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                                2 of 6 DOCUMENTS
 
                  Copyright (c) 1999 Maryland Law Review, Inc.
                       University of Maryland School of Law
 
                                      1999
 
                                58 Md. L. Rev. 528
 
LENGTH: 44399 words
 
ARTICLE: MAGNIFICENT FAILURE REVISITED: MODERN MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FROM
 1967 TO 1998
 
Dan Friedman *
 
 

   * Associate, Miles & Stockbridge P.C., Baltimore, Maryland. Lecturer,
 University of Maryland School of Law. B.A., University of Maryland; J.D.,
 University of Maryland School of Law. 1995-96, Law Clerk to the Honorable Robert
 L. Karwacki, Court of Appeals of Maryland. 1994-95, Law Clerk to the Honorable
 John Carroll Byrnes, Circuit Court for Baltimore City (and Delegate, Maryland
 Constitutional Convention, 1967-68). 1991-93, Law Clerk, Baltimore City Charter
 Revision Commission (the Cole Commission). 1989-91, Legislative Assistant to the
 Honorable Mary Pat Clarke, President, Baltimore City Council. 1988-89,
 Legislative and Administrative Assistant to the Honorable Paul G. Pinsky,
 Delegate now Senator, Maryland General Assembly. My deepest debt is owed to my
 research assistant, Synthia J. Shilling (University of Baltimore School of Law,
 Class of 1999). Thanks also to Judge John Carroll Byrnes for the idea that
 became this Article; to Miles & Stockbridge, and particularly John Parker
 Sweeney, for accommodating the eccentricity of my academic interests; to
 Professors Richard C. Boldt, Robert F. Williams, and the late Marc Feldman, for
 their reviews of prior drafts; to the Miles & Stockbridge library staff (and
 Kimberly Nash), for finding obscure source materials; to my long-suffering,
 life-long editorial team of Roger S. Friedman and Jeffrey S. Rosenfeld, Esq.;
 and to my wonderful and supportive family: Laure Ruth, Sam and Eli Friedman.
 
   It is appropriate that this Article is published in an issue of the Maryland
 Law Review dedicated as a tribute to Professor Marc Feldman. Marc was my
 supervisor, mentor, co-author, colleague, and friend, but above all, my teacher.
 My last conversation with Marc, just two weeks before his untimely death,
 included his suggestions for the improvement of this Article. Although that
 conversation was by telephone, I could feel Marc's hand on my elbow, holding
 tight, propelling me in the direction he wanted, his face close to mine, urging,
 prodding, cajoling. I have tried to honor Marc's comments, not because they were
 his, but because they were right and they were true. This Article, in some small
 way, is my tribute to Marc.
 
SUMMARY:
  ...  In the immediate aftermath, John P. Wheeler, Jr. and Melissa Kinsey
 analyzed this proposed constitution and described its defeat as a "magnificent
 failure"; this phrase captures both the extraordinary efforts and visionary
 proposals of the framers, and the failure of the electorate to approve it. ...
 Since the defeat of the proposed constitution, there also have been several
 important (and some relatively unimportant) textual modifications to the
 Maryland Declaration of Rights, although none of these are attributable to the
 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention. ...  In 1972, the citizens of Maryland
 ratified an Equal Rights Article (Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of
 Rights) prohibiting discrimination based on gender. ...  After the defeat of the
 proposed constitution, none of the proposals of the constitutional convention
 concerning the legislative branch have been brought to fruition. ... Upon the
 defeat of the proposed constitution, it was still necessary to reorganize the
 General Assembly according to the "one person/one vote" principle, which was
 enshrined in the Maryland Constitution by a 1969 amendment. ...  - One of the
 most contentious battles in the constitutional convention was caused by the
 proposal to eliminate, as statewide elective offices, the positions of attorney
 general and comptroller of the treasury. ...  To accomplish this goal, the
 proposed constitution mandated local home rule for Maryland counties and
 Baltimore City; required that all laws passed by the General Assembly apply
 generally throughout the state; and empowered the General Assembly to create
 "Multi-County Governmental Units." ...
 
TEXT:
  [*529]
 
 

    The reader should not ... be misled by the title, Magnificent Failure. The
 Maryland constitution [of 1967-1968] failed at the polls but that failure was
 only partial if it teaches.   n1
 
 

    On May 14, 1968, Maryland voters rejected a proposed new state constitution.
    n2 In the immediate aftermath, John P. Wheeler, Jr. and Melissa Kinsey
 analyzed this proposed constitution and described its defeat as a "magnificent
 failure"; this phrase captures both the extraordinary efforts and visionary
 proposals of the framers, and the failure of the electorate to approve it.   n3
 Thirty years later, it is appropriate to reassess the proposals, analyze the
 continuing effects of their rejection, and examine Maryland's subsequent
 constitutional developments. This Article assesses the success or failure of the
 Maryland Constitutional Convention in light of the later adoption - by
 constitutional amendment, statute, or regulation - of many of the important
 innovations proposed in the 1967-1968 constitution.
 
   I. Magnificent Failure
 
 The original version of the constitution currently in force in Maryland was
 drafted in 1867.   n4 Then, as now, the constitution requires that Maryland's
 citizens have the opportunity to hold a constitutional convention every twenty
 years.   n5 In 1930, and again in 1950,  [*530]  the Maryland electorate voted
 for a constitutional convention.   n6 Both times, however, the General Assembly
 ignored the demands of the citizens and refused to call a convention.   n7
 
   II. The Path to the Convention
 
 In 1964, the United States Supreme Court held that the apportionment of
 representation in the Maryland General Assembly violated the Equal Protection
 Clause of the United States Constitution.   n8 Maryland Governor J. Millard
 Tawes requested that the 1965 session of the General Assembly call for a
 constitutional convention both to correct the improper distribution of
 legislative districts and to correct  [*531]  other perceived weaknesses in the
 existing constitution.   n9 The legislature again refused to call a
 constitutional convention.   n10 Faced with the General Assembly's
 intransigence, Governor Tawes appointed a Constitutional Convention Commission
 anyway, and charged that body with conducting:
 
 

    an inquiry into the necessity for, and extent and nature of, any amendment,
 modification or revision of the Constitution of Maryland, with particular
 respect to whether a Constitutional Convention should be held, the procedures
 for calling such a Convention, the basis for representation at the Convention
 and the procedures for the election of the Delegates thereto.   n11
 
 

    The twenty-seven-member commission,   n12 popularly known as the Eney
 Commission,   n13 met regularly from July 21, 1965 through June 14, 1967.   n14
 Within its first two meetings, the Commission determined that a "complete
 revision of the Constitution of Maryland [was] urgently desirable and necessary"
 and that this could "best be accomplished by means of a constitutional
 convention."   n15 The Eney  [*532]  Commission eventually produced a draft
 constitution for Maryland,   n16 and compiled a series of source materials for
 use by the convention delegates.   n17
 
   Members of the 1966 session of the General Assembly finally passed a bill
 providing for a special referendum to determine the sense of the people on the
 need for constitutional revision.   n18 The referendum was held on September 13,
 1966, and the citizens indicated their support for the constitutional
 convention.   n19 A special, nonpartisan election of constitutional convention
 delegates was held on June 13, 1967.   n20 The qualifications, backgrounds, and
 political views of the delegates have been carefully studied and reported.   n21
 [*533]  The delegates were well-educated, reform-minded, and largely
 apolitical.   n22
 
   Before the convention, a special, preliminary session was held on July 11,
 1967, at which H. Vernon Eney was elected convention president.   n23 The
 constitutional convention proper convened in Annapolis on September 12, 1967.
 n24 The convention-enabling legislation provided that the convention should
 conclude no later than December 12, 1967, although a majority of the elected
 delegates could extend that date to January 12, 1968.   n25 The work of the
 convention required nearly all of the allotted time: the constitution was
 approved in its final form on January 6 and 8,   n26 and the formal signing and
 closing ceremonies were held on January 10, only two days before the January 12,
 1968 deadline.   n27 All but three of the convention delegates voted in favor of
 the constitution.   n28 The substance of the constitution that the convention
 produced is the subject of Part IV of this Article.
 
    [*534]  After its drafting, the proposed constitution was:
 
 

    supported strongly by all but a handful of convention delegates, ...
 endorsed by all living governors, the highest judges, the legislative leaders,
 party luminaries, the captains of industry, the leaders of labor, the mass media
 of Baltimore and Washington, unlimited numbers of do-gooders, and various
 itinerant experts from out of state. Opposition came from a rag-tag band of the
 pitiful elite - courthouse gangs whose jobs had been excised from constitutional
 status, the know-nothings of the radical right, a few opportunistic politicians,
 selective puritans who took an instant dislike to a single provision - and a
 majority of the voters who turned out on May 14[, 1968].   n29
 
 

    The final vote was 284,033 in favor of adoption of the proposed constitution
 and 367,101 opposed.   n30 The proposed constitution won a majority of votes
 only in Prince George's and Montgomery counties, the two Washington, D.C.
 suburban counties.   n31
 
   III. Why the Proposed Constitution WasRejected
 
 Many explanations have been offered to account for the defeat of the proposed
 Maryland Constitution of 1967-1968. Some commentators have blamed the content of
 the proposed constitution, suggesting that it was "too liberal" for Maryland.
 n32 Some have argued that the convention delegates themselves were too
 intellectual or too liberal to represent the Maryland electorate.   n33 Some
 political scientists point to the fact that the entire constitution was
 submitted to the voters for a single vote, as a "single package deal," and
 suggest convincingly that this contributed to the defeat.   n34 Still others
 blame the convention delegates and those responsible for the ratification
 campaign for their lack of political skill.   n35 But all commentators agree
 that the propo [*535]  nents of the constitution failed to persuade the
 electorate of the necessity of constitutional revision.   n36
 
   Robert D. Loevy blames the content of the constitution itself for its failure
 at the polls: "[A] winning majority [for the constitution] could have been
 fashioned only by watering down the reforms which were included, making it less
 liberal, less progressive, and less intellectual in tone. It also would have had
 to be considerably more palatable to the rural areas ...."   n37 A pamphlet
 published by the League of Women Voters also places a large measure of blame on
 the substance of the constitution.   n38 For example, the constitution would
 have eliminated the constitutional status of the offices of many minor political
 functionaries, although probably not the offices themselves.   n39 The League of
 Women Voters' pamphlet points out how these changes tended to galvanize
 opposition to the constitution among the holders of these minor offices and
 their political organizations.   n40
 
   The criticisms of the substance of the constitution are largely spurious.
 Loevy's contention that the proposed constitution was "too intellectual in tone"
 is puzzling. The proposed constitution was easier to read, more direct, simpler
 in its use of language, and clearer than the existing Maryland Constitution; it
 was designed so that the citizens of Maryland could understand it.   n41 The
 existing constitution, by its length, language, and density, must remain the
 private reserve of the elite: lawyers, politicians, and political scientists.
 n42 The problem was  [*536]  not the substance of the proposed constitution, but
 the fact that the voting public was persuaded by opponents of the constitution
 that it was too liberal or too intellectual.   n43
 
   There was also criticism that the delegates themselves were not
 representative of the Maryland electorate. One set of commentators has argued
 that the delegates to the constitutional convention "were far out of step with
 the mainstream of Maryland political thought" and "more interested in
 implementing constitutional reform than in fashioning a document which would be
 acceptable to the voters of Maryland."   n44 The convention delegates were,
 however, democratically elected representatives chosen from a broad array of
 candidates. Wheeler and Kinsey report that 739 candidates ran for 142 seats in
 the constitutional convention, and that one district alone had 63 candidates.
 n45 Faced with many choices, the electorate selected those candidates whom they
 believed would best represent them.   n46
 
   The "all-or-nothing" nature of the vote on the proposed constitution does
 provide a compelling, although incomplete, explanation for the electoral defeat.
 The all-or-nothing vote created a two-fold problem, one rhetorical and one
 mathematical. Wheeler and Kinsey identified this rhetorical disadvantage:
 
 

    No delegate was completely happy with everything the convention did, and it
 is hardly surprising that few citizens were. Everyone could find something to
 disagree with.
 
   ... [Proponents of the Constitution would state]: "There are things in this
 document that I disagree with and I hope they will be changed later, but these
 are minor compared to the progressive steps taken in this document."   n47
 
 

    The all-or-nothing vote caused proponents to couch their support as
 qualified or limited, thus allowing opponents the rhetorical advantage. Wheeler
 and Kinsey noted: "Some ... [opponents] were  [*537]  not inclined to adhere to
 the admonition to determine whether the good outweighed the bad; one apple
 tainted the whole barrel."   n48
 
   The all-or-nothing nature of the vote also created a mathematical problem for
 the proposed constitution. Wayne Swanson has demonstrated that even if a
 majority of the voters approved of a majority of the innovations of the proposed
 constitution, the all-or-nothing nature of the vote would have tended to produce
 a defeat.   n49 Wheeler and Kinsey made a similar point:
 
 

    The points in this constitution that aggravated entrenched interests were
 single ones here and there. Yet the only way to avoid any one was to veto the
 whole document. If some way could have been found to isolate these factors and
 to provide separate votes upon them, it is conceivable that all might actually
 have been adopted. When one adds the opponents to 19-year-old voting to those
 local officials upset by losing their constitutional status and throws in the
 politicians agitated by the single-member district imposition as well as
 opponents of regional government, the opposition swells in size.   n50
 
 

    Finally, the most common explanation for the defeat of the proposed
 constitution is simply that the convention delegates failed to "sell"
 constitutional reform to the electorate. Some attribute this to overconfidence.
 n51 Others attribute it to a lack of political muscle:
 
 

    The principal advocates of the reforms in the proposed document ...
 possessed the least political power in the [existing] structure and generally
 lacked strong local political organizational support with the resources to
 mobilize voter support.... The chief opponents of the reforms ... were
 standpatters who had close ties with local Democratic organizations,
 particularly in Baltimore City and County. As office- holders they were also
 skilled in the art of influencing the voter and knew from experience the issues
 which could provoke a negative voter response ....   n52
 
    [*538]
 
 Because of this lack of political power, proponents of the 1967-1968
 constitution were ultimately unable to persuade the electorate of the need for
 constitutional reform.
 
   The same point, that proponents lacked sufficient political power to muster
 support for the constitution, can also be made in terms of the underlying
 political theory of the role of state constitutional conventions in the
 political traditions of the United States. While constitutional conventions are
 not unique to this country,   n53 they took on distinctive characteristics
 during the American revolution. These features include: (1) a constitutional
 convention's capacity to create fundamental law that is unalterable by ordinary
 legislative act;   n54 (2) its superiority to the ordinary legislature by virtue
 of its function and the opportunity it offers for "an extraordinary
 representation of the people";   n55 and (3) its permanent availability as a
 means of changing governments.   n56 As one commentator has noted,
 "Mythologically, [the  [*539]  constitutional convention] is the personification
 of the sovereign people assembled for the discharge of the solemn duty of
 framing their fundamental law. It is supposed to be above politics and to have
 no peer among governmental agencies."   n57 Over time it also has become clear
 that state constitutional conventions, like the constitutions they create, have
 become identified with a majoritarian impulse.   n58 With the exception of the
 first characteristic, the capacity to create fundamental law, state
 constitutional conventions do not acquire these characteristics merely by their
 creation. They must earn them.
 
