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Law Reviews, Combined
AUTHOR (Dan Friedman) AND TEXT (constitution)
Note:
5 of 6 DOCUMENTS
Copyright (c) 1998 Temple University of the Commonwealth
System of Higher Education
Temple Law Review
Fall, 1998
71 Temple L. Rev. 637
LENGTH: 29571 words
ARTICLE; THE HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND INTERPRETATION OF THE MARYLAND
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS *
* This article was previously published at
70 Temple L. Rev. 945 (1997). Due to printing
errors, we are reprinting the
article here in full. - Eds.
by Dan Friedman *
* Associated with the law firm of Miles < Stockbridge,
P.C., in Baltimore,
Maryland> Member, Adjunct Faculty, University of Maryland School
of Law. B.A.
1988, University of Maryland; J.D. 1994, University of Maryland
School of Law.
1995-96, Law Clerk to the Honorable Robert L. Karwacki, Court
of Appeals of
Maryland. 1994-95, Law Clerk to the Honorable John Carroll Byrnes,
Circuit Court
for Baltimore City. My deep appreciation goes to Judges Karwacki
and Byrnes;
Professors Marc Feldman and Richard C. Boldt of the University
of Maryland
School of Law; Professor Robert F. Williams of the Rutgers Law
School; Michael
S. Miller and the staff of the Maryland State Law Library; Jeffrey
S. Rosenfeld,
Esq.; Roger S. Friedman; and my wife, Laurence Anne Ruth, Esq.
SUMMARY:
... Second, Maryland's appellate courts traditionally
have exhibited a
reluctance to give independent content to the provisions of the
Declaration of
Rights. ... That a well regulated Militia is the proper
and natural defence of
a free Government. ... That a well regulated Militia is
the proper and natural
defence of a free government. ... That a well regulated
militia is the proper
and natural defence of a free government. ... That a well
regulated militia is
the proper and natural defence of a free government. ...
That a well-regulated
militia is the proper, and natural defence of a free government.
... That a
well regulated militia is the proper and natural defence of a
free government.
... That a well regulated militia is the proper, natural
and safe defence of a
free government. ... That monopolies are odious, contrary
to the spirit of a
free government and the principles of commerce, and ought not
to be suffered.
... That monopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit
of a free government and
the principles of commerce, and ought not to be suffered. ...
TEXT:
[*637]
"An independent argument under the state clause takes
homework - in texts,
in history, in alternative approaches to analysis."
n1
Justice Hans A. Linde, Oregon Supreme Court
Justice Linde's statement, made at a state constitutional law
symposium in
Maryland, n2 clearly is true. This article and its
accompanying chart make the
"homework" easier for lawyers developing legal arguments based
on the Maryland
Declaration of Rights. n3
The article first reviews the basic arguments in favor
of independent state
constitutional jurisprudence. Although familiar to the state
constitutional
scholar, many practitioners are unaccustomed to invoking the
often greater
protections afforded by state constitutions than by the federal
document. A
brief historical sketch of the political and social environs
in which the
various versions of the Maryland Declaration of Rights were adopted
follows.
Specific techniques for incorporating the Maryland Declaration
of Rights into
legal argument also are discussed.
At the heart of this article, in chart form, each provision
of every version
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is analyzed. The chart,
its accompanying
commentary, and bibliography provide the raw material for crafting
arguments
based on the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Although the article is, of course, geared toward Maryland
lawyers, it is
useful to all practitioners to assist them in understanding how
to develop
"alternative approaches to analysis" to formulate winning arguments
under state
constitutional law. It also may be helpful as a guide to the
type of historical
research required in other states. n4
[*638]
I. The Value of Independent State Constitutional Analysis
At least since the publication of Justice Brennan's seminal article
in 1977
advocating a return to state constitutions, n5 there
has been an increased
focus on those rights protected by the state constitution.
n6 One source of
this renewed interest can be found in an historical analysis
of the political
theory underlying our federalist system.
The federalist system was designed as a compromise to
balance the perceived
need for a strong national government with the political reality
of the existing
powerful state governments. n7 The resulting competitive
nature of the federal
system has important implications for the protection of the fundamental
rights
of the people. During the early period of United States history,
states, more
than the national government, had the capacity to act to curtail
citizens'
freedoms. n8 The national government was constrained
to act within the limited
powers delegated to it by the United States Constitution.
n9 Likewise, the
United States Constitution was believed to have limited powers
over citizens,
and the Bill of Rights was believed to constrain only the actions
of the federal
government, not states. n10 State constitutional
guarantees of fundamental
liberties were, therefore, a citizen's front line of protection.
Later, the balance shifted toward the national government
in two parallel
ways. First, as a result of the expansion of national authority
in the 1930's
and 1940's, the national government assumed greater power for
direct action on
the lives of its citizens. n11 Second, many states
refused to enforce the
basic guarantees of liberty and freedom for their citizens provided
in their own
constitutions. n12 This, in turn, led to intervention
by the United States
Supreme Court in the form of "incorporating" the guarantees of
the United States
Bill of Rights against the states. n13
Although there is no necessary relationship between selective
incorporation
and a withering of state constitutional law, citizens, lawyers,
and the state
courts grew conditioned to view the United States Supreme Court
as the guarantor
of our most fundamental freedoms. n14 Lawyers failed
to consult state
constitutions and to advance claims based upon them.
n15
Today, another paradigm shift is underway. In the political
arena, there is a
distinct trend away from national government as a provider of
services, and
toward an increased role for the states in the provision of services
to
citizens. n16 Simultaneous with this shift in political
models has been a
shift in jurisprudential models. As it has retreated from the
activism of the
Warren Court, the United States Supreme Court, apart from enforcing
the minimum
constitutional standards, has become more willing to allow states
freedom to
determine their own policies. n17 In some states,
the state supreme courts
have reacted vigorously and have begun to develop their own independent
state
constitutional jurisprudences. n18 Other states'
courts have been more
cautious. n19
Those states that have begun to develop independent analyses
of their own
state constitutions have done so in response to two largely
incontrovertible theses. First, state constitutions largely predate
the Federal
Constitu [*639] tion. n20 The chart will illustrate
that the large majority
of the rights protected by Maryland's Declaration of Rights date
to 1776,
thirteen years before the adoption of the first ten amendments
to the United
States Constitution. Second, the United States Supreme Court's
decisions must
address the "lowest common denominator" n21 that
can be applied to every
state, whereas the state supreme courts have the freedom to tailor
more narrowly
the rules they create to the unique characteristics, history,
and traditions of
their individual states. n22
II. The History of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
A history of the Maryland Declaration of Rights encompasses at
least five
distinct phases: 1) the convention of 1776 and the adoption of
the first
Maryland Declaration of Rights; 2) the constitutional convention
of 1850- 1851
and the adoption of the Declaration of Rights of 1851; 3) the
constitutional
convention of 1864 and the adoption of the Declaration of Rights
of 1864; 4) the
constitutional convention of 1867 and the adoption of the Declaration
of Rights
of 1867; and 5) the amendments made to the constitution of 1867.
Also of
interest is the proposed Constitution of 1967-1968 and the refusal
of Maryland
voters to adopt that proposal. It is not the purpose of this
article to give a
complete history of the constitutional conventions from which
the various
versions of the Maryland Declaration of Rights arose. Instead,
I will attempt to
provide a reading list for each period so that the practicing
lawyer may invoke
the milieu from which a provision has developed.
n23
A. The Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776.
From 1774-1776, as the move to independence fermented in the
American colonies,
Marylanders governed themselves by a de facto "government by
convention." n24
A total of nine conventions were held. The first of these was
held June 22-25,
1774 and the last ran from August 14 through November 11, 1776,
concluding with
the adoption of the first Constitution of the State of Maryland.
n25 While the
first two conventions addressed policy questions, by the third
convention, the
delegates began to deal with the daily business of running the
colony. n26 The
fifth convention adopted an "Association of the Freemen of Maryland"
that bound
the people of the province into a "loose political organization."
n27 That
document served as the basis of government until the first state
constitution
went into effect in 1776. n28
On June 28, 1776, the eighth convention of Maryland authorized
its
representatives to the Continental Congress to vote for American
independence.
n29 The convention also called for elections to a ninth convention
to draft a
new constitution, to be held beginning August 12, 1776.
n30 In planning the
Constitutional Convention (which would be the ninth convention),
the eighth
convention retained the same stringent property requirements
for the franchise
that had governed previous conventions. n31 This
led to significant
disruptions during the election. n32 Despite several
election defeats, n33
the [*640] "Whiggish" conservatives held a majority
of the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention. n34 When the Constitutional
Convention began, the
Whig party quickly seized control. n35 Matthew Tilghman
of Talbot County was
unanimously elected president of the Convention,
n36 a post he held in each of
the previous conventions he attended. n37
When the Constitutional Convention of 1776 concluded its
work by adopting a
new constitution and declaration of rights on November 11, 1776,
it had produced
a document that has been called the most conservative of the
colonial era
constitutions. n38
A modern lawyer researching a provision of the 1776 Declaration
of Rights has
a wide range of materials available, but the materials that one
desires most do
not exist. There are many excellent secondary sources analyzing
the revolution.
n39 However, no records of the Maryland Constitutional Convention's
deliberative
process are known to exist. n40
B. The Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1851.
Fletcher Green has described the constitutional developments
of the "South
Atlantic" states of Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, and North and
South Carolina,
from immediately after the Revolutionary War to the 1850's, as
a time of
sectional conflict between "up-country" people and those of the
"low country."
n41 In each state that Green studied, the rise in population
and power of the
western parts of each state came at the expense of the older,
rural, and
conservative eastern portions of the states. n42
In Maryland, the legislative branch was elected by county
rather than
population, creating huge disparities in political power in the
General Assembly
that favored the Eastern Shore, with its many counties and few
residents. n43
Despite previous attempts to redistribute the power,
n44 maldistribution
continued to lead to agitation for constitutional reform, particularly
in the
newer, western parts of the state that included Baltimore City.
n45
Advocates for a constitutional convention also cited a
need to limit the
authority of the General Assembly to appropriate funds and incur
debt. n46 The
General Assembly had incurred over sixteen million dollars of
debt for public
works projects primarily in the western portion of the state,
leading to
increased taxes statewide. n47 The Eastern Shore
particularly resented the
increased taxes because the proceeds were used to fund public
works projects
like the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal and the Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad that brought
products from the West and economic competition to the Eastern
Shore. n48
Reformers also urged two changes in the judicial branch.
n49 First, they
wanted to do away with the appointed judiciary, which they argued
was not
sufficiently democratic, and replace it with an elected judiciary.
n50 Second,
the expense of running the judiciary was thought to be excessive
and cost-
saving devices were to be considered. n51 When the
convention began, Thomas F.
Bowie, a convention delegate from Prince George's County,
[*641] stated that
judicial reform was the most important issue of the convention,
and without it
the Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland would never have agreed
to a
convention. n52
Behind each discussion at the 1851 Constitutional Convention
lurked the face
of slavery, as residents of the Eastern Shore, and their Southern
Maryland
allies feared that the westerners would abolish slavery given
sufficient power
in the legislature. n53
For the historian, there are far fewer historical and
interpretive works
explaining the 1851 Constitutional Convention and they are of
lesser quality
than those about the 1776 Constitutional Convention, but excellent
journals of
the convention were kept and are available. n54
C. The Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1864.
Secession and joining the Confederacy, although threatened, were
never
realistic possibilities for Maryland. To avoid Washington, D.C.
being surrounded
by rebel states, the national authorities kept a close watch
to ensure
Maryland's loyalty. n55 When Marylanders elected
Augustus W. Bradford, the
Union Party candidate for Governor, on November 6, 1861,
n56 it signaled that
Maryland would remain with the Union. n57
The Constitution of Maryland, however, continued to recognize
slavery. n58
At a minimum, a constitutional amendment was necessary for emancipation,
n59
but by 1863, many emancipationists felt that a new constitutional
convention
would be preferable. n60 By this time, the Union
Party in Maryland had broken
into two parties. n61 The "Unconditional Union" advocated
immediate
emancipation of slaves without compensation, a state constitutional
convention,
and "complete and absolute support of the National administration."
n62 The
"Conditional Union" proclaimed its loyalty and desire to win
the war, but
condemned the Lincoln Administration's aggressive war measures,
including the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. n63 The
Conditional Union also
supported emancipation, but preferred a slower and more deliberate
pace. n64
It was willing to submit the question of constitutional convention
to the
voters. n65 The Democratic Party was in a weakened
state and could only field
candidates in the areas of the Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland.
n66
The 1863 elections n67 took place in the long
shadow of the National
Government. General Robert C. Schenck of the Union Army Corps,
headquartered in
Baltimore, openly advocated the election of the Unconditional
Union ticket.
n68 Further, to consolidate Union strength and in fear of agitation,
Schenck
virtually took military control of the supervision of the election.
n69 Under
such conditions, it is not surprising that the Unconditional
Union ticket won an
overwhelming victory. n70 When the new General Assembly
session began on
January 6, 1864, among the first items was a call for a constitutional
convention. n71 By January 8, the measure was adopted
and a popular election
was scheduled for April 6 to determine if the people of Maryland
wanted a
constitutional convention. n72 The convention received
strong support n73
and was scheduled to begin on April 27, 1864. n74
There were [*642]
ninety-six delegates elected to the convention: sixty-one Union
party members
from northern and western counties, Baltimore City, Talbot, Caroline,
and
Worcester Counties, and thirty-five Democrats exclusively from
the Pro- Slavery
counties of Kent, Queen Anne's, Dorchester, Somerset, Anne Arundel,
Montgomery,
Prince George's, Charles, Calvert, and St. Mary's.
n75
As outside forces played a large role in the events leading
up to the
Convention, they also continued to play a critical role during
the Convention.
With Lt. General Ulysses Grant's Union Army besieging Petersburg
and Richmond,
Confederate General Robert E. Lee ordered General Jubal A. Early
to march up the
Shenandoah Valley, enter Maryland, and menace Washington, D.C.
and Baltimore.
n76 Lee hoped that the Union Army would be forced to send troops
to defend their
capital, thus relieving the pressure on the Confederate capital
in Richmond.
n77 The main Confederate thrust, although victorious at the battle
of Monocacy
Junction, n78 was delayed by the battle, thus permitting
Union reinforcements
to arrive, n79 and eventually requiring their withdrawal.
n80 Small
detachments of confederate cavalry, made up largely of Maryland
natives, fought
skirmishes in Cockeysville, Govanstown, and Pikesville.
n81 The Constitutional
Convention, meeting in Annapolis, recessed for ten days during
the height of
Early's raid, but the psychological impact on Convention delegates
lasted
longer. n82
The constitution that was produced abolished slavery and
sought to ensure
continued Unionist control of the Maryland political landscape
by
disenfranchising southern sympathizers, Copperheads, and Democrats
largely
through the use of "iron clad" loyalty oaths. n83
The historical literature exploring the civil war period
is too voluminous to
catalog. Even those works limited to Maryland's role in the Civil
War are
numerous. n84 An excellent source for understanding
the 1864 Constitutional
Convention are its journals, which are the most extensive for
any Maryland
Constitutional Convention until 1967.
D. The Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1867 and Subsequent
Amendments.
The Maryland Constitutional Convention of 1867 is properly described
by William
Starr Myers as the "self-reconstruction of Maryland."
n85 Democrats, outlawed
from voting after the 1864 Convention, made a tremendous political
comeback
after Governor Thomas Swann declined to enforce the "iron-clad"
oaths. n86 The
result was a sweep to power by the Democrats. n87
The entire body of the 1867
convention was from the Democratic party as the Union party failed
to field a
ticket of nominees. n88 Although unable to repeal
emancipation, the Democrats
did remove what they considered to be the most objectionable
provisions of the
1864 Constitution, including the "iron- clad" oaths.
n89
Although the 1867 Declaration of Rights and Constitution
are still in force
in Maryland, little scholarship has discussed their inception.
n90 Convention
records were not kept and the only record of the proceedings
is a compilation of
newspaper accounts. n91
[*643]
E. The Proposed Maryland Constitution and Declaration
of Rights of 1967- 68.
In 1967, Maryland attempted to write a new constitution. It was:
supported strongly by all but a handful of convention
delegates, it was
endorsed by all living governors, the highest judges, the legislative
leaders,
party luminaries, the captains of industry, the leaders of labor,
the mass media
of Baltimore and Washington, unlimited numbers of do-gooders,
and various
itinerant experts from out of state. Opposition came from a rag-tag
band of the
pitiful elite - courthouse gangs whose jobs had been excised
from constitutional
status, the know-nothings of the radical right, a few opportunistic
politicians,
selective puritans who took an instant dislike to a single provision
- and a
majority of the voters who turned out on May 14 [, 1968].
n92
Despite its defeat at the polls, the proposed Constitution of
1967-68 is an
important document. Many of the proposals rejected at the time
have been adopted
subsequently in a piecemeal fashion. Moreover, the proposals
are seen as a
high-water mark of good government and it is not infrequent that
a proposal will
be supported by reference to what would have happened had the
1967-98
Constitution been adopted. n93
With respect to the 1967-68 Constitutional Convention,
there are many
excellent resource materials, including convention documents
and journals and
secondary sources. n94
III. How To Read the Chart
Each column of the following chart represents the Maryland Declaration
of
Rights as it existed at a specific time in Maryland history.
