Cases relating to equal pay for teachers:
CATHERINE
B. C. THOMAS ET AL. vs. ISAAC S. FIELD ET AL., 143 Md. 128 (1923)
The Ordinance of Estimates of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
for the year 1922 contains the following provision: "Allowance of fund
to the Board of School Commissioners to be used in their discretion solely
for the purpose of equalizing salaries of secondary teachers on the basis
of equal pay for equal work without distinction as to sex or color." The
Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City, which will be hereafter
referred to as the School Board, [***2] declined to apply the fund
thus appropriated to the purpose indicated in the ordinance, or to expend
it at all. Thereupon the appellants, all of whom are residents, and citizens,
and some of whom are taxpayers, of the City of Baltimore, filed a petition
in the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City, asking that court to issue
a mandamus commanding the School Board of Baltimore City "to exercise the
discretion vested in them as aforesaid and to apply the said sum of $ 40,525.80
to the equalization of the present salaries of said secondary teachers
on the basis of equal pay for equal work, without distinction as to sex
or color." The respondents, the appellees in this case, filed an answer
to that petition in which, after denying the correctness of the legal conclusions
upon which the petition rested, and calling for proof of its [*130]
allegations of fact, they said: "Under Section 99 of the City Charter (Edition
of 1915), the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City, is given
absolute discretion in the matter of fixing the salaries of all officers,
teachers, secretaries, clerks and employees of said board, the only restriction
upon said power being that said salaries, [***3] in the aggregate,
shall not exceed the amount appropriated therefor in the annual Ordinance
of Estimates; that the adoption or rejection of the so-called principle
of equal pay for equal work in the administration of the public schools
of Baltimore City is a matter committed solely to the discretion of these
defendants and that mandamus will not lie to compel them to adopt said
principle in the management of said public schools; that under the law,
as it exists, no such appropriation item can be mandatory in its nature
and that even if this were not true, there was no attempt on the part of
the Board of Estimates or the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore to make
this item mandatory, as will fully appear by reference to the section of
said ordinance appropriating said fund, which specifically states that
said fund is to be applied in the discretion of the Board of School Commissioners."
They also denied that the appellants had any right to maintain the action,
on the ground that they had no interest in its subject matter. A demurrer
filed to that answer was overruled by the court, and the petition dismissed.
From that order the present appeal was taken.
MILLS
v. LOWNDES et al., 26 F. Supp. 792 (1939)
The object of this action is to accomplish, if possible, an equalization
of the salaries paid to white and colored teachers in the public schools
of Maryland. The plaintiff is a colored school teacher who is employed
and paid by the County School Board of Anne Arundel County, Maryland. His
complaint alleges that for many years past in this State only white teachers
are employed to teach in schools for white children and only colored teachers
in the schools for colored children; and that in most of the Counties of
the State, including Anne Arundel County, the salaries paid colored teachers
in colored schools are materially less than the amounts paid white teachers
in white schools although having equal professional qualifications. He
calls attention to a Maryland statute which provides the minimum scale
of salaries for white teachers, graduated to professional qualifications
and years of experience, and a separate statute providing a lower minimum
for teachers in colored schools; and alleges that in practical application
colored school teachers are paid less than white teachers solely on account
of their race and color. [**2] He contends that this constitutes
an unconstitutional discrimination which is [*795] prohibited
by the equal protection clause of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution, U.S.C.A.
See also: MILLS
v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY et al., 30 F. Supp. 245 (1939)
Christmas
v. Board of Education, 231 F. Supp. 331 (1964)
In this class action filed on May 1, 1964, Negro plaintiffs seek an
injunction restraining defendants, the Board of Education of Harford County
and the Superintendent of Schools, from: (A) refusing to adopt and implement
a plan providing for the elimination of segregated schools in Harford County
by September 1964, rather than in four steps ending September 1967, as
proposed by defendants; (B) discriminating on the basis of race in hiring
new teachers; and (C) continuing to assign Negro teachers exclusively to
Negro schools solely on the basis of race.
Joseph
H. MORTON et al., Plaintiffs, Cordelia E. King et al., Intervening Plaintiffs,
v. CHARLES COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants, 373 F. Supp. 394
(1974)
See also: Morton
v. Charles County Bd. of Education, 520 F.2d 871 (1975)
Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that defendant school board refused
employment and promotions to plaintiffs, and discharged plaintiffs on grounds
of race. The plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief under U.S.
Const. amends. XIII, XIV, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1981-1983, and Md. Code
Ann. art. 77, § 113. The court denied all of the claims, except one.
The court reasoned that the evidence did not support plaintiffs' contention
that there had been a pattern of discriminatory practices against blacks
in the hiring and promotion of school principals and administrators. The
plaintiffs alleged that the recruiting policies of the defendant were racially
motivated since the recruiters visited more predominantly white colleges
and universities. However, the court disagreed and held that the fact that
a majority of the students attending a particular institution may be white
does not mean that such institution is not the best place to find a qualified
black prospect. Moreover, the court held that, although one of the plaintiffs'
claims was actionable, one actionable claim did not show a pattern of racial
discrimination.
(Note: The opinion cites 4 other "connected" cases.)