   The 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention failed to achieve its goal of
 ratification of a new and modern constitution for Maryland because it failed to
 become the "personification of the sovereign people."   n59 In
 representational democracy, elected representatives face a constant tension
 between their role as representatives of the people and their role as leaders.
 n60 If the elected representatives are too concerned with the
 representational aspect, the result is government by  [*540]  public opinion
 poll.   n61 On the other hand, if the elected representatives are too concerned
 with leading, they lose their legitimacy as representatives.   n62 When the
 elected leaders properly negotiate the tension between leadership and
 representation, they become able to shape public opinion.   n63 At this point,
 leadership becomes easier, because the elected officials have molded public
 opinion in view of the direction in which they want to lead. Had the
 constitutional convention took seriously both roles, it could have led public
 opinion in support of the proposed constitution.   n64
 
   To lead public opinion would have required consistent and constant effort.
 Before the convention, proponents of the convention should have explained to the
 public the reasons for a constitutional convention. During the convention, the
 delegates should have solicited and encouraged public participation, even at the
 expense of efficiency. After the convention, delegates and other proponents of
 the constitution should have continued to educate the public and solicit support
 for the decisions made.   n65 In this way elected delegates to the
 constitutional convention could have shaped public opinion in favor of the
 proposed constitution and fulfilled their dual duties as representatives and
 leaders.
 
   IV. Magnificent Failure Revisited
 
 With the historical background in place, this Part turns to the major proposals
 contained in the proposed constitution.   n66 In each instance, the analysis
 will include a discussion of the provision (or absence of a provision) under the
 1867 Maryland Constitution, as  [*541]  amended to 1967, a review of the change
 proposed by the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention, and the subsequent history
 of the provision. The analysis reveals that, in some cases, a problem recognized
 by the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention was immediately corrected by
 constitutional amendment.   n67 In other cases, deficiencies were corrected over
 time, either in the manner suggested by the constitutional convention or in some
 other way.   n68 Finally, some problems identified by the 1967-1968
 Constitutional Convention remain in the Maryland Constitution.
 
   The proposals of the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention can be divided into
 two types of changes: a "structural" group and a "balance of power" group. The
 structural group includes reforms such as reorganization of courts,   n69
 removal of salaries from the Constitution,   n70 and deletion of obsolete
 provisions.   n71 These reforms could have been, and subsequently were, made
 with little difficulty. However, elected officials have been unable to muster
 support for those proposals that would have changed the balance of power among
 and between the branches of state government - reforms such as strengthening the
 governor's power by removing the Board of Public Works, the Comptroller, and the
 Attorney General.   n72
 
   The largest measure of credit for the modernizations that have occurred
 belongs to Governor Marvin Mandel and his administration.   n73 While his ideas
 may have been derived from the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention, Mandel
 resubmitted portions of the pro [*542]  posed constitution as amendments,
 succeeded in getting General Assembly approval, and secured citizen
 ratification.   n74 H. Vernon Eney and the staff to the 1967-1968 Constitutional
 Convention also deserve a large measure of the credit for the ultimate adoption
 of many of the proposals. Although most of the official publications produced by
 the constitutional convention were issued after the electoral defeat, President
 Eney, believing in the importance of constitutional reform, urged that the
 documents serve as guidelines for future piecemeal revisions.   n75
 
   A. Declaration of Rights
 
 Historically, the Maryland Declaration of Rights existed as a separate document
 from the Maryland Constitution.   n76 The proposed constitution not only would
 have changed this arrangement by incorporating the Declaration of Rights as a
 new Article I,   n77 it also would have substantially changed the format of the
 rights provisions. The Declaration of Rights, as it existed in 1967, contained
 forty-five articles, but the draft constitution honed that list to eighteen.
 n78 The proposed constitution also added three new rights not previously
 guaranteed by the Maryland Declaration of Rights: freedom from racial
 discrimination,   n79 protection against electronic eavesdropping,   n80  [*543]
 and fair treatment in investigations.   n81 Each of these rights now has
 constitutional status, either through legislative or judicial enactment.   n82
 
   The Eney Commission and the constitutional convention itself redesigned the
 Maryland Declaration of Rights in conscious imitation of the federal Bill of
 Rights.   n83 The language of many of the proposed new rights followed those of
 the analogous federal rights. Even the order of the proposed Declaration of
 Rights followed, at least in part,  [*544]  the federal order.   n84 This
 proposed "federalization" of Maryland's rights provisions, although not
 accomplished by constitutional amendment, has been carried out by judicial
 interpretation. A number of the decisions of the Court of Appeals of Maryland,
 both prior to and subsequent to the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention, have
 ignored the plain language of provisions of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
 and instead have based their interpretation solely on the language of the
 analogous federal provision.   n85 Former Washington Supreme Court Justice
 Robert F. Utter has called this phenomenon of judicial amendment a virtual
 rewriting of the state constitution without amendment or consent of the
 citizens.   n86 Although the 1967- 1968 Constitutional Convention did not start
 the federalization of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, its proposals, as well
 as the interpretations of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, are part of a larger
 trend toward such federalization.
 
   Since the defeat of the proposed constitution, there also have been several
 important (and some relatively unimportant) textual modifications to the
 Maryland Declaration of Rights, although none of these are attributable to the
 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention. One amendment, passed in 1970, permits
 religious invocation in state buildings without conflicting with the federal
 Establishment Clause.   n87  [*545]  In 1972, the citizens of Maryland ratified
 an Equal Rights Article (Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights)
 prohibiting discrimination based on gender.   n88 A series of constitutional
 amendments passed in 1992 was designed to reduce the burden of jury service.
 n89 First, the size of the jury was reduced from a panel of twelve to a panel of
 six jurors.   n90 Second, jury trials were made available only for civil suits
 wherein the amount in controversy exceeds $ 5000.   n91 Finally, the most recent
 change in the Declaration of Rights is the adoption of a hortatory "Victims'
 Rights" Article.   n92
 
   Other changes to the Declaration of Rights include the deletion of the
 archaic reference to suffrage for "white men";   n93 the clarification that
 service in the armed forces reserves or in the Maryland National Guard does not
 violate the prohibition on holding dual offices;   n94 and  [*546]  the deletion
 of obsolete, inaccurate, invalid, unconstitutional, and duplicative provisions.
 n95
 
   B. Elective Franchise
 
 The proposed constitution sought to broaden suffrage, both by lowering the
 voting age and by reducing residency requirements. Most of the proposed changes
 subsequently have been adopted and indeed have resulted in a broader franchise.
 
   1. Voting Age. - Although the Maryland constitutional revision was
 unsuccessful in lowering the voting age in state elections, federal legislation
 soon brought about the change.   n96 Title III of the federal Voting Rights Act
 of 1970   n97 purported to give eighteen- to twenty-year- olds the right to vote
 in all federal, state, and local elections. When the Supreme Court found that
 the Act exceeded the scope of Congress's legislative powers,   n98 an amendment
 to the United States Constitution   n99 accomplished the same goal.   n100 As a
 result, eighteen- to  [*547]  twenty-year-olds were not permitted to vote in the
 1968 primary or general elections,   n101 and an almost completely new group of
 eighteen- to twenty-year-olds were prohibited from voting in the 1970 primary
 and general elections.   n102 One estimate puts the number of eighteen- to
 twenty-year-olds prevented from gaining the right to vote at 125,000, or
 approximately six percent of the electorate at that time.   n103
 
    [*548]
 
   2. Residency Requirements. - Maryland's residency requirement to vote under
 the 1867 Constitution, as it stood in 1967, required one year of residency in
 the state and six months within the county or legislative district.   n104 The
 proposed constitution would have reduced these requirements to six and three
 months, respectively, and would have permitted the General Assembly to reduce
 further these residency requirements for presidential elections.   n105
 Opponents of the constitution criticized these reduced residency requirements,
 arguing that:
 
 

    the purpose of the residency requirements is to enable the prospective voter
 to become acquainted with State and local conditions by actual residence in the
 State and district with a sufficient minimum time to enable the prospective
 voter to become acquainted with his neighbors, to discuss State and local
 problems with them and to become established as a genuine member of the
 community. Only in this way, may the prospective voter be an INTELLIGENT and
 INFORMED voter as contrasted to a PRO FORMA or UNINFORMED voter.   n106
 
 

    With the defeat of the proposed constitution, plans to reduce the residency
 requirements for voting were not long delayed. In 1969, the General Assembly
 recommended, and the citizens approved, a constitutional amendment that reduced
 the residency requirement to six months within the state, and permitted the
 General Assembly, by law, to reduce further the residency requirements for
 voting in presidential elections.   n107 This reduction in residency
 requirements presaged the decision by the United States Supreme Court in Dunn v.
 Blumstein,   n108 which invalidated Tennessee's residency requirements of one
 year in the state and three months in the county prior to the election on the
 ground that they constituted an impermissible denial of the fundamental right to
 vote.   n109
 
    [*549]
 
   3. Referendum. - The referendum power was added to the Maryland Constitution
 in 1915.   n110 Originally conceived in the Progressive era as a way to check
 conservative legislatures, by the 1960s the referendum had become identified
 largely as a tool of conservatives to oppose progressive legislation.   n111 For
 example, in 1964, a referendum to repeal an act strengthening state protection
 against racial discrimination received forty-seven percent of the vote and
 carried thirteen counties.   n112 With this in mind, the 1967-1968
 Constitutional Convention sought to make referenda more difficult by increasing
 the requirement of petition signatures from three to five percent of the voter
 turnout.   n113
 
   The referendum is not one of the areas where the proposals of the 1967-1968
 convention have led to subsequent constitutional change. Since 1967, only minor
 revisions have been made in the referendum power.   n114
 
   C. Legislative Branch
 
 The 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention considered radically revising the
 provisions governing the legislative branch, and eventually recommended
 important changes in the structure and powers of the legislature.   n115 After
 the defeat of the proposed constitution, none  [*550]  of the proposals of the
 constitutional convention concerning the legislative branch have been brought to
 fruition. The reason for this seems clear. There has been no constitutional
 convention since 1967- 1968; thus, the only route to constitutional amendment
 must begin in the legislature and receive the approval of three-fifths of the
 members of each house.   n116 Consequently, change is difficult. If a proposed
 constitutional amendment would reduce the power and prestige of the legislature,
 few legislators would support it.   n117 Alternatively, if a proposal would
 increase the power and prestige of the legislature - as many of the proposals of
 the 1967-1968 constitution would have - other institutions may face a
 commensurate loss of power.   n118 To implement such a proposal, legislators
 would need to overcome likely gubernatorial opposition and the public perception
 that such an amendment was a grab for political power.
 
   1. Removing Limitations on the General Assembly. - Under standard American
 political theory, state legislatures are the repository of all sovereign power.
 n119 Thus, state legislatures may pass legislation governing any subject matter
 they select, with the state and federal consti [*551]  tutions functioning as
 the sole limitation.   n120 The Court of Appeals of  [*552]  Maryland has
 recognized this basic tenet of state sovereignty, stating that "the delegated
 legislative powers of the General Assembly are plenary, except as limited by the
 Federal and State Constitutions."   n121
 
   The 1867 Maryland Constitution contains numerous provisions governing
 legislative action. Some of these provisions prohibit the General Assembly from
 legislating over a given subject matter.   n122 Other provisions require the
 General Assembly to regulate subjects by legislative act.   n123 The provisions
 in the first group, preventing the legislature from legislating, are few in
 number and arcane.   n124 The more insidious problem arises from provisions that
 require the General Assembly to legislate in certain areas. Although it has not
 presented a problem in Maryland, courts can transform such mandates into
 limitations on legislative power, by the canon of construction expressio unius
 est exclusio alterius (the expression of one is the exclusion of an [*553]
 other).   n125 As Wheeler and Kinsey write, "So far as the legislature has
 plenary powers to act in the absence of constitutional restraint, almost any
 constitutional statement becomes a limitation."   n126
 
   The 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention sought to eliminate both problems by
 removing most constitutional limitations on legislative enactment.   n127 In the
 thirty years since the defeat of the proposed constitution, no changes have been
 made to limit the problem of negative implication.
 
   2. Composition of the General Assembly. - The basic unit of representation in
 the Maryland General Assembly, at least from 1776 to 1968, was the county.
 n128 But after the United States Supreme Court's  [*554]  decision in Baker v.
 Carr,   n129 the disparity in size between the most populous and least populous
 counties made representation by county impossible:
 
 

    "The unpleasant reality which the committee [on the legislative branch]
 finally had to face was the fact that, for each county to retain at least one
 delegate, [and conform to the 'one man/one vote' principle], the House of
 Delegates would have to have [based on demographic trends] 192 members following
 the reapportionment in 1970 and 227 members following the reapportionment in
 1980 ...."   n130
 
 

    Thus, it was impossible to retain the county as the basic unit of
 representation in the General Assembly. To avoid this quagmire, the
 constitutional convention determined that reapportionment would be best left to
 the General Assembly itself, subject to two important restrictions: (1) that the
 membership in the House of Delegates not exceed 120 members and the Senate not
 exceed 40 members; and (2) that each delegate represent a single district.
 n131 The mechanism by which the General Assembly would undertake redistricting
 was somewhat novel and originated at the Convention. The drafters proposed a
 nine-member "Redistricting Commission"   n132 and charged it with creating a
 redistricting plan. The plan would be submitted to the gover [*555]  nor,   n133
 who then would introduce the plan to the General Assembly.   n134 The General
 Assembly was then free to adopt the Commission plan or another of its own
 design.   n135 The proposed constitution provided that the Court of Appeals
 would have original review of the adopted redistricting plan.   n136
 
   Upon the defeat of the proposed constitution, it was still necessary to
 reorganize the General Assembly according to the "one person/one vote"
 principle, which was enshrined in the Maryland Constitution by a 1969
 amendment.   n137
 
   Following the 1970 census, a more substantial change was adopted that remains
 in effect today.   n138 Under this system, the governor is charged with creating
 a redistricting plan after the census.   n139 The governor then causes the plan
 to be introduced in the General Assembly.   n140 If the General Assembly fails
 to adopt an alternative plan, the governor's plan becomes law.   n141 The new
 system, like that proposed by the Constitutional Convention of 1967-1968,
 provides for original jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals of Maryland for
 challenges to the redistricting plan adopted.   n142
 
    [*556]  In summary, after the United States Supreme Court mandated that
 state legislatures conform to the principle of "one man/one vote," nothing could
 be done to retain representation in the General Assembly by county. Over time,
 demographic change has required that legislative districts cross county lines
 more and more frequently. With respect to the mechanism for redistricting, it is
 unclear if the 1972 system requiring the governor to commence the redistricting
 process was adopted in response to the proposals of the Constitutional
 Convention of 1967-1968, or out of the General Assembly's understandable
 frustration that resulted from redistricting the state and its own members so
 many times in a short period of time.   n143 In either case, the constitutional
 amendment created a workable system for reapportioning the legislature in
 compliance with federal law.
 
   3. Retention of the Executive Budget System. - In 1916, an executive budget
 system was adopted in Maryland.   n144 Under this system, the governor drafts
 and submits the budget bill to the General Assembly  [*557]  for its approval.
 This system reverses the traditional legislative process, wherein bills
 originate in the General Assembly and proceed to the governor for approval.
 n145 The advantage is that it allows the governor greater control of the budget
 under which his or her administration will operate.   n146 Of course, the
 governor's additional power to propose the state budget comes at the expense of
 the legislative branch, which is deprived of that traditional power. The
 delegates to the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention proposed retaining the
 executive budget system,   n147 and in the intervening thirty years, there has
 been no formal proposal to return to the previous legislative budget system.
 