The left-most
column is the Maryland Declaration of Rights as it exists on
the publication
date of this article. It is the document initially adopted in
1867 with
subsequent amendments to date. The second column is the Declaration
of Rights as
adopted in 1867. The third column is the short-lived 1864 Maryland
Declaration
of Rights. In column four is the Declaration of Rights adopted
in 1851. The
fifth column is Maryland's original Declaration of Rights adopted
in 1776. The
final two columns are drafts that were circulated during the
1776 Constitutional
Convention. While neither of these drafts has (or has had) the
force of law,
they provide useful legislative history. n95 To the
best of my knowledge,
never before have these drafts generally been available to the
public.
I have retained the integrity of each version so that
the reader may read
down a column and see the version in the order adopted, as well
as read across a
row to see the history of a given constitutional provision. As
a result there
are a few gaps where provisions were moved by a convention to
a different
order. n96
In an analysis found in the footnotes to the chart, I
have tried to draw upon
every possible source to make the chart complete. A major source
is the records
of the Constitutional Conventions, although these are somewhat
[*644] uneven.
n97 The annotations also include suggested historical antecedents
for the
Maryland Declaration of Rights, including the Magna Carta and
the English Bill
of Rights of 1689. n98 These sources are referenced
as appropriate.
Other historical antecedents include those constitutions
of our sister states
adopted prior to the adoption of the first Maryland Declaration
of Rights. n99
Although New Hampshire, n100 South Carolina,
n101 Virginia, n102 New
Jersey, n103 and Pennsylvania n104 all
adopted constitutions prior to
Maryland, only Virginia and Pennsylvania attempted declarations
or bills of
rights analogous to Maryland's. Therefore, the provisions adopted
by Virginia
and Pennsylvania are the most relevant antecedents to the Maryland
Declaration
of Rights. The three constitutions provide very similar and,
in some cases,
identical rights. n105 This is despite the fact that
these documents differ
greatly in many respects regarding the forms of government established.
n106
Maryland's 1776 Constitution has been described as the most conservative
of the
state constitutions of this period. n107 Pennsylvania's
1776 Constitution has
been described as "radical," providing the intellectual counterpoint
to the
Federal Constitution with its unicameral legislature, lack of
an executive
branch, and broad-based suffrage. n108
The similarities in the rights provisions of the Maryland,
Virginia, and
Pennsylvania Declarations of Rights give rise to two opposing
interpretations. First, this would seem to support the claim
(made about the
Federal Bill of Rights, but equally applicable to those of the
states) that
those drafting the provisions "did not concern [themselves] primarily
with
stating, with absolute textual precision, the rights that Americans
believed
would best protect their liberty." n109 Under this
view, whatever textual
differences exist between provisions would be of minor interest
because these
distinctions would not signify an underlying attempt to give
different meaning
to a provision. Conversely, the similarities may suggest the
universality of
agreement that the protection of these rights was important.
Even Maryland
conservatives and Pennsylvania radicals could agree on the general
contours of
these rights. n110 A natural corollary of this second
view is to give
increased importance to the different words used in the various
constitutions.
Great care would be necessary to ensure that a textual difference
indicated an
intent to give a different meaning, rather than invoke a preferred
manner of
expressing a universally understood meaning. I do not attempt
to settle this
fundamental debate about the nature of text. All relevant provisions
of the
first Virginia and Pennsylvania constitutions have been included
in the chart.
Perhaps a word of caution is warranted. The chart frequently
will claim that
a provision of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is derived
from a right
provided by the Magna Carta, or is similar to a right afforded
by another
state's constitution. This does not necessarily mean that the
interpretation
must be identical. The American experience and Maryland traditions
have improved
upon the Magna Carta.
Although the chart refers to many of the cases decided
by Maryland's
appellate courts that are based on the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, the case
citations given are not an exhaustive compilation. The reason
for this is
[*645] two-fold. First, the Constitutions volume of the
Maryland Annotated Code
and computer sources do an adequate job of providing a complete
list of case
citations decided on or referencing the Maryland Declaration
of Rights. Second,
Maryland's appellate courts traditionally have exhibited a reluctance
to give
independent content to the provisions of the Declaration of Rights.
Instead, the
courts have preferred to hold that the provisions of Maryland's
fundamental
document are "in pari materia" n111 with analogous
federal constitutional
guarantees. n112 Because these decisions premised
on a "lock-step" approach
are of limited utility in developing an independent jurisprudence,
they
generally are omitted. Only those cases that are noteworthy,
or those in which
the courts escaped the intellectual straight-jacket of this approach,
are cited.
IV. How to Create An Argument
For the practitioner, the factual setting obviously drives litigation.
If a
provision of the Maryland Declaration of Rights might apply colorably
to a
client's case, turn to the chart, read across the row and see
how that article
has evolved over the 220 years of Maryland independence. If the
Federal
Constitution and its amendments do not provide an analogous right,
counsel is
limited only by the Court of Appeals of Maryland's prior interpretation
of the
provision. Arguments can be based on the article's text, history,
framers'
intent, or anything else.
The work is more challenging if the United States Constitution
and Bill of
Rights provide an analogous n113 right, but the federal
court interprets the
right to exclude a client's claim or defense. In this situation,
counsel must
argue to both the state trial and appellate courts that the federal
case law
interpreting an analogous provision should be discarded and that
independent
Maryland interpretations of the Maryland provisions should be
used. n114 The
bases for arguing for independent Maryland interpretations are
limitless, but an
excellent starting place is a list of factors developed by Justice
Handler of
the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Hunt: n115
1. Textual language differences, including both where
a right unprotected by
the Federal Constitution is protected by the state constitution,
and where the
language used to describe a right protected by both the federal
and state
constitution is so significantly n116 different to
permit independent
evaluation;
2. a unique legislative history;
3. the existence of state law on the subject prior to
the creation or
recognition of a constitutional right;
4. situations where the different structures of federal
and state governments
compel different results; n117
5. matters of particular state interest or local concern;
6. unique state traditions; and
7. public attitudes.
To Justice Handler's list, I would add virtually anything else,
including the
persuasiveness of dissenting or subsequently overruled opinions
in the United
States Supreme Court, persuasive decisions of sister state courts,
or [*646]
even a state court's ideological differences with the Supreme
Court. n118 Any
of these bases provide a solid ground for counsel to argue that
the
interpretation of an analogous provision of the Federal Constitution
should be
disregarded in favor of an independent Maryland interpretation.
Counsel must
then convince the court that an alternative interpretation is
superior.
Maryland courts will not be persuaded overnight, but I
do not doubt that
carefully-made, persuasive arguments will prevail.
[*647] Current1867186418511776Draft <number>2Draft
<number>1 DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS
(1867, as amended to
1997) n119 DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS (1867) n120 DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS (1864) n121 DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS (1851) n122 The DECLARATION of
RIGHTS n123
(adopted November 4,
1776) The DECLARATION of
RIGHTS n124
(Draft <number>2, September 17,
1776) The DECLARATION
and CHARTER of
RIGHTS n125
(Draft <number>1, August 27, 1776) We the People of the State
of Maryland,
grateful to Almighty God for our civil and religious liberty,
and taking serious
consideration the best means of establishing a good Constitution
of this State
for the sure foundation and more permanent security thereof,
declare: n126 ,
n127 We the People of the State of Maryland, grateful to Almighty
God for our
civil and religious liberty, and taking into our serious consideration
the best
means of establishing a good Constitution in this State for the
sure foundation
and more permanent security thereof, declare: We, the People
of the State of
Maryland, grateful to Almighty God for our civil and religious
liberty, and
taking into our serious consideration the best means of establishing
a good
Constitution in this State for the sure foundation and more permanent
security
thereof, declare: We, the People n128 of the State
of Maryland, grateful to
Almighty God for our civil and religious liberty, and taking
into our serious
consideration the best means of establishing a good Constitution
in this State,
for the sure foundation and more permanent security thereof,
declare: THE
parliament of Great Britain, by a declaratory act, having assumed
a right to
make laws to bind the Colonies in all cases whatsoever, and in
pursuance of such
claim endeavored by force of arms to subjugate the United Colonies
to an
unconditional submission to their will and power, and having
at length
constrained them to declare themselves into independent states,
and to assume
government under the authority of the people - therefore We,
the delegates of
Maryland, in free and full Convention assembled, taking into
our most serious
consideration the best means of establishing a good constitution
in this state,
for the sure foundation, and more permanent security thereof,
declare, THE
parliament of Great-Britain, by a declaratory act, having assumed
a right to
make laws to bind the colonies in all cases whatsoever, and in
pursuance of such
claim endeavored by force of arms to subjugate the United Colonies
to an
unconditional submission to their will and power, and having
at length
constrained them to declare themselves into independent states,
and to assume
government under the authority of the people, therefore, We,
the delegates of
Maryland, in free and full Convention assembled, taking into
our most serious
consideration the best means of establishing a good constitution
in this State,
for the sure foundation, and more permanent security thereof,
declare, THE
parliament of Great-Britain, n129 by a declaratory
act, having assumed a right
to make laws to bind the colonies in all cases whatsoever, and
in pursuance of
such claim endeavored by force of arms to subjugate the United
Colonies to an
unconditional submission to their will and power, and having
at length
constrained them to erect themselves into independent states,
and to assume new
forms of government; WE, therefore, the delegates of Maryland,
in free and full
Convention assembled, taking into our most serious consideration
the best means
of establishing a good constitution in this state, for the surer
foundation, and
more permanent security thereof; declare, [*648]
(eliminated) n130 1. That
we hold it to be self-evident, that all men are created equally
free; that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights,
among which are
life, liberty, the enjoyment of the proceeds of their own labor,
and the pursuit
of happiness. n131 1. That all Government of right
originates from the People,
is founded in compact only, and instituted solely for the good
of the whole; and
they have, at all times, the inalienable right to alter, reform
or abolish their
Form of Government in such manner as they may deem expedient.
n132 , n133 1.
That all Government of right originates from the People, is founded
in compact
only, and instituted solely for the good of the whole; and they
have, at all
times, the inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their
form of
Government in such manner as they may deem expedient.
n134 , n135 , n136
2. That all government of right originates from the people, is
founded in
compact only, and instituted solely for the good of the whole;
and they have at
all times the inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their
form of
Government in such manner as they may deem expedient.
n137 , n138 1. That
all government of right originates from the people, is founded
in compact only,
and instituted solely for the good of the whole; and they have,
at all times,
according to the mode prescribed in this Constitution, the inalienable
right to
alter, reform or abolish their form of Government in such manner
as they may
deem expedient. n139 , n140 1. That all
government of right originates from
the people, is founded in compact only, and instituted solely
for the good of
the whole. n141 1. That all government of right originates
from the people, is
founded in compact only, and instituted solely for the good of
the whole. 1.
That all government of right originates from the people, is founded
in compact
only, and instituted solely for the good of the whole. 2. The
Constitution of
the United States, and the Laws made, or which shall be made,
in pursuance
thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the authority of
the United States, are, and shall be the Supreme Law of the State;
and the
Judges of this State, and all the People of this State, are,
and shall be bound
thereby; anything in the Constitution or Law of this State to
the contrary
notwithstanding. n142 , n143 2. The Constitution
of the United States, and
the Laws made, or which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and
all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, are, and
shall be the Supreme Law of the State; and the Judges of this
State, and all the
People of this State, are, and shall be bound thereby; anything
in the
Constitution or Law of this State to the contrary notwithstanding.
n144 ,
n145 , n146 [*649] 3. The powers not
delegated to the United States by the
Constitution thereof, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people thereof. n147
3. The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution thereof, nor
prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to
the People
thereof. n148 , n149 , n150
4. That the People of this State have the sole
and exclusive right of regulating the internal government and
police thereof, as
a free, sovereign and independent State. n151 ,
n152 4. That the People of
this State have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the
internal
government and police thereof, as a free, sovereign and independent
State.
n153 , n154 3. That the people of this State ought
to have the sole and
exclusive right of regulating the internal government and police
thereof. n155
2. That the people of this State ought to have the sole and exclusive
right of
regulating the internal government and police thereof.
n156 2. That the people
of this state ought to have the sole and exclusive right of regulating
the
internal government and police thereof. 2. That the people of
this state ought
to have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the internal
government and
police thereof. n157 , n158 ,
n159 , n160 [*650] 5. (a) That the
Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England,
and the trial
by Jury, n161 , n162 , n163
according to the course of that Law, and to
the benefit of such of the English statutes, as existed on the
Fourth day of
July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience,
have been
found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and
have been
introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity;
and also of all
Acts of Assembly in force on the first day of June, eighteen
hundred and
sixty-seven; except such as may have since expired, or may be
inconsistent with
the provisions of this Constitution; subject, nevertheless, to
the revision of,
and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State. And
the Inhabitants
of Maryland are also entitled to all property derived to them
from, or under the
Charter granted by His Majesty, Charles the First to Caecilius
Calvert, Baron of
Baltimore. n164 , n165 (b) The parties
to any civil proceeding in which the
right to a jury trial is preserved are entitled to a trial by
jury of at least 6
jurors. 5. That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the
Common Law of
England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that
law, and to the
benefit of such of the English statutes, as existed on the Fourth
day of July,
seventeen hundred and seventy-six, and which, by experience,
have been found
applicable to their local and other circumstances; and have been
introduced,
used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity; and also of
all Acts of
Assembly in force on the first day of June, eighteen hundred
and sixty-seven;
except such as may have since expired, or may be inconsistent
with the
provisions of this Constitution; subject, nevertheless, to the
revision of, and
amendment or repeal by the Legislature of this State; and the
Inhabitants of
Maryland are also entitled to all property derived to them from,
or under the
Charter granted by His Majesty, Charles the First, to Caecilius
Calvert, Baron
of Baltimore. n168 , n169 4. That the
inhabitants of Maryland are entitled
to the common law of England, and the trial by jury according
to the course of
that law, and to the benefit of such of the English Statutes
as existed on the
fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six, and which,
by experience
have been found applicable to their local and other circumstances,
and have been
introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity,
and also of all
acts of Assembly in force on the first day of June, eighteen
hundred and
sixty-four, except such as may have since expired, or may be
altered by this
Constitution, subject, nevertheless to the revision of, and amendment
or repeal
by the Legislature of this State; and the inhabitants of Maryland
are also
entitled to all property derived to them from or under the charter
granted by
his Majesty, Charles the First, to Cecilius Calvert, Baron of
Baltimore. n170
3. That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common
law of England,
and the trial by jury, according to the course of that law, and
to the benefit
of such of the English statutes as existed on the fourth day
of July, seventeen
hundred and seventy-six, and which by experience have been found
applicable to
their local and other circumstances, and have been introduced,
used and
practiced by the courts of law or equity, and also of all acts
of Assembly in
force on the first Monday of November, eighteen hundred and fifty,
except such
as may have since expired, or may be altered by this Constitution,
subject,
nevertheless to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by the
Legislature of
this State; and the inhabitants of Maryland are also entitled
to all property
derived to them from or under the charter, granted by his Majesty
Charles the
First, to Caecilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore.
n171 3. That the inhabitants
of Maryland are entitled to the common law of England, and the
trial by jury,
according to the course of that law, and to the benefit of such
of the English
statutes, as existed at the time of their first emigration, and
which, by
experience, have been found applicable to their local and other
circumstances,
and of such others as have been since made in England or Great
Britain, and have
been introduced, used, and practised by the courts of law, or
equity; and also
to all acts of assembly in force on the first of June seventeen
hundred and
seventy- four, except such as may have since expired, or have
been, or may be
altered by acts of convention, or this Declaration of Rights
- subject
nevertheless to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by,
the Legislature of
this State; and the inhabitants of Maryland are also entitled
to all property
derived to them from or under the charter granted by his majesty
Charles I, to
Caecilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore. 3. That the inhabitants
of Maryland are
entitled to the common law of England, and the trial by jury,
according to the
course of that law, and to the benefit of such of the English
statutes, as
existed at the time of their first emigration, and which by experience
have been
found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and
of such others as
have been since made in England, or Great-Britain, and have been
introduced,
used, and practiced by the courts of law, or equity; and also
to all acts of
assembly in force on the first of June seventeen hundred and
seventy-four,
except such as may have since expired, or have been, or may be
altered by acts
of Convention, or this Declaration of Rights, subject nevertheless
to the
revision of, and amendment or repeal by the legislature of this
state; and the
inhabitants of Maryland are also entitled to all property derived
from or under
the charter granted by his majesty Charles the first to Caecilius
Calvert baron
of Baltimore. n172 [*651] (c) That notwithstanding
the Common Law of
England, nothing in this Constitution prohibits trial by jury
of less than 12
jurors in any civil proceeding in which the right to a jury trial
is preserved.