Cases relating to segregation/desegregation/integration/busing :
MARGARET WILLIAMS et al. v. DAVID W. ZIMMERMAN et al.,
172 Md. 563 (1937)
Case involving the integration of Catonsville High School. Marshall
and Houston served as counsel. For
case materials see http://www.ecpclio.net entry MSA SC 5339-62-9.
HEINTZ
et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF HOWARD COUNTY, 213 Md. 340 (1957)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioners, residents and taxpayers of a county,
sought review of the judgment of the Circuit Court for Howard County (Maryland)
dismissing their petition for a writ of mandamus to require appellee, the
Board of Education of Howard County, to establish and maintain separate
schools for African-American children. Petitioners contended that the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education was erroneous.
OVERVIEW: The petitioners contended that the U.S. Const. amend. XIV
was never constitutionally proposed or adopted for the reason that more
than one-fourth of the states voted to reject it, and its promulgation
by the Secretary of State did not validate the amendment. They further
contended that the sole power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment was constitutionally
reposed in the U.S. Congress. In affirming the judgment of the trial court,
the court noted that the United States Supreme Court had held that the
decision by the political departments of the U.S. Government as to the
validity of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment had been accepted.
In accordance with the historic precedent the question of the efficacy
of ratifications by state legislatures, in the light of previous rejection
or attempted withdrawal, should have been regarded as a political question
pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in
the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the
adoption of the amendment. The court had to recognize the binding force
of such decisions of the Supreme Court and had to be controlled by them.
STATE
BOARD OF PUBLIC WELFARE et al. v. MYERS, MINOR, etc., 224 Md. 246 (1961)
OVERVIEW: The juvenile, an African-American, was adjudged a delinquent
and was due to be committed to a reform school. Counsel for the juvenile
filed a motion to have the juvenile sent to the all white reform school
rather than the all black reform school. While that motion was under consideration,
the juvenile filed a bill of complaint to have the system of racially segregated
reform schools declared unconstitutional. The trial court rendered judgment
in favor of the juvenile. The court found that the juvenile's subsequent
commitment to the white reform school did not make the declaratory action
moot because the order of commitment could always be rescinded and the
issue of segregation was an important issue that needed to be addressed
by the courts. The court also found that the juvenile lacked standing to
attack the racial segregation of the girls' schools and the all black school.
Finally, the court found that the system of racially segregated reform
schools was illegal because the reform schools were more of a school than
a detention facility and thus were subject to the laws regarding the integration
of public schools.
COUNSEL: Robert C. Murphy, Assistant Attorney General, with whom was
C. Ferdinand Sybert, Attorney General, on the brief, for the appellants.
Tucker R. Dearing and Juanita Jackson Mitchell, with whom were Thurgood
Marshall, Jack Greenberg and Dearing & Toadvine on the brief, for the
appellee.
(Source: E. H. Schopler, COMMENT NOTE.--RACIAL SEGREGATION, 38 A.L.R.2d
1188 (1954 & Supp.)
BORDERS
et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY et al., 265 Md.
488 (1972)
OVERVIEW: The parents of white school aged children commenced suit
against the school board and sought declaratory and injunctive relief stopping
the school board from busing their children to the remaining all black
schools in the county. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court refused
to issue the injunction, and the parents sought review. On appeal, the
court affirmed the order as modified. The court held: (1) the parents failed
to make out any case supporting their claim that the transfer of the students
presented any personal danger in terms of traffic safety and personal inconvenience
of any substantial nature; (2) busing was required to achieve racial balance;
(3) where it was possible to identify a segregated school, a prima facie
case in violation of the Equal Protection cause was shown; (4) it was constitutionally
permissible to require busing where de jure desegregation existed, and
it was permissible to recognize the achieving of racial balance for one
of the reasons of redrawing school attendance lines; and (5) the school
board properly bused the students thus transferred.
(Source: E. H. Schopler, DE FACTO SEGREGATION OF RACES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
11 A.L.R.3d 780 (1967 & Supp.))
Vaughns
v. Board of Education, 574 F. Supp. 1280 (1983)
The class sought to reopen their case, which was brought under 42 U.S.C.S.
§ 1983 for injunctive and declaratory relief due to the Board's failure
to desegregate its school system. The class asserted in its motion that
the Board failed to dismantle the dual school system, or to bring about
stable desegregation, and therefore never achieved the unitary system that
was ordered by the court in 19973. The Board contended that its obligations
under the court's 1973 decree disappeared after the court relinquished
jurisdiction of the case in March 1975. The court resumed jurisdiction
in the case and held that the class was entitled to relief because the
Board violated outstanding orders of the court by not eliminating the pre-1973
discrimination. The court found that a unitary system was not firmly established
when the court relinquished active jurisdiction. Additionally, specific
acts of defendants since 1975 have caused some resegregation, particularly
in connection with the Board's busing changes. The court held that its
1973 decree was still in force and effect, and a continuing need for the
order existed, as a unitary school system was not achieved.
Documents for the Classroom:
From Segregation to Integration: The Donald Murray Case, 1935-1937
McCready v. Byrd (Are there more materials in teachersmd.net?)
Secondary Sources:
Student
Note entitled "RACE-BASED FACULTY HIRING AND LAYOFF REMEDIES IN SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION CASES" from the Harvard Law Review (Cite: 104 Harv. L. Rev.
1917
(1991)
Compiled by Jennifer Hafner. Last updated 28 October 2003.