   A subsequent correction in the allocation of the balance of power between the
 executive and legislative branches with respect to the budget process was made
 in the late 1970s.   n148 Around this time, the General Assembly began passing
 bills mandating funding levels for certain programs.   n149 In effect, these
 minimum funding bills limited  [*558]  the governor's freedom to create the
 budget as he saw fit.   n150 In 1977, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
 the Maryland Constitution prohibited the General Assembly from mandating minimum
 funding of certain programs.   n151 The General Assembly responded immediately
 by amending the constitution to permit minimum funding mandates.   n152 In this
 manner, the balance of power has reached a point of equilibrium: the legislature
 can mandate minimum funding for programs it deems important; the governor must
 include those projects in the budget the governor prepares for submission to the
 General Assembly; and the General Assembly then approves the governor's budget.
 n153
 
   4. Shared Power with Local Government. - The 1967-1968 Constitutional
 Convention sought to reduce the General Assembly's role in local affairs by
 removing the responsibility to pass local legislation. The hope was that this
 change would strengthen both the General Assembly and the local governments. The
 mechanics of the proposed changes are dealt with in Part IV.F.   n154
 
   5. Legislative Sessions. - The proposed constitution called for a lengthening
 of the sessions of the General Assembly. Under the 1867  [*559]  Constitution as
 it existed in 1967, legislative sessions were limited to seventy days per year.
 n155 The proposed constitution would have allowed a ninety-day session with two
 possible thirty-day extensions.   n156 After the defeat of the proposed
 constitution, the legislature proposed, and the electorate adopted, a
 constitutional amendment to extend the legislative session to ninety days.
 n157
 
   The lengthening of the session has not had the desired effect. Wheeler and
 Kinsey's description of the end of a legislative session as a "last minute
 log-jam of legislation when dozens of bills pass one house or the other at
 fantastic rates of speed with at best the formalities touched upon"   n158 is
 still accurate. It may be that legislation can only overcome the general inertia
 of a legislative body when some significant force is applied. This force may
 come in the form of constituent outcry, media criticism, or the pressure exerted
 by fellow members of the legislature. The shortness of time at the end of a
 session, with the impending constitutional deadline, serves to magnify these
 forces. So long as Maryland continues to employ a part-time legislature, the end
 of a session, regardless of whether it is a seventy- day, ninety-day, or one
 hundred twenty-day session, will bring an end- of-session rush to adopt
 legislation.   n159
 
    [*560]
 
   D. Executive Branch
 
   1. Gubernatorial Control of Executive Branch. - Granting the governor of
 Maryland greater control of the executive branch was a clear goal of the
 Constitutional Convention of 1967-1968.   n160 The convention sought to
 accomplish this goal by reducing the number of statewide officials   n161 (in
 order that the governor would be the only state official elected on a statewide
 basis), reducing the power of the Board of Public Works,   n162 and granting the
 governor increased power to reorganize the executive branch and cabinet
 officers.   n163
 
   a. Comptroller and Attorney General. - One of the most contentious battles in
 the constitutional convention was caused by the proposal to eliminate, as
 statewide elective offices, the positions of attorney general   n164 and
 comptroller of the treasury.   n165 Currently,  [*561]  neither the comptroller
 n166 nor the attorney general   n167 is dependent on the governor for his or her
 position. Because each of these elected officials has his or her own
 constituency, the attorney general and comptroller have every reason to act
 independently, and little impetus to follow the governor.   n168 Similarly, the
 state treasurer is elected by the General Assembly and is not dependent upon the
 governor for support.   n169 Finally, the comptroller of the treasury, the state
 treasurer, and the governor together comprise the Maryland Board of Public
 Works.   n170
 
   The Eney Commission had recommended the complete excision of the office of
 the comptroller from the constitution.   n171 At the constitutional convention,
 the move to delete the comptroller became extremely political, and the votes
 were very close.   n172 Finally, a compromise was reached to retain the office
 of comptroller as a constitutionally recognized office, but to strip the office
 of most of its powers and duties.   n173 Since the defeat of the proposed
 constitution of  [*562]  1967-1968, there have been no constitutional changes
 made in the offices of the comptroller or attorney general.
 
   b. Board of Public Works. - The name of the Board of Public Works is largely
 insufficient to describe the central role that the Board plays in Maryland
 government. In many ways, the Board of Public Works is the executive branch of
 Maryland's government. Although the constitutional duties of the Board are
 limited,   n174 and reflect the original role as overseer of the State's
 investments in railroad and canal companies,   n175 today the functions of the
 Board are set largely by statute. They include the authority to sell bonds and
 determine their rates of interest; to let state contracts; to approve leases of
 and the purchase and sale of state property; and to promulgate rules and
 regulations for state agencies.   n176 In this way, many of the most important
 executive branch decisions are made by the Board of Public Works. Of the three
 votes on the Board, the governor controls only one.   n177
 
   Both the Eney Commission and the 1967-1968 proposed constitution sought to
 eliminate the Board of Public Works and concentrate its executive
 decision-making authority in the chief executive of the state, the governor.
 n178 Since the electoral defeat of the proposed constitution, however, there
 have been no further attempts to eliminate the Board of Public Works.   n179
 
   c. Reorganizing the Executive Branch. - Under the Maryland Constitution as it
 existed in 1967, the structure and organization of the executive branch was
 under the exclusive control of the legislative  [*563]  branch.   n180 A
 gubernatorial commission appointed to study the executive branch described it as
 follows:
 
 

    Maryland constitutional and statutory provisions permit only a single avenue
 for executive reorganization. This avenue requires that all proposals for
 executive reorganization formally originate in the legislature; that they be
 considered by each house, where they may be modified or tabled; and that they be
 approved by each house and transmitted to the Governor for his approval, if they
 are to become law.   n181
 
 

    By 1967, the legislature had used its authority to create over 240 boards,
 departments, and commissions.   n182 Moreover, the governor's control of these
 executive agencies was weak. Although the governor had (and continues to have)
 broad appointment powers subject to senatorial confirmation,   n183 the
 governor's removal power was limited to circumstances of "incompetency or
 misconduct," but not for political disobedience.   n184 The terms of office of
 the heads of executive departments were not necessarily coterminous with that of
 the governor, thus permitting carry-over appointees from a previous
 gubernatorial administration to exercise substantial executive authority.   n185
 Finally, many of the executive departments, as they were constituted in 1967,
 were directed by boards or commissions, rather than by a single department
 head.   n186 Each of these factors tended to weaken the governor's control over
 the executive branch.   n187
 
    [*564]  The Constitutional Convention of 1967-1968 sought to strengthen the
 governor's power over the executive branch.   n188 First, the convention
 proposed to assign all executive powers, duties, and functions to no more than
 twenty principal departments.   n189 Second, although the General Assembly would
 be allowed to make the initial allocation of functions among the twenty
 departments,   n190 either the General Assembly or the governor could propose
 subsequent reorganization.   n191 Reorganizations proposed by the governor would
 become effective unless rejected by the legislature.   n192 Finally, the
 convention proposed that most departments would be directed by a single
 department head, serving at the pleasure of the governor.   n193 For those
 departments that were permitted to retain a governing board, including the State
 Board of Education, the convention proposed that the governor appoint half of
 the board's membership upon assuming office.   n194
 
   Once the proposed constitution of 1967-1968 was rejected, this fertile area
 for constitutional reform was not forgotten. Governor Marvin Mandel proposed,
 the General Assembly adopted, and the voters of Maryland approved legislation
 granting the governor the power to reorganize the executive branch.   n195
 
    [*565]  A recent amendment to the Maryland Constitution served to reinforce
 the governor's right to control the executive branch. In response to several
 "midnight appointments" by "lame duck" Governor William Donald Schaefer, the
 General Assembly passed a constitutional amendment to prohibit last-minute
 appointments by outgoing governors.   n196
 
   2. Lieutenant Governor. - Even before the constitutional convention, it was
 assumed that the new constitution would reestablish the office of lieutenant
 governor. The short-lived Maryland Constitution of 1864 provided for a
 lieutenant governor, but the office was abolished upon the adoption of the 1867
 Constitution.   n197 Wheeler and  [*566]  Kinsey report that the decision to
 create an office of lieutenant governor was uncontroversial at the 1967-1968
 Convention.   n198
 
   Ironically, the need for a lieutenant governor quickly became apparent after
 the defeat of the proposed 1967-1968 Constitution. In the 100 years between the
 adoption of the 1867 Constitution and the start of the 1967-1968 Constitutional
 Convention, only three governors were unable to complete their terms of office:
 Governor William Pinkney Whyte, who resigned on March 4, 1874, in preparation
 for accepting a seat in the United States Senate;   n199 Governor Robert M.
 McLane, who resigned on March 27, 1885, to become United States Minister to
 France;   n200 and Governor Herbert R. O'Conor, who resigned to accept a seat in
 the United States Senate on January 3, 1947.   n201 In each case, a replacement
 from the resigning governor's  [*567]  own party was elected by the General
 Assembly to complete the term: Governor James Black Groome,   n202 Governor
 Henry Lloyd,   n203 and Governor William Preston Lane, Jr.,   n204 respectively.
 But less than eight months after the rejection of the 1967-1968 constitution,
 Governor Spiro T. Agnew, a member of the Republican Party, was elected vice
 president of the United States. When Agnew resigned as Governor on January 7,
 1969 to become vice president, the General Assembly elected Marvin Mandel, the
 Speaker of the House of Delegates, and a Democrat, to fill Agnew's unexpired
 term.   n205
 
   The constitution was amended in 1970 to create the office of lieutenant
 governor.   n206 The need for such a position was reinforced shortly thereafter
 when Governor Mandel, under investigation by the United States Attorney's Office
 for alleged corruption, elevated his Lieutenant Governor, Blair Lee, III to
 serve as acting Governor.   n207 Lee served in that capacity from June 4, 1977,
 until January 15, 1979,  [*568]  and again briefly on January 16, 1979.   n208
 There has been no subsequent need for a lieutenant governor to replace the
 governor.
 
   3. The Veto. - The gubernatorial veto was first authorized in Maryland by the
 1867 Constitution.   n209 As the veto power was initially constituted, the
 governor had six days after being presented with a legislative act either to
 sign the bill, veto it,   n210 or refuse to act on the bill ("pocket" it). The
 effect of the governor's refusal to act was determined by the action or inaction
 of the General Assembly:
 
 

    If any bill shall not be returned by the Governor within six days (Sundays
 excepted), after it shall be presented to him, the same shall be a Law in like
 manner as if he signed it, unless the General Assembly shall, by adjournment,
 prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a Law.   n211
 
 

    Apparently, the drafters of this provision hoped that it would persuade the
 General Assembly to pass important legislation throughout the legislative
 session, rather than waiting for the end-of-session rush.   n212
 
   One question that the text of the veto provision left open was the validity
 of post-adjournment approval and signature by the governor. The Court of Appeals
 of Maryland upheld post-adjournment sign [*569]  ing,   n213 but left open the
 question of whether the signature must be affixed within the six-day period.
 n214
 
   A more important problem with the veto power as set forth in the 1867
 Constitution was the governor's ability to manipulate the veto's timing to
 prevent a vote to override the veto. The manipulation worked as follows. If a
 governor vetoed a bill during the session, that bill was immediately returned to
 the General Assembly for an override vote.   n215 If a Governor vetoed a bill
 after the adjournment, that bill would be returned to the General Assembly
 during its next session. When permitted to expire by pocket veto after
 adjournment, however, there was no method for legislative
 reconsideration. Obviously, preferring not to face override votes, governors
 learned to manipulate the date of presentment, delaying it in order to force the
 six-day period to expire after the adjournment of the General Assembly.   n216
 By manipulating the date of presentment, governors could avoid an override vote
 altogether.
 
   In 1950, a constitutional amendment partially closed this loophole by
 requiring that all bills vetoed or pocket vetoed after adjournment be returned
 to the next session of the General Assembly for consideration of an override.
 n217 In 1960, this again was modified so that no bills would be returned to the
 legislature if there had been an  [*570]  intervening election between the
 pocket veto and the possible return of the bill for override.   n218
 
   The Maryland Constitution also provides for a limited "line-item" veto.
 n219 This line-item veto originally permitted the governor to strike out any
 portion of an appropriation bill. This changed in 1916, when Maryland adopted
 the executive budget system.   n220 Under the system, the governor (rather than
 the General Assembly) originates the budget process by introducing a budget
 bill; this bill was excepted from the line-item veto.   n221 Therefore, as the
 constitution stood in 1967, the line-item veto applied only to supplemental
 appropriation bills originating in the General Assembly.   n222
 
   The proposed constitution of 1967-1968 retained the general executive veto,
 but eliminated the pocket veto. Under the proposed constitution, the governor
 would have been required to sign or veto an act within twenty days of
 presentment if the General Assembly was in session, or within thirty days if it
 had adjourned.   n223 The governor's failure to act within these time limits
 would result in the bill becoming law without the governor's signature.   n224
 The convention hoped that these changes, along with lengthening the legislative
 session from seventy to ninety days,   n225 and permitting the General Assembly
 to call itself into special session,   n226 would result in a more orderly and
 timely legislative process.   n227 The constitutional convention also proposed
 expanding the line-item veto to permit the governor not only to  [*571]  strike,
 but also to reduce, an item in a supplementary appropriation.   n228
 
   Since the rejection of the 1967-1968 proposed constitution, two amendments to
 this provision were adopted. A 1974 amendment eliminated the pocket veto, as
 recommended by the 1967-1968 Convention.   n229 For the administrative
 convenience of the General Assembly, the voters in 1988 approved a veto calendar
 which eliminated the constitutional requirement of three "readings" for the
 consideration of vetoed bills.   n230
 
   E. Judicial Branch
 
   1. Organization of Court System. - The Maryland judiciary had long been a
 source of dissatisfaction. An account contemporaneous to the convention
 described the Maryland judiciary as follows:
 
 

    Maryland's court system is very complex, and unnecessarily so. There are no
 less than 16 different types of courts, with little uniformity from one
 community to another. A lawyer from one county venturing into another is likely
 to feel almost as bewildered as if he had gone into another state with an
 entirely different system of courts. A case which would be handled in the
 people's court of one county is handled by a trial magistrate in another, by the
 municipal court in another, and by the circuit court in still another ....
 n231
 
 

    Reorganizing and streamlining this confusing system was a high priority on
 the eve of the constitutional convention,   n232 and the proposed changes were
 the self-described greatest accomplishment of the  [*572]  convention
 delegates.   n233 The plan, as endorsed by the constitutional convention, was to
 create a unified, four-tiered court system with a Court of Appeals, an
 Intermediate Appellate Court,   n234 a Superior Court, and a District Court.
 n235
 
   Upon the rejection of the proposed constitution, a constitutional amendment
 was rapidly passed that created a unified, statewide district court.   n236
 Although the circuit courts have yet to be unified, a constitutional amendment
 was adopted in 1980 unifying the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City (formerly
 composed of the Superior Court of Baltimore City, Court of Common Pleas, the
 Baltimore City Court, Circuit Court of Baltimore City, Circuit Court No. 2, and
 the Criminal Court of Baltimore)   n237 into the single, unified, consolidated
 Circuit Court for Baltimore City.   n238
 
    [*573]  Some of the constitutional convention's and the proposed
 constitution's sound proposals with respect to the state court system have yet
 to be adopted. For example, Orphans' Courts, with elected lay judges, still
 probate contested wills in most counties in the State of Maryland.   n239 An
 even more egregious example is the failure to create a unified, statewide
 circuit court system. In 1995, the General Assembly appointed a commission to
 study the future of the Maryland court system.   n240 This commission
 recommended the creation of a statewide, unified circuit court   n241 as well as
 the abolition of the Orphans' Court system.   n242 So far, no action has been
 taken, although the commission itself urged a delay of any proposed
 constitutional amendment until the Maryland General Assembly meets for its
 session in the year 2000.   n243
 
   The proposed constitution also recognized that the cost of operating the
 state's judicial system should be borne by the state as a whole.   n244 With the
 rejection of the proposed constitution, the former system, by which the county
 governments are required to fund their own circuit courts, was retained. To
 remedy this problem Baltimore City has long sought state funding for the city's
 circuit court.   n245
 
    [*574]
 
   2. Judicial Selection and Tenure. - Under the 1867 Constitution, as it
 existed in 1967, the governor had the power to appoint judges to serve on the
 Court of Appeals of Maryland and on the respective circuit courts.   n246 After
 being appointed, the selected judge was to serve for approximately one year,
 until the next general election; at this election, the appointed judge could
 seek election to a fifteen-year term by running in a potentially contested
 primary and general election.   n247
 