n166 , n167 5. The Constitution of the United States,
and the laws made in
pursuance thereof, being the supreme law of the land, every citizen
of this
State owes paramount allegiance to the Constitution and Government
of the United
States, and is not bound by any law or ordinance of this State
in contravention
or subversion thereof. n173 , n174
[*652] 6. That all persons invested
with the Legislative or Executive powers of Government are the
Trustees of the
Public, and as such, accountable for their conduct: Wherefore,
whenever the ends
of Government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered,
and all
other means of redress are ineffectual, the People may, and of
right ought, to
reform the old, or establish a new government; the doctrine of
non-resistance
against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish and
destructive of the
good and happiness of mankind. n175 6. That all persons
invested with the
Legislative or Executive powers of Government are the Trustees
of the Public,
and as such, accountable for their conduct: Wherefore, whenever
the ends of
Government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered,
and all
other means of redress are ineffectual, the People may, and of
right ought to
reform the old or establish a new government, the doctrine of
nonresistance
against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish and
destructive of the
good and happiness of mankind. n176 ,
n177 6. That all persons invested with
the Legislative or Executive powers of government are the Trustees
of the
public, and as such, accountable for their conduct; wherefore,
whenever the ends
of government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered,
and all
other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of
right ought to
reform the old or establish a new government. The doctrine of
non-resistance
against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish and
destructive of the
good and happiness of mankind. n178 4. That all persons
invested with the
legislative or executive powers of government are the trustees
of the public,
and as such accountable for their conduct; whenever the ends
of government are
perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all
other means of
redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought to
reform the old or
establish a new government; the doctrine of non-resistance against
arbitrary
power and oppression, is absurd, slavish and destructive of the
good and
happiness of mankind. n179 4. That all persons invested
with the legislative
or executive powers of government, are the trustees of the public,
and as such
accountable for their conduct, wherefore, whenever the ends of
government are
perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all
other means of
redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought,
to reform the old
or establish a new government; the doctrine of nonresistance
against arbitrary
power and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of
the good and
happiness of mankind. 4. That all persons invested with the legislative
or
executive powers of government are the trustees n180
of the public, and as
such accountable for their conduct; wherefore whenever the ends
of government
are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and
all other means of
redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought,
to reform the old
or establish a new government ; the doctrine of non-resistance
against arbitrary
power and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of
the good and
happiness of mankind. 2. That persons entrusted with the legislative
and
executive powers are the trustees and servants of the public,
and as such
accountable for their conduct; wherefore whenever the ends of
government are
perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered by the legislative
singly;
or a treacherous combination of both those powers, the people
may, and of right
ought, to establish a new, or reform the old government : passive
obedience is
only due to the laws of God, and to the laws of the land; the
doctrine of
non-resistance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd,
slavish, and
destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.
n181 , n182 , n183
[*653] 7. That the right in the People to participate in
the Legislature is the
best security of liberty, and the foundation of all free Government;
for this
purpose, elections ought to be free and frequent; and every citizen
n184
having the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, ought
to have the
right of suffrage. n185 , n186 ,
n187 7. That the right in the People to
participate in the Legislature is the best security of liberty,
and the
foundation of all free Government; for this purpose, elections
ought to be free
and frequent; and every white male citizen having the qualifications
prescribed
by the Constitution, ought to have the right of suffrage.
n188 , n189 7.
That the right in the people to participate in the Legislature
is the best
security of liberty, and the foundation of all free government;
for this purpose
elections ought to be free and frequent, and every free white
male citizen
having the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, ought
to have the
right of suffrage. n190 5. That the right in the
people to participate in the
Legislature is the best security of liberty, and the foundation
of all free
government; for this purpose elections ought to be free and frequent,
and every
free white male citizen having the qualifications prescribed
by the
Constitution, ought to have a right of suffrage.
n191 , n192 5. That the
right in the people to participate in the legislature is the
best security of
liberty, and the foundation of all free government; for this
purpose elections
ought to be free and frequent, and every man having property
in, a common
interest with, and an attachment to the community, ought to have
a right of
suffrage. 5. That the right in the people to participate in the
legislature is
the best security of liberty, and the foundation of all free
government; for
this purpose, elections ought to be free and frequent, and every
man having
property in, a common interest with, and attachment to the community,
ought to
have a right of suffrage. 3. That the right in the people to
participate in the
legislature is the foundation of liberty, and of all free government;
for this
purpose, elections ought to be free, and frequent, made viva
voce, without
treating or bribery, and every man having sufficient evidence
of a permanent
common interest with, and attachment to the community, ought
to have a right of
suffrage. n193 8. That the Legislative, Executive
and Judicial powers of
Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each
other; and no
person exercising the functions of one of said Departments shall
assume or
discharge the duties of any other. n194 ,
n195 , n196 , n197 8. That the
Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of government ought
to be forever
separate and distinct from each other; and no person exercising
the functions of
one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties
of any other.
n198 , n199 8. That the legislative, executive and
judicial powers of
government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each
other; and no
person exercising the functions of one of said departments shall
assume or
discharge the duties of any other. n200 6. That the
legislative, executive and
judicial powers of government ought to be for ever separate and
distinct from
each other; and no person exercising the functions of one of
said departments,
shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.
n201 , n202 6. That the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government ought
to be for ever
separate and distinct from each other. n203 ,
n204 6. That the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers of government, ought to be for
ever separate,
distinct from, and independent of each other. 4. That the legislative,
judicial,
and executive powers of government ought to be for ever separate,
distinct from,
and independent of each other. n205 ,
n206 9. That no power of suspending
Laws or the execution of Laws, unless by, or derived from the
Legislature, ought
to be exercised, or allowed. n207 , n208
9. That no power of suspending Laws
or the execution of Laws, unless by, or derived from the Legislature,
ought to
be exercised, or allowed. n209 , n210
9. That no power of suspending laws or
the execution of laws, unless by or derived from the Legislature,
ought to be
exercised or allowed. n211 7. That no power of suspending
laws, or the
execution of laws, unless by or derived from the legislature,
ought to be
exercised or allowed. n212 7. That no power of suspending
laws, or the
execution of laws, unless derived from the legislature, ought
to be exercised or
allowed. 7. That no power of suspending laws, or the execution
of laws, unless
by or derived from the legislature, ought to be exercised or
allowed. 5. That no
power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, unless by
the legislature,
ought to be exercised or allowed. n213 ,
n214 10. That freedom of speech and
debate, or proceedings in the Legislature, ought not to be impeached
in any
Court of Judicature. n215 , n216 ,
n217 , n218 10. That freedom of
speech and debate, or proceedings in the Legislature, ought not
to be impeached
in any Court of Judicature. n219 , n220
10. That freedom of speech and
debate, or proceedings in the Legislature, ought not to be impeached
in any
Court of Judicature. n221 8. That freedom of speech
and debates or proceedings
in the Legislature, ought not to be impeached in any court of
judicature. n222
8. That freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings, in the
legislature, ought
not to be impeached in any other court or judicature. 8. That
freedom of speech,
and debates, or proceedings, in the legislature, ought not to
be impeached in
any court or judicature. 6. That freedom of speech, and debates,
or proceedings,
in the legislature, ought not to be impeached or questioned in
any other place.
n223 [*654] 11. That Annapolis be the place of meeting
of the Legislature; and
the Legislature ought not to be convened, or held at any other
place but from
evident necessity. n224 , n225 11. That
Annapolis be the place of meeting of
the Legislature; and the Legislature ought not to be convened,
or held at any
other place but from evident necessity. n226 ,
n227 11. That Annapolis be
the place for the meeting of the Legislature, and the Legislature
ought not to
be convened or held at any other place but from evident necessity.
n228 9.
That Annapolis be the place for the meeting of the Legislature;
and the
Legislature ought not to be convened or held at any other place
but from evident
necessity. n229 , n230 ,
n231 9. That a place for the meeting of the
legislature ought to be fixed, the most convenient to the members
thereof, and
to the depository of public records, and the legislature ought
not to be
convened or held at any other place but from evident necessity.
9. That a place
for the meeting of the legislature ought to be fixed, the most
convenient to the
members thereof, and to the depository of public records, and
the legislature
ought not to be convened or held at any other place but from
evident necessity.
7. That a place for the meeting of the legislature ought to be
fixed, the most
convenient to the members thereof, and to the depository of public
records, and
the legislature ought not to be convened and held at any other
place but from
evident necessity. 12. That for the redress of grievances, and
for amending,
strengthening and preserving the Laws, the Legislature ought
to be frequently
convened. n232 , n233 12. That for the
redress of grievances, and for
amending, strengthening and preserving the laws, the Legislature
ought to be
frequently convened. n234 , n235 12.
That for the redress of grievances, and
for amending, strengthening and preserving the laws, the Legislature
ought to be
frequently convened. n236 10. That for the redress
of grievances, and for
amending, strengthening and preserving the laws, the Legislature
ought to be
frequently convened. n237 10. That for redress of
grievances, and for
amending, strengthening and preserving, the laws, the legislature
ought to be
frequently convened. 10. That for redress of grievances, and
for amending,
strengthening and preserving the laws, the legislature ought
to be frequently
convened. 8. That for redress of all grievances, and for amending,
strengthening
and preserving of the laws, the legislature ought to be frequently
convened.
n238 13. That every man hath a right to petition the Legislature
for the redress
of grievances in a peaceable and orderly manner.
n239 , n240 13. That every
man hath a right to petition the Legislature for the redress
of grievances in a
peaceable and orderly manner. n241 ,
n242 13. That every man hath a right to
petition the Legislature for the redress of grievances, in a
peaceable and
orderly manner. n243 11. That every man hath a right
to petition the
Legislature for the redress of grievances in a peaceable and
orderly manner.
n244 11. That every man hath a right to petition the legislature
for the redress
of grievances, in a peaceable and orderly manner. 11. That every
man hath a
right to petition the legislature for the redress of grievances,
in a peaceable
and orderly manner. 9. That every man hath a right to petition
the legislature
for the redress of grievances, in a peaceable and orderly manner.
n245 14.
That no aid, charge, tax, burthen or fees, ought to be rated
or levied, under
any pretence, without the consent of the Legislature.
n246 , n247 , n248
14. That no aid, charge, tax, burthen, or fees, ought to be rated
or levied,
under any pretence, without the consent of the Legislature.
n249 , n250 14.
That no aid, charge, tax, burthen or fees, ought to be rated
or levied under any
pretence, without the consent of the Legisla[ture.
n251 12. That no aid,
charge, tax, burthen, or fees, ought to be rated or levied, under
any pretence,
without the consent of the Legislature. n252 12.
That no aid, charge, tax,
burden, fee, or fees, ought to be set, rated or levied, under
any pretence,
without the consent of the legislature. n253 12.
That no aid, charge, tax,
burden, fee, or fees, ought to be set, rated or levied, on any
pretence, without
the consent of the legislature. 10. That no aid, charge, tax,
burthen, fee, or
fees, ought to be set or levied on any pretence whatever, without
the consent of
the legislature. n254 [*655] 15. That
the levying of taxes by the poll is
grievous and oppressive, and ought to be prohibited;
n255 that paupers ought
not to be assessed for the support of the government; that the
General Assembly
shall, by uniform rules, provide for the separate assessment,
classification and
sub-classification of land, improvements on land and personal
property, as it
may deem proper; and all taxes thereafter provided to be levied
by the State for
the support of the general State Government, and by the Counties
and by the City
of Baltimore for their respective purposes, shall be uniform
within each class
or sub-class of land, improvements on land and personal property
which the
respective taxing powers may have directed to be subjected to
the tax levy; yet
fines, duties or taxes may properly and justly be imposed, or
laid with a
political view for the good government and benefit of the community.
n256 ,
n257 , n258 15. That the levying of taxes by the
poll is grievous and
oppressive, and ought to be prohibited; that paupers ought not
to be assessed
for the support of the government; but every person in the State,
or person
holding property therein, ought to contribute his proportion
of public taxes for
the support of the government, according to his actual worth
in real or personal
property; yet fines, duties or taxes may properly and justly
be imposed or laid,
with a political view, for the good government and benefit of
the community.
n259 , n260 15. That the levying of taxes by the
poll is grievous and
oppressive, and ought to be prohibited; n261 ,
n262 that paupers ought not
to be assessed for the support of the government, but every other
person in the
State or person holding property therein, ought to contribute
his proportion of
public taxes, for the support of government, according to his
actual worth in
real or personal property; yet fines, duties, or taxes may properly
and justly
be imposed or laid, with a political view, for the good government
and benefit
of the community. n263 13. That the levying of taxes
by the poll is grievous
and oppressive and ought to be abolished; n264 that
paupers ought not to be
assessed for the support of government; but every other person
in the State or
person holding property therein, ought to contribute his proportion
of public
taxes, for the support of government, according to his actual
worth in real or
personal property; n265 yet fines, duties, or taxes,
may properly and justly
be imposed or laid on persons and property, with a political
view, for the good
government and benefit of the community. 13. That the levying
of taxes by the
poll is grievous and oppressive, and ought to be abolished; that
paupers ought
not to be assessed n266 for the support of government;
but every other person
in the State ought to contribute his proportion of public taxes
for the support
of government, according to his actual worth, in real or personal
property,
within the State; yet fines, duties, or taxes, may properly and
justly be
imposed or laid, with a political view, for the good government
and benefit of
the community. n267 13. That the levying of taxes
by the poll is grievous and
oppressive, and ought to be abolished; that paupers ought not
to be assessed for
the support of government, but every other person of the state
ought to
contribute his proportion of public taxes for the support of
government
according to his actual worth in real or personal property within
the state;
n268 yet fines, duties, or taxes, may properly and justly be
imposed or laid
with a political view for the good government and benefit of
the community. 11.
That every person in the State ought to contribute his proportion
of public
taxes for the support of government, according to his actual
worth in real or
personal estate; n269 that the levying of taxes by
the poll is grievous and
oppressive, and ought to be abolished; n270 that
pauper estates not exceeding
thirty pounds currency n271 ought not to be assessed
for the support of
government. [*656] 16. That sanguinary Laws
n272 , n273 ought to be
avoided as far as it is consistent with the safety of the State;
and no Law to
inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties ought to be made
in any case, or
at any time, hereafter. n274 16. That sanguinary
Laws ought to be avoided as
far as it is consistent with the safety of the State; and no
Law to inflict
cruel and unusual pains and penalties ought to be made in any
case, or at any
time hereafter. n275 , n276 16. That
sanguinary laws ought to be avoided,
as n277 far as it is consistent with the safety of
the State; and no law to
inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties ought to be made
in any case or at
any time hereafter. n278 14. That sanguinary laws
ought to be avoided, so far
as is consistent with the safety of the State; and no law to
inflict cruel and
unusual pains and penalties ought to be made in any case, or
at any time
hereafter. n279 14. That sanguinary laws ought to
be avoided, as far as is
consistent with the safety of the State; and no law to inflict
cruel and unusual
pains and penalties ought to be made in any case, or at any time
hereafter. 14.
That sanguinary laws ought to be avoided, as far as is consistent
with the
safety of the State; and no law to inflict cruel and unusual
pains and penalties
ought to be made in any case, or at any time hereafter.
n280 12. That
sanguinary laws ought to be avoided as far as is consistent with
the safety of
the state. n281 17. That retrospective Laws, punishing
acts committed before
the existence of such Laws, and by them only declared criminal,
are oppressive,
unjust and incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no ex post facto
Law ought to
be made; nor any retrospective oath or restriction be imposed,
or required.
n282 , n283 17. That retrospective Laws, punishing
acts committed before the
existence of such Laws, and by them only declared criminal, are
oppressive,
unjust and incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no ex post facto
Law ought to
be made, nor any retrospective oath, or restriction be imposed,
or required.
n284 , n285 17. That retrospective laws, punishing
acts committed before the
existence of such laws, and by them only declared criminal are
oppressive,
unjust and incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no expost facto
law ought to be
made. n286 15. That retrospective laws, punishing
acts committed before the
existence of said laws, and by them only declared criminal, are
oppressive,
unjust and incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no expost facto
n287 law
ought to be made. 15. That retrospective laws, punishing facts
committed before
the existence of such laws, and by them only declared criminal,
are oppressive,
unjust, and incompatible with liberty; wherefore no ex post facto
law ought to
be made. n288 15. That retrospective laws, punishing
facts committed before
the existence of such laws, and by them only declared criminal,
are oppressive,
unjust, and incompatible with liberty; wherefore no ex post facto
law ought to
be made. 13. That retrospective laws, punishing facts committed
before the
existence of such laws, and by them only declared to be criminal,
are
oppressive, unjust, and incompatible with liberty; therefore
no ex post facto
law ought to be made. 18. That no Law to attaint particular persons
of treason
or felony ought to be made in any case, or at any time, hereafter.
n289 ,
n290 18. That no Law to attaint particular persons of treason,
or felony ought
to be made in any case, or at any time hereafter.
n291 , n292 18. That no
law to attaint n293 particular persons of treason
or felony ought to be made
in any case, or at any time, hereafter. n294 16.
