But there is another point in the case which depends on state power and state law. And it
is contended, on the part of the plaintiff, that he is made free by being taken to Rock Island, in
the State of Illinois, independently of his residence in the territory of the United States; and being
so made free he was not again reduced to a state of slavery by being brought back to Missouri.

Our notice of this part of the case will be very brief; for the principle on which it depends
was decided in this court, upon much consideration, in the case of Strader et al. v. Graham,
reported in 10th Howard, 82. In that case, the slaves had been taken from Kentucky to Ohio,
with the consent of the owner, and afterwards brought back to Kentucky. And this court held
that their status or condition, as free of slave, depended upon the laws of Kentucky, when they
were brought back into that State, and not of Ohio; and that this court had no jurisdiction to
revise the judgment of a state court upon its own laws. This was the point directly before the
court, and the decision that this court had not jurisdiction, turned upon it, as will be seen by the
report of the case.

So in this case: as Scott was a slave when taken into the State of Illinois by his owner,
and was there held as such, and brought back in that character, his status, as free or slave,
depended on the laws of Missouri, and not of Illinois.

It has, however, been urged in the argument, that by the laws of Missouri he was free on
his return, and that this case, therefore, cannot be governed by the case of Strader et al. v.
Graham, where it appeared, by the laws of Kentucky, that the plaintiffs continued to be slaves on
their return from Ohio. But whatever doubts or opinions may, at one time, have been entertained
upon this subject, we are satisfied, upon a careful examination of all the cases decided in the
State courts of Missouri referred to, that it is now firmly settled by the decisions of the highest
court in the State, that Scott and his family upon their return were not free, but were, by the laws
of Missouri, the property of the defendant; and that the Circuit Court of the United States had no
jurisdiction, when, by the laws of the State, the plaintiff was a slave and not a citizen.

Moreover, the plaintiff, it appears, brought a similar action against the defendant in the
State court of Missouri, claiming the freedom of himself and his family upon the same grounds
and the same evidence upon which he relies in the case before the court. The case was carried
before the Supreme Court of the State; was fully argued there; and that court decided that neither
the plaintiff nor his family were entitled to freedom, and were still the slaves of the defendant;
and reversed the judgment of the inferior State court, which had given a different decision.

Upon the whole, therefore, it is the judgment of this court, that it appears by the record
before us that the plaintiff in error is not a citizen of Missouri, in the sense in which that word is
used in the Constitution; and that the Circuit Court of the United States, for that reason, had no
jurisdiction in the case, and could give no judgment in it.

Its judgment for the defendant must, consequently, be reversed, and a mandate issued
directing the suit to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

84