

the party agitations of the day. He did not mean to say this was the motive. It was so stated at the time. It did not turn out as was expected. After a while General Eaton resigned, or was displaced to make way for a gentleman of different politics. 'Tis was the commencement of a new dynasty. It had been said that it was not quite right here to speak of motives; but he would refer to facts. It happened in a few years that when the State changed hands, and a new party came into power, in 1839—another President was elected. In 1841 another change was made—and it happens that the President in all these changes was of the same politics with the dominant party in the State. In all this, there may have been no political motive. But he spoke of the facts. This unfortunate company for years had been a prize, and subject of contention between the great parties. The salary was at times \$3,000 to \$6,000 per annum, a sum worth fighting for, and the Presidency had been always given to men high in political power. Perhaps on account of their merit—made probably as a reward for services rendered. In 1841 the management of the company, with all its debts, embarrassments, and burdens came into the hands of Whig appointees. They have finished the work, and now that the office may become valuable again, it is to be brought into this overwhelming strife of party warfare. Gentlemen say this is not the object. Mr. Tuck knew nothing of motives. He looked at the effect. The salary is now \$2,000. Let its affairs go before the people in discussions about the presidency, and then we shall have parties divided as to its affairs, management, &c. It must become a prominent element in political discussions. It has been the case, and will be so again. We are to have four agents. These are to be nominated by parties. This is the admission. There are to be two of each party, and the Treasurer is to be umpire. Here is party at once. Well, a man wishes to become president, he has only to arrange with his friends in the State, as is commonly done to nominate candidates for the agency, who will support him for the presidency. It will soon be known who is the favorite of these commissioners. Just as surely as we know who Electors of President will vote for—just as we know who delegates to a convention will support as the candidate for Governor. If I am asked for a motive, I point to the salary—\$2,000 or more, and even if the salary were not so high, there are many men who will wish to have the place. 'Tis enough that it is an office. This will be the effect of the measure.

He would vote against all such propositions for reasons heretofore assigned by the gentleman from Carroll. [Mr. Brown,] on another occasion. He, Mr. T., had not Mr. B's aid on this question. Let those things be left to the legislature. This Constitution had now full weight enough—more probably than it could carry through the race it was to run on the political course on the first Monday in June. Give the legislature power over the subject. The object here is to restrict the legislature by giving the

power to the people. May we not do more harm than good?—The history of corporations in Maryland shows that you cannot restrain them against their will. It is only when they knock at the legislature for something for themselves that the State can obtain what she wants or may desire, and that is by attaching it to the grant as a condition—a *quid pro quo*. The time may be when these companies will come to the legislature again, and if you deny to that body all power to act, how can the State exercise any control over them? We have the control of the Canal company now; in one sense we vote a majority of the stock. We can elect the officers; but this gives us no control over the charter. We have no control over the rail road companies. We have ten out of thirty directors in the Baltimore and Ohio Rail Road company, and so with some of the others. He was willing to leave all this to the two branches of the legislature. Our financial policy is dependant in a great degree on the management of these works, and it is better to leave their control to that hand of the government, which must supply the ways and means to carry on the State. It may become very important for the legislature to have control over the mode of appointing these agents or commissioners, but if it be placed in this instrument they cannot have the power until another Convention. He believed the people cared little about it. They had trouble enough already. It is said they are deeply interested. How? In the canal? When will that work give any relief against the taxes we pay? How will these elections lessen the evils we bear? They would increase them by promoting agitation and troublesome questions of no benefit to any one but those who may want places. These commissioners do not levy the taxes—they will have nothing to do with them except to receive in the salaries out of the taxes which you will call on the people to pay if these offices be created. So far as the people are interested, Mr. Tuck believed, that in his section of the State there would be a general disposition to let any other section have the election of the agents, if it would pay the taxes now assessed upon us for these works. The multiplication of offices is a slow way of diminishing expenses of government, or of relieving the people from taxation. Mr. Tuck would vote against the measure in all its forms.

Mr. HARBINE said:

He had heard nothing to induce him to change his views upon the subject under consideration. He had understood the gentleman from Prince George's, (Mr. Tuck,) to say, that it was a political matter which the Convention ought not to be troubled with.

Now, if matters of the gravest importance like this, were to be left to the legislature, why call a Convention at all? Certainly, things not half so important had and would find a place in the Constitution. If this be an exception, he would like to know in what particular.

He thought the immense interests of the State