But it is insisted that the Supreme Court of Missouri has settled this case by its decision
in Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576; and that this decision is in conformity with the weight of
authority elsewhere, and with sound principles. If the Supreme Court of Missouri had placed its
decision on the ground that it appeared Dr. Emerson never became domiciled in the Territory,
and so its laws could not rightfully operate on him and his slave; and the facts that he went there
to reside indefinitely, as an officer of the United States, and that the plaintiff was lawfully
married there, with Dr. Emerson's consent, were left out of view, the decision would find support
in other cases, and I might not be prepared to deny its correctness. But the decision is not rested
on this ground. The domicil of Dr. Emerson in that Territory is not questioned in that decision:
and it is placed on a broad denial, of the operation, in Missouri, of the law of any foreign State or
country, upon the status of a slave, going with his master from Missouri into such foreign State
or country, even though they went thither to become, and actually became, permanent inhabitants
of such foreign State or country, the laws whereof acted directly on the status of the slave, and
changed his status to that of a freeman.

To the correctness of such a decision I cannot assent. In my judgment, the opinion of the
majority of the court in that case is in conflict with its previous decisions, with a great weight of
judicial authority in other slaveholding States, and with fundamental principles of private
international law. Mr. Chief Justice Gamble in his dissenting opinion in that case, said:

"I regard the question as conclusively settled by repeated adjudications of this court; and
if I doubted or denied the propriety of those decisions, I would not feel myself any more at liberty
to overturn them, than I would any other series of decisions by which the law upon any other
question had been settled. There is with me nothing in the law of slavery which distinguishes it
from the law on any other subject, or allows any more accommodation to the temporary
excitements which have gathered around it ... But in the midst of all such excitement, it is
proper that the judicial mind, calm and self-balanced, should adhere to principles established
when there was no feeling to disturb the view of the legal questions upon which the rights of
parties depend."

"In this State, it has been recognized from the beginning of the government as a correct
position in law, that the master who takes his slave to reside in a State or Territory where slavery
is prohibited, thereby emancipates his slave."

The questions which arise exclusively under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, this court, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, has the rightful authority
finally to decide. And if we look beyond these questions, we come to the consideration whether
the rules of international law, which are part of the laws of Missouri until displaced by some
statute not alleged to exist, do or do not require the status of the plaintiff, as fixed by the laws of
the Territory of Wisconsin, to be recognized in Missouri. Upon such a question, not depending
on any statute or local usage, but on principles of universal jurisprudence, this court has
repeatedly asserted it could not hold itself bound by the decisions of State Courts, however great
respect might be felt for their learning, ability, and impartiality. See Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1;

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