Such is considered to be the law in this state. The plaintiff in ejectment may bring an action of trespass for the mesne profits, pending a writ of error. Run. Eject. 423. Donford vs. Ellys, 12 Mod. 138.

1810. Johnston Cope

BUCHANAN, J. delivered the opinion of the court. The court agree with the court below in the opinion contained in the bill of exceptions on which this case is brought up.

The question is, whether, in an action of trespass brought in the name of the lessor of the plaintiff against the tenant in possession, for mesne profits, from the time of the demise, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove an entry or actual possession in him after the recovery in ejectment?

On that question the court have no doubt.

The tenant in possession is estopped by his confession of lease, entry and ouster, and cannot controvert either the title or possession of the plaintiff; and it is sufficient for the plaintiff to produce the judgment alone, without showing the writ of execution executed, or possession acquired in any other manner.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

## JOHNSTON VS. COPE et al.

APPEAL from Baltimore County Court. Assumpsit by In assumpsit on the appellant against the appellees, on an agreement for ment to recover the price paid for the sale of six bales of linens called Flanders sheetings, to red to be unsound, be furnished and supplied by the latter to the former, of by the defendants good and merchantable linens, at and for a large sum of Held, that the bare money, and for which payment had been made. The descriptions of the description of the de claration stated, that although six bales were afterwards price, does not of delivered, yet they were not good, sound, merchantable ranty; and that the linens, but on the contrary bad and unmerchantable, &c sponsible for their The general issue was pleaded; and at the trial the plain-less he warranted them to be sound, tiff prayed the court to direct the jury, that if they should or knew they were not at the time of be of opinion from the testimony, that the merchandize in the sale, in which latter case he question was sold to the plaintiff for the full merchantable would be liable for the fraud price, that it implies a warranty that the same was, at the time of the sale, good, sound and merchantable; and that if the merchandize in question was unsound, and that unsoundness was not obvious to the buyer at the time of the sale, in the state in which such goods are usually sold, the plain-

JUNE.