   Judges of the courts of limited jurisdiction were selected in a variety of
 ways, each prescribed by the Constitution. Orphans' Court judges were popularly
 elected to four-year terms.   n248 People's Court judges in Baltimore City,
 after initial gubernatorial appointment, stood for popular election to
 eight-year terms.   n249 People's Court judges in other parts of the state were
 selected different ways in different counties.   n250 Municipal Court judges in
 Baltimore City, after initial gubernatorial appointment, stood for popular
 election to ten-year terms.   n251 The governor was responsible for the
 appointment of trial magistrates and committing magistrates, but in practice,
 state senators generally controlled these appointments.   n252
 
   This system was criticized for being too political and not sufficiently
 capable of picking excellent judges. Former Judge Emory H. Niles had, since his
 retirement in 1962, advocated the adoption of a new system of judicial selection
 "referred to generally in this country as the Missouri Plan and in Maryland as
 the Niles Plan."   n253 Under the Niles Plan, the governor would have appointed
 all judges from lists of three to five eligible people recommended by judicial
 nominating commissions; after two years, and every eight years thereafter, a
 judge would have been required to stand for reelection in a non-contested,
 [*575]  retention election.   n254 Although the General Assembly had rejected
 this plan at five consecutive sessions, reformers hoped to implement it in the
 new state constitution.   n255 Eventually both the Eney Commission and the
 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention endorsed the Niles Plan.   n256
 
   Subsequent to the defeat of the 1967-1968 proposed constitution, many of the
 reforms advocated by Emory Niles have been adopted, both by constitutional
 amendment and by executive order. Governor Marvin Mandel instituted the current
 judicial nominations system by an executive order.   n257 Each subsequent
 governor has maintained and followed this general guideline while updating it as
 appropriate.   n258 The judicial nominations system as it exists today creates a
 seventeen- member Appellate Judicial Nominating Commission and sixteen separate
 Trial Court Judicial Nominating Commissions.   n259 When a vacancy occurs, the
 appropriate commission seeks and interviews potential candidates and submits a
 list of qualified persons to the governor.   n260 The governor then selects a
 person to fill the judicial vacancy from among those listed by the commission.
 n261
 
   The Niles plan also sought to remove judges from the rigors of electoral
 politics;   n262 this goal has been accomplished at three of the four levels of
 Maryland courts. The 1969 constitutional amendment that created the statewide
 district court system   n263 abolished the old patchwork system for electing
 judges of courts of limited jurisdiction. The new provisions required that
 district court judges be appointed by the governor, subject to confirmation by
 the state senate, for terms of ten years.   n264 In 1976, another constitutional
 amendment abolished  [*576]  the requirement that appellate judges stand in a
 contested election.   n265 Appellate judges now must run in non-contested,
 retention elections for terms of ten years.   n266 As a result of these changes,
 now only circuit court judges are required to stand for popular election.   n267
 
   3. Judicial Disabilities. - The desire to maintain and increase the
 independence of judges - to remove them from the influence of the executive
 branch and the vicissitudes of public opinion - has been an important,
 longstanding concern in Maryland and elsewhere. The initial Maryland Declaration
 of Rights of 1776 provided:
 
 

    That the independency and uprightness of Judges are essential to the
 impartial administration of justice, and a great security to the rights and
 liberties of the people; wherefore the Chancellor and all Judges ought to hold
 commissions during good behavior; and the said Chancellor and Judges shall be
 removed for misbehavior, on conviction in a court of law, and may be removed by
 the Governor, upon the address of the General Assembly; Provided, That two
 thirds of all the members of each House concur in such address.   n268
 
 

    This language remained virtually intact until the adoption of the Maryland
 Constitution of 1867.   n269 In this constitution, the Declaration of Rights was
 changed to provide that "judges shall not be removed, except in the manner, and
 for the causes, provided in this Constitution."   n270 This constitution
 provided for the political impeachment of judges found to be unable to discharge
 their duties with effi [*577]  ciency "by reason of continued sickness, or of
 physical or mental infirmity."   n271
 
   A 1966 constitutional amendment created a commission on judicial
 disabilities, the function of which was to investigate claims of judicial
 disability and make recommendations to the General Assembly.   n272 The General
 Assembly then would vote on whether to retain the judge, or, by a two-thirds
 vote of each House, remove the judge from office.   n273 The Eney Commission
 recommended deleting the judicial disabilities commission from the constitution
 and transferring the final removal authority to the state supreme court.   n274
 The constitutional convention retained the constitutional status of the judicial
 disabilities commission, but agreed with the Eney Commission that final removal
 power should rest with the Court of Appeals of Maryland.   n275
 
   With the defeat of the proposed constitution, the General Assembly retained
 its voice in judicial removal until 1970 when, by constitutional amendment, the
 authority to remove judges was transferred from the General Assembly to the
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.   n276
 
   4. Judicial Administration. - By a 1943 constitutional amendment, the Chief
 Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland was desig [*578]  nated the
 "administrative head of the judicial system of the State."   n277 This power
 permits the chief judge to reassign any judge (except judges of the Orphans'
 Court) to sit temporarily in any other court in order to relieve accumulated
 work or to fill a vacancy.   n278 The Eney Commission proposed retaining and
 expanding the chief judge's administrative powers.   n279
 
   Since the defeat of the proposed constitution, the preexistent system has
 been retained. There have been minor changes, but the constitutional provision
 remains virtually intact.   n280 However, there have been monumental changes in
 judicial administration in Maryland due largely to the personality of former
 chief judge, Robert C. Murphy.   n281 Aiding the chief judge in his
 administrative duties is an administrative office of the courts, first
 established by statute in 1955.   n282
 
   F. Local Government
 
 By divesting the General Assembly of its local lawmaking function, and granting
 this function to the counties, the Constitutional  [*579]  Convention of 1967-
 1968 hoped to revitalize and energize both the local and state levels of
 government.   n283 To accomplish this goal, the proposed constitution mandated
 local home rule for Maryland counties and Baltimore City;   n284 required that
 all laws passed by the General Assembly apply generally throughout the state;
 n285 and empowered the General Assembly to create "Multi-County Governmental
 Units."   n286
 
   Prior to 1967, although the Maryland Constitution permitted some local
 legislative autonomy through charter home rule,   n287 only four counties had
 adopted such a charter.   n288 Moreover, these counties were permitted to
 legislate only about those subjects permitted to them by the General Assembly.
 n289 By constitutional amendment in 1966, the General Assembly authorized a
 second class of local rule called "code home rule."   n290 Under this system, a
 non-charter county  [*580]  can be granted limited home rule powers.   n291 When
 the constitutional convention convened in 1967, however, not a single county had
 yet adopted the new code home rule form of local government.   n292
 
   With such limited local governance, the Maryland General Assembly
 historically took an active role in legislating for local governments. As one
 study found:
 
 

    The consideration of local legislation requires a substantial share of the
 time and energies of members of the General Assembly. In this respect Maryland
 occupies almost a unique position among states, for its legislature gives
 perhaps more attention to the details of local government than does the
 legislature of any other state in the Union.   n293
 
 

    Wheeler and Kinsey noted that this system has provided great legislative
 flexibility and has not led to severe abuse.   n294 They also stated, however,
 that "if there was a central drive in the convention, it was to get the
 legislative branch out of the business of legislating for specific localities
 and force the local governments to govern locally."   n295
 
   The constitutional convention sought to recast the local-state relationship
 in its entirety. First, it proposed that all counties be required to adopt their
 own home rule charters.   n296 Under these charters, counties could legislate as
 they saw fit in any subject area that  [*581]  the county deemed appropriate,
 unless the General Assembly denied by law this power.   n297 Second, the General
 Assembly was prohibited from enacting legislation that did not have general
 application throughout the state.   n298 Finally, the constitutional convention
 proposed the possibility of "Multi-County Governmental Units."   n299 This last
 proposal eventually became one of the most divisive issues of the campaign for
 ratification, because the opponents of the proposed constitution used this
 proposal to play on racist fears that Baltimore City, with its African-American
 majority, would annex the mostly white suburban areas.   n300 Indeed, Wheeler
 and Kinsey identified the discus [*582]  sion of regional government directly
 with racial issues; "when some said 'regional government,' they were
 communicating 'race.'"   n301
 
   After the defeat of the proposed constitution, few changes have been made in
 the relationship between state and local governments.   n302 Few additional
 counties have chosen to adopt a charter form of government.   n303 The General
 Assembly continues to pass legislation of purely local application.
 
    [*583]  Regional planning for the Baltimore metropolitan area has long been
 attempted, with varying degrees of success. The Baltimore Regional Planning
 Council was established in 1956 as part of the State Planning Department.   n304
 In 1963, the Baltimore Regional Planning Council was replaced by the Regional
 Planning Council.   n305 The Regional Planning Council became an independent
 agency in 1984.   n306 In 1989, the name was changed to the Baltimore Regional
 Council of Governments.   n307 Finally, in 1992, it became the Baltimore
 Metropolitan Council.   n308
 
   There is a renewed interest in regional governments in the Baltimore
 metropolitan area.   n309 David Rusk has identified a city's relative
 "elasticity" - its ability to expand its borders to reduce population density
 n310 - as a key component of that city's ability to thrive economically.   n311
 Rusk notes that a 1948 constitutional amendment prevents Baltimore City from
 expanding through annexation without approval of the voters in the area to be
 annexed.   n312 Because Rusk believes such approval (or repeal of the
 constitutional provision) is impossible, he recommends establishing a
 "Metropolitan Municipality" as the upper tier of a two-tiered system of local
 government in Baltimore City, and Baltimore, Anne Arundel, Carroll, Harford,
 Howard, and Queen Anne's counties.   n313 This metropolitan government would be
 respon [*584]  sible for providing low cost housing on a regional basis   n314
 and normalizing taxing disparities between the jurisdictions.   n315 If such
 proposals are successful in gathering support, it will be interesting to see if
 the same arguments will be made against regional government that were made in
 1967-1968. It will also be interesting to see how the state constitution is
 involved in favor of, and in opposition to, these ideas.
 
   G. Finance and Taxation
 
 The provisions governing finance and taxation, although spread throughout the
 1867 Maryland Constitution, are mostly found in Article III (Legislative
 Department). The 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention proposed creating a
 separate article (Article 6) to deal with the issues of state government
 finance, including the state budget process and bonding authority.
 
   1. The State Budget Process. - The 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention
 proposed retaining the executive budget system that had existed successfully in
 Maryland since 1916.   n316 A discussion of the Maryland executive budget system
 and the decision to retain that system is included in Part IV.C.3.   n317
 
   2. Bond Financing. - The constitutional provisions governing state debt in
 the 1867 Maryland Constitution, as it existed in 1967, were an anachronistic and
 restrictive remnant of poor financial choices made in the first half of the
 nineteenth century.   n318 These ex [*585]  pensive and embarrassing financial
 mistakes clearly influenced the delegates to the Maryland Constitutional
 Convention of 1850.   n319 To avoid a repetition, severe restrictions were
 placed on the issuance of state bonds.   n320 First, each bond issuance was
 required to be accompanied by the levying of a tax sufficient to pay interest as
 it came due and principal within fifteen years.   n321 A total debt ceiling of $
 100,000 was installed, with the possibility of an emergency $ 50,000 limit on
 borrowing for temporary deficiencies.   n322 Finally, the credit of the state
 could not be given or loaned to any individual, association, or corporation.
 n323
 
   The tight controls on incurring debt were slightly modified in the Maryland
 Constitution of 1864,   n324 and were modified again slightly in the 1867
 version.   n325 The provision was amended in 1924 to permit the credit of the
 state to be pledged to raise money for veterans' bonuses,   n326 and again in
 1960, to permit tax anticipation borrowing and  [*586]  to enable the state
 treasurer to borrow to cover temporary emergencies.   n327
 
   This restrictive regime forced the state to find creative ways to finance
 necessary improvements. The Court of Appeals of Maryland assisted in this
 enterprise by stretching the words of restrictive constitutional provisions
 beyond their normal meanings.   n328 As the Eney Commission found, "Frequent
 litigation has been essential and the words 'debt,' 'credit,' and 'works of
 internal improvement,' as used in  [*587]  this part of the Constitution have
 taken on highly specialized meanings, understood only by the initiated."   n329
 
   The Eney Commission and the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention decided both
 to scrap this archaic system and to adopt a provision patterned on the New York
 Constitution.   n330 This provision would have provided that:
 
 

    If at any time the General Assembly shall have failed to appropriate and to
 make available sufficient funds to provide for the timely payment of the
 interest and principal then due upon all state indebtedness, it shall be the
 duty of the comptroller to pay, or to make available for payment, to the holders
 of such indebtedness from the first revenues thereafter received applicable to
 the general funds of the State, a sum equal to such interest and principal.
 n331
 
 

    While this proposed change created little controversy, there was a great
 deal of concern about a second recommendation: to extend the maturity period for
 state bonds from fifteen to twenty-five years.   n332 Although delegates were
 concerned that the longer maturity might negatively affect the state's bond
 rating, they eventually adopted the longer maturity period.   n333 Finally, the
 proposed constitution would have permitted the credit of the state to be loaned
 to private institutions if the loan served a public purpose.   n334
 
   Upon the defeat of the proposed constitution, the preceding status quo
 prevailed. In 1972, a constitutional amendment modified the requirement that
 each issuance of state debt be matched to the imposition of a tax to fund
 repayment.   n335 Under this amendment, the requirement to levy a tax does not
 apply "in the event that sufficient funds to pay the principal and interest on
 the debt are appropriated for this purpose in the annual state budget."   n336
 In 1976, the historic prohibition against pledging the state's faith and credit
 for internal  [*588]  improvements was removed.   n337 Finally, in 1982, the
 constitution was amended again to permit the treasurer to issue short-term notes
 in anticipation of revenue, including bond revenues.   n338
 
   The review of the current provisions governing state bond financing is
 decidedly mixed. The constitutional language is archaic and difficult to
 understand. The words of the provision still have "highly specialized meanings,
 understood only by the initiated."   n339 On the other hand, Maryland has
 maintained its enviable credit rating,   n340 and the provision no longer
 hampers the ability of state government to raise capital or to fund internal
 improvements.
 
