

WEEMS, as a modification of his own proposition.

The question then recurred on the amendment heretofore of Mr. McHENRY, to strike out the word "two-thirds;" and insert in lieu thereof "a majority."

Mr. CHAMBERS, of Kent, desired to request the gentleman from Harford, (Mr. McHENRY,) to furnish a reason for the change he proposed. The objection to a majority was perfectly obvious, and as he, (Mr. C.,) supposed, was understood by every body. In a period of political excitement, a majority, from political considerations it was supposed, might be induced to effect a change in the case of an officer whose politics were offensive. This consideration, he believed, had always induced the necessity of a vote of two-thirds. The gentleman was aware that, in judicial proceedings generally, unanimity was required before a man could be convicted of a crime. Twelve men must all unite before there could be a conviction. He had not known an instance in which less than two-thirds was required to adopt such a proposition. He would be glad to learn what reasons the gentleman had to assign for the alternation he proposed.

Mr. McHENRY said he would, in two or three words, repeat what he had said before. His impression was, that instead of party feeling operating as a general rule against incumbents of office, its tendencies were in their favor. The sympathies of impartial men were always with the unfortunate, and an office-holder threatened with disgrace was so considered. Party feeling was much more easily enlisted in his behalf in all legislative bodies than in behalf of the general interests of the community, so far as his limited observation had extended. The public was not brought so palpably into view; its exposure to wrong by the continuance of an inefficient or faithless officer was not presented so prominently as to operate on the motives which usually governed men equally with the loss likely to be inflicted on an individual, whom all could identify and most were personally acquainted with. He would rather that an officer should suffer than the public. He did not know that if he were to take half an hour to make his meaning more plain than it was already, he would have enlightened the Convention.

Mr. RANDALL said he would call the attention of gentlemen to one fact, which it seemed to him ought to have an important bearing upon the action of this Convention on this subject—the impeachment of the judges. He alluded to the provision made for the election of judges by the people as reported from the judiciary committee. If the judges are to be elected by the people, then, as in all the States in the Union where they are so elected, they will be selected as other persons are, by one or the other of the political parties—they will be nominated, as others were, by a political party; and elected by a political party. They, by this report too, are to be elected for a term of years, and to be re-eligible. Thus, they would scarcely have served out their term and relieved themselves from their

party prejudices and influences before they will again be propitiating party with a view to their re-nomination and re election. Hence, these judges will always be, or believed by many to be, improperly operated upon and influenced in the performance of their judicial duties, and hence, there would be a foundation, real or imaginary, constantly laid for impeachments which did not exist in the present mode of appointment. These judges thus nominated and supported by a political party, would canvass the State with their political friends and opponents, who were candidates for seats in the Legislature.

Thus party judges, senators, and delegates would all be brought into direct collision. Prejudices would be engendered and oppositions formed against these judges, senators, and delegates in this their first associations. Now, he would ask, if it was not human nature that these prejudices and oppositions should continue and be aggravated by the party conflicts and collisions which would take place after the election of judges, senators and delegates of opposite political parties, in the discharge of their respective duties.

Is this the time, then, he would ask, when by a different mode of placing our judges in office, we are creating bias and prejudice against them in the minds of those who are to impeach and try them—is this the time to increase the facilities of their condemnation—to diminish the securities and protection which the existing and the old constitutions both throw around them? Must not this change of reducing the number necessary to convict from two-thirds to one half of the Legislature, necessarily and essentially impair still more the independence of the judiciary.

If you elect the judiciary for a term of years, you diminish that independence materially. If you allow them to be re-elected you increase their dependence.

If they are to be impeached, tried and convicted, by a majority of the Legislature who might be opposed to them in politics, under improper influences and prejudices, he felt alarmed for the independence of the judiciary. He threw out those sentiments rather as hints for reflection than as argument. He thought the change of electing judges if we made it, would be sufficiently radical, and he would remark to his friend, (Mr. McHENRY,) if those suggestions were worthy of consideration, there should be a postponement of this question for the present at least, until the Convention decided on the mode of appointing the judges.

The question then recurred and was taken upon the amendment offered by Mr. McHENRY, also on Journal of February 24th, to strike out the words "two-thirds," and insert in lieu thereof "a majority," in the following section [19] offered by Mr. SPRIGG:

"The House of Delegates shall have the sole power of impeachment in all cases, but a majority of all the members, must concur in an impeachment; all impeachments shall be tried by the Senate, and when sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation, to do justice according to the law and evidence, but no person