

File No. 5390 Continued.

OPINION.

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These two sections seem to me to fall within the second division of the title of the Act, namely, "to prevent the doing of such work by persons other than those licensed."

I think the meaning of those two sections is plain, and that they clearly prohibit any person whatever from doing the kind of work mentioned in Section 5, except in two specific instances: (1), where the work is done under the supervision of a licensed master electrician, and (2), in the case of minor electric repairs.

Section 17 contains a further exception from the terms of the Act in favor of journeymen and of apprentices, and in favor, also, of certain public service corporations doing work at their own plants.

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Since, in my opinion, Sections 12 and 13 clearly prohibit every one from doing the kind of work mentioned in Section 5, unless the case falls within the two exceptions named in Sections 12 and 13, or within the exceptions mentioned in Section 17, it follows that a person not embraced within these specific exceptions cannot do the kind of work mentioned in Section 5, unless he obtains a license and gives bond. This application of law to every one not embraced within the specific exceptions may be unreasonable, or unwise, or unfortunate. It may be that there ought to have been other exceptions named by the Legislature. This, however, was a matter for the Legislature to determine, and since, in my opinion, the Act is clear, it must be enforced according to its plain terms.

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In *State vs. Tag*, 100 Md., 588, the Barber Act provided that no person should hereafter practice the occupation of barber without obtaining a license, and that every person now engaged in such business should file an affidavit, &c. A subsequent section of the law provided that the Act should not apply to or affect any person now occupied as a barber. The court said that the Act clearly exempted all existing barbers from its provisions, and "while such a result is to be perhaps deplored, yet it is not within our power to mould the statute into what we may think it ought to be, but it is our plain duty to discover the intention of the Legislature from the language used, and to give that language its most natural and obvious import and construction."

Referring to the case of *Maxwell vs. State*, 40 Md., 273, the court, in the *Tag* case, said:

"It (the Act of 1874) provided for a general assessment of property for taxation, but unfortunately by its first section it was declared that all property shall be exempt. Everybody knew that the Legislature intended to say just the reverse, namely, that all property, with