to call the over the qualification of an elector of a member attention of the gentleman from Kent, (Mr.