not affected by the subsequent general Acts of the Legislature intended to cure deeds defectively executed. Whether the act of the Legislature involved in that case was nugatory and void, as an unauthorized usurpation of power denied to the Legislature upon principles of common right or Constitutional restriction was a question which the Court expressly said they were relieved from considering. "The title of the Property" said the Court by reason of the defective acknowledgment remaining on the Petitioners it was unquestionably competent for the Legislature at their request to settle it in the mode prescribed by the Act of assembly" There was nothing decided in that case that in any manner conflicts with what we decide in this.

The case of Dampier vs. Nelson 9 Gill 299, is also relied on by the appellees, but we can perceive nothing in that case that supports the position assumed by the Appellees Counsel. That was the case in which it was decided that a Respondent had no such vested or Constitutional right in a defence of usury to an otherwise honest and proper debt whereby he was enabled to insist upon the forfeiture of the entire debt as should be guarded and saved from the operation of a repealing Act of the Legislature. The Court said there was no vested right in the proper sense of the term, directed by the act of the Legislature when under review that the Act was no more than the proper exercise of the Legislative authority over the subject of remedies, a power which can be exercised as well in relation to past as to future contracts. That when vested rights are spoken of by the Court as being guarded against legislative interference, they mean those rights to a party may adhere and upon which he may insist without violating principles of sound morality.

The case of Harrison vs Harrison 22 Md 468, also relied on decides nothing that properly applies to this case. The Marriage that was celebrated in the District of Columbia between the Uncle and his Niece was held not to be ipso facto void but only voidable upon judgment or decree pronounced in the life time of the parties, in a direct proceeding taken for the purpose, and the Marriage Act of 1777, Chapter 12, imposing the disability being general in its character, it was further held to be competent to the Legislature by the subsequent of 1860 chapter 271, to relieve from the disability and to make such Marriage valid. This can in no manner aid the Appellees in this case.

There were cases from other States referred to, which most relied on being cases decided by the Superior Courts of Pennsylvania and Ohio. In those two States Legislation of the character here involved appears to have been maintained to the greatest extent. In the first of these States the principle upon which such retroactive laws are supported, as stated in one of the earlier decisions upon the subject (Underwood vs Lilly 10 S & R 101) and also in one of the latest (Spruch vs, Porter 61 Penn St 327) is that they shall impair no contract nor disturb any vested right but only vary remedies, cure defects in proceedings otherwise your, which do not vary Executory obligations contrary to their situation when entered into and when prosecuted. In Ohio, according to the latest decision (Chesnut vs Shaw 16 Ohio 599,) such Legislation can be maintained only where it operates upon that class of Deeds where enough had been done to show that a Court of Chancery ought in each case to pass a Decree for a Conveyance, that when the title in Equity is such that a Court of Chancery ought to interfere and Decree a good Title, it is within the Power of the Legislature to confirm the Deed, without subjecting the Parties to the expense of litigation. It is manifest that the Decisions in neither of these States can be invoked as authorities for the Appellees as against the Appellants.

The conclusion is from what has been said, that we are of opinion that the Deed before us is not affected or rendered operative by virtue of the