   3. Post Audit. - The 1867 Maryland Constitution has, at all times, conferred
 auditing authority on the Maryland House of Delegates.   n341 By 1967, however,
 the audit function was in fact performed by a member of the executive branch,
 the state auditor.   n342 The state auditor was appointed by the governor and
 worked under the supervision of the comptroller.   n343 This arrangement of the
 executive branch auditing itself runs counter to good fiscal practice, and both
 the Eney Commission and the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention proposed to
 return the audit function to the legislative branch.   n344 Wheeler and Kinsey
 note that, even before the proposed constitution was submitted to the voters,
 the General Assembly had returned the post-audit function to its
 constitutionally assigned role under the direction of the  [*589]  legislature.
 n345 Today, the Maryland Code fixes the office of the Legislative Auditor as an
 officer of the legislative branch.   n346
 
   4. Lotteries. - The decision to continue the constitutional prohibition on
 lotteries   n347 was a source of great controversy both before   n348 and after
 the constitutional convention. The Eney Commission recommended eliminating the
 constitutional prohibition against the lottery.   n349 At the convention, the
 prediction that the lottery provisions would be controversial proved to be true:
 
 

    The process of reaching the decision to [retain a ban on state lotteries]
 ... in the draft constitution took up more time of the convention and produced
 more debate - at times acrimonious - than any other matter relating to state
 finance and taxation. Indeed the matter was not settled until the closing hours
 of the convention when on third reading after the convention could muster only
 68 of the 72 votes needed to include the provision in the draft, it agreed to
 reconsider and finally produced the needed votes.   n350
 
 

    Eventually the convention decided to retain the constitutional ban on
 state-run lotteries.   n351 That ban had existed in the same form since the
 Constitution of 1851.   n352 Although the convention proposed modernizing the
 language, the proposed constitution retained the same concept.   n353
 
   After the defeat of the proposed constitution, the ban on lotteries from the
 1867 Constitution remained in effect. In 1972, the citizens of Maryland voted to
 eliminate the prohibition on state-run lotteries  [*590]  and to create the
 Maryland Lottery.   n354 Today, the Maryland Lottery provides a small but
 significant percentage of state revenues.   n355
 
   5. The Balanced Budget Amendment. - One of the most important recent
 innovations in Maryland state government finance was not recommended by the
 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention. In 1973, Maryland adopted a balanced budget
 amendment.   n356 This amendment requires that total estimated revenues exceed
 total estimated appropriations.   n357 Moreover, in the process of amending the
 budget bill, the General Assembly cannot cause appropriations to exceed
 revenues.   n358
 
    [*591]
 
   H. Other Issues
 
   1. Salaries. - The 1867 Maryland Constitution provided set salaries for the
 governor,   n359 attorney general,   n360 treasurer,   n361 comptroller,   n362
 members of the General Assembly,   n363 appellate judges,   n364 trial judges
 outside of Baltimore City,   n365 and trial judges in Baltimore City.   n366
 Additionally, the constitution provided that, except in cases specifically
 provided in the constitution, no constitutional office could receive an annual
 salary greater than $ 3000.   n367 Inflation eroded the value of these set
 salaries between 1867 and 1967. Over this hundred- year period, this problem had
 been recognized, and constitutional amendments modified the set salaries.   n368
 For the attorney general, the set salary was replaced by the provision that "he
 shall receive for his services an annual salary of three thousand dollars, or
 such annual salary as the General Assembly may from time to time by law
 prescribe."   n369 Judicial salaries also were removed from the constitution and
 placed in the discretion of the legislature, with the sole requirement that a
 judge's salary "shall not be diminished during his continuance in office."
 n370 The cap of $ 3000 annual salary for constitutional offices for which no
 salary was listed in the constitution was also removed.   n371
 
    [*592]  With respect to the governor and members of the General Assembly,
 although some modification in salary had been made, the root problem remained.
 The governor's salary had been adjusted, but to a new fixed figure.   n372 The
 salaries of the members of the General Assembly had been increased to $ 2400
 annually,   n373 and voters rejected a 1966 proposal to permit the General
 Assembly to set its own salary.   n374
 
   With respect to the executive branch, the proposed constitution of 1967-1968
 provided that:
 
 

    The salary of the governor, of the lieutenant governor, of the attorney
 general, and of the comptroller shall be prescribed by law, and shall neither be
 increased nor decreased during the term for which each was elected.   n375
 
 

    Similarly, with respect to the legislative branch, the proposed constitution
 stated that:
 
 

    A member of the General Assembly shall receive the salary and allowances
 prescribed by law. A salary increase enacted during one term of office shall not
 become effective before the next term. No senator or delegate shall be paid
 daily living expenses during regular sessions of the General Assembly.   n376
 
 

    Obviously, this proposal of the 1967-1968 Convention was nearly identical to
 a proposal that the voters rejected merely a year before.   n377 The Maryland
 electorate was not willing to trust the General Assembly to set its own salaries
 directly.
 
   Upon the defeat of the proposed constitution, the problem of fixed salaries
 for the governor and members of the General Assembly continued until the
 development of an innovative solution: the Governor's Salary Commission   n378
 and the General Assembly Compensa [*593]  tion Commission.   n379 Each of these
 commissions is independently appointed and makes a recommendation to the General
 Assembly as to appropriate salary adjustments.   n380 Upon receipt of the
 recommendations, the General Assembly may accept or reduce the amount
 recommended, but cannot increase the proposed salary change.   n381 Any change
 in salary made does not become effective until the next term of office.   n382
 In this manner, a thorny problem that the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention
 was unable to solve has now been resolved.
 
   2. Streamlining and Simplifying. - One common and accurate criticism of the
 1867 Constitution is that it is too long and too complicated.   n383 The Eney
 Commission correctly saw this as a major defect and adopted the following
 drafting principles aimed at curing this problem:
 
 

    1. To the greatest possible extent the language used should be terse, plain
 and simple, so that its meaning would be easily understood by an informed
 citizen of average intelligence and literacy.
 
   2. The organization of the draft should be simple and clear and the
 arrangement logical.
 
   3. The constitution should provide only for the structure of government and
 should provide no more detail than absolutely necessary.
 
   4. The language should be plain and direct and, where necessary, mandatory
 and not merely exhortatory.
 
   5. The style and language should be in accord with modern usage and, where
 change in language was thought desirable to accomplish this purpose even though
 no change in substance was intended, the change should be made.
 
   6. Where through court decisions language has obtained a special and
 well-understood constitutional meaning, it should be retained, if possible,
 where no change in sub [*594]  stance is intended; but archaic, obsolete or
 outmoded language should not be retained merely because its meaning has been the
 subject of court decisions, and "words of art," the precise meaning of which is
 known only to those skilled in the art, should be avoided.
 
   7. The constitution should be divided into articles and sections and, if
 possible, a numbering system adopted which would facilitate the incorporation in
 the proper place of any future amendments.
 
   8. The Declaration of Rights should be a part of the constitution and not a
 separate document.   n384
 
 

    Similarly, the constitutional convention took the issue of streamlining
 seriously. Delegate Howard R. Penniman from Montgomery County, a professor of
 political science at Georgetown University, was appointed to chair a committee
 on style, drafting, and arrangement.   n385 The Baltimore Sun described this
 committee's function: "The committee on style has the duty of making sure each
 and every word in the final draft of the document is necessary, and that the sum
 total means what the convention wants it to mean."   n386 The result of these
 careful efforts was a better-organized, logical, and succinct constitution.
 Wheeler and Kinsey noted that the proposed constitution contained 14,000 words,
 a reduction from the 42,000 that existed in the 1867 Constitution at that time.
 n387
 
   Upon the rejection of the proposed constitution of 1967-1968, hopes for a
 better-organized and more streamlined constitution largely have gone by the
 wayside.   n388 Whatever updates have occurred subsequently have been minor in
 scope. For example, until an amendment in 1971,   n389 Article 7 of the
 Declaration of Rights provided that "every white male citizen ... ought to have
 the right of suff [*595]  rage."   n390 The 1971 constitutional amendment
 corrected this single glaring anachronism, but did not undertake more. In 1972,
 the detailed description of those persons ineligible to vote   n391 was removed
 and replaced by a simple statement that the General Assembly could regulate
 voter eligibility.   n392 In 1976, an amendment deleted the last overtly racist
 provision of the Maryland Constitution, which dealt with the necessary white
 population for the creation of new counties.   n393 The most comprehensive
 attempt to clean up the constitution was a constitutional amendment approved by
 the voters in 1977. The stated purpose of this amendment was the "removal or
 correct[ion of] constitutional provisions which are obsolete, inaccurate,
 invalid, unconstitutional, or duplicative; generally relating to technical
 revisions of the Maryland Constitution."   n394 Although nonsubstantive by its
 own terms, this amendment at least removed some difficulties in the 1867
 Constitution. Finally, an amendment in 1982 replaced a gender-specific reference
 with a gender-neutral reference, and thus permitted civil and criminal contempt
 for the failure of both men and women to pay alimony and child support.   n395
 
   Although each of these amendments corrected grievous failings in the 1867
 Constitution, none could accomplish the overarching goal of streamlining and
 simplifying the constitution.
 
   3. Constitutional Amendment. - The creation of written constitutions, more
 fundamental than the positive law enacted by the legislature, is a uniquely
 American contribution to the science of  [*596]  government.   n396 Maryland's
 constitutions have always recognized the supremacy of constitutional law. The
 first Maryland Constitution permitted the legislature to amend the constitution,
 but only if the General Assembly passed the amendment at two consecutive
 sessions.   n397 By the 1851 constitution, a second route of constitutional
 change, the constitutional convention, was established.   n398
 
   The 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention proposed retaining the two routes of
 constitutional revision, convention or amendment. To confirm that the General
 Assembly had the inherent power to call a constitutional convention at any time,
 the proposed constitution stated this power explicitly.   n399 Wheeler and
 Kinsey reported that the convention draft was predicated on two assumptions:
 
 

    It was assumed the kind of constitution proposed would not require frequent
 amendment. Because of the significant shift from a highly detailed constitution
 to a short one dealing largely with fundamentals, constitutional change to meet
 changing conditions would be far less necessary. Therefore, there was no reason
 to make easier the process of amendment. A second assumption resulted from
 reapportionment. Legislative obstacles created by a malapportioned General
 Assembly fearing results of constitutional change would no longer be a problem.
 The legislature would now represent - in theory at least - the majority, so
 there was less need for bypassing it [by constitutional revision].   n400
 
 

    In this way, the proposed constitution did little, and the delegates saw
 little need, to adjust the method of constitutional amendment.   n401
 
   The defeat of the 1967-1968 proposed constitution at the polls therefore had
 little effect on the methods of constitutional revision.  [*597]  Two avenues
 remain open: constitutional convention or amendment proposed by three-fifths of
 each house of the General Assembly.
 
   A minor change in the method of amending the constitution was made in 1972,
 by relaxing the requirement that each proposed constitutional amendment be
 embraced in a separate bill.   n402 This amendment permitted the general
 clean-up of the constitution in 1977.   n403
 
   Conclusion
 
 This Article begins with a quote from John P. Wheeler, Jr. and Melissa Kinsey's
 book, Magnificent Failure: The Maryland Constitutional Convention of 1967-1968.
 n404 The authors stated their belief that the Constitutional Convention of
 1967-1968 would not be an unmitigated failure if appropriate lessons could be
 drawn.   n405 The historical record indicates that important lessons indeed have
 been learned. First and foremost are the substantive lessons. In many of the
 areas discussed above, the work of the Eney commission and the constitutional
 convention itself led directly to important reforms of the Maryland
 Constitution.
 
   There is no meaningful method to quantify the number of the changes in the
 Maryland Constitution that were proposed by the 1967- 1968 Constitutional
 Convention that have subsequently made their way into the constitution.   n406
 Important changes, such as the reorgani [*598]  zation of the court system, have
 been adopted. On the whole, the Maryland Constitution has been significantly
 modernized in the thirty years since the rejection of the proposed constitution
 of 1967-1968. Yet, other important suggestions remain unimplemented. Some of
 these may be addressed in the future, but most are now unlikely to be
 implemented. For those ideas, the only hope of resurrection is another
 constitutional convention.
 
   There are also lessons of process to be learned. The lesson of the 1967-1968
 Constitutional Convention is not to aspire to a lesser constitution or to accept
 something lesser for and from Marylanders. The lesson is that courting public
 opinion is the responsibility of the proponents as well as the opponents of
 reform. Voter education should begin early and should emphasize the need for
 constitutional reform. It should continue during the convention and encourage
 public participation in the convention. The process of education must continue
 after the convention, by explaining the reasons for the choices made.
 
   Finally, one might infer from the failure of the proposed constitution, and
 by the subsequent success of many of the proposals, that a piecemeal approach to
 constitutional revision is best. I am reluctant to embrace this view.   n407 The
 piecemeal, incremental approach, by its nature, works in the absence of a
 constitutional convention.   n408 By eschewing the use of a constitutional
 convention, we reduce the possibility of substantial citizen activity in the
 creation of their fundamental documents. We also lose the possibility of a
 holistic approach to revision.   n409
 
    [*599]  I look forward to the elections of 2010, when the citizens of
 Maryland will again be asked if they would like to convene a constitutional
 convention.   n410 I hope we say yes.
 
 

 
FOOTNOTES:
 
   n1. John P. Wheeler, Jr. & Melissa Kinsey, Magnificent Failure: The Maryland
 Constitutional Convention of 1967-1968, at 215-16 (1970) [hereinafter
 Magnificent Failure].
 
   n2. Id. at 1-2.
 
   n3. Id. at 215-16.
 
   n4. Md. Const. of 1867, preamble, reprinted in The Constitution of 1867,
 Constitutional Convention Commission of Maryland, Constitutional Revision Study
 Documents 511 (1968) [hereinafter Study Documents] (noting that the
 constitutional convention was convened on May 8, 1867 and adjourned on August
 17, 1867); id. at 511 n.1 (noting that the proposed constitution was ratified by
 the people on September 18, 1867). This constitution went into effect on October
 5, 1867. Id. at 553. There have been more than one hundred amendments in the
 intervening 130 years. See Amendments to the Constitution of 1867, in Study
 Documents, supra, at 583, 592-95 (listing the voting results of proposed
 amendments to the Maryland Constitution from 1867-1967).
 
   n5. Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XIV, 2 (1981). The Bluebook demands that
 reference to the Maryland Constitution and Declaration of Rights be cited in the
 form "Md. Code Ann., Const. art. , " and "Md. Code Ann., Decl. of Rts. art. ."
 The editors of the Maryland Law Review have complied with this citation form and
 it is used throughout this Article. It is, however, misleading as it suggests
 that these fundamental documents are merely a portion of the compilation of
 statutory law. They are not.
 
   There is no recorded debate from the Constitutional Convention of 1867
 indicating why this procedure was adopted or why the twenty-year period was
 selected. See Debates of The Maryland Constitutional Convention of 1867, at
 271-72, 380, 449 (Philip B. Perlman ed., 1923); see also Janice C. May,
 Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited, Publius, Winter 1987, at 153,
 156 n.15 (noting that, of the fourteen states with constitutions requiring
 periodic votes on the question of whether to call for a constitutional
 convention, eight set twenty years as the appropriate interval: Connecticut,
 Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New York, Ohio, and Oklahoma). This may
 reflect Thomas Jefferson's oft- repeated maxim that governments and
 constitutions need to be changed every twenty years. See, e.g., Letter from
 Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 15 The Writings of
 Thomas Jefferson 42 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903).
 
   Under the 1864 Maryland Constitution, a constitutional convention could be
 convened only upon the recommendation of two-thirds of each branch of the
 General Assembly and with the approval of the voters. Md. Const. of 1864, art.
 XI, 2. The 1851 Constitution required that the General Assembly ascertain the
 "sense of the people" about whether a constitutional convention was necessary in
 the "first session immediately succeeding the returns of every census of the
 United States." Md. Const. of 1851, art. XI, 1.
 
   n6. Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 13. In 1930, the Maryland General
 Assembly refused to call a constitutional convention even though a majority of
 those who voted on the referendum favored a constitutional convention. See
 Address Before the Senate Committee on Amendments to the Constitution and the
 House Committee on Ways and Means by Mr. Philip B. Perlman on the Requirement
 that the General Assembly Call a Constitutional Convention [hereinafter Perlman
 Address], in Constitutional Convention Commission, Report of the Constitutional
 Convention Commission, app. at 425, 425 (1967) [hereinafter Report]. The 1867
 constitutional provision provides that "if a majority of voters at such election
 ... shall vote for a Convention, the General Assembly, at its next session,
 shall provide by Law for the assembling of such convention, and for the election
 of Delegates thereto." Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XIV, 2 (1981) (emphasis
 added). Although a slim majority of those who actually voted on the issue
 supported calling a convention, the legislature reasoned that this was "less
 than a majority of the voters who voted at the general election on all
 candidates and propositions" and, consequently, refused to call a convention.
 See Perlman Address, supra, at 425.
 
   n7. In 1937, frustrated by the General Assembly's failure to authorize a
 revision of the Maryland Constitution, H.L. Mencken published a proposal for a
 new constitution in the Baltimore Sun. See H.L. Mencken, A New Constitution for
 Maryland, partially reprinted in H.L. Mencken, A Second Mencken Chrestomathy
 327, 327 (Terry Teachout ed., 1994). In the introduction to this partial
 reprint, Mencken wrote, "It got some attention among judges and lawyers through
 the country, and I received some interesting commentaries on it, but in Maryland
 it went almost unnoticed and none of its innovations has been adopted since, or
 even discussed." Id. Mencken's cantankerous proposals included a right to
 privacy; limitations on public debt; old-age pensions for the indigent; a strong
 executive with a ten- year term of office; a fifteen-member unicameral
 "legislative counsel"; and a unified and coordinated court system. Id. at
 329-39.
 
   n8. Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 674
 (1964).
 
   n9. At a later occasion, Governor Tawes stated:
 
 

   During my eight years as Governor, I found this document very restrictive to
 the successful operation of an efficient state government and entirely too
 clumsy and ineffective as a document of basic law. Moreover, many lawyers,
 judges, legislators and students of political science expressed to me the
 opinion that our Constitution was too lengthy and too detailed to serve
 satisfactorily as the basic law of our State.
 
