three trials in the county court. It was attended to, and that faithfully, by the counsel.

Now, that was the way in which business was delayed in the Baltimore county court by the accumulation of cases. And yet gentlemen get up here and say we ought not to have three judges. He would say, looking at the court of chancery, and to the number of cases that passed through it, if this Convention abolished it, one judge could not do more than attend to the chancery business. And the common law and appeal cases on our docket would require, alone, two judges to attend to the business. It was, also, a remarkable fact, a lamentable fact, known to the profession, that, owing to the amount of business in court, a number of suitors would not go into it, but preferred to settle their cases even at a heavy discount. He believed that a large number of cases were settled by arbitration to avoid the delays of court. If the business of the court could be dispatched speedily, and at small cost, the people would be satisfied.

Mr. BLAKISTONE said that when he was last on the floor he did not get through all he had to say. He did not wish it to be understood that he was against having a sufficient number of judges. He was for giving Baltimore as many as was necessary, but not too many. If they gave Baltimore city five separate judges, then it would be necessary that there should be five separate clerks. Well, that would be an additional tax. But he entertained a strong reason why he would not go for giving her a chancery court, and that was, because if we did not do it, it was as certain as possible that the old court of chancery would be re-established. Well, he did not know that, to his own feelings, any thing more agreeable could happen. If the Convention abolished the chancery court, they would deprive not only the people of Baltimore of it, but all the other portions of the State. Now, he wished to show that the district composed of the counties of Frederick, Washington and Allegany required quite as much time to transact their business as the city court of Baltimore. The number of days the court was in session in this district, according to the gentleman's (Mr. Gwinn's) record, was 294. The number of days Baltimore city court was in session was 240, being a difference of 54 days for the district composed of Frederick, Washington and Allegany. Now, he proposed, as a matter of justice, if they gave Baltimore city six courts, that they should also do something for Western Maryland, whose citizens were equally entitled, with those of Baltimore city, to consideration. They were all equally as good reformers; and yet some gentlemen said, by their acts at least, that there ought to be a discrimination against them. They say, "You shall have as few judges in Eastern Maryland, and in Southern Maryland, as we can help, but you may pile them upon us in Baltimore city. Now, if it took 294 days to transact the business in the district of Frederick, Washington and Allegany, and took Baltimore city 240 days, then they could claim at least an equal number of judges. He had already said he did not wish to be understood as refusing to give Baltimore that number of judges which was necessary to enable them to transact all the business of the city; and the Constitution should be so arranged as to give each portion of the State judges sufficient to do the business entrusted to them, with as little delay as could be imagined. But we must be just before we were generous. If, then, gentlemen would meet him on an equal platform, and say they would give his (Mr. B's) constituents a judge, he would meet them. But he must protest against an undue proportion of the judges being given to one locality, to the exclusion of all the rest of the State. Why was it, he would ask, that one judge could dispose of 732 cases, and it took five to dispose of 1336? and especially where the population was in a small compass, and where the judge could do more than twice as much business than if he traveled. He hoped that, before this subject was finally disposed of, some gentleman would move to reconsider the vote on the amendment, and also to re-establish the old chancery court.

Mr. MORGAN thought the question had been debated enough. He merely wanted to explain, because there had been some misunderstanding as to his own views on the subject. He had urged on yesterday the appointment of two common law judges for Baltimore city, the appointment of a criminal judge and a judge of the orphans' court, and also a police court for Baltimore, if she thought proper to have it. That was distinctly what he had urged on yesterday. Now there seemed to be some difference of opinion as to how the courts should be constituted, whether with separate equity jurisdiction or by uniting it with the common courts. His friend (Mr. Brent) had offered an amendment in which he proposed that there should be but one court, composed of a number of judges of detailed duties. Now, he (Mr. Morgan) had no objection to combining the jurisdiction of the judges together and distributing the duties among them, if the gentleman from Baltimore desired to have a combination of those judges—that they were not to be separated in their jurisdiction—that one of the judges should be detailed to attend to equity business and another to the common law business. He had no objection at all to this arrangement. He desired not to be understood as throwing any impediment in the way of giving to Baltimore a certain number of judges; but his objection was, as to the number claimed, it being larger than he could assent to. With respect to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Baltimore city, (Mr. Brent,) he would say that he had applied to one of the most distinguished members of the bar, and he had obtained his views on the subject. He observed that if the chancery court was retained there, there would be no necessity for another judge for Baltimore. But he added that, if that court was abolished, there might be a necessity for three judges. In consequence of that, he had drawn up the proposition which he held in his hand, and if the motion to reconsider did prevail in the Convention he would move it as a substitute for the one separating the common