Gibson/Papenfuse Race and the Law in Maryland Image No: 147 Enlarge and print image (75K) << PREVIOUS NEXT >> |
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Gibson/Papenfuse Race and the Law in Maryland Image No: 147 Enlarge and print image (75K) << PREVIOUS NEXT >> |
2. Sit-in Demonstrations The most effective method of destroying discrimination in places of public accommodation was the assertion of a right to service by siti-in demonstrations. The demonstrations created a confrontation with segregation, but the nonviolent nature of the protests diminished the force of opposition. The courts had established the principle that segregation was a wrong, even if the constitution only restricted governmental behavior. The protestors asserted their moral rights as a method of forcing a change. In Maryland, blacks and whites joined together in a series of demonstrations. Three of these demonstrations went through the court system and produced some fascinating legal decisions. In Baltimore County, an integrated group of protesters were arrested when they challenged Gwynn Oaks Amusement Park's racial exclusion practices. When they were told to leave, five individuals joined arms and had to be pushed and shoved to be removed. Two protestors dropped to the ground and had to be carried from the premises. The five men and women were convicted of acting in a disorderly manner in a place of public resort. On appeal, the protestors were represented by Francis Murnaghan, Jr.,164 and the brief was signed by Robert B. Watts, Bob Martineau,165 and Venable, Baetjer & Howard. The Court of Appeals noted that the amusement park was free to discriminate among customers and to call upon the police to remove unwanted persons. The enforcement by a police officer of what was, in effect, the policy of the park did not constitute state responsibility for segregation. Further, the convictions were for disorderly conduct. On that issue, the Court said The effect of appellants' behavior on the crowd is shown by the testimony that some of its members spit and kicked and shouted threats and imprecations, and that the Park employees feared a mob scene was about to erupt. The conduct of appellants in refusing to obey a lawful request to leave private property disturbed the peace and incited a crowd.166 In Montgomery County, another integrated group picketed the Glen Echo Amusement Park on June 30, 1960. Some of the members of the group left the picket line to enter the park. Whites purchased tickets for carousel rides and then gave the tickets to blacks who got on the carousel. The park guard reported their presence to the park manager who told him to arrest the riders if they refused to leave. The guard notified the riders that they should leave. When they refused to do so, he arrested them. He took them to a Montgomery County police station where he swore a warrant for their arrest. The guard had obtained a commission as a Montgomery County deputy sheriff under special county law that permitted guards employed by companies who were paid entirely by the company to be deputy sheriffs with the normal powers of such officers within the premises of their employer. Thus, the form which the guard signed was a warrant for a police officer. Another group of protestors walked across the park to a restaurant leased from the park. The guard told them to leave, and followed the same procedures in arresting them after they had refused to go. The Court of Appeals upheld the convictions of blacks who got tickets for the carrousel ride from white purchasers, but the convictions of the 145 |