That no law to attaint
particular persons of treason or felony, ought to be made in
any case or at any
time hereafter. n295 16. That no law to attaint particular
persons of treason
or felony, ought to be made in any case or at any time hereafter.
n296 16.
That no law to attaint particular persons of treason or felony
ought to be made
in any case, or at any time hereafter. 14. That no law to attaint
particular
persons of treason or felony, n297 no law to inflict
unusual pains and
penalties, unknown to the common law, ought to be made in any
case, or at any
time hereafter. n298 15. That the people of this
state ought to have the sole
and exclusive right of regulating the internal government and
police thereof.
n299 , n300 [*657] 16. That the inhabitants
of Maryland are entitled to the
common law of England, and to the trial by jury, according to
the course of that
law, and to the benefit of such English statutes, as existed
at the time of
their first emigration, and which by experience have been found
applicable to
the local, and other circumstances, and of such others as have
been since
introduced, used, and practiced by the courts of law, or equity;
and also to all
acts of assembly in force prior to the first of June seventeen
hundred and
seventy-four, except such as have been, or may be altered by
acts of Convention,
or this charter of rights; and to all property derived from,
or under the
charter granted by his majesty Charles the first to Caecilius
Calvert baron of
Baltimore. n301 , n302 ,
n303 [*658] 19. That every man, for any injury
done to him in his person or property, ought to have remedy by
the course of the
Law of the land, and ought to have justice and right, freely
without sale, fully
without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to
the Law of the
land. n304 , n305 , n306
19. That every man for any injury done to him in
his person, or property, ought to have remedy by the course of
the Law of the
Land, and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale,
fully without
any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the Law
of the Land. n307
, n308 19. That every man, n309 for any
n310 injury done to him in his
person or property, ought to have remedy by the course of the
law of the land,
and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale, fully
without any
denial, and speedily without delay, according to the law of the
land. 17. That
every free man, for every injury done to him in his person or
property, ought to
have remedy by the course of the law of the land, and ought to
have justice and
right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily
without delay
according to the law of the land. n311 17. That every
freeman, for every
injury done to him in his goods, lands, or person, ought to have
remedy by the
course of the law of the land, and ought to have justice and
right, freely
without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without
delay, according to
the law of the land. 17. That every freeman for every injury
done to him in his
person or property ought to have remedy by the course of the
law of the land,
and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale, fully
without any
denial, and speedily without delay, according to the law of the
land. 17. That
every freeman for every injury done to him in his goods, lands,
or person, by
any other person, ought to have remedy by the course of the law
of the land, and
ought to have justice and right for the injury done to him, freely
without sale,
fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according
to the law of
the land. n312 , n313 20. That the trial
of facts, where they arise, is one
of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties, and estate
of the People.
n314 , n315 , n316 20. That the trial
of facts, where they arise, is one of
the greatest securities of the lives, liberties, and estate of
the People.
n317 , n318 20. That the trial of facts where they
arise, is one of the
greatest securities of the lives, liberties, and estate of the
people. n319
18. That the trial of facts where they arise, is one of the greatest
securities
of the lives, liberties, and estate of the people.
n320 18. That the trial of
facts where they arise, is one of the greatest securities of
the lives,
liberties, and estate of the people. 18. That the trial of facts
where they
arise is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties,
and estate of
the people. 18. That the trial of facts where they arise is one
of the greatest
securities of the lives, liberties, and estate of the people.
n321 21. That in
all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed
of the
accusation against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or
charge, in due time
(if required) to prepare for his defence; to be allowed counsel;
to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; n322 to
have process for his
witnesses; to examine the witnesses for and against him on oath;
and to a speedy
trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he
ought not to be
found guilty. n323 , n324 ,
n325 , n326 21. That in all criminal
prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed of the accusation
against
him; to have a copy of the Indictment or Charge, in due time,
if required, to
prepare for his defence; to be allowed counsel; to be confronted
with the
witnesses against him; to have process for his witnesses; to
examine the
witnesses for and against him on oath; and to a speedy trial
by an impartial
jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found
guilty. n327 ,
n328 21. That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a
right to be
informed of the accusation against him; to have a copy of the
indictment or
charge, in due time (if required) to prepare for his defence;
to be allowed
counsel; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have process for
his witnesses, to examine the witnesses for and against him on
oath, and to a
speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent
he ought not
to be found guilty. n329 19. That in all criminal
prosecutions, every man hath
a right to be informed of the accusation against him; to have
a copy of the
indictment or charge, in due time (if required) to prepare for
his defence; to
be allowed counsel; n330 to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to
have process for his witnesses; to examine the witnesses for
and against him on
oath; and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose
unanimous
consent he ought not to be found guilty. n331 19.
That in all criminal
prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed of the accusation
against
him, to have a copy of the indictment or charge in due time (if
required) to
prepare for his defence, to be allowed council, n332
to be confronted with the
witnesses against him, to have process for his witnesses, to
examine the
witnesses for and against him on oath, n333 and to
a speedy trial by an
impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not
to be found guilty.
19. That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right
to be informed of
the accusation against him, to have a copy of the indictment
or charge in due
time (if required) to prepare for his defence, to be allowed
counsel, to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, to have process for
his witnesses, to
examine the witnesses for and against him on oath, and to a speedy
trial by an
impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not
to be found guilty.
19. That in all capital n334 and criminal prosecutions,
every man hath a right
to be informed of the accusation against him, n335
to be allowed counsel, to
be confronted with the accusers, or witnesses, n336
to examine evidence on
oath in his favour, and to a speedy trial n337 by
an impartial jury, without
whose unanimous n338 consent he ought not to be found
guilty. n339 , n340
[*659] 22. That no man ought to be compelled to give evidence
against himself
in a criminal case. n341 , n342 ,
n343 , n344 22. That no man ought to
be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case.
n345 ,
n346 22. That no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against
himself in a
criminal case. n347 , n348 20. That no
man ought to be compelled to give
evidence against himself in a court of common law, or in any
other court, but in
such cases as have been usually practiced in this State, or may
hereafter be
directed by the Legislature. n349 20. That no man
ought to be compelled to
give evidence against himself in a court of common law, or in
any other court,
but in such cases only as have been usually practiced in this
state. 20. That no
man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in
a court of common
law, or in any other court, but in such cases as have been usually
practiced in
this state, or may hereafter be directed by the legislature.
20. That no man in
the courts of common law ought to be compelled to give evidence
against
himself. n350 , n351 23. In the trial
of all criminal cases, the Jury shall
be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court
may pass upon
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.
n352 , n353 ,
n354 , n355 The right of trial by Jury of all issues
of fact in civil
proceedings in the several Courts of Law in this State, where
the amount in
controversy exceeds the sum of five thousand dollars, shall be
inviolably
preserved. n356 [*660] 24. That no man
ought to be taken or imprisoned or
disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed,
or exiled, or,
in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or
property, but by
the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.
n357 , n358 , n359
, n360 , n361 , n362 23.
That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned, or
disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed,
or exiled, or,
in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or
property, but by
the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the Land.
n363 , n364 23. That
no man n365 ought to be taken or imprisoned, or disseized
of his freehold,
liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner
destroyed, or
deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment
of his peers, or
by the law of the land. n366 21. That no freeman
n367 ought to be taken or
imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges,
or outlawed,
or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life,
liberty, or
property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of
the land: Provided,
That nothing in this article shall be so construed as to prevent
the Legislature
from passing all such laws for the government, regulation and
disposition of the
free colored population of this State as they may deem necessary.
n368 21.
That no freeman ought to be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized
of his freehold,
liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner
destroyed, or
deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the lawful
judgment of his
peers, or by the law of the land. n369 21. That no
freeman ought to be taken,
or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, liberties, or privileges,
or
outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived
of his life,
liberty, or property, but by the lawful judgment of his peers,
or by the law of
the land. 21. That no freeman ought to be taken, or imprisoned,
or disseised of
his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled,
or in any manner
destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but
by the lawful
judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.
n370 (eliminated) n371 24.
That Slavery shall not be re-established in this State; but having
been
abolished under the policy and authority of the United States,
compensation, in
consideration thereof, n372 is due from the United
States. n373 , n374 ,
n375 24. That hereafter, in this State, there shall be neither
slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except in punishment of crime, whereof
the party shall
have been duly convicted: and all persons held to service or
labor as slaves are
hereby declared free. n376 , n377 ,
n378 25. That excessive bail ought not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, n379 nor
cruel or unusual punishment
inflicted, by the Courts of Law. n380 ,
n381 , n382 25. That excessive
bail ought not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel or unusual
punishments inflicted by the Courts of Law. n383
, n384 25. That excessive
bail ought not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel or unusual
punishments inflicted by the Courts of Law. n385
22. That excessive bail ought
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual
punishments
inflicted by the courts n386 of law.
n387 22. That excessive bail ought not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual
punishments
inflicted by the court of law. 22. That excessive bail ought
not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments
inflicted by the
court of law. 22. That excessive bail ought not be required,
nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted.
n388 , n389 [*661]
26. That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search
suspected places,
or to seize any person or property, are grevious [grievous] and
oppressive; and
all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend
suspected
persons, without naming or describing the place, or the person
in special, are
illegal, and ought not to be granted. n390 ,
n391 , n392 , n393 26. That
all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected
places, or to
seize any person, or property, are grievous and oppressive; and
all general
warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected
persons, without
naming or describing the place, or the person in special, are
illegal, and ought
not to be granted. n394 , n395 26. That
all warrants, without oath, or
affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person
or property, are
grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected
places, or
to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing
the place, or the
person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted.
n396 23. That all
warrants, without oath, or affirmation, to search suspected places,
or to seize
any person or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all
general warrants to
search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without
naming or
describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal,
and ought not to be
granted. n397 23. That all warrants without oath
or affirmation, to search
suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous
and
oppressive; and all general warrants - to search suspected places,
or to
apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the
place, or the
person in special, - are illegal, and ought not to be granted.
23. That all
warrants without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places,
or to seize
any person, or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all
general warrants
to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons,
without naming or
describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal,
and ought not to be
granted. 23. That all warrants, without oath, to search suspected
places, or to
seize any person, or his property, are grievous and oppressive;
and all general
warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend all persons
suspected,
without naming or describing the place, or any person in special,
are illegal.
n398 , n399 27. That no conviction shall work corruption
of blood or
forfeiture of estate. n400 , n401 27.
That no conviction shall work
corruption of blood, or forfeiture of estate. n402
, n403 27. That no
conviction shall work corruption of blood, nor shall there be
any forfeiture of
the estate of any person for any crime, except treason, and then
only on
conviction. n404 , n405 24. That no conviction
shall work corruption of
blood, or forfeiture of estate. n406 24. That there
ought to be no forfeiture
of any part of the estate of any person for any crime except
murder, or treason
against the State, and then only on conviction and attainder.
24. That there
ought to be no forfeiture, of any part of the estate of any person
for any
crime, except murder, or treason against the State, and then
only on conviction
and attainder. 24. That there ought not to be forfeiture of any
part of the
estate of convicted and attainted persons except for murder or
high treason
against the State. 28. That a well regulated Militia is the proper
and natural
defence of a free Government. n407 ,
n408 , n409 28. That a well regulated
Militia is the proper and natural defence of a free government.
n410 , n411
28. That a well regulated militia is the proper and natural defence
of a free
government. n412 25. That a well regulated militia
is the proper and natural
defence of a free government. n413 25. That a well-regulated
militia is the
proper, and natural defence of a free government. 25. That a
well regulated
militia is the proper and natural defence of a free government.
25. That a well
regulated militia is the proper, natural and safe
n414 defence of a free
government. n415 29. That standing Armies are dangerous
to liberty, and ought
not to be raised, or kept up, without the consent of the Legislature.
n416 ,
n417 29. That Standing Armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought
not to be
raised, or kept up, without the consent of the Legislature.
n418 , n419 29.
That standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not
to be raised or
kept up without the consent of the Legislature. n420
26. That standing armies
are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept
up without consent
of the Legislature. n421 26. That standing armies
are dangerous to liberty,
and ought not to be raised or kept up, without consent of the
legislature. 26.
That standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not
to be raised or
kept up without consent of the legislature. 26. That standing
armies are
dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised, or kept up
without consent of
the legislature. n422 [*662] 30. That
in all cases, and at all times, the
military ought to be under strict subordination to, and control
of, the civil
power. n423 , n424 30. That in all cases,
and at all times, the military
ought to be under strict subordination to, and control of the
civil power.
n425 , n426 29. That in all cases and at all times
the military ought to be
under strict subordination to and control of the civil power.
n427 27. That in
all cases and at all times the military ought to be under strict
subordination
to, and control of the civil power. n428 27. That
in all cases, and at all
times, the military ought to be under strict subordination to,
and control of
the civil power. 27. That in all cases and at all times the military
ought to be
under strict subordination to, and controul of the civil power.
27. That in all
cases and at all times the military ought to be under strict
subordination to,
and controul of the civil power. 31. That no soldier shall, in
time of peace, be
quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor
in time of war,
except in the manner prescribed by Law. n429 ,
n430 31. That no soldier
shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the
consent of the
owner, nor, in time of war except in the manner prescribed by
Law. n431 ,
n432 30. That no soldier shall in time of peace be quartered
in any house
without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war except in
the manner
prescribed by law. n433 , n434 28. That
no soldier ought to be quartered in
any house in time of peace without the consent of the owner,
and in time of war
in such manner only n435 as the Legislature shall
direct. 28. That no soldier
ought to be quartered in any house, in time of peace, without
the consent of the
owner; and in time of war, in such manner only as the Legislature
shall direct.
28. That no soldier ought to be quartered in any house in time
of peace, without
the consent of the owner; and in time of war, in such manner
only as the
legislature shall direct. 28. That no soldier ought to be quartered
in any house
in time of peace, without the consent of the owner; and in time
of war in such
manner only as the legislature shall direct. n436
32. That no person except
regular soldiers, marines, and mariners in the service of this
State, or
militia, when in actual service, ought, in any case, to be subject
to, or
punishable by Martial Law. n437 32. That no person
except regular soldiers and
marines and mariners in the service of this State, or militia
when in actual
service, ought, in any case, to be subject to, or punishable
by, Martial Law.
n438 , n439 31. That no person, except regular soldiers,
mariners, and
marines, in the service of this State, or militia when in actual
service, ought
in any case to be subject to, or punishable by, martial law.
n440 29. That no
person except regular soldiers, mariners, and marines, in the
service of this
State, or militia when in actual service, ought in any case to
be subject to or
punishable by martial law. n441 29. That no person,
except regular soldiers,
mariners and marines in the service of this State, or militia
when in actual
service, ought in any case to be subject to or punishable by
martial law. 29.
That no person except regular soldiers, mariners and marines
in the service of
this State, or militia when in actual service, ought in any case
to be subject
to, or punishable by, martial law. 29. That no person except
soldiers, mariners
or marines in the service of this State, ought in any case to
be subject to, or
punishable by martial law. [*663] 33. That the independency
and uprightness of
Judges are essential to the impartial administration of Justice,
and a great
security to the rights and liberties of the People: Wherefore,
the Judges shall
not be removed, except in the manner, and for the causes provided
in this
Constitution. n442 No Judge shall hold any other
office, civil or military, or
political trust, or employment of any kind, whatsoever, under
the Constitution
or Laws of this State, or of the United States, or any of them;
except that a
Judge may be a member of a reserve component of the armed forces
of the United
States or a member of the militia of the United States or this
State; or receive
fees or perquisites of any kind for the discharge of his official
duties. n443
, n444 , n445 33. That the independency
and uprightness of Judges are
essential to the impartial administration of Justice, and a great
security to
the rights and liberties of the People; wherefore, the Judges
shall not be
removed, except in the manner, and for the causes provided in
this Constitution.
n446 No Judge shall hold any other office, civil
or military, or political
trust, n447 or employment of any kind, whatsoever,
under the Constitution or
Laws of this State, or of the United States, or any of them;
or receive fees or
perquisites of any kind for the discharge of his official duties.
n448 33.
That the independency and uprightness of Judges are essential
to the impartial
administration of justice, and a great security to the rights
and liberties of
the people; wherefore the Judges shall not be removed, except
for misbehavior,
on conviction in a Court of Law, or by the Governor, upon address
of the General
Assembly; provided , that two-thirds of all the members of each
House concur in
such address. n449 No Judge shall hold any other
office, civil or military, or
political trust or employment of any kind whatsoever, under the
Constitution or
Laws of this State, or of the United States, or any of them,
or receive fees or
perquisites of any kind for the discharge of his official duties.
