prefer that of the committee to the one offered by the gentleman from Baltimore city, [Mr. Brent.] One distinction he had yesterday urged, he had since discovered, did not exist to the extent he had supposed. From the examination he had then given the proposition, he thought it went further, than after further perusal this morning, he found it did in fact. He thought it merely fixed the per diem allowance to be paid the members of the Convention. He now perceived that a fund should be set apart to be expended by the Governor. He [Mr. T.,] would say, that that would have the effect to lessen his objection to it.

He would observe in reference to the gentletleman, (Mr. Brent's.) substitute, that no mortal man could tell who would be chief magistrate, or secretary of the State of Maryland in

1860.

No man could see under what influence he was to be elected, and we knew that no man was going into the Gubernatorial chair solely upon his approbation or opposition to the call of a Convention. And we all knew, also, that his election was to be either expedited, or retarded by reason of his peculiar opinion on national politics. It was always a mixed question, and by a combination of political and other circumstances a man might be put into the Gubernatorial chair without reference to his opinions on the subject of State policy, and not on account of any peculiar merits of his own.

Now he, [Mr. T.,] would not be willing to place such great power in the hands of an individual, for, as he had said yesterday, the Governor was nothing but a mere man—an individual exercising for the time being certain functions in behalf of his fellow-citizens. He should say that they ought to fix a day when the sense of the people should be taken upon the question

of calling a Convention.

It was very important to fix a day for that purpose. It was a secondary question whether they would prefer to confer upon the Governor all the powers necessary for that purpose, or upon the legislative bodies—the House of Delegates and Senate. He, [Vr. T..] would prefer

the House of Delegates and Senate.

Mr. T. after adverting to the impropriety of

Mr. T. after adverting to the impropriety of these constant agitations of Constitutional reform that were likely to occur, and deprecating them said, let it be a fixed fact in the Constitution, that the sense of the people shall be taken periodically every ten years, then all these agitations

will be quieted.

Mr. Chambers suid, this was a subject of the deepest interest, and required very deliberate consideration. It affects the organic law not only as it may be adopted now, but it must materially effect that law as it may be adopted in all future time. He was happy to believe, from indications in debate, that there would be less diversity of opinion on this, than on some other important questions; at least less conformity to political lines of division. The subject had been one certainly fruitful of excitement elsewhere, much of

any thing as party capital, which would produce discontent with the condition of the government, in respect to matters that did not justify it. He had, therefore, taken his seat in this body under a thorough conviction, that in the new Constitution, provision must be made for calling a Convention by the people whenever they should desire it; and every thing he had seen and heard here, had deepened that conviction. Two considerations seemed prominently to present themselves-the first was to assure to the people the right to call a Convention whenever they deliberately resolved to have one, and the second was to repress, as far as practicable, all agitation from collision of opinions on the subject. These elements should enter into any scheme we adopt. He had no such fixed opinion in favor of any particular scheme, as to make him very tenacious in regard to it. He did believe that the most effectual way to secure the greatest latitude of decision, and to subdue all cause for agitation, was to allow the people, at every election, annual or biennial, as they may be, at every general election, to express their wishes upon the subject. He did not mean to say it was a provision which would be most likely to produce either an early Convention, or frequent Conventions. He thought eifferently-it was his opinion that in this, as in most other instances, the difficulty of accomplishing the object was a great incentive to ceaseless effort to effect it. The great cause and clamor was caused, as he believed, not by the defects of the existing Constitution, but by the fact that no provision was made for giving the people the opportunity of reviewing it. There was a great deal in "fashion" in this as in matters of minor importance. Conventions to amend the Constitution had been held, every where almost, in the different States of the Union-they were the fashion of the day, he might say the passion of the day-and the people were told, very truly told, they had as much control over the government in Maryland, as the people in New York, Virginia and elsewhere, had over theirs. The Constitution, contemplating, as he believed it did, an entirely different mode of altering its provisions, as a change of our condition might require, and assuming as its framers did, that the alterations would be in few particulars at a time, had made no provision, nor had it given, in his view, any authority for a Convention. Hence arose not only a desire to have a Convention with many persons, but hence also the occasion for objection and resistance, and consequently of collision, agitation and excitement. Believing these to be the causes of agitation and excitement, he thought the best remedy to prevent their recurrence, was to afford every possible facility to hold them as often as the people chose to call them. Our theory is, that the Government belongs to the people, they have the sole right to control it, and he was for indulging them in the largest lisence. To withhold the privilege for ten years, even, is a partial prohibition. Every defected or disappointed politician, would be preparing for a vigorous effort