 

    J. Millard Tawes, Preface, in Report, supra note 6, at vii, vii.
 
   n10. Report, supra note 6, at 1.
 
   n11. Statement by Governor J. Millard Tawes on the Appointment of the
 Constitutional Convention Commission, in Report, supra note 6, app. at 419, 419.
 
   n12. A total of 32 members served on the Constitutional Convention Commission
 over its two year tenure: William Preston Lane, Jr. (Honorary Chairman); H.
 Vernon Eney (Chairman); Robert E. Martineau (secretary); E. Dale Adkins, Jr.;
 William Prescott Allen; Harry Bard; Calhoun Bond; Elsbeth Levy Bothe; Franklin
 L. Burdette; Richard W. Case; Hal C.B. Clagett; Ernest N. Cory, Jr.; Charles
 Della; Leah S. Freedlander; James O'C. Gentry; Walter R. Haile; John R.
 Hargrove, Sr.; Stanford Hoff; Martin D. Jenkins; William J. McWilliams; Ridgely
 P. Melvin, Jr.; Clarence W. Miles; Edward T. Miller; Charles Mindel; John W.
 Mitchell; George L. Russell, Jr.; E. Phillip Sayre; Alfred L. Scanlan; L. Mercer
 Smith; Melvin J. Sykes; Furman L. Templeton; and William C. Walsh. Report, supra
 note 6, at iii.
 
   n13. The commission was formally known as the Constitutional Convention
 Commission, but popularly known as the Eney Commission in honor of its
 chairperson, Baltimore lawyer H. Vernon Eney. Mr. Eney subsequently was elected
 as a delegate to the constitutional convention from Baltimore County and served
 as the convention president. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 16, 39.
 
   n14. Id. at 19.
 
   n15. Report, supra note 6, at 3 n.6. The Eney Commission's quick
 determination that the old constitution could not be the basis of constitutional
 revision, and that an entirely new constitution should be drafted, led to early
 criticism of the draft constitution. See Save Our State Committee, Proposed
 Constitution 1 (1967) (criticizing the proposed constitution as "quite unrelated
 to the present Maryland Constitution and departing radically from its
 provisions").
 
   n16. Draft Constitution, in Report, supra note 6, at 69, 71-93.
 
   n17. See Study Documents, supra note 4, at ix (discussing the purpose of the
 compilation). This Article relies heavily on the work of the Eney Commission.
 Although the Commission was not directly responsible for drafting the proposed
 constitution that was rejected by the voters, some of the Eney Commission's
 original proposals have become part of the Constitution of Maryland. See infra
 notes 67-75 and accompanying text (discussing the subsequent piecemeal enactment
 of the rejected constitution). See generally Robert F. Williams, Are State
 Constitutional Conventions Things of the Past? The Increasing Role of the
 Constitutional Commission in State Constitutional Change, 1 Hofstra L. & Pol'y
 Symp. 1, 5-6 (1996) (stating that the debates and reports of state
 constitutional commissions should be considered constitutional history because
 they often "form the origins of important state constitutional changes").
 
   n18. See Act of May 6, 1966, ch. 500, 1966 Md. Laws 817, 818-19 (calling for
 a constitutional convention, setting the dates therefor, and apportioning
 representation); Act of May 6, 1966, ch. 501, 1966 Md. Laws 818, 818-19 (setting
 the dates and procedures for the convention).
 
   n19. The Eney Commission reported 160,280 votes for the constitutional
 convention, 31,680 against. See Returns for Statewide Referendum, in Report,
 supra note 6, app. at 468, 468. The Commission cautioned, however, that these
 returns "differed somewhat" from those reported by the Governor. Report, supra
 note 6, at 14 n.10. The Baltimore Sun reported that the vote was 160,617 for and
 31,702 opposed. See The Convention Opens, Balt. Sun, Sept. 12, 1967, at A12.
 
   n20. Report, supra note 6, at 17; see also Wayne R. Swanson et al., Politics
 and Constitutional Reform: The Maryland Experience 1967-1968, at 30 (1970)
 (arguing that "the nonpartisan election of delegates to the [1967]
 Constitutional Convention redounded to the advantage of those individuals in
 high socio economic positions and ... reduced the extent to which the convention
 body reproduced the characteristics of the voting age population").
 
   n21. See, e.g., Swanson et al., supra note 20, at 28-111; Marianne Ellis
 Alexander, The Issues and Politics of the Maryland Constitutional Convention,
 1967-1968, at 12-13 (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
 Maryland) (on file with author) (classifying the delegates into four distinct
 "voting blocs" based on their backgrounds); Wayne R. Swanson, The Politics of
 Constitutional Revision: The Maryland Constitutional Convention, 1967-1968, at
 40-62 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University) (on file with
 author) (surveying the "social and political backgrounds" of those elected
 delegates).
 
   n22. See Swanson et al., supra note 20, at 28-43. The delegates were largely
 apolitical in the sense that many had never previously sought or held public
 office, and many were not particularly affiliated with either major political
 party. Id. at 35. The election to the constitutional convention was "apolitical"
 in that the political affiliations of the candidates were not indicated. Id. at
 28.
 
   n23. See Journal of the Constitutional Convention of Maryland of 1967-1968,
 at 17 (1968) [hereinafter Journal of the Convention] (reporting the vote by
 acclamation by which Eney was elected).
 
   n24. Id. at 21. In his keynote address, President Eney told the convention:
 
 

   And so, we, the citizens of what we proudly call the great free State of
 Maryland, have, along with our fellow citizens of other states, become cringing,
 favor-seeking vassals, fawning at the feet of Uncle Sam, grateful for the few
 crumbs of our own money tossed to us. But that great big, sprawling,
 bureaucratic colossus sitting astride the Potomac is too big, too far removed
 from the people, too impersonal to make more than uncertain, feeble, ineffective
 and ofttimes inept attempts to solve these problems which ought to be solved by
 state and local governments.
 
   The challenge is clear for us to see; it is written in large bold letters on
 the walls of this historic State House. We have almost complete freedom in
 drafting a constitution to submit to our people. So long as it provides for a
 republican form of government, so long as it does not transgress the rights and
 liberties of the individual citizen guaranteed and protected by the Constitution
 of the United States, we, the people of the State of Maryland, can have almost
 any kind of constitution we choose.
 
 

    Id. at 24.
 
   n25. Report on Enabling Acts For the Constitutional Convention, in Report,
 supra note 6, app. at 471, 473.
 
   n26. See Journal of the Convention, supra note 23, at 527-59.
 
   n27. Id. at 570-71.
 
   n28. Id. at 558 (indicating that Albert F. Baumann, Philip H. Dorsey, and
 Joseph P. Murphy were the only delegates who voted against the constitution).
 But see Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 166 (reporting that only Baumann
 and Dorsey voted against the constitution).
 
   n29. Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 4 (quoting Royce Hanson, Analysis:
 In Maryland, the Courthouse Gangs and the Little Guys Join Forces to Defeat a
 Reform Constitution, City, July-Aug. 1969, at 38).
 
   n30. Id. at 5.
 
   n31. Id. at 4.
 
   n32. Robert D. Loevy, Vote Analysis Made of Maryland Defeat, 52 Nat'l Civic
 Rev. 519, 522 (1968) (suggesting that a majority vote in favor of the proposed
 constitution could only have been secured by making it "less liberal, less
 progressive, and less intellectual in tone").
 
   n33. See Swanson et al., supra note 20, at 125-26 (concluding that the
 delegates "were far out of step with the mainstream of Maryland political
 thought").
 
   n34. See Swanson, supra note 21, at 177-78 (noting that voters rejected the
 proposed constitution as a whole out of opposition to individual provisions).
 
   n35. See Swanson et al., supra note 20, at 125-26 (contrasting the
 statesman-like atmosphere of the convention with the partisan nature of the
 campaign to defeat its ratification).
 
   n36. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 214 (discussing lessons
 learned from the failure of the ratification campaign); Alexander, supra note
 21, at 411-16 (attributing demographic and political reasons for the failure);
 Swanson, supra note 21, at 184 (discussing the convention's failure to proceed
 incrementally and with sensitivity to the "conservative values inherent in
 Maryland political culture" as reasons for the constitution's failure).
 
   n37. Loevy, supra note 32, at 522.
 
   n38. League of Women Voters of Md., The Maryland Voter, Summer 1968, at 1.
 
   n39. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 89-90 (discussing how the
 positions that would lose their constitutional status likely would be retained
 by statute).
 
   n40. League of Women Voters of Md., supra note 38. Categorizing the
 convention's elimination of these offices from the constitution as a political
 failure, rather than as a substantive choice, is misleading. The delegates to
 the constitutional convention knew that the holders of these offices would be
 dissatisfied by their deletion, and that this dissatisfaction could have
 political implications, but the delegates chose to delete the offices anyway.
 Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 211-12 (giving specific, well-publicized
 examples of the grievances and threats voiced by holders of offices slated to
 lose their constitutional status).
 
   n41. See Report, supra note 6, at 6 (summarizing and drafting principles of
 the constitution to ensure "that its meaning would be easily understood by an
 informed citizen of average intelligence and literacy").
 
   n42. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 67 (noting that Maryland's
 constitution is the ninth longest among the states, and that this length is
 indicative of archaic and tedious restrictions).
 
   n43. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (discussing political rather
 than substantive reasons for the failure of the constitution).
 
   n44. Swanson et al., supra note 20, at 125-26.
 
   n45. Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 29.
 
   n46. One piece of information that was minimized in voting for convention
 delegates was party affiliation. See id. at 30 (characterizing the "civic" and
 "non-political air" that permeated the special election). While party
 affiliation information may have helped select more "representative" delegates,
 it would have undermined efforts to create a nonpartisan convention atmosphere.
 See Peter J. Galie & Christopher Bopst, Changing State Constitutions: Dual
 Constitutionalism and the Amending Process, 1 Hofstra L. & Pol'y Symp. 27, 37
 (1996) (indicating that a "convention's success or failure depends on a number
 of variables," including a low level of partisanship).
 
   n47. Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 209-10.
 
   n48. Id. at 209.
 
   n49. See Swanson, supra note 21, at 178 (explaining that with the
 all-or-nothing approach, the voter will often "reject the total document despite
 his favorable reaction to a majority of the provisions in the constitution").
 
   n50. Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 210.
 
   n51. See Swanson, supra note 21, at 175 (suggesting that "the type of
 detached behavior exhibited by the proponents during the ratification campaign
 can probably be attributed to their overconfidence").
 
   n52. Alexander, supra note 21, at 414.
 
   n53. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, at
 310- 12 (paperback ed., 1993) (explaining the origins and role of conventions in
 Great Britain).
 
   n54. See id. at 309 (discussing the concept of a constitutional convention as
 a body above direct legislative control, the purpose of which was to determine
 the fundamental form of government). Even Maryland's first constitution
 recognized this essential characteristic of a constitution by creating a
 rudimentary system for constitutional amendment which, although in the hands of
 the legislature, was also superior to ordinary legislation. The Maryland
 Constitution of 1776 provided for constitutional revision only upon approval by
 two consecutive sessions of the Maryland General Assembly. Md. Const. of 1776,
 art. LIX. Given that elections to the House of Delegates were held annually, Md.
 Const. of 1776, art. II, the electorate would have had the opportunity to
 indicate their approval or disapproval of a proposed constitutional amendment
 before adoption.
 
   n55. See Wood, supra note 53, at 338 (describing the view of proponents of
 the Pennsylvania state constitution that a convention is "actually superior in
 authority to the ordinary legislature" because it conferred this opportunity).
 
   The Maryland Constitution of 1864 exemplifies what happens when
 constitutional conventions are not representative of the citizenry. That
 constitution, adopted during the Civil War, was approved only with the support
 of absentee ballots cast by Maryland Union troops in the field, a novel and
 perhaps unconstitutional procedure. See Report, supra note 6, at 54-55
 (explaining the basis of the narrow majority that ratified the 1864
 Constitution). The constitution produced has been described as having two
 purposes, the freeing of the slaves, and the continuation in political power of
 the unconditional Union Party. See William Starr Myers, The Self-Reconstruction
 of Maryland 1864-1867, Johns Hopkins U. Stud. in Hist. & Pol. Sci., Jan.-Feb.
 1909, at 9. Because this constitution did not appropriately reflect the
 political views of the Maryland electorate, it was replaced at the earliest
 possible opportunity, 1867. See id. at 126.
 
   n56. See Wood, supra note 53, at 319 (discussing the function of conventions
 as "permanent continuing institutions, integral parts of [America's] political
 system, essential for its working, and always available for the people's use").
 In this way, constitutional conventions have replaced revolution as the method
 of altering unsatisfactory governments. See Board of Supervisors of Elections v.
 Attorney Gen., 246 Md. 417, 432, 229 A.2d 388, 396 (1967) (describing a
 constitutional convention as "the exercise of the fundamental right of the
 people to change their constitution" and characterizing this right as one of
 "peaceful revolution" retained "beyond the constitution").
 