30. That the
independency and uprightness of Judges are essential to the impartial
administration of justice, and a great security to the rights
and liberties of
the people, wherefore the Judges shall not be removed except
for misbehaviour,
on conviction in a court of law, or by the Governor, upon address
of the General
Assembly; provided, that two-thirds of all the members of each
House concur in
such address. No Judge shall n450 hold any other
office, civil or military, or
political trust or employment of any kind whatsoever,
n451 under the
Constitution or Laws of this State, or of the United States,
or any of them, or
receive fees or perquisites of any kind for the discharge of
his official
duties. n452 30. That the independency and uprightness
of Judges are essential
to the impartial administration of justice, and a great security
to the rights
and liberties of the people; wherefore the Chancellor and Judges
ought to hold
commissions during good behaviour, and the said Chancellor and
Judges shall be
removed for misbehaviour, on conviction in a court of law, and
may be removed by
the Governor upon address of the General Assembly, Provided,
that two-thirds of
all the members of each house concur in such address. That salaries,
liberal,
but not profuse, ought to be secured to the Chancellor and the
Judges during the
continuation of their commissions, in such manner, and at such
time as the
legislature shall hereafter direct, upon consideration of the
circumstances of
this state. No Chancellor or Judge ought to hold any other office,
civil or
military, or receive fees or perquisites of any kind.
n453 30. That the
independency and uprightness of judges are essential to the impartial
administration of justice, and a great security to the rights
and liberties of
the people; wherefore the chancellor and all judges ought to
hold commissions
during good behaviour, and the said chancellor and judges shall
be removed for
misbehaviour on conviction in a court of law, and may be removed
by the governor
upon the address of the general assembly, provided that two thirds
of all the
members of each house concur in such address. n454
That salaries liberal but
not profuse ought to be secured to the chancellor and the judges
during the
continuation of their commissions, in such manner and at such
time as the
legislature shall hereafter direct upon consideration of the
circumstances of
this state: n455 No chancellor or judge ought to
hold any other office civil
or military, or receive fees or perquisites of any kind. 30.
That the
independency and uprightness of judges are essential to the impartial
administration of justice, and a great security to the rights
and liberties of
the people; therefore the chancellor and all judges ought to
hold commissions
during good behaviour, removable only for misbehaviour on conviction
in a court
of law, on conviction by impeachment, or by a vote of the legislature.
n456
[*664] 34. That a long continuance in the Executive Departments
of power or
trust is dangerous to liberty; a rotation, therefore, in those
Departments is
one of the best securities of permanent freedom.
n457 , n458 , n459 ,
n460 34. That a long continuance in the Executive Departments
of power, or
trust, is dangerous to liberty; a rotation, therefore, in those
Departments is
one of the best securities of permanent freedom.
n461 , n462 34. That a long
continuance in the Executive Departments of power or trust, is
dangerous to
liberty; a rotation, therefore, in those departments is one of
the best
securities of permanent freedom. n463 31. That a
long continuance in the
executive departments of power or trust, is dangerous to liberty;
a rotation,
therefore, in those departments is one of the best securities
of permanent
freedom. n464 31. That a long continuance, in the
first executive departments
of power or trust, is dangerous to liberty; a rotation, therefore,
in those
departments, is one of the best securities of permanent freedom.
n465 31. That
a long continuance in the first executive departments of power
or trust is
dangerous to liberty, a rotation therefore in those departments
is one of the
best securities of permanent freedom. n466 31. That
a long continuation in
offices of trust or profit is dangerous to liberty, a rotation
therefore in
office is one of the best securities of permanent freedom; that
salaries
liberal, but not profuse, ought to be secured to the chancellor
and the judges,
during the continuation of their commissions, and reasonable
salaries, or fees,
allowed to the offices. n467 32. That no person holding
a place of profit, or
receiving any part of the profits thereof, or concerned in army,
navy, or
government contracts, or employed in the executive department
of civil
government, or in the regular land service, or marine, of this,
or the United
States, or a minor, or an alien, ought to have a seat in the
legislature or
privy council of this State. n468 [*665]
35. That no person shall hold, at
the same time, more than one office of profit, created by the
Constitution or
laws of this State; nor shall any person in public trust receive
any present
from any foreign Prince or State, or from the United States,
or any of them,
without the approbation of this State. The position of Notary
Public shall not
be considered an office of profit within the meaning of this
Article. n469
Membership in the militia of this State shall not be considered
an office of
profit within the meaning of this Article; nor shall any remuneration
received
as a consequence of membership in a reserve component of the
armed forces of the
United States or of membership in the militia of the United States
or of this
State be considered a present within the meaning of this Article.
n470 ,
n471 , n472 , n473 35. That no person
shall hold, at the same time, more
than one office of profit, created by the Constitution or Laws
of this State;
nor shall any person in public trust receive any present from
any foreign Prince
or State, or from the United States, or any of them, without
the approbation of
this State. n474 , n475 35. That no person
ought to hold, at the same time
more than one office of profit, n476 created by the
Constitution or laws of
this State; nor ought any person in public trust to receive any
present n477
from any Foreign Prince or State, or from the United States,
or any of them,
without the approbation of this State. 32. That no person ought
to hold at the
same time more than one office of profit, created by the Constitution
or laws of
this State; nor ought any person in public trust to receive any
present from any
Foreign Prince, or State, or from the United States, or any of
them, without the
approbation of this State. n478 32. That no person
ought to hold, at the same
time, more than one office of profit, nor ought any person, in
public trust, to
receive any present from any foreign prince or state, or from
the United States,
or any of them, without the approbation of this State.
n479 32. That no person
ought to hold at the same time more than one office of profit,
nor ought any
person in public trust to receive any present from any foreign
prince or state,
or from the United States, or any of them, without the approbation
of this
state. 33. That no person ought to hold at the same time more
than one office of
profit, nor any person in public trust to receive any gratuity,
present, or
emolument, from any foreign prince, or State, or from the United
States, or any
of them. [*666] 36. That as it is the duty of every
man to worship God in such
manner as he thinks most acceptable to Him, all persons are equally
entitled to
protection in their religious liberty; wherefore, no person ought
by any law to
be molested in his person or estate, on account of his religious
persuasion, or
profession, or for his religious practice, unless, under the
color of religion,
he shall disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State,
or shall infringe
the laws of morality, or injure others in their natural, civil
or religious
rights, nor ought any person to be compelled to frequent, or
maintain, or
contribute, unless on contract, to maintain, any place of worship,
or any
ministry; n480 nor shall any person, otherwise competent,
be deemed
incompetent, as a witness, or juror, on account of his religious
belief; n481
provided, he believes in the existence of God, and that, under
His dispensation
such person will be held morally accountable for his acts, and
be rewarded or
punished therefor either in this world or in the world to come.
n482 , n483
36. That as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such
manner as he
thinks most acceptable to Him, all persons are equally entitled
to protection in
their religious liberty; wherefore no person ought, by any law
to be molested in
his person or estate on account of his religious persuasion or
profession, or
for his religious practice, unless under the color of religion
any man shall
disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State, or shall
infringe the laws
of morality, or injure others in their natural, civil or religious
rights nor
ought any person to be compelled to frequent, or maintain, or
contribute, unless
on contract, to maintain any place of worship, or any ministry;
nor shall any
person, otherwise competent, n486 be deemed incompetent,
as a witness or juror
on account of his religious belief; provided, he believes in
the existence of
God, and that under His dispensation such person will be held
morally
accountable for his acts, and be rewarded or punished therefor,
either in this
world, or the world to come. n487 , n488
36. That as it is the duty of every
man to worship God in such manner as he thinks most acceptable
to Him, all
persons are equally entitled to protection in their religious
liberty; wherefore
no person ought, by any law, to be molested in his person or
estate on account
of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his religious
practice, unless
under color of religion, any man shall disturb the good order,
peace or safety
of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure
others in their
natural, civil or religious rights, nor ought any person to be
compelled to
frequent or maintain or contribute, unless on contract, to maintain
any place of
worship, or any ministry; nor shall any person be deemed incompetent
as a
witness n489 or juror, who believes in the existence
of God, and that under
his dispensation such person will be held morally accountable
for his acts, and
be rewarded or punished therefor, either in this world or the
world to come. 33.
That as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner
as he thinks
most acceptable to Him, all persons are equally entitled to protection
in their
religious liberty; wherefore, no person ought, by any law, to
be molested in his
person or estate on account of his religious persuasion or profession,
or for
his religious practice, unless under color of religion, any man
shall disturb
the good order, peace or safety of the State, or shall infringe
the laws of
morality, or injure others in their natural, civil or religious
rights; nor
ought any person to be compelled to frequent or maintain or contribute,
unless
on contract, to maintain any place of worship, or any ministry;
nor shall any
person be deemed incompetent as a witness or juror, who believes
in the
existence of a God, and that under his dispensation such person
will be held
morally accountable for his acts, and be rewarded or punished
therefor, either
in this world or the world to come. n490 33. That,
as it is the duty of every
man to worship God in such manner as he thinks most acceptable
to him; all
persons, professing the Christian religion, are equally entitled
to protection
in their religious liberty; wherefore no person ought by any
law to be molested
in his person or estate on account of his religious persuasion
or profession, or
for his religious practice; unless under colour of religion,
any man shall
disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State, or shall
infringe the laws
of morality, or injure others, in their natural, civil, or religious
rights; nor
ought any person to be compelled to frequent or maintain, or
contribute, unless
on contract, to maintain any particular place of worship, or
any particular
ministry; yet the legislature may in their discretion lay a general
and equal
tax for the support of the Christian religion; leaving to each
individual the
power of appointing the payment over of the money collected from
him, to the
support of any particular place of worship or minister, or for
the benefit of
the poor of his own 33. That as it is the duty of every man to
worship God in
such manner as he thinks most acceptable to him, all persons
professing the
christian religion are equally entitled to protection in their
religious
liberty, wherefore no person ought by any law to be molested
in his person or
estate on account of his religious persuasion or profession,
or for his
religious practice, unless under colour of religion any man shall
disturb the
good order, peace, or safety of the State, or shall infringe
the laws of
morality, or injure others in their natural, civil or religious
rights; nor
ought any person to be compelled to frequent or maintain, or
contribute, unless
on contract, to maintain any particular place of worship, or
any particular
ministry; yet the legislature may in their discretion lay a general
and equal
tax for the support of the christian religion, leaving to each
individual the
power of appointing the payment over of the money collected from
him, to the
support of any particular place of worship or minister, or for
the poor of his
own denomination, or the 35. That no person ought to be by any
law molested in
his person or estate for his religious persuasion, profession,
or practice, nor
compelled to frequent or maintain, or contribute, unless on contract,
to
maintain any religious worship, place of worship, or ministry,
provided that
such of the present clergy of the church of England, who have
remained in their
parishes, and performed their duty, and shall continue to do
so, be entitled to
receive during their lives the provision and support established
by an act of
assembly passed at a session of assembly, begun and held at the
city of
Annapolis the 16th of November, 1773, entitled, "An act for the
support of the
clergy of the church of England in this province," subject nevertheless
to such
rules and regulations as shall be hereafter made by the legislature.
n493 ,
n494 [*667] Nothing shall prohibit or require the
making reference to belief
in, reliance upon, or invoking the aid of God or a Supreme Being
in any
governmental or public document, proceeding, activity, ceremony,
school,
institution, or place. denomination, or the poor in general of
any particular
county : but the churches, chapels, glebes, and all other property
now belonging
to the church of England, ought to remain to the church of England
forever. And
all acts of Assembly, lately passed, for collecting monies for
poor in general
of any particular county; n492 but the churches,
chapels, glebes, and all
other property now belonging to the church of England, ought
to remain to the
church of England for ever. And all acts of assembly lately passed
for
collecting monies for building or repairing Nothing in this article
shall
constitute an establishment of religion. n484 ,
n485 building or repairing
particular churches or chapels of ease, shall continue in force,
and be
executed, unless the Legislature shall, by act, supersede or
repeal the same:
but no county court shall assess any quantity of tobacco, or
sum of money,
hereafter, on the application of any vestry-man or church-wardens;
and every
encumbent of the church of England, who hath remained in his
parish, and
performed his duty, shall be entitled to receive the provision
and support
established by the act, entitled, "An act for the support of
the clergy of the
church of England in this Province," till the November court
of this present
year, to be held for the county in which his parish shall lie,
or partly lie, or
for such time as he hath remained in his parish, and performed
his duty. n491
particular churches or chapels of ease, shall continue in force
and be executed,
unless the legislature shall by act supersede or repeal the same;
but no county
court shall assess any quantity of tobacco or sum of money hereafter
on the
application of any vestryman or churchwardens : and every incumbent
of the
church of England who hath remained in his parish and performed
his duty, shall
be entitled to receive the provision and support established
by the act,
entitled, "An act for the support of the clergy of the church
of England in this
province," till the November court of this present year, to be
held for the
county in which his parish shall lie, or partly lie, or for such
time as he hath
remained in his parish and performed his duty. [*668]
37. That no religious
test ought ever to be required as a qualification for any office
of profit or
trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the
existence of
God; n495 nor shall the legislature prescribe any
other oath of office than
the oath prescribed by this Constitution. n496 ,
n497 , n498 37. That no
religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification for
any office of
profit or trust, in this State, other than a declaration of belief
in the
existence of God; nor shall the legislature prescribe any other
oath of office
than the oath prescribed in this Constitution. n499
, n500 37. That no other
test or qualification ought to be required, on admission to any
office of trust
or profit, than such oath of allegiance and fidelity to this
State, and the
United States, n501 as may be prescribed by this
Constitution; and such oath
of office and qualification as may be prescribed by this Constitution,
or by the
Laws of the State, and a declaration of belief in the Christian
religion, or in
the existence of God, and in a future state of rewards and punishments.
n502
, n503 34. That no other test or qualification ought
to be required on
admission to any office of trust or profit, then such oath of
office as may be
prescribed by this Constitution, or by the Laws of the State,
and a declaration
of a belief in the Christian religion; n504 and if
the party shall profess to
be a Jew, the declaration shall be of his belief in a future
state of rewards
and punishments. n505 , n506 [*669]
(Repealed) n507 38. That every gift,
sale or devise of land, to any Minister, Public Teacher or Preacher
of the
Gospel, as such, or to any Religious Sect, Order or Denomination,
or to, or for
the support, use or benefit of, or in trust for any Minister,
Public Teacher or
Preacher of the Gospel, as such, or any Religious Sect, Order
or Denomination,
and every gift, or sale of goods, or chattels, to go in succession,
or to take
place after the death of the Seller or Donor, to or for such
support, use or
benefit, and also every devise of goods, or chattels to or for
the support, use
or benefit of any Minister, Public Teacher or Preacher of the
Gospel, as such,
or any Religious Sect, Order or Denomination, without the prior,
or subsequent
sanction of the Legislature, shall be void; except always, any
sale, gift, lease
or devise of any quantity of land, not exceeding five acres for
a church,
meeting-house, or other house of worship, or parsonage, or for
a burying ground,
which shall be improved, enjoyed or used only for such purpose;
or such sale,
gift, lease or devise, shall be void. n508 ,
n509 , n510 , n511 38. That
every gift, sale or devise of lands to any minister, public teacher
or preacher
of the Gospel, as such, or to any religious sect, order or denomination,
or for
the support, use or benefit of, or in trust for any minister,
public teacher, or
preacher of the Gospel, as such, or any religious sect, order
or denomination,
and every gift or sale of goods or chattels, to go in succession
or to take
place after the death of the seller or donor, to or for such
support, use or
benefit, and also every devise of goods or chattels to or for
the support, use
or benefit of any minister, public teacher or preacher of the
Gospel, as such,
or any religious sect, order or denomination, without the prior
or subsequent
sanction n512 of the Legislature, shall be void;
except, always, any sale,
gift, lease or devise of any quantity of land not exceeding five
acres for a
church, meeting house, or other house of worship, or parsonage,
or for a burying
ground, which shall be improved, enjoyed or used only for such
purpose; or such
sale, gift, lease or devise, shall be void. 35. That every gift,
sale or devise
of lands to any minister, public teacher or preacher of the gospel,
as such, or
to any religious sect, order or denomination, or to or for the
support, use or
benefit of, or in trust for, any minister, public teacher, or
preacher of the
gospel, as such, or any religious sect, order or denomination,
and every gift or
sale of goods or chattels to go in succession, or to take place
after the death
of the seller or donor, to or for such support, use or benefit;
and, also, every
devise of goods or chattels, to or for the support, use or benefit
of any
minister, public teacher or preacher of the gospel, as such,
or any religious
sect, order or denomination, without the leave of the Legislature,
shall be
void; except always, any sale, gift, lease or devise of any quantity
of land not
exceeding five acres for a church, meeting house, or other house
of worship, or
parsonage, or for a burying ground, which shall be improved,
enjoyed or used
only for such purpose; or such sale, gift, lease or devise, shall
be void.
n513 34. That every gift, sale or devise of lands to any minister,
public
teacher, or preacher of the gospel, as such, or to any religious
sect, order or
denomination, or to or for the support, use or benefit of, or
in trust for, any
minister, public teacher or preacher of the gospel, as such,
or any religious
sect, order or denomination - and every gift or sale of goods,
or chattels, to
go in succession, or to take place after the death of the seller
or donor, or to
or for such support, use or benefit - and also every devise of
goods or chattel
to, or to or for the support, use or benefit of any minister,
public teacher or
preacher of the gospel, as such, or any religious sect, order
or denomination,
without the leave of the legislature, shall be void; except always
any sale,
gift, lease or devise of any quantity of land not exceeding two
acres, for a
church, meeting, or other house of worship, and for a burying-
ground, which
shall be improved, enjoyed or used only for such purpose - or
such sale, gift,
lease or devise shall be void. 34. That every gift, sale, or
devise of lands to
any minister, public teacher or preacher of the gospel, as such,
or to any
religious sect, order or denomination, or to or for the support,
use or benefit
of, or in trust for, any minister, public teacher or preacher
of the gospel, as
such, or any religious sect, order or denomination; and every
gift or sale of
goods or chattels to go in succession, or to take place after
the death of the
seller or donor, or to or for such support, use or benefit; and
also every
devise of goods or chattels to, or to or for the support, use
or benefit of any
minister, public teacher or preacher of the gospel, as such,
or any religious
sect, order or denomination, without the leave of the legislature,
shall be
void; except always any sale, gift, lease or devise of any quantity
of land not
exceeding two acres, for a church, meeting, or other house of
worship, and for a
burying ground, which shall be improved, enjoyed or used only
for such purpose
or such sale, gift, lease or devise shall be void.
n514 [*670] 36. That no
person conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath ought to
be obliged by any
law to take an oath in order to be admitted into office, and
in all civil cases
such persons ought to be permitted to take an affirmation.
n515 35. That no
other test or qualification ought to be required, on admission
to any office of
trust or profit, then such oath of support and fidelity to this
State, and such
oath of office as shall be directed by this Convention, or the
Legislature of
this State, and a declaration of a belief in the Christian religion.
n516 35.
