to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were
intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted. Such an argument would be
altogether inadmissible in any tribunal called on to interpret it. If any of its provisions are
deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the instrument itself by which it may be amended;
but while it remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its
adoption. It is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and delegates the same
powers to the government, and reserves and secures the same rights and privileges to the citizen;
and as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but
with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its
framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule of
construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of
the popular opinion or passion of the day. This court was not created by the Constitution for
such purposes. Higher and graver trusts have been confided to it, and it must not falter in the
path of duty.

What the construction was at that time, we think can hardly admit of doubt. We have the
language of the Declaration of Independence and of the Articles of Confederation, in addition to
the plain words of the Constitution itself; we have the legislation of the different States, before,
about the time, and since the Constitution was adopted; we have the legislation of Congress,
from the time of its adoption to a recent period; and we have the constant and uniform action of
the Executive Department, all concurring together, and leading to the same result. And if
anything in relation to the construction of the Constitution can be regarded as settled, it is that
which we now give to the word "citizen" and the word "people."

And upon a full and careful consideration of the subject, the court is of opinion that, upon
the facts stated in the plea in abatement, Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within the
meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and not entitled as such to sue in its courts; and,
consequently, that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the case, and that the judgment on the
plea in abatement is erroneous.

b.         Validity of Missouri Compromise

[Having thus concluded that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction over Scott's cause of
action, Taney found it necessary to justify further inquiry into that court's decision on the merits.
Without such a justification, critics might dismiss the rest of the opinion as dicta. His
contention, based on the arcane subtleties of common law pleading, was that the Court had the
power to delve yet further into the record in order to correct other errors material to the case. The
Chief Justice then proceeded to the question of whether Scott acquired his freedom through his
sojourn in free territory.]

In considering this part of the controversy, two questions arise: 1st. Was he, together
with his family, free in Missouri by reason of the stay in the territory of the United States

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