   In Maryland, the availability of a state constitutional convention as a means
 of replacing unsatisfactory governments has evolved slowly, and in each instance
 in which a convention was convened, there was some question about its
 constitutionality. The 1776 Convention was revolutionary, conducted in defiance
 of the established government. The 1851 Constitutional Convention was convened
 contrary to the requirements of Article 59 of the 1776 Constitution. See Md.
 Const. of 1776, art. LIX; William Starr Myers, The Maryland Constitution of
 1864, Johns Hopkins U. Stud. in Hist. & Pol. Sci., Aug.-Sept. 1901, at 347; see
 also James Warner Harry, The Maryland Constitution of 1851, Johns Hopkins U.
 Stud. in Hist. & Pol. Sci., July-Aug. 1902, at 53. The 1864 Constitutional
 Convention was not convened pursuant to the provisions of the 1851 Constitution.
 Md. Const. of 1851, art. XI; Myers, supra, at 347-48. Furthermore, it was
 alleged that the 1867 Constitutional Convention was not called according to the
 provisions of the 1864 constitution. Md. Const. of 1864, art. XI; see Myers,
 supra note 55, at 110 (discussing efforts by some citizens to obtain an
 injunction in the Superior Court of Baltimore City to prohibit the election of
 the 1867 Constitutional Convention on the ground that it violated the method
 prescribed by the 1864 constitution). There was also a challenge to the
 constitutionality of the 1967- 1968 Constitutional Convention. See Board of
 Supervisors, 246 Md. at 445, 229 A.2d at 403 (affirming the circuit court's
 order "that it was mandatory that a convention be called ... and that the call
 could not be delayed").
 
   n57. Harvey Walker, Myth and Reality in State Constitutional Development, in
 Major Problems in State Constitutional Revision 3, 15 (W. Brooke Graves ed.,
 1960) (footnote omitted).
 
   n58. Cf. Galie & Bopst, supra note 46, at 31 (distinguishing the process of
 amending state constitutions from the process of federal amendment as "requiring
 citizen participation ... [that] is majoritarian in character").
 
   n59. Walker, supra note 57, at 15.
 
   n60. See Malcolm E. Jewell & Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in
 the United States 67-70 (4th ed. 1986) (comparing the two competing approaches
 to representation, the "trustee" role, where the representative makes decisions
 "according to principles, convictions, and conscience" and the "delegate" role,
 where the representative follows the wishes of the constituency, even if
 contrary to his or her own judgment).
 
   n61. See Hanna Pitkin, Commentary: The Paradox of Representation, in
 Representation 38, 41 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1968) (noting
 that a representative is a "representative in name only" if he or she simply
 allows the constituency to decide every issue).
 
   n62. See id. (noting that a representative is not truly a representative if
 he or she constantly acts in opposition to the wishes of the constituency).
 
   n63. See Jewell & Patterson, supra note 60, at 70 (explaining that most
 experienced representatives assume both a "trustee" and "delegate" orientation
 when dealing with different issues, often following public opinion on an issue
 when it is overwhelming, but also using their own judgment about their
 constituency to act in the constituents' best interest).
 
   n64. See Swanson et al., supra note 20, at 125-26 (discussing the failure of
 leadership that occurred in the transition from the constitutional convention to
 the ratification campaign).
 
   n65. Some efforts at post-convention public education were made. See
 Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 191-206; Report, supra note 6, at 12-14
 (detailing education efforts that included community seminars, mass mailings,
 and a motion picture).
 
   n66. This analysis discusses only those amendments to the Maryland
 Constitution with origins in the proposed constitution of 1967-1968 and does not
 purport to be a comprehensive analysis of all recent constitutional amendments
 in Maryland.
 
   n67. Constitutional amendment in the absence of a constitutional convention
 requires passage by three-fifths of both houses of the Maryland General
 Assembly, a vote by the qualified voters of the state, and a proclamation by the
 governor that the majority of those voting on the proposed amendment favored its
 enactment. Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XIV, 1 (1981).
 
   n68. See John W. Frece, Tax Proposals Face Hostile World, Balt. Sun, Nov. 25,
 1990, at N1 (reporting that the major recommendations of the 1967-1968
 Constitutional Convention were subsequently adopted over a period of years); see
 also Williams, supra note 17, at 16 & n.61 (explaining that the trend to enact
 constitutional reforms piecemeal - as opposed to wholesale constitutional
 revision - can be seen in Florida, Minnesota, and Oregon).
 
   n69. See infra notes 231-282 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed
 changes to the Maryland judicial system and their history).
 
   n70. See infra notes 359-382 and accompanying text (discussing the positions
 whose salaries were to be deconstitutionalized and become statutorily enacted).
 
   n71. See infra notes 389-393 and accompanying text (discussing the deletion
 of provisions limiting the vote to white males).
 
   n72. This category of "balance of power" reforms includes proposals to delete
 limits on legislation action and to remove the Board of Public Works. See infra
 notes 119-127, 173- 179 and accompanying text.
 
   n73. Robert J. Brugger, Maryland: A Middle Temperament 1634-1980, at 632
 (1988) (crediting Governor Mandel and the character of the reapportioned
 assembly with having "resurrected constitutional reform" after the defeat of the
 proposed constitution).
 
   n74. See id.
 
   n75. See Letter from H. Vernon Eney, President, Constitutional Convention of
 Maryland of 1967-1968, to Spiro T. Agnew, Governor of Maryland (Nov. 1, 1968),
 reprinted in Constitutional Convention of Maryland 1967-1968, Comparison of
 Present Constitution and Constitution Proposed by Convention xi (1968)
 [hereinafter Comparison] ("The consensus of opinion is that there were many
 provisions of the proposed Constitution which, if presented separately, would
 have been adopted by the people and the fact remains that the present
 Constitution is still very much in need of a thoroughgoing revision.").
 
   n76. See Dan Friedman, The History, Development, and Interpretation of the
 Maryland Declaration of Rights, 71 Temp. L. Rev. 637, 677 n.3 (1998).
 
   n77. See infra note 384 and accompanying text (noting that the Eney
 Commission advocated including the Declaration of Rights as part of the
 constitution).
 
   n78. After a reworked preamble, the new declaration of rights provided for:
 Freedom of Expression (1.01), Freedom of Religion (1.02), Right to Due Process
 and Equal Protection (1.03), Right to Fair Treatment in Investigations (1.04),
 Freedom from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures (1.05), Right to Grand Jury
 Indictment (1.06), Rights of Criminal Accused (1.07), Removal of Criminal Cases
 (1.08), Right Against Self-Incrimination (1.09), Prohibition Against Double
 Jeopardy (1.10), Prohibition Against Unusual Punishments (1.11), Prohibition
 Against Imprisonment for Debt (1.12), Right to Jury Trial in Civil Cases (1.13),
 Preservation of Habeas Corpus (1.14), Prohibition Against Ex Post Facto Laws
 (1.15), Eminent Domain (1.16), Continuity of Government During Emergencies
 (1.17), and Reserved Rights (1.18). See Comparison, supra note 75, at 119-24,
 133.
 
   n79. See id. at 5 (noting section 1.03, which states "no person shall be
 deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor be denied
 the equal protection of the laws, nor be subject to discrimination by the State
 because of race, color, religion, or national origin" (emphasis added)).
 
   n80. See id. at 6 (proposing in section 1.05 that "the right of the people to
 be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
 searches, seizures, interceptions of their communications, or other invasions of
 their privacy, shall not be violated" (emphasis added)). This proposed
 protection against electronic interception of communications was also found in
 the Model State Constitution. See National Mun. League, Model State Constitution
 2 (6th ed. 1963) [hereinafter Model State Const.].
 
   n81. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 5 (stating in section 1.04 that "no
 person shall be denied the right to fair and just treatment in any investigation
 conducted by the State or by any unit of local government, or by any of their
 departments or agencies").
 
   n82. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that Article 24 of the
 Maryland Declaration of Rights provides protection against racial
 discrimination. See Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 353, 601 A.2d 102, 107
 (1992) ("Although the Maryland Constitution contains no express equal protection
 clause, it is settled that the Due Process Clause of the Maryland Constitution,
 contained in Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights, embodies the concept of
 equal protection of the laws to the same extent as the Equal Protection Clause
 of the Fourteenth Amendment." (citations omitted)); id. at 356, 601 A.2d at 109
 (noting that "'classifications based on alienage, like those based on
 nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
 scrutiny'" (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971))). The same
 Article also provides a guarantee of fair treatment during investigations. See
 Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 330 Md. 540, 559, 625 A.2d 914, 923 (1993)
 ("Procedural due process, guaranteed to persons in this State by Article 24 of
 the Maryland Declaration of Rights, requires that administrative agencies
 performing adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions observe the basic principles
 of fairness as to parties appearing before them." (citations omitted)). The
 Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.
 Proc. 10-401 to 10-4B-05 (1995 & Supp. 1998), requires wiretaps to comply with
 Fourth Amendment protections. See also Richard P. Gilbert, A Diagnosis,
 Dissection, and Prognosis of Maryland's New Wiretap and Electronic Surveillance
 Law, 8 U. Balt. L. Rev. 183, 220-21 (1979) (discussing Maryland's Act and
 comparing it to federal law).
 
   n83. See Report, supra note 6, at 98 (stating that "the [Eney] Commission
 takes as its model the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution").
 National authorities on state constitutional revision also advocated adopting
 the language of the federal bill of rights. See Model State Const., supra note
 80, at 28 ("The language follows the U.S. Bill of Rights not only because of its
 excellence but also because its terms have achieved considerable uniformity of
 meaning through repeated construction in the courts."); Robert S. Rankin,
 National Mun. League, State Constitutions: The Bill of Rights 2 (1960)
 (explaining why state constitutions reflect the influence of the federal bill of
 rights); Milton Greenberg, Civil Liberties, in National Mun. League, Salient
 Issues of Constitutional Revision 7, 12 (John P. Wheeler, Jr. ed., 1961)
 [hereinafter Salient Issues] ("State adoption of the language of the national
 constitution is desirable and would avoid confusion.").
 
   n84. Compare Comparison, supra note 75, at 119 (stating in section 1.01 that,
 "The people shall have the right peaceably to assemble and to petition the
 government for a redress of grievances" and "freedom of the press and freedom of
 speech shall not be abridged, each person remaining responsible for abuse of
 those rights") with U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting
 an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
 abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
 peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
 grievances."). Opponents of the proposed constitution clearly understood that
 the proposed constitution's rights provisions were to be federalized. See Save
 our State Committee, supra note 15, at vi (noting that "in lieu of the articles
 in the present Declaration of Rights - many having originated in the [Maryland]
 Constitution of 1776 - are substituted provisions in the first eight amendments
 to the federal Constitution").
 
   n85. See Friedman, supra note 76, at 645 ("Maryland's apellate courts
 traditionally ... have preferred to hold that the provisions of Maryland's
 fundamental documents are 'in pari materia' with analogous federal
 cosntitutional guarantees.").
 
   n86. See State v. Smith, 814 P.2d 652, 661 (Wash. 1991) (en banc) (Utter, J.,
 concurring) (explaining that ignoring the difference between the language and
 history of the federal Equal Protection Clause and the privileges and immunities
 language in the state constitution is "to rewrite our [state] constitution
 without benefit of a constitutional convention and to deprive the people of this
 state of additional rights, which they adopted in our constitutional convention,
 without their consent").
 
   n87. Act of May 5, 1970, ch. 558, 1970 Md. Laws 1625 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970)
 ("Nothing shall prohibit or require the making reference to belief in, reliance
 upon, or invoking the aid of God or a Supreme Being in any governmental or
 public document, proceeding, activity, ceremony, school, institution, or
 place.") (codified at Md. Code Ann., Decl. of Rts. art. 36 (1981)).
 
   n88. Act of May 26, 1972, ch. 366, 1972 Md. Laws 1225 (ratified Nov. 7, 1972)
 ("Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of
 sex.") (codified at Md. Code Ann., Decl. of Rts. art. 46 (1981)). For an
 analysis of the standards of review under the Maryland Equal Rights Article, see
 Friedman, supra note 76, at 708 n.580 (and sources cited therein). See also Paul
 Benjamin Linton, State Equal Rights Amendments: Making a Difference or Making a
 Statement?, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 907, 913 n.15 (1997) (arguing that "Maryland cases
 quite clearly adopted an 'absolutist' position, holding that Article 46 ...
 forbids all sex-based discrimination, without exception" (citations omitted)).
 
   n89. See Act of May 5, 1992, ch. 203, 1992 Md. Laws 2221 (ratified Nov. 3,
 1992) (codified at Md. Code Ann., Decl. of Rts. art. 5 (Supp. 1998)); Act of May
 5, 1992, ch. 204, 1992 Md. Laws 2223 (ratified Nov. 3, 1992) (codified at Md.
 Code Ann., Decl. of Rts. art. 5 (Supp. 1998)); Act of May 5, 1992, ch. 205, 1992
 Md. Laws 2224 (ratified Nov. 3, 1992) (codified at Md. Code Ann., Decl. of Rts.
 art. 23 (Supp. 1998)); Act of May 5, 1992, ch. 206, 1992 Md. Laws 2225 (ratified
 Nov. 3, 1992) (codified at Md. Code Ann., Decl. of Rts. art. 23 (Supp. 1998));
 see also Norris P. West, 6-Member Civil Juries, Higher Dollar Threshold OK'd
 Judge Would Hear Suits Below $ 5,000, Balt. Sun, Nov. 4, 1992, at A25.
 
   n90. Act of May 5, 1992, ch. 203, 1992 Md. Laws 2221.
 
   n91. Act of May 5, 1992, ch. 205, 1992 Md. Laws 2224.
 
   n92. Act of May 2, 1994, ch. 102, 1994 Md. Laws 1195 (ratified Nov. 8, 1994)
 (codified at Md. Code Ann., Decl. of Rts. art. 47 (Supp. 1998)); see also Cianos
 v. State, 338 Md. 406, 412-13, 659 A.2d 291, 294-95 (1995) (explaining that
 article 47 requires that trial judges give appropriate consideration to the
 impact of crime upon victims).
 
   n93. Act of May 6, 1971, ch. 357, 1971 Md. Laws 760 (ratified Nov. 7, 1972)
 (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Decl. of Rts. art. 7 (1981)). This Act,
 of course, did not confer the franchise on non-Whites or women because the
 United States Constitution had already so extended it. Instead, it simply
 eliminated archaic language. See U.S. Const. amend. XV, 1 (guaranteeing that the
 "right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
 by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
 condition of servitude"); U.S. Const. amend. XIX (guaranteeing that "the right
 of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
 United States or by any State on account of sex"). Despite these federal
 amendments, the Maryland change was significant because it is not a minor detail
 when the fundamental document of a state purports to discriminate against some
 of its own citizens.
 
   n94. Act of Apr. 10, 1990, ch. 61, 1990 Md. Laws 405 (ratified Nov. 6, 1990)
 (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Decl. of Rts. arts. 33, 35; Const. art.
 III, 10 (Supp. 1998)).
 
   n95. Act of Apr. 26, 1977, ch. 681, 1977 Md. Laws 2743 (ratified Nov. 7,
 1978) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Decl. of Rts. arts. 23-24, 46;
 Const. art. I, 1-11; art. III, 5-6, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19, 37, 41, 53, 59; art. IV,
 1, 1A, 3, 4A, 6, 12, 14, 18, 20, 22, 40, 41-I, 44, 45; art. V, 5-7, 11; art. VI,
 1; art. VII, 1; art. XI-A, 2, 5; art. XI-D, 1(a); art. XIII, 1, 2; art. XV, 2,
 3; art. XVI, 2, 6; art. XVII, 1, 3-9 (1981 & Supp. 1998)). For a discussion of
 this Act as an overall cleanup of the Maryland Constitution and Declaration of
 Rights, see infra text accompanying note 394. The impact of this Act on the
 Declaration of Rights was to create the new Article 23 (which states that a jury
 is the judge of law and fact in all criminal cases and guarantees the right to
 civil jury trial); delete old Article 24 (which prohibited reestablishment of
 slavery but demanded compensation from the federal government for manumission);
 renumber the former Article 23 (due process) as current Article 24; and delete
 Article 38 (which restricted gifts to church and clergy).
 
   n96. For an analysis of the arguments for and against lowering the voting age
 to 18 years, see Doris W. Jones, Lowering the Minimum Voting Age to 18 Years:
 Pro and Con Arguments, reprinted in Study Documents, supra note 4, at 51, 52-59.
 
   n97. Voting Rights Act of 1970, amended by Pub. L. No. 91-285, 6, 84 Stat.
 318 (1970); Pub. L. No. 94-73, tit. IV, 407, 89 Stat. 405 (1975) (codified as
 amended at 42 U.S.C. 1973bb-1973bb-1 (1994)).
 
   n98. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970) (plurality opinion)
 (finding the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 constitutional with respect to
 federal elections, but unconstitutional with respect to state and local
 elections).
 
   n99. U.S. Const. amend. XXVI, 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States,
 who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged
 by the United States or by any State on account of age.").
 