That no other test or qualification ought to be required on admission
to any
office of trust or profit, than such oath of support and fidelity
to this State,
and such oath of office as shall be directed by this Convention
or the
legislature of this state, and a declaration of a belief in the
christian
religion. 37. That no other oath, affirmation, test or qualification
ought to be
required on admission to any office of trust or profit, then
such oath or
affirmation of support and fidelity to this State as shall be
prescribed by this
Convention, and such oath of office as shall be directed by law,
and a
declaration of a belief in the Christian religion. [*671]
39. That the manner
of administering an oath or affirmation to any person, ought
to be such as those
of the religious persuasion, profession, or denomination, of
which he is a
member, generally esteem the most effectual confirmation by the
attestation of
the Divine Being. n517 , n518 ,
n519 39. That the manner of administering
an oath or affirmation to any person ought to be such as those
of the religious
persuasion, profession, or denomination, of which he is a member,
generally
esteem the most effectual confirmation by the attestation of
the Divine Being.
n520 , n521 39. That the manner of administering
an oath or affirmation to any
person ought to be such as those of the religious persuasion,
profession or
denomination of which he is a member generally esteem the most
effectual
confirmation by the attestation of the Divine Being.
n522 36. That the manner
of administering an oath or affirmation to any person ought to
be such as those
of the religious persuasion, profession or denomination of which
he is a member,
generally esteem the most effectual confirmation by the attestation
of the
Divine Being. n523 36. That the manner of administering
an oath to any person,
ought to be such, as those of the religious persuasion, profession,
or
denomination, of which such person is one, generally esteem the
most effectual
confirmation, by the attestation of the Divine Being. And that
the people called
Quakers, those called Dunkers, and those called Menonists, holding
it unlawful
to take an oath on any occasion, ought to be allowed to make
their solemn
affirmation, in the manner that Quakers have been heretofore
allowed to affirm;
and to be of the same avail as an oath, in all such cases, as
the affirmation of
Quakers hath been allowed and accepted within this State, instead
of an oath.
And further, on such affirmation, warrants to search for stolen
goods, or the
apprehension or commitment of offenders, ought to be granted,
or security for
the peace awarded, and Quakers, Dunkers or Menonists ought also,
on their solemn
affirmation as aforesaid, to be admitted as witnesses, in all
criminal cases not
capital. n524 36. That the manner of administering
an oath to any person,
ought to be such as those of the religious persuasion, profession
or
denomination of which such person is one, generally esteem the
most effectual
confirmation by the attestation of the divine being. And that
the people called
quakers, those called dunkers, and those called menonists, holding
it unlawful
to take an oath on any occasion, ought to be allowed to make
their solemn
affirmation in the manner that quakers have been heretofore allowed
to affirm,
and to be of the same avail as an oath in all such cases as the
affirmation of
quakers hath been allowed and accepted within this state instead
of an oath. And
further, on such affirmation warrants to search for stolen goods,
or the
apprehension or commitment of offenders, ought to be granted,
or security for
the peace awarded, and quakers, dunkers or menonists, ought also
be on their
solemn affirmation as aforesaid, to be admitted as witnesses
in all criminal
cases not capital. n525 [*672] 37. That
the city of Annapolis ought to have
all its rights, privileges and benefits, agreeable to its Charter
and the Acts
of Assembly confirming and regulating the same; subject to such
alterations as
have been or as may be made by the Legislature. n526
37. That the city of
Annapolis ought to have all its rights, privileges, and benefits,
agreeable to
its Charter, and the acts of Assembly confirming and regulating
the same,
subject nevertheless to such alteration as may be made by this
Convention, or
any future Legislature. 37. That the city of Annapolis ought
to have all its
rights, privileges, and benefits, agreeable to its charter and
the acts of
assembly confirming and regulating the same, subject nevertheless
to such
alterations as may be made by this Convention or any future legislature.
38.
That the city of Annapolis ought to have all its rights, privileges,
and
benefits, agreeable to its charter and the acts of assembly.
40. That the
liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved; that every
citizen of the
State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments
on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.
n527 , n528 ,
n529 , n530 , n531 40. That the liberty
of the press ought to be inviolably
preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed
to speak, write
and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of
that privilege. n532 , n533 40. That
the liberty of the press ought to be
inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to
be allowed to
speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for
the abuse of that liberty. n534 , n535
38. That the liberty of the press
ought to be inviolably preserved. n536 38. That the
liberty of the press ought
to be inviolably preserved. 38. That the liberty of the press
ought to be
inviolably preserved. 39. That the liberty of the press ought
to be involubly
preserved. n537 41. That monopolies are odious, contrary
to the spirit of a
free government and the principles of commerce, and ought not
to be suffered.
n538 , n539 , n540 41. That monopolies
are odious, contrary to the spirit of
a free government and the principles of commerce, and ought not
to be suffered.
n541 , n542 41. That monopolies are odious, contrary
to the spirit of a free
government and the principles of commerce, and ought not to be
suffered. n543
39. That monopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit of a free
government and
the principles of commerce, and ought not to be suffered.
n544 39. That
monopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit of a free government,
and the
principles of commerce and ought not to be suffered.
n545 39. That monopolies
are odious, contrary to the spirit of a free government, and
the principles of
commerce, and ought not to be suffered. 40. That monopolies in
trade are odious,
contrary to the spirit of a free government, and the principles
of commerce, and
ought not to be suffered. 41. That no person hereafter imported
into this state
from Africa, or any part of the British dominions, ought to be
held in slavery
under any pretence whatever, and that no negro or mulatto slave
ought to be
brought into this State for sale from any part of the world.
n546 [*673] 42.
That no title of nobility or hereditary honors ought to be granted
in this
State. n547 , n548 , n549
42. That no title of nobility or hereditary
honors ought to be granted in this State. n550 ,
n551 42. That no title of
nobility or hereditary honors ought to be granted in this State.
n552 40. That
no title of nobility or hereditary honors ought to be granted
in this State.
n553 40. That no title of nobility, or hereditary honours, ought
to be granted
in this State. n554 40. That no title of nobility
or hereditary honours ought
to be granted in this State. 42. That no title of nobility ought
to be granted
in this State. 43. That the Legislature ought to encourage the
diffusion of
knowledge and virtue, the extension of a judicious system of
general education,
the promotion of literature, the arts, sciences, agriculture,
commerce and
manufactures, and the general amelioration of the condition of
the People.
n555 The legislature may provide that land actively devoted to
farm or
agricultural use shall be assessed on the basis of such use and
shall not be
assessed as if subdivided. n556 , n557
43. That the Legislature ought to
encourage the diffusion of knowledge and virtue, the extension
of a judicious
system of general education, the promotion of literature, the
arts, sciences,
agriculture, commerce and manufactures, and the general melioration
of the
condition of the people. n558 , n559
43. That the Legislature ought to
encourage the diffusion of knowledge and virtue, the extension
of a judicious
system of general education, n560 the promotion of
literature, the arts,
sciences, agriculture, commerce and manufactures, and the general
melioration of
the condition of the people. n561 41. That the Legislature
ought to encourage
the diffusion of knowledge and virtue, the promotion of literature,
the arts,
sciences, agriculture, commerce and manufactures, and the general
melioration of
the condition of the people. n562 44. That the provisions
of the Constitution
of the United States, and of this State, apply, as well in time
of war, as in
time of peace; and any departure therefrom, or violation thereof,
under the plea
of necessity, or any other plea, is subversive of good Government,
and tends to
anarchy and despotism. n563 , n564 ,
n565 44. That the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, and of this State, apply as
well in time of
war as in time of peace; and any departure therefrom, or violation
thereof,
under the plea of necessity, or any other plea, is subversive
of good
Government, and tends to anarchy and despotism. n566
, n567 , n568 [*674]
45. This enumeration of Rights shall not be construed to impair
or deny others
retained by the People. n569 45. This enumeration
of Rights shall not be
construed to impair or deny others retained by the People.
n570 , n571 44.
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or
deny others
retained by the people. n572 42. This enumeration
of rights shall not be
construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.
n573 , n574 41.
That the subsisting resolves of this and the several Conventions
held for this
colony, ought to be in force as laws, unless altered by this
Convention, or the
legislature of this State. 41. That the subsisting resolves of
this and the
several Conventions held for this colony ought to continue and
be in force as
laws, unless altered by this Convention or the legislature of
this State. 43.
That the resolves and proceedings of this and the several Conventions
held for
this colony ought to continue and be in force as laws, unless
altered by this
Convention, or the legislature of this State. 45. That the Legislature
shall
pass no law providing for an alteration, change or abolishment
of this
Constitution, except in the manner therein prescribed and directed.
n575 ,
n576 43. That this Constitution shall not be altered, changed
or abolished,
except in the manner therein prescribed and directed.
n577 42. That this
declaration of rights, or the form of government, to be established
by this
Convention, or any part of either of them, ought not to be altered,
changed or
abolished by the legislature of this State, but in such manner
as this
Convention shall prescribe and direct. 42. That this declaration
of rights, or
the form of government to be established by this Convention,
or any part of
either of them, ought not to be altered, changed or abolished
by the legislature
of this state, but in such manner as this Convention shall prescribe
and direct.
44. That the form of government to be established by this Convention
ought not
to be altered, changed or abolished, but in such manner as this
Convention shall
prescribe and direct. n578 46. Equality of rights
under the law shall not be
abridged or denied because of sex. n579 ,
n580 , n581 [*675] 47. (a) A
victim of crime shall be treated by agents of the State with
dignity, respect,
and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice process.
(b) In a case
originating by indictment or information filed in a circuit court,
a victim of
crime shall have the right to be informed of the rights established
in this
Article and, upon request and if practicable, to be notified
of, to attend, and
to be heard at a criminal justice proceeding, as these rights
are implemented
and the terms "crime", "criminal justice proceeding", and "victim"
are specified
by law. (c) Nothing in this Article permits any civil cause of
action for
monetary damages for violation of any of its provisions or authorizes
a victim
of crime to take any action to stay a criminal justice proceeding.
n582 ,
n583 [*676] This Declaration of Rights was assented
to, and passed, in
Convention of the Delegates of the freemen of Maryland, begun
and held at
Annapolis the 14th day of August, A.D. 1776. This declaration
of rights was
assented to and passed in Convention of the delegates of the
freemen of
Maryland, begun and held at Annapolis the 14th day of August,
anno domini 1776.
Printed for the consideration of the members. By order of the
Convention, By
order of the Convention, MAT. TILGHMAN, President MATTHEW TILGHMAN,
President
[SEE FOOTNOTES IN ORIGINAL]
FOOTNOTES:
n1. Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the
States' Bills of
Rights, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379, 392 (1980).
n2. The first annual Judge Irving A. Levine Memorial program
was held May 16,
1979, in College Park, Maryland. The topic was "States' Bills
of Rights."
n3. The scope of this article is limited to a discussion
of the Declaration
of Rights and not the main body of the Maryland Constitution.
There are
arguments for and against adopting this limitation. One argument
is that the two
documents are indivisible, and that only together do they give
a complete
picture of the intended balance of power between government and
the governed. On
the other hand, John R. Haeuser suggests that the two documents
as an historical
matter, were intended to be separate. He argues that "the Declaration
of Rights
was regarded not as establishing, but only affiming [sic] those
traditional
rights" that the colonists possessed as English subjects. John
Richard Haeuser,
The Maryland Conventions, 1774-1776: A Study in the Politics
of Revolution 88
(1968) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Georgetown University) (on file
with the
author). By contrast, "the form of government, on the other hand,
was
acknowledged to be revolutionary. Only to this latter document
did the
Convention apply the term 'constitution'." Id. Haeuser concludes
that the
"Declaration of Rights was considered entirely separate and logically
prior."
Id. at 89; see also 1 A. E. Dick Howard, Commentaries on the
Constitution of
Virginia 34-35 (1974) (arguing that members of Virginia Convention
of 1776,
trained in Lockean conceptions, would find a declaration of man's
inherent
rights to be a natural first step after dissolution of bond to
Great Britain).
Without endorsing either of these entirely plausible arguments,
I chose to limit
this article to an analysis of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
due to space
and time constraints.
n4. The Virginia Bill of Rights, Georgia Bill of Rights,
and Florida
Declaration of Rights each have been the subject of similar articles.
See 1
Howard, supra note 3, at 27-313; Dorothy T. Beasley, The Georgia
Bill of Rights:
Dead or Alive?, 34 Emory L.J. 341 (1985); Robert N. Katz, The
History of the
Georgia Bill of Rights, 3 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 83 (1986-87); Joseph
W. Little &
Steven E. Lohr, Textual History of the Florida Declaration of
Rights, 22 Stetson
L. Rev. 549 (1993).
n5. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977).
n6. It is ironic that there is a far greater body of academic
literature
justifying a reliance upon state constitutions than there are
articles that
actually rely upon state constitutions. The justification for
the reliance on
state constitutions given here necessarily is cursory. For a
more complete
analysis, see Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow:
Legitimacy of
State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C.
L. Rev. 353
(1984). For a bibliography of other resources, see Earl M. Maltz,
Robert F.
Williams & Michael Araten, Selected Bibliography on State
Constitutional Law,
1980-1989, 20 Rutgers L.J. 1093 (1989).
n7. See Shirley S. Abrahamson & Diane S. Gutmann,
The New Federalism: State
Constitutions and State Courts, 71 Judicature 88, 90-91 (1987-1988)
(discussing
impact of federalism on state and federal court systems).
n8. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-48
(1833).
n9. See U.S. Const. art. I, 8 (enumerating limited powers
of Congress).
n10. Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 247.
n11. The unrestrained power of the national congress to
legislate under the
Commerce Clause, and the United States Supreme Court's refusal
to check that
power, reached what may be their outer limits in three cases.
See Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1971) (upholding congressional
power to
make and enforce legal penalties for loan sharking based on finding
that
cumulative loan sharking affects interstate commerce); Katzenbach
v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (upholding enforcement of racial discrimination
prohibition on small restaurant because general racial discrimination
affected
interstate travel and commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 125 (1942)
(upholding Congress's power to regulate single farmer's wheat
grown solely for
his home consumption on grounds that cumulative effect of personal
consumption
might affect interstate commerce). More recent decisions have
retreated from
this position. See e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
551 (1995)
(holding federal "Gun-Free School Zones Act" exceeded Congress's
legislative
power under Commerce Clause).
n12. Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State
Constitutional Law, 63
Tex. L. Rev. 1195, 1217 (1985) (stating that equal protection
claims brought
under state constitutions have been rejected by state courts).
n13. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969)
(holding that double
jeopardy prohibition of Fifth Amendment applies to states through
Fourteenth
Amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding
that Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial applies to states); Washington
v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 18-19 (1967) (holding that Sixth Amendment right to compulsory
process for
obtaining witnesses applies to states); Klopfler v. North Carolina,
386 U.S.
213, 223 (1967) (holding that Sixth Amendment right to speedy
trial applies to
states); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (holding
that Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses applies to states); Malloy
v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 5 (1964) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment secures against
states same
right to remain silent as Fifth Amendment applies to federal
government); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (holding that Sixth Amendment
right to
assistance of counsel applies to states); Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660,
667 (1962) (holding that state law inflicted cruel and unusual
punishment in
violation of Fourteenth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
656-57 (1961)
(holding that evidence procured by means of unreasonable search
and seizure must
be excluded from state criminal trials); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717, 722 (1961)
(holding that Fourteenth Amendment entitles accused to impartial
jury); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees
public trial); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)
(holding that
Fourteenth Amendment concept of liberty embraces Free Exercise
Clause); DeJonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (holding that right to peaceable
assembly
guaranteed by Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Near
v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (holding that freedom of the press is
protected from
state invasion by Fourteenth Amendment); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925) (assuming that Fourteenth Amendment protects freedom of
speech from
impairment by states).
n14. Williams, supra note 6, at 353.
n15. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions:
the
Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1141,
1161-63 (1985)
(arguing that most lawyers fail to raise, or raise only in passing,
state
constitutional issues in trial and appellate courts).
n16. See, e.g., Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-33, 111 Stat.
