Gibson/Papenfuse
Race and the Law in Maryland

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Gibson/Papenfuse
Race and the Law in Maryland

Image No: 51   Enlarge and print image (71K)            << PREVIOUS   NEXT >>

the legislature required free blacks to obtain an annual license from a justice of the peace attesting to their good character in order to be able to sell corn, wheat or tobacco.86 The statute was amended in 1825 to add the requirement that a free black selling tobacco obtain a certificate from a justice of the peace attesting to the lawful origins of the particular tobacco sold.87 The law was strengthened in 1832 to prohibit the purchase from any free negro or mulatto or any slave of "any bacon, pork, beef, mutton, com, wheat, tobacco, rye or oats" unless the seller produced a certificate from a justice of the peace or "three respectable persons residing in the neighborhood of said negro" that the seller came into possession of the goods honestly.88 Further, the statutes in the eighteenth century probibiting "tumultuous meetings of negroes and other slaves" were supplemented in 1806 by a statute that specified that it was a criminal act for a free negro or mulatto to be found in such a "tumultuous meeting."89 Other sections of the statute forbade slave ownership of either guns or dogs. It permitted free negroes to own one dog if they had a license from a justice of the peace. It permitted gun ownership if the gun was left at home or if the free negro had a certificate of his orderly and peaceable character from a justice of the peace. The license for a free negro to have a gun was repealed in 1824.90 Racial prejudice and practical policy were mingled in another event during the first decade of the nineteenth century. Virginia passed a law in 1805 prohibiting manumission of slaves unless the freed black left the state. Although legislative dispensations in individual cases were permitted, the anticipated effect of such a law was a migration from Virginia to Maryland of thousands of freed slaves. Maryland responded in 1806 by flatly prohibiting the immigration of free blacks or mulattoes.91 One final note on the deterioration of the status of free blacks at the opening of the nineteenth century is sounded in Rusk v. Sowerwine. The case involved an action in replevin to recover a slave. The plaintiff offered in evidence the testimony of Minta, the sister of Benjamin Banneker. He demonstrated that Banneker was free prior to 1783 and held property, voted, and even gave evidence. His sister, presumably, held the same status and would not be barred by the law of 1783, nor was she under the proscriptions of the 1717 law as applied to free negroes held in servitude. The county court admitted her testimony, but the Court of Appeals held that she was not a competent witness in a suit between free white Christians.92 C. Property or Freedom: The Problems of Status Decisions Despite the prejudice against free blacks, the status of freedom was prized. Now that manumissions were growing, the reports were filled with decisions on petitions for freedom. Maryland lawyers prided themselves on their willingness to assure petitioners a hearing.93 The ethical standard was to secure accurate determinations, however, not freedom per se. Thus, lawyers like Reverdy Johnson could be found for the petitioner in one suit94 and for the master in another.95 49