

to Baltimore but two delegates, of whom he had the honor to be one.

Since that time, he had never asked that people for any honor or trust that was not granted him, except in one instance, when only a portion of the population could vote. He had a right, therefore, to speak as a friend of the city. He did not intend to lecture the gentleman, he repeated, and in the course of his remarks, he thought he could make it evident, that if the people of Baltimore desired to have a Constitution—one which would be acceptable to them—the chance of obtaining it was effectually destroyed by the course pursued by the gentleman from Baltimore. He intended, in the course of his remarks, to show his reason for this opinion, and then, if the gentleman could combat it, why he might do so. These remarks applied to the course which the gentleman had pursued.

When Patrick Henry said, in 1774, in the House of Delegates of Virginia, "Cæsar had his Brutus, Charles the First his Cromwell, and George the Third may profit by their example," he meant what he said. When the gentleman from Baltimore threatened the small counties, and mentioned the acts which brought Charles the First to the scaffold—when he compared the small counties to Charles the First, he held out the threat to these counties in the State, that Baltimore would rise in its strength and bring them to the scaffold. Why, this was but a figure of speech, for it could not be supposed for one moment, that a high officer to whom was entrusted the conservation of the public tranquility would be the first to recommend revolution and bloodshed.

Mr. BRENT thought the gentleman must have a disposition to misconstrue his remarks. If his remarks, which he considered perfectly consistent with peace and order, were construed into any disposition for sanguinary revolution on his part, he declared solemnly, upon his responsibility as a member, that he never alluded to any thing but a peaceable, legal mode, and he would show what he meant by this when the gentleman should conclude.

Mr. HOWARD said, that he had supposed it to be a figure of speech merely, and had considered it as such. He [Mr. H.] had had something to do with the convulsions to which the gentleman had alluded, and which ended in the Constitution of 1836. He did not regret this, because he found now that those gentlemen of the Convention who were eminently conservative relied upon that Constitution.

He thought, therefore, that all those who had any thing to do with the origin of that Constitution, had nothing to reproach themselves with, because no one in the Convention who opposed that movement, appeared to find fault with the basis then fixed. He had something to do with that civil revolution. He looked back to the times when his own mind was filled with anxiety during the progress of it, and he thought it was not a thing to be lightly spoken of. He did not know how the city of Baltimore was to rise in her might and compel the small counties to come

into measures, unless it should be by the force of reason. He was incapable of comprehending it, unless there should be some period in the history of the State when this power could be interposed, to check the wheels of government, as in 1836. But during the few months of that history, he would venture to say that there was no man in the State now of reflecting mind who did participate in the affair, who would not confess that his thoughts and soul were filled with anxiety upon the events then passing before him; and now it should be seriously thought of before it was undertaken. The experience of those men who had anything to do with such a crisis, would make them particularly cautious how they undertook a second revolution of that character.

The proposition of the gentleman from Washington, (Mr. Fiery,) was stated by the gentleman to be a mere "crumb." He had stated this on two separate occasions. If that gentleman, a quarter of a century ago, had tried as hard as he did to gain two delegates added to the two Baltimore already possessed, and had failed—for he failed—he would not have considered this acquisition as a "crumb." They gained four at least, and then the city was placed upon a footing with the large counties. Now, it was proposed to give them ten, which is double the present delegation. Was not the principle of population recognized in this bill? For what reason was Baltimore city to go beyond the larger counties, except for population? None, on the face of the earth. Even the gentleman from Anne Arundel was willing to give her an excess over the counties because she contained more population. Did not this recognize the principle that an increase of population demanded an increase of representation? What was the doctrine of representation according to population? That doctrine was one thing, and the ratio of representation was another thing. They were perfectly distinct in their character. Ratio in its nature was arbitrary, depending upon the will of the majority. Why take five thousand rather than ten thousand?—Because of the abstract propriety of the case only, and because it would shut out some smaller counties entitled to representation. There was no principle in the amount upon which the ratio depended. It was a mere arbitrary rule. Suppose the ratio should be made twelve thousand. They would have as much right to make it that number as any other, and it would be intrinsically as just, except it would shut out the smaller counties. What would become of the counties if they should make the ratio 20,000? Why, half the State would be unrepresented. The adoption of a ratio was therefore an arbitrary rule, depending upon no fixed principle.—"Crumb" as this proportion was said to be by the gentleman, [Mr. Brent] it conceded to the city a vast increase in representation. In regard to the ratio that might be adopted, it was very clear that it was entirely arbitrary. But he was not in favor of adopting a ratio that would shut out the small counties, and never would be.

The principle of representation had been laid