Again, what does this bill propose? In the execution of the laws of the State, and the conflicts arising out of them, and in the innumerable instances that required professional advice, it deprived the Governor of the counsel of an Attorney General, and made twenty or thirty deputies elected in the counties at a distance from the seat of government, certainly not eminently qualified to give advice, many of them neither personally or professionally known to him, his advisers and consultors. He asked the Convention, could the Governor have confidence in such consultations, and would the important interests of the State be as wisely and sedulousiy guarded as under a different system? For his part he could see no good that could result from such a system, except it be to create employment for the benefit of attorneys, without any compensation fixed or limited by law.

Instead of placing the duties of the office of Attorney General in the hands of twenty or more deputies, place them in the hands of one man responsible to the Governor, convenient to him for consultation at all times, and selected from amongst the eminent minds of the State for his knowledge of the law and his capacity to discharge business. This officer should be the adviser of the Governor—his duties should be prescribed by law, and his salary should be fixed and he should be prohibited from receiving any extra fee or allowance for his attention to State business, other than that allowed by law. He would also make it his duty to attend to all cases arising out of the State, in which the interest of the State might be concerned. These cases were continually arising, and would continue to arise, and if gentlemen would take the trouble to look at the treasurer's report, transmitted under an order of this Convention, they would see the enormous expense incurred under the present system in the prosecution of this class of cases; in one or two instances, the amount paid to attorneys, running up to some five or six thousand dollars in each case. This was the result, the inevitable result of your system, and would never receive his sanction or approval.

The amendment of the gentleman from Cecil, (Mr. McLane,) proposed that the attorney employed by the State was to apply to the Legislature for compensation. His friend from Baltimore, (Mr. Gwinn,) had sufficiently answered that argument, though he conceived him rather inconsistent. Yesterday he understood the gentleman to object to the counsel applying to the Legislature, because he did not think that body could estimate properly the value of the services performed, but to-day he has said that he was in favor of allowing the Legislature to fix the compensation.

Mr. Gwinn explained and said, that the arguments which he had used, were not capable of this contradictory interpretation.

Mr. Morgan resumed. He understood his friend now to draw a distinction between what might be considered just claims, and improper claims, and that as to the latter class, attorneys employed to prosecute them by the State, could not from the prejudice attending upon them, receive a just compensation from the Legislature. This was conceding the whole argument, for a claim that might be considered a proper one before investigation might afterwards turn out to be a very unjust one, to be allowed or to be prosecuted—but the correctness, or incorrectness of the claim did not lessen the labor of the counsel employed to investigate it—and those which might be decided to be wrong, would possibly require labor, thought, learning and application in proportion to the contingency of success or defeat. He therefore concurred with the gentleman, that the Legislature could not know what amount of time, labor, application and diligence, which counsel brought to the investigation of such cases, and that they were not the proper agents to form an opinion of the value of the services rendered. In illustration of this argument, his friend on yesterday referred to the McCullough case, and although it was well known that both himself and the gentleman had opposed that claim in the Legislature, yet he understood him to say, that he would have voted for the compensation that was claimed by the distinguished counsel who investigated it.

Mr. McCullough interposing, objected to this claim being brought before the Convention. There must, he said, be one of two objects in bringing this question up—either to retard the progress of the Convention, or to forestall public opinion upon the claim.

Mr. Morgan said:

That he had no design to force the claim upon public opinion. The peculiar relation of the gentleman from Cecil to the claimants had not occurred to him. He certainly had none but the kindest feelings towards either that gentleman or the claimants. He had no agency in bringing it up in this debate, but now that it had been brought in and used by way of argument, he meant no disrespect when he said, that he knew perfectly well when he was in order, and that he meant and intended to use it as a fact for what it was worth in this debate.

Mr. McCullough said, that in his observations, he had no reference to the gentleman.

Mr. Morgan said:

His object was not to argue the merits of the claim—with that we had nothing to do. But his friend from Baltimore had said, that the legislature was not the proper agent to pay attorneys, because they refused compensation in some cases where compensation should be given. He cited this claim as a fact, to prove his argument. He agreed with the gentleman in his conclusions, and no stronger fact could have been brought forward to sustain his views than this very case.

What was that case? Mr. McCullough was a contractor for a la ge portion of the Annapolis and Elk Ridge rail road, he claimed from the State some fifty or sixty thousand dollars, for services rendered outside of his contract. The legislature recognized the equity of some part of the claim by passing an act under which a board of commissioners composed of three distinguished