251, 575 (providing grants to states to use in administering
independently their
welfare programs).
n17. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
551 (1995) (holding
that Federal "Gun-Free School Zones Act" exceeded Congress's
authority under
Commerce Clause because it sought to regulate intrastate activity
that could
have no substantial impact on interstate commerce).
n18. See State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148, 1151-52 (Me.
1984) (holding that
defendant's claim that he was denied state and federal right
to speedy trial
failed under both state and federal constitutional analysis);
State v. Ball, 471
A.2d 347, 350 (N.H. 1983) (holding, in part, that when defendant
brought claims
of unreasonable search and seizure under both state and federal
law, court would
interpret independently defendant's state constitutional guarantees);
State v.
Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 957 (N.J. 1982) (holding, in part, that individual's
interest in telephone company's billing records was entitled
to protection under
state constitution even though it was not entitled to protection
under Federal
Constitution); Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (Or. 1981)
(in banc)
(holding, in part, that claim based on state constitutional provision
guaranteeing rights of prisoners should be addressed prior to
federal right to
privacy claim).
n19. See e.g., Ronald K. L. Collins, Reliance on State
Constitution - The
Montana Disaster, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1095, 1115 (1985) (criticizing
Montana Supreme
Court for limiting Montana's constitutional protection from self-incrimination
to protection afforded by Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Lisa
D. Munyon,
Comment, "It's A Sorry Frog Who Won't Holler In His Own Pond:"
The Louisiana
Supreme Court's Response to the Challenge of New Federalism,
42 Loy. L. Rev.
313, 318 (1996) (discussing Louisiana Supreme Court's general
failure to
interpret state constitutional provisions independently from
federal standards
established by United States Supreme Court).
n20. The following states, listed chronologically, adopted
their first state
constitutions before the Federal Constitution became effective
in 1789: Delaware
(Del. Const. of 1776, reprinted in 2 Sources and Documents of
United States
Constitutions 199 (William F. Swindler ed., 1973) [hereinafter
Sources and
Documents]); Maryland (Md. Const. of 1776, reprinted in 4 id.
at 372 (1975));
New Jersey (N.J. Const. of 1776, reprinted in 6 id. at 449 (1976));
Pennsylvania
(Pa. Const. of 1776, reprinted in 8 id. at 277 (1979)); South
Carolina (S.C.
Const. of 1776, reprinted in 8 id. at 462 (1979)); Virginia (Va.
Const. of 1776,
reprinted in 10 id. at 51 (1979)); Georgia (Ga. Const of 1777,
reprinted in 2
id. at 443 (1973)); New York (N.Y. Const. of 1777, reprinted
in 7 id. at 163
(1978)); Vermont (Vt. Const. of 1777, reprinted in 9 id. at 487
(1979));
Massachusetts (Mass. Const. of 1780, reprinted in 5 id. at 92
(1975)). Even
those states whose constitutions post-date the adoption of the
United States
Constitution may contain provisions which pre-date the analogous
federal
provision. This is a result of the heavy borrowing that was done
in the adoption
of later state constitutions. For example, the rights provisions
of Oregon's
original 1859 Constitution "adopted Indiana's copy of Ohio's
version of sources
found in Delaware and elsewhere." Linde, supra note 1, at 381.
Justice Linde's
attribution to Delaware as an ultimate source probably is inaccurate
as
Delaware's 1776 Declaration of Rights was little more than a
copy of Maryland's
Declaration of Rights of the same year. See infra note 99. For
a discussion of
the borrowing of provisions of state constitutions, see Christian
G. Fritz, More
than "Shreds and Patches:" California's First Bill of Rights,
17 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 13, 14 (1989) (discussing other 19th century state constitutions
and their
impact on creation of California's first bill of rights); Christian
G. Fritz,
The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary
Observations on
State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth Century West, 25
Rutgers L.J. 945
(1994) (discussing process of state constitution-making in west
and relationship
between state constitutions and Federal Constitution).
n21. Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 635
P.2d 108, 115 (Wash.
1981) (en banc) (citing Project Report: Toward An Activist Role
for State Bills
of Rights, 8 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 271, 290 (1973)).
n22. Lawrence G. Sager, Forward: State Courts and the
Strategic Space Between
the Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 959,
960-61 (1985)
(discussing strategic relationship between constitutional ideals
and rules of
constitutional law and corresponding need for state courts to
interpret
independently state constitutional law).
n23. There are a few resources that cut across time periods.
Several general
Maryland histories exist. By far the best among these is Robert
J Brugger,
Maryland: A Middle Temperament, 1634-1980 (1989). Also available
are Maryland: A
History, 1632-1974 (Richard Walsh < William Lloyd Fox eds.,
1974)> 3 J. Thomas
Scharf, History of Maryland (1967). The Constitutional Convention
Commission, in
1967, wrote a short history of the Maryland Constitution. Constitutional
Convention Commission, Report of the Constitutional Convention
Commission 25-68
(1967); see also Michael S. Miller, Tracking the United States
and Maryland
Constitution in Literature: Then and Now, 20 Md. Bar J. 5 (1987)
(identifying
primary and secondary sources that discuss the United States
Constitution and
the history of the Maryland Constitution); Charles J. Rohr, The
Constitutions of
Maryland, 24 Johns Hopkins Alumni Mag. 213 (1936) (discussing
the framing of
each of Maryland's four constitutions). There are also works
that analyze a
particular aspect of the Maryland Constitution across the relevant
time periods,
although none are directly concerned with the Declaration of
Rights. One such
work is Charles J. Rohr, The Governor of Maryland: A Constitutional
Study, 50
Johns Hopkins U. Stud. in Hist. & Pol. Sci., No. 3 (1932)
[hereinafter Governor
of Maryland], which provides a constitutional study of the development
of the
governor's office from the colonial period to the time of publication.
Another
is Carl N. Everstine, The General Assembly of Maryland: 1634-
1776 (1980), which
provides a general history of Maryland's General Assembly, with
particular focus
placed on matters of legislative philosophy, organization, and
procedure.
n24. Everstine, supra note 23, at 517. During this period
Maryland's Colonial
Governor, Robert Eden, played an inactive role in governmental
affairs. Id. at
521.
n25. Id. at 522, 559-63.
n26. Id. at 522-28.
n27. Id. at 531. The Association of Freemen of Maryland
provided that
political power was vested in the Convention and provided a means
for election
to the Convention. The executive and some judicial power were
given to a 16
member "Council of Safety." Id. at 531-38. Membership was reduced
to seven by
the sixth convention. Id. at 541.
n28. Id. at 531.
n29. Id. at 555; Proceedings of the Conventions of the
Province of Maryland,
Held at the City of Annapolis, in 1774, 1775 & 1776, at 176
(1836) [hereinafter
Proceedings].
n30. Proceedings, supra note 29, at 184-89.
n31. Id. at 184-85.
n32. See David Curtis Skaggs, Roots of Maryland Democracy:
1753-1776, at
180-84 (1973) (describing demonstrations protesting method of
choosing
convention's election judges).
n33. Among the election losers were influential conservative
leaders from
previous conventions, including Thomas Stone (a signer of the
Declaration of
Independence), Thomas Johnson, Jr. (Maryland's first governor
(1777-1779)),
William Paca (Governor of Maryland, 1782-1785), Charles Carroll
of Carrollton (a
signer of the United States Constitution and a United States
Senator), Thomas
Contee, Robert Tyler, Josias Beall, Walter Tolley, Jr., and John
Moale. It was
only through considerable maneuvering that William Paca and Charles
Carroll of
Carrollton became the representatives from Annapolis, and Thomas
Johnson, Jr.
was chosen to represent Caroline County, where he owned no property.
Id. at 180,
182. Ronald Hoffman, by contrast, says that Johnson did own some
minimal
property in Caroline County. Ronald Hoffman, A Spirit of Dissension:
Economics,
Politics and The Revolution in Maryland 172 (1973).
n34. Skaggs divides the Convention into two factions:
a small "democratic"
group and a larger "Whiggish" or "country" party. Skaggs, supra
note 32, at 187.
The democratic group was lead by Rezin Hammond. The Whig group
was lead by
Samuel Chase (a signer of the Declaration of Independence), Thomas
Johnson, Jr.,
William Paca, Matthew Tilghman, Charles Carroll of Carrollton,
and Charles
Carroll, Barrister. Id. at 188.
n35. Id. at 195.
n36. Proceedings, supra note 29, at 209.
n37. Mr. Tilghman, in fact, was President of six previous
conventions. Id. at
3 (first convention, June 22, 1774); id. at 6 (second convention,
Nov. 21,
1774); id. at 11 (fourth convention, Apr. 24, 1775); id. at 19
(fifth
convention, July 26, 1775); id. at 39 (sixth convention, Dec.
7, 1775); id. at
165 (eighth convention, June 21, 1776).
n38. Hoffman, supra note 33, at 269.
n39. See Philip A. Crowl, Maryland During and After the
Revolution, a
Political and Economic Study (1943) (discussing predominantly
aristocratic
social makeup of Maryland constitutional framers); Hoffman, supra
note 33
(discussing economic and social movements affecting Maryland's
revolutionary
period); H. H. Walker Lewis, The Maryland Constitution of 1776
(1976)
(discussing forces that helped shape the Maryland Constitution);
Skaggs, supra
note 32 (same); Edward A. Tomlinson, The Establishment of State
Government In
Maryland: The Constitution of 1776, 9 Md. Bar J. 4 (1976) (same);
Haeuser, supra
note 3 (evaluating ideas and intentions of members of constitutional
convention); James Alfred Haw, Politics in Revolutionary Maryland,
1753-1788
(1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia)
(on file with
the author) (discussing politics of the period). Other works
of smaller scope
also abound, including Thorton Anderson, Maryland's Property
Qualification for
Office: A Reinterpretation of the Constitutional Convention of
1776, 73 Md.
Hist. Mag. 327 (1978) (taking a critical look at the property
ownership
requirement); Herbert E. Klingelhofer, The Cautious Revolution:
Maryland and the
Movement Toward Independence: 1774-1776, 60 Md. Hist. Mag. 261
(1965)
(describing events leading up to Convention of 1776). About the
revolutionary
period generally, see Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions:
Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions
in the
Revolutionary Era (1980) (discussing general tendencies in early
American
constitutional formation); Fletcher M. Green, Constitutional
Development in the
South Atlantic States, 1776-1860: A Study in the Evolution of
Democracy (1930)
(same); Max Farrand, The Delaware Bill of Rights of 1776, 3 Am.
Hist. Rev. 641
(1898) (comparing 1776 constitutions of Maryland, Pennsylvania,
and Delaware);
John Rainbolt, A Note on the Maryland Declaration of Rights and
Constitution of
1776, 66 Md. Hist. Mag. 420 (1971).
n40. Secrecy was an important consideration for the delegates
to the 1776
Constitutional Convention. For example, the oath of office taken
by the Clerk of
the Convention, Gabriel Duvall (who later served as a Justice
of the United
States Supreme Court), was to "honestly, diligently and faithfully
discharge the
office of clerk to the convention of Maryland," and "not disclose
or reveal the
secrets thereof." Proceedings, supra note 29, at 209 (emphasis
added). As a
result of this penchant for secrecy, no records of the debates
of the convention
were kept. All that remains for the modern historian is the record
of the
proceedings, recording the questions and the resulting votes.
Early drafts
circulated among the delegates also provide some insight into
the working of the
convention. Id.; see also The Decisive Blow is Struck: A Facsimile
Edition of
the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1776 and
the First Maryland
Constitution (1977) [hereinafter The Decisive Blow] (beginning
August 14, 1776).
n41. Green, supra note 39, at 209.
n42. Id. at 146-50.
n43. The History of Legislative Apportionment in Maryland,
in Constitutional
Revision Study Documents of the Constitutional Convention Commission
of Maryland
138-39 (State of Md. 1968) [hereinafter Constitutional Revision
Study
Documents].
n44. The most significant attempt at redistribution came
in 1836. This crisis
was precipitated by the senatorial electors, whose function it
was to select the
15-member state senate. Because of voting inequalities, the Whigs
had won 21 of
the 40 elector's seats despite receiving only about 1/3 of the
total votes cast.
In protest, the Democratic electors refused to attend the electoral
college,
denying the Whigs a quorum. Although sufficient senatorial electors
later
acquiesced and attended the electoral college, the point was
not lost on the
General Assembly. Brugger, supra note 23, at 229; see also Constitutional
Revision Study Documents, supra note 43, at 138-39; James Warner
Harry, The
Maryland Constitution of 1851, 20 Johns Hopkins U. Stud. in Hist.
& Pol. Sci.,
Nos. 7-8, at 15 (1902) (describing effects of Democratic electors'
boycott of
early stages of 1836 State Reform Convention). During the next
session, despite
a conservative, Whig majority, the General Assembly approved
a reform measure to
reapportion the legislature. 1836 Md. Laws ch. 197, 3-28 (amending
districts and
term lengths of State Senators).
n45. Constitutional Revision Study Documents, supra note
43, at 138-39.
n46. Harry, supra note 44, at 16-17. Rohr discusses this
desire to limit the
General Assembly's authority to incur debt as part of a general,
and necessary,
trend away from the dominance of the legislative branch and toward
an equal
balance of powers. Governor of Maryland, supra note 23,
at 71-72.
n47. Harry, supra note 44, at 34-35.
n48. Id. at 35. Mr. Harry also links these tax protests
to objections to Acts
of 1844, Chapter 280, the "Stamp Tax." Id. at 22; see also 3
Scharf, supra note
23, at 212-14 (noting resistance of Marylanders to British Stamp
Tax).
n49. Harry, supra note 44, at 18-19.
n50. Id. at 19.
n51. According to contemporary accounts, the expenditures
for the judiciary
totaled $ 41,500 in 1840. Id. at 19 n.15. A conflicting report
is given in
William J. Evitts, A Matter of Allegiances: Maryland from 1850
to 1861 (1974),
in which Evitts reports that "in 1842 Governor Francis Thomas
declared that
Maryland's annual $ 36,000 expenditure was the largest judicial
salary bill in
all the states. In fact, it was not, but most Marylanders took
the governor's
estimate as gospel." Id. at 34 n.47.
n52. 2 Debates and Proceedings of the Maryland Reform
Convention to Revise
the State Constitution 460-61 (1851). This is likely an exaggeration:
the
delegates from the Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland had resisted
a
constitutional convention for as long as possible in order to
try to avoid
changes in slavery laws. Harry, supra note 44, at 20-21.
n53. Id. at 29-67.
n54. A good starting point for researching the 1851 Convention
is Harry,
supra note 44. Although not specifically about the constitutional
convention,
several books and articles explain the political climate of the
period. The best
among these is Evitts, supra note 51. Others include Douglas
Bowers, Ideology
and Political Parties in Maryland 1851-1856, 64 Md. Hist. Mag.
