remaining under territorial government, as well as that covered by States. It is a total absence of
power everywhere within the dominion of the United States, and places the citizens of a territory,
so far as these rights are concerned, on the same footing with citizens of the States, and guards
them as firmly and plainly against any inroads which the general government might attempt,
under the plea of implied or incidental powers. And if Congress itself cannot do this—if it is
beyond the powers conferred on the Federal Government—it will be admitted, we presume, that it
could not authorize a territorial government to exercise them. It could confer no power on any
local government, established by its authority, to violate the provisions of the Constitution.

It seems, however, to be supposed, that there is a difference between property in a slave
and other property, and that different rules may be applied to it in expounding the Constitution of
the United States. And the laws and usages of nations, and the writings of eminent jurists upon
the relation of master and slave and their mutual rights and duties, and the powers which
governments may exercise over it, have been dwelt upon in the argument.

But in considering the question before us, it must be borne in mind that there is no law of
nations standing between the people of the United States and their government and interfering
with their relation to each other. And if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the
master in a slave, and makes no distinction between that description of property and other
property owned by a citizen, no tribunal, acting under the authority of the United States, whether
it be legislative, executive, or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction, or deny to it the
benefit of the provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the protection of private
property against the encroachments of the government.

Now as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a different point, the
right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. The right to
traffic in it, like an ordinary article f merchandise and property, was guaranteed to the citizens of
the United States, in every State that might desire it, for twenty years. And the government in
express terms is pledged to protect it in all future time, if the slave escapes from his owner. This
is done in plain words ~ too plain to be misunderstood. And no word can be found in the
Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or which entitles
property o that kind to less protection than property of any other description. The only power
conferred is the power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights.

Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the court that the Act of Congress which
prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the territory of the United
States north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore
void; and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his family, were made free by being carried
into this territory; even if they had been carried there by the owner, with the intention of
becoming a permanent resident.

c.         Status Under State Law

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