197 (Fall 1969);
Laurence Frederick Schmeckebier, History of the Know-Nothing
Party in Maryland,
17 Johns Hopkins U. Stud. in Hist. & Pol. Sci., Nos. 4-5
(April-May, 1899). A
glimpse of the life of a delegate to the 1851 convention, albeit
a relatively
unimportant one, is provided in George M. Anderson, A Delegate
to the 1850-51
Constitutional Convention: James W. Anderson of Montgomery County,
76 Md. Hist.
Mag. 250 (Fall 1981).
n55. William Starr Myers, The Maryland Constitution of
1864, 19 Johns Hopkins
U. Stud. in Hist. & Pol. Sci., Nos. 8-9 at 8 (1901).
n56. This election is decried as a "shameless mockery,
and its results were
but the work of fraud and violence." 3 Scharf, supra note 23,
at 460. (The home
of Governor Bradford, located in Baltimore County on the present-day
grounds of
the Elkridge Country Club was burned during the Civil War by
Confederate
soldiers in apparent retribution for the destruction of the Virginia
Governor's
mansion.)
n57. Myers, supra note 55, at 8-9.
n58. Md. Const. of 1851, art. III, 43.
n59. The Emancipation Proclamation, by its terms, did
not affect the slaves
of Maryland. The Emancipation Proclamation, 12 Stat. 1268 (1862);
see also Lea
S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment,
138 U. Pa. L. Rev.
437, 441 n.22 (1984) (stating that Emancipation Proclamation
had "no effect on
the legal status of slaves in ... Maryland" and other states).
n60. There had been several calls for a constitutional
convention, notably in
1858 and 1862. See Myers, supra note 55, at 13.
n61. See id. at 13 (discussing formation of "Unconditional
Union" party).
n62. Id. at 15, 32.
n63. Id. at 15.
n64. See id. (discussing President Lincoln's aggressive
war measures and
Unconditional Union's opposition to them).
n65. See id. (discussing convention bill).
n66. Id. at 16; see also id. at 24 (discussing overall
election results).
n67. 1863 was not a gubernatorial election year. Candidates
for Comptroller
of the Treasury headed their parties' tickets. Id. at 14-15.
n68. Id. at 20.
n69. See id. at 17-24 (discussing actions taken by General
Schenck, including
issuance of "General Order No. 53").
n70. Id. at 24.
n71. See id. at 30 (discussing opening message delivered
to joint meeting of
Session of General Assembly).
n72. Id. at 30-31.
n73. The vote was 31,593 in favor of the convention, with
19,524 opposed to
it. Id. at 34.
n74. Id. at 35.
n75. See id.at 35-39 (discussing delegates in attendance
and their respective
duties).
n76. 3 Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative: Red River
to Appomattox 446
(1974).
n77. Id.
n78. Id. at 452.
n79. Id. at 454.
n80. Id. at 461.
n81. Myers, supra note 55, at 44-45.
n82. Id. at 44-48.
n83. The "iron-clad" oaths were authorized by the Maryland
Constitution of
1864 in Article I, Sections 4 and 7, and Article III, Section
47. The election
judges were required to ask a series of questions designed to
eliminate the vote
of any Southern sympathizers.
n84. Research on the Constitutional Convention of 1864
should begin with
Myers, supra note 55. For politics of the period, see Jean H.
Baker, The
Politics of Continuity: Maryland Political Parties From 1858
to 1870 (1973);
Charles Branch Clark, Politics in Maryland During the Civil War
(1952).
n85. William Starr Myers, The Self-Reconstruction of Maryland
1864-1867, 27
Johns Hopkins U. Stud. in Hist. & Pol. Sci., Nos. 1-2, at
9-10 (1909).
n86. Governor of Maryland, supra note 23, at 83.
n87. Myers, supra note 85, at 76-77.
n88. Id. at 113.
n89. See supra note 83 for a discussion of the source
and nature of these
oaths.
n90. The only work that I can recommend is Myers, supra
note 85.
n91. See Philip B. Perlman, Debates of the Maryland Constitutional
Convention
of 1867 (1923) (noting that sole record of Convention debates
consisted of
newspaper accounts).
n92. John P. Wheeler, Jr. & Melissa Kinsey, Magnificent
Failure: The Maryland
Constitutional Convention of 1967-1968, at 4 (1970) (quoting
Royce Hanson,
Analysis: In Maryland, the Courthouse Gangs and the Little Guys
Join Forces to
Defeat a Reform Constitution, City, July-August 1969, at 38).
n93. Prior to his appointment to the Court of Appeals
in Maryland in May of
1968, Judge Marvin Smith served as a delegate to the 1967-68
Constitutional
Convention. Judge Smith, more than any other member of the Court,
has relied on
the work of the Constitutional Convention. In In re Special Investigation
No.
244, 459 A.2d 1111 (Md. 1983), Judge Smith adopted a rule for
the appropriate
use of the proposed constitution of 1967-68 as legislative history:
"that
proposed Constitution can effectively be used to interpret our
present
Constitution, that from the Convention of 1867, only in the case
of an amendment
to the present Constitution adopting some of the language of
the proposed
Constitution, as has been done in certain instances." Id. at
1114-15. For other
opinions of Judge Smith relying upon the 1967- 68 Constitutional
Convention, see
Maryland Action for Foster Children Inc. v. State, 367 A.2d 491,
507 (Md. 1977)
(Smith, J. dissenting) ("The constitutional provisions here under
discussion are
essentially the same as those proposed by the Constitutional
Convention of
Maryland in 1968. I find interesting and persuasive the views
expressed at the
Constitutional Convention on this subject by Delegates Joseph
Sherbow and
William S. James.") (citations omitted); Kadan v. Board of Supervisors
of
Elections of Baltimore County, 329 A.2d 702, 711-12 (Md. 1974)
(citing 1967-68
Constitutional Convention records regarding lay judges of Orphan's
Court); State
Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. Calvert, 327 A.2d 290, 300-04
(Md. 1974) (citing
1967-68 Constitutional Convention proposals as relevant legislative
history for
provision granting original jurisdiction over redistricting to
the Court of
Appeals); In re Diener and Broccolino, 304 A.2d 587, 617-19 (Md.
1973) (Smith,
J., dissenting) (concerning judicial removal provisions of 1967-68
Constitution).
n94. In addition to Wheeler & Kinsey, supra note 92,
other sources discussing
the 1967-68 Convention include Wayne Richard Swanson et al.,
Politics and
Constitutional Reform: The Maryland Experience, 1967- 68 (Wash.
Ctr. for Metro.
Stud. October, 1970); Marianne Ellis Alexander, The Issues and
Politics of the
Maryland Constitutional Convention, 1967-1968 (1972) (unpublished
Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Maryland) (on file with the author);
Wayne Richard
Swanson, The Politics of Constitutional Revision: The Maryland
Constitutional
Convention, 1967-1968 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Brown University)
(on file with the author). A vast amount of original material
from the 1967-68
Constitutional Convention is part of the collection of the Maryland
State Law
Library and the Thurgood Marshall Law Library at the University
of Maryland
School of Law.
n95. The drafts are among the only pieces of legislative
history available
for the 1776 Declaration, as much of the work was done by committee
and not
recorded .
n96. One example is Article 5 of our current Declaration
of Rights. In the
August 27, 1776, draft, the same guarantees were made by Article
16. To maintain
the order in both directions, the August 27, 1776, box for the
historical
antecedent of our Article 5 is blank, but a cross reference sends
the reader to
the appropriate box for Article 16 of the August 27, 1776, version.
n97. It is ironic that those Maryland Constitutional Conventions
that were
most meticulous about providing an historical record of their
debates and
proceedings (1967-68 and to a lesser degree, 1864) are those
that had the least
impact, while the more important conventions (1867 and 1776)
kept significantly
fewer records and held many of their discussions in private sessions.
n98. Professor Howard has described the Virginia Bill
of Rights of 1776 as:
a restatement of the basic principles of the English
liberty documents, such
as Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, and the Bill of Rights.
To this English
heritage were added statements of natural rights philosophy:
that power derives
from the people, that men have certain inherent rights which
they retain in
civil society, and that a majority of the people have the right
to alter or
abolish an existing form of government.
1 Howard, supra note 3, at 7. A similar statement
could be made about the
Maryland Constitution. For reference to origins of Maryland provisions
in
historic English sources, see chart infra. For specific provisions
drawing on a
natural rights philosophy, see Tom N. McInnis, Natural Law and
the Revolutionary
State Constitutions, 14 Legal Stud. F. 351 (1990).
n99. Some commentators have erroneously suggested that
the Delaware
Declaration of Rights of 1776 predates Maryland's and was a model
for the
Maryland document. See e.g. Max Farrand, The Delaware Bill of
Rights of 1776,
The American Historical Review, Vol. III (1898); Tom W. Bell,
The Third
Amendment: Forgotten But Not Gone, 2 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts.
J. 127 n.96 (1993).
The reverse is true. The Maryland Constitutional Convention assembled
in
Annapolis on August 14, 1776. The Decisive Blow, supra note 40
(August 14,
1776). On Saturday, August 17, 1776, the convention elected a
drafting committee
to prepare "a declaration and charter of rights, and a form of
government for
this state." Id. (August 17, 1776). By August 27, 1776, an initial
draft of the
Declaration of Rights was circulated to the convention body.
Id. (August 27,
1776). A second draft of the Declaration of Rights was produced
on September 17,
1776. Id. (September 17, 1776). The convention body adopted the
Declaration of
Rights in final form along with the new constitution on November
11, 1776. Id.
(November 11, 1776).
In Delaware, immediately after Independence, Assembly
Speaker Caesar Rodney
called a special session of the Assembly beginning on July 22,
1776. George
Herbert Ryden, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney, 1756- 1784
94-95 (Univ. of
Penna., 1933); H. Clay Reed, The Delaware Constitution of 1776,
Delaware Notes
15 (Sixth Series, 1930). The Assembly approved a call for a convention
"to
ordain and declare the future Form of Government of this State."
Richard Lynch
Mumford, Constitutional Development in the State of Delaware,
1776- 1897 51 (
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Delaware, 1968). The
Convention
assembled in New Castle on August 27, 1776. The Convention approved
the proposed
Declaration of Rights on September 11, 1776.
Thus, a careful review of the proceedings of the respective
conventions
reveals that Maryland's first draft Declaration of Rights was
completed on
August 27, 1776, the same day that the Delaware Convention convened.
Given that
Maryland's August 27, 1776 draft, was substantially similar to
the verson
ultimately adopted, it is clear that Maryland's version preceded
the Delaware
version. H. Clay Reed, The Delaware Constitution of 1776, Delaware
Notes 15
(Sixth Series, 1930); Richard Lynch Mumford, Constitutional Development
in the
State of Delaware, 1776-1897 51 (unpublished Ph.D dissertation,
Univ. of
Delaware, 1968); see also Letter from George Read to Caesar Rodney
(September
17, 1776) reprinted in George Herbert Ryden, Letters to and From
Caesar Rodney,
1756-1784 (Univ. of Penna., 1933).
n100. New Hampshire's original constitution was adopted
January 5, 1776, and
contained no rights-type provisions. See N.H. Const. of 1776,
reprinted in
Sources and Documents, supra note 20, at 342-43 (1976).
n101. South Carolina's initial constitution, adopted March
26, 1776,
contained no declaration or bill of rights. That constitution
proved inadequate
and was superseded by a new constitution a mere two years later.
See S.C. Const.
of 1776, reprinted in 8 id. at 462-67 (1979); id. at 461 ("[The
South Carolina
Constitution of 1776] was a hasty improvisation, and two years
later a more
systematic scheme of government was substituted.").
n102. The Virginia Bill of Rights was adopted June 12,
1776, and its
constitution was adopted on June 20, 1776. Va. Const. of 1776,
reprinted in 10
id. at 13-14 (1979). Although the officially adopted version
of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights is cited throughout this article, it is
generally accepted
that George Mason's May 27, 1776 draft was more influential nationally
and
internationally than the official draft. George Mason's May 27,
1776, draft of
the Virginia Declaration of Rights served as a model for the
American
Declaration of Independence, Pauline Maier, American Scripture:
Making the
Declaration of Independence 125-28 (1997); the French Declaration
of the Rights
of Man, Gilbert Chinard, Notes on the French Translations of
the "Forms of
Government or Constitutions of the Several United States' 1778
and 1783," 88-106
Yearbook of the American Philosophical Society, 1943; Durand
Echeverria, French
Publication of the Declaration of Independence and the American
Constitutions,
1776-1783, 47 Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America
313 (1953); and
the bills and declarations of rights of many of the American
states. John Selby,
The Revolution in Virginia, 1775-1783 103 (1988); R. Carter Pittman,
Book Review
of Sources of Our Liberties, 68 Va. Mag. Hist. & Biog. 109
(1960). Professor
Howard notes that Mason's May 27, 1776 draft of the Virginia
Declaration of
Rights was reprinted in The Maryland Gazette on June 13, 1776,
1 Howard, supra
note 3, at 39, and was thus available to the delegates to the
Maryland
constitutional convention that would assemble on August 14, 1776.
n103. New Jersey's July 2, 1776, Constitution did not
contain a separate
declaration or bill of rights, but several familiar rights provisions
were
codified in that document. See Art. XVI (addressing right to
counsel and
witnesses in criminal trials); Art. XVIII (guaranteeing freedom
of religion);
Art. XIX (establishing guaranty against the establishment of
religion); Art. XX
(stating prohibition against dual office holding); and Art. XXII
(providing for
retention of English common law). See N.J. Const. of 1776, reprinted
in 6
Sources and Documents, supra note 20, at 449-53 (1976).
n104. The Pennsylvania Convention convened on July 15,
1776, and after a
period of public comment, a constitution was adopted September
28, 1776. John N.
Schaeffer, Public Consideration of the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution,
98 Pa.
Mag. Hist. & Biog. 415, 417 (1974).
n105. Compare infra chart and accompanying commentary
(outlining the
legislative history of the various Maryland constitutions including
proposed
constitutions and drafts), with Va. Const. of 1776, reprinted
in 10 Sources and
Documents, supra note 20, at 48-50 (1979) (containing Virginia's
Bill of
Rights), and Pa. Const. of 1776, reprinted in 8 id. at 278-79
(1979) (containing
Pennsylvania's Declaration of Rights).
n106. See Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions
of the Founding Decade:
Pennsylvania's Radical 1776 Constitution and its Influences on
American
Constitutionalism, 62 Temp. L. Rev. 541, 567 (1989) (stating
that Maryland's
constitution was the most conservative of the "founding decade").
n107. Hoffman, supra note 33, at 269.
n108. Williams, supra note 106, at 547-48, 576-79.
n109. Maeva Marcus, The Adoption of the Bill of Rights,
1 Wm. & Mary Bill
Rts. J. 115, 115 (1992).
n110. See McInnis, supra note 98, at 368-69.
n111. It is my contention that the Maryland appellate
courts use the phrase
"in pari materia" in two distinct ways. The first is used primarily
when
analyzing statutes, but also with regards to the due process
and equal
protection guarantees implicit within the Declaration of Rights.
When speaking
of these subjects, the courts give a nuanced meaning to the phrase
"in pari
materia" meaning that two items arose from the same background
and generally
have complementary, but not necessarily identical, meanings.
See, e.g., Aero
Motors, Inc. v. Administrator, Motor Vehicle Adm'n, 337 A.2d
685, 699 (Md. 1975)
(holding that although article of Maryland Declaration of Rights
concerning due
process has "been equated" with Due Process Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment, by
judicial construction and application, the two provisions are
not synonomous).
The second meaning of the phrase "in pari materia" is used when
the subject is
any other provision of the Declaration of Rights, and particularly
those
protecting the rights of criminal defendants. In those circumstances
the phrase
"in pari materia" means that the right protected by the state
constitution is
identical to the analogous federal provision, and that the Maryland
court will
defer completely to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation
of the
provision. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 638 A.2d 107, 109 n.2 (Md.
1994)
(interpreting Article 26 of Maryland Declaration of Rights as
being identical to
Fourth Amendment).
n112. The academic literature of state constitutional
law is highly critical
of the "lock-step" method of constitutional interpretation, wherein
the content
of a state provision is shackled to the United States Supreme
Court's
interpretation of an analogous federal provision. See, e.g.,
Linde, supra note
1, at 382-83 (arguing that most state courts rely on interpretations
of Federal
Bill of Rights to determine meaning of state constitutional guarantees);
Robert
F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court
Comment on Federal
Constitutional Issues when Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional
Grounds,
63 Tex. L. Rev. 1025, 1047 (1985) (asserting that if states cease
to consider
constitutional provisions from their own perspective then the
federal bench
would be deprived of rich and diverse research); Williams, supra
note 6, at 397
(stating that state court judicial review of state statutes or
executive actions
qualitatively different from Supreme Court's judicial review
of same action).
n113. I use the word "analogous" intentionally, but somewhat
tentatively. I
do not want to suggest in any way that the Federal Fourth Amendment
right
against unreasonable searches and seizures is identical to the
warrant
requirement of Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
I mean to say
only that they are analogous, "similar or comparable in certain
respects."
Webster's New World Dictionary (3d college ed. 1997).
n114. Failure to preserve a state constitutional argument
at trial likely
will be interpreted as a waiver of that issue in any subsequent
appellate
proceeding. Md. R. 8-131.
n115. 450 A.2d 952, 965-69 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring).
I hasten to
note that I do not subscribe to Justice Handler's factor approach,
but that I
subscribe to the criticism of that approach given in Justice
Pashman's
concurring opinion in Hunt: "At bottom, Justice Handler's approach
effectively
entails a presumption against divergent interpretations of [the
state]
constitution unless special reasons are shown for [a state] to
take a path
different from that chosen at the federal level." Id. at 960
(Pashman, J.,
concurring). Nonetheless, Justice Handler's factors provide an
excellent
starting place for this discussion.
n116. As must be obvious, different judges and different
courts each will
have different conceptions about what constitutes a significant
textual
difference.
n117. I include within this category decisions of the
Supreme Court based on
federalism concerns, which obviously are not structurally relevant
to the Court
of Appeals of Maryland. A clear example of this is San Antonio
Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973) (holding
education policy to
be uniquely state concern); see also Sager, supra note 22, at
975-76 (discussing
role of federalism).
n118. For a discussion of these sources for independent
state constitutional
analysis, see generally Williams, supra note 6 (comparing federal
and state
judicial review and evaluating states' rejection of Supreme Court
reasoning).
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