   n100. The traditional explanation for the adoption of the Twenty-Sixth
 Amendment is the Vietnam War and the social protest it engendered. Eighteen
 through twenty-one year- olds filled important roles both by serving in the
 military and in leading social protest against the war. See Akhil Reed Amar, The
 Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule,
 and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 749, 772 (1994) (opining that
 "the Twenty-Sixth Amendment extended the vote to young adults on the theory that
 if they were old enough to bear arms in Vietnam, they were old enough to vote on
 the wisdom of that war, and on all else"); Michael P. Rosenthal, The Minimum
 Drinking Age for Young People: An Observation, 92 Dick. L. Rev. 649, 653 (1988)
 (identifying Vietnam as the "primary cause" for the change of the age of the
 majority); Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy,
 Distribution, and the Right to Bear Arms, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1257, 1305 n.148
 (1991) (noting that the Voting Rights Act and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
 "expressed a congressional judgment that the educational level reached by 18
 year olds, their civic and military obligations and their readiness and capacity
 to participate in the political process rendered unreasonable a minimum voting
 age classification above eighteen" (quoting House Comm. on the Judiciary, Report
 on Lowering the Voting Age to 18, H.R. Rep. No. 37, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5
 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Celler))). But see Robert M. Jarvis et al., Contextual
 Thinking: Why Law Students (and Lawyers) Need to Know History, 42 Wayne L. Rev.
 1603, 1607-08 (1996) (arguing unconvincingly that the primary reason for the
 Amendment was the desire to overcome Mitchell's limitation of Congress's power
 to regulate state and local elections, apparently without realizing that Vietnam
 was the impetus for this desire).
 
   n101. The November 5, 1968 general elections saw the election of President
 Richard M. Nixon (R.-Calif.). In Maryland, Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R.)
 defeated United States Senator Daniel Brewster (D.) in his re-election bid. See
 1 Archives of Maryland: An Historical List of Public Officials of Maryland 349
 (Edward C. Papenfuse ed., 1990) [hereinafter Archives of Maryland]. The Maryland
 Congressional Delegation was remarkably stable: Rogers C. B. Morton (R.-1st
 District), Clarence D. Long (D.-2nd District), Edward A. Garmatz (D.-3rd
 District), George H. Fallon (D.-4th District), Samuel N. Friedel (D.-7th
 District), and Gilbert Gude (R.-8th District) were all re-elected. J. Glenn
 Beall, Jr. (R.) took over the Sixth District seat vacated by Mathias's departure
 for the United States Senate. Id. at 364-65. Only in the Fifth District was the
 incumbent congressional representative, Hervey G. Machen (D.), defeated by a
 newcomer, Lawrence J. Hogan (R.). Id. at 365. No Maryland state elections were
 held in 1968. Id. at 19.
 
   n102. The November 3, 1970 general election was not a presidential election.
 In Maryland, Congressman J. Glenn Beall, Jr. (R.) defeated incumbent Senator
 Joseph D. Tydings (D.) for the United States Senate. Id. at 349. Congressmen
 Morton, Long, Garmatz, Hogan, and Gude were re-elected. Paul S. Sarbanes (D.)
 replaced the retiring Fallon. Goodloe Byron (D.) took the seat vacated by
 Beall's election to the Senate. Parren J. Mitchell (D.) was elected to represent
 the seventh congressional district. In Maryland state elections, Marvin Mandel
 (D.) was re-elected Governor, an office he had ascended to upon the election of
 then-Governor Spiro T. Agnew (R.) as Vice President of the United States. See
 infra note 205 and accompanying text. Francis Burch was reelected Attorney
 General of Maryland. Louis L. Goldstein (D.) was elected to his fourth (of ten)
 term as Comptroller of the Treasury. 1 Archives of Maryland, supra note 101, at
 28.
 
   Some young residents of the Eastern Shore's first district may also have lost
 the opportunity to vote in the special election held on May 25, 1971, to fill
 the vacancy created when President Nixon appointed Congressman Rogers C.B.
 Morton to be United States Secretary of the Interior. The remaining voters
 selected William O. Mills (R.). Id. at 365 n.88.
 
   The first 18-year-olds to vote in a Maryland election were those
 participating in the Baltimore City elections of the fall of 1971. It was in
 this election that William Donald Schaefer (D.) was first elected Mayor.
 
   n103. Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 139.
 
   n104. See Md. Const. of 1867, art. I, 1.
 
   n105. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 2, 10 (setting forth these reduced
 requirements in sections 2.01-.02).
 
   n106. Save Our State Committee, supra note 15, at 79 (capitalization in
 original).
 
   n107. Act of May 21, 1969, ch. 784, 1969 Md. Laws 1683 (ratified Nov. 3,
 1970) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. I, 1 (1981)); see Cohen
 v. Governor, 255 Md. 5, 14, 255 A.2d 320, 324-25 (1969) (per curiam) (holding
 that the proposed amendment had to be submitted to a general election, rather
 than the special one originally scheduled for November 4, 1969).
 
   n108. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
 
   n109. Id. at 334, 360.
 
   n110. Act of Apr. 16, 1914, ch. 673, 1914 Md. Laws 1143 (ratified Nov. 2,
 1915) (codified at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XVI (1981)); see Frank T.
 Ralabate, Direct Legislation, in Study Documents, supra note 4, at 66, 66-67
 (explaining the procedures by which a referendum may be petitioned for under the
 Maryland Constitution).
 
   n111. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 142 (describing the
 referendum as "a useful veto device by which sufficiently agitated and
 interested minorities can thwart progressive legislation of increasingly
 responsible and responsive political leaders").
 
   n112. Id.
 
   n113. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 138 (citing section 2.11 of the
 proposed constitution which increased the percentage over that required by Md.
 Const. of 1867, art. XVI, 3).
 
   n114. Act of Apr. 26, 1977, ch. 681, 1977 Md. Laws 2743 (ratified Nov. 7,
 1978) (requiring the "removal or correct[ion of] constitutional provisions which
 are obsolete, inaccurate, invalid, unconstitutional, or duplicative; generally
 relating to technical revisions of the Maryland constitutional" provision
 addressing the referendum power) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Decl. of
 Rts. arts. 23-24, 46; Const. art. I, 1-11; art. III, 5-6, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19, 37,
 41, 53, 59; art. IV, 1, 1A, 3, 4A, 6, 12, 14, 18, 20, 22, 40, 41-I, 44, 45; art.
 V, 5-7, 11; art. VI, 1; art. VII, 1; art. XI-A, 2, 5; art. XI-D, 1(a); art.
 XIII, 1, 2; art. XV, 2, 3; art. XVI, 2, 6; art. XVII, 1, 3-9 (1981 & Supp.
 1998)).
 
   n115. The most radical measure with respect to the legislative branch of the
 Maryland state government was the proposal to replace the traditional, bicameral
 legislature with a "modern" unicameral legislature in accordance with the
 recommendation of the National Municipal League. Model State Const., supra note
 80, 4.02 & cmt., at 42-44. The Eney Commission carefully considered both
 alternatives, and in a 13-12 vote, chose to recommend retaining the bicameral
 model. Report, supra note 6, at 125. Nonetheless, because of the closeness of
 the vote, the Commission submitted an alternative draft constitution based upon
 a unicameral legislature. See id. at 143-46; see also John H. Michener, The
 Structure of the Maryland Legislature, in Study Documents, supra note 4, at 107,
 108-09 (discussing arguments for and against unicameralism and bicameralism).
 The constitutional convention also considered unicameralism, but ultimately
 decided to retain the traditional bicameral model. See Magnificent Failure,
 supra note 1, at 70-71.
 
   n116. Md. Const. art. XIV, 1.
 
   n117. See Gerald Benjamin & Thomas Gais, Constitutional Conventionphobia, 1
 Hofstra L. & Pol'y Symp. 53, 71-72 (1996) (suggesting that proposed
 constitutional revisions "that directly challenge legislative power ... go
 nowhere").
 
   n118. During the 1998 session of the General Assembly, two proposals were
 made that would have expanded legislative power: HB 1156 (proposing the deletion
 of the limitation on the duration of the session of the General Assembly), and
 HJ 6 (proposing the formation of a commission to study single-member districting
 for the General Assembly). The text of the proposals, as well as a report on the
 legislature's failure to adopt either measure, are available at Maryland General
 Assembly Homepage (visited Jan. 23, 1999)
 <http://mlis.state.md.us/1998rs/billfile/hb1156.htm> and Maryland General
 Assembly Homepage (visited Jan. 23, 1999)
 <http://mlis.state.md.us/1998rs/billfile/hj0006.htm>.
 
   n119. See W.F. Dodd, Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitutional
 Law, 29 Yale L.J. 137, 137-38 (1919) (arguing that the "state legislature has
 all powers not forbidden to it" by the National and State constitution, and that
 state constitutional law involves a "broader [than the federal] sphere of powers
 existing unless they are denied"); Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution: Its
 Function and Form for Our Time, 54 Va. L. Rev. 928, 968 (1968) (noting that
 "state government is a government of plenary powers, except as limited by the
 state and federal constitutions"); William F. Swindler, State Constitutions for
 the 20th Century, 50 Neb. L. Rev. 577, 593 (1971) (noting that "[state]
 legislative power is plenary in the absence of specific constitutional
 limitations"); Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 Wm. &
 Mary L. Rev. 169, 178 (1983) ("When the Union was formed, the states retained
 almost plenary governmental power exercised primarily by their legislatures.").
 See generally Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations
 Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union (3d
 ed. 1874).
 
   n120. There are important exceptions to the general rule that state
 legislatures possess plenary power and may legislate on any topic not prohibited
 by the state constitution. A state legislature may not pass laws governing
 subject matters that are preempted by federal statutory or regulatory law. See
 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 247-48 (1984) (explaining that a
 state law can be preempted by federal law, but only if Congress evidences an
 intent to occupy a given field or, even if Congress has not entirely displaced
 state regulation, if the state law conflicts with federal law). The state
 legislature may not pass a law that impairs interstate commerce. See Southern
 Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770- 71 (1945) (noting that a state law can
 be invalid as an impairment of interstate commerce and setting forth the test to
 determine if impairment exists). The state legislature may not abolish its
 republican form of government. U.S. Const. art. IV, 4; see also Hans A. Linde,
 When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against
 Homosexuality, 72 Or. L. Rev. 19, 19 (1993) (opining that a "state's federal
 obligation [i.e., under U.S. Const. art. IV, 4] to maintain a republican form of
 government disqualified [an anti- homosexual rights] proposal from being put to
 a plebiscite by initiative petitions"). But see Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 1
 (1849) (holding that the determination whether a state provided a republican
 form of government is a political question entrusted to the legislative branch
 of government). State legislatures are prohibited from undertaking national
 functions. U.S. Const. art. I, 10. Finally, since the application of the federal
 bill of rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the states are
 prohibited from depriving their respective citizens of most of the guarantees of
 the federal bill of rights. For a catalog of those rights incorporated against
 the states, see Friedman, supra note 76, at 677 n.13.
 
   Recently, the United States Supreme Court has indicated a renewed interest in
 federalism and the appropriate relationship between the national and state
 governments. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997) (holding
 unconstitutional a federal gun control reporting law that required state and
 local law enforcement officers to enforce federal law); Seminole Tribe v.
 Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75-76 (1996) (barring suit by Indian tribe against State
 based in part on issues of federalism); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
 U.S. 779, 837-83 (1995) (invalidating the Arkansas state constitutional
 provision imposing term limits on members of the United States House and
 Senate); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that the
 federal Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress's legislative power under
 the Commerce Clause); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)
 (holding that the "take-title" portion of the federal Low- Level Radioactive
 Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 improperly commandeered the legislative
 process of the states); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (holding
 that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act does not preempt the
 mandatory retirement provisions of the Missouri state constitution).
 
   For scholarly analyses of this line of cases, see Kathleen M. Sullivan,
 Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 78,
 81 (1995) (analyzing the decision in Term Limits "as a preview of the Court's
 response to other coming controversies over the relative reach of state and
 federal power"). See also Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and
 Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752,
 752 (1995) (describing Lopez as a "long overdue revival of the doctrine that the
 federal government is one of limited enumerated powers"); Daniel A. Farber, The
 Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and the
 Original Understanding, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 615, 618 (1995) (examining the "New
 Federalism" that has evolved out of "concern for federal invasions of state
 prerogatives").
 
   The current membership of the Supreme Court is deeply divided about the
 nature of this federal-state balance. While both sides of the Court agree that
 the "people" have given sovereignty to both the states and the national
 government, the amount and quality of the sovereignty delegated remain elusive.
 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, have opined
 that sovereignty was transferred by the people to the states, which, with the
 exception of the narrowly defined enumerated powers of the federal government,
 are the irreducible repositories of sovereignty. Justices Stevens, Souter,
 Ginsburg, and Breyer have opined that the "undifferentiated" people retain to
 themselves numerous powers. Justice Kennedy has provided the swing vote. See
 Sullivan, supra, at 103 (analyzing the two opposing views on the Court and
 identifying Justice Kennedy as the "swing vote" in federalism cases); Melvin R.
 Faraoni, Note, Printz v. United States: Federalism Revisited or Madison and
 Hamilton Are at It Again, 30 Ariz. St. L.J. 491, 503 & n.108 (1998) (same).
 Obviously, the outcome of the United States Supreme Court's ongoing debate on
 these "first principles," Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552; U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at
 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting), will influence state supreme courts generally (and
 the Court of Appeals of Maryland specifically) in their assessments of the
 limits of state sovereignty and the nature and scope of a state legislature's
 "plenary" power to legislate.
 
   n121. Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Attorney Gen., 246 Md. 417, 428,
 229 A.2d 388, 394 (1967); see also Richards Furniture Corp. v. Board of County
 Comm'rs, 233 Md. 249, 257, 196 A.2d 621, 625 (1963) ("The Maryland Constitution
 is not a grant of powers to the General Assembly, but a statement of limitations
 on its otherwise plenary powers.").
 
   n122. See, e.g., Md. Const. of 1867, art. III, 55 (prohibiting suspension of
 writ of habeas corpus); id. 59 (prohibiting the establishment of "any general
 pension system").
 
   n123. See, e.g., id. 42 (requiring the legislature to pass laws governing
 elections); id. 43 (mandating that the legislature protect "the property of the
 wife ... from the debts of her husband"); id. 44 (requiring the legislature to
 pass laws that "protect from execution a reasonable amount of the property of
 the debtor"); id. 45 (requiring the legislature to pass laws governing
 registration of wills); id. 48 (requiring the legislature to pass laws governing
 corporate charters); id. 49 (requiring the legislature to pass laws governing
 Judges of Elections); id. 50 (requiring the legislature to pass laws prohibiting
 bribery); id. 58 (requiring the legislature to pass laws governing taxation of
 foreign corporations); id. 60 (granting the legislature the authority to pass
 laws governing parole).
 
   n124. See George A. Bell & Jean E. Spencer, The Legislative Process in
 Maryland 4-10 (2d ed. 1963) (discussing "prohibited or limited legislative
 action" in Maryland); Edmund C. Mester, The Constitutional Position of the
 Legislature of Maryland 49 (1949) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of
 Maryland) (on file with author) ("The limitations placed on the General Assembly
 by the [state] Constitution are quite numerous and, in many instances, of
 controlling importance.").
 
   n125. See Grad, supra note 119, at 966 (noting that "courts have often given
 [constitutional grants of legislative power] the full effect of negative
 implication, relying sometimes on the canon of construction expresio unius est
 exclusio alterius"); Williams, supra note 119, at 202-04 (explaining that courts
 have sometimes transformed state constitutional provisions into limitations on
 legislative power); see also Model State Const., supra note 80, 2.01 & cmt., at
 36-38 (noting the problem of "judicial findings of implied limitations which
 were wholly unintended").
 
   n126. Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 70.
 
   n127. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 147-50 (citing sections 3.19-.24 of
 the proposed constitution which reduce limitations on the legislature primarily
 to procedural requirements and the requirement to pass general laws).
 
   n128. The first Maryland Constitution provided for the House of Delegates to
 be composed of four delegates per county, Md. Const. of 1776, art. II, and two
 each from Annapolis and "Baltimore town." Md. Const. of 1776, art. IV, V. The
 state senate was elected indirectly by two senatorial electors, chosen from each
 county, and one each from Annapolis and "Baltimore town." Md. Const. of 1776,
 art. XIV. The electors then chose fifteen state senators (nine from the western
 shore, six from the eastern shore). Md. Const. of 1776, art. XV. See John H.
 Michener, The History of Legislative Apportionment in Maryland, in Study
 Documents, supra note 4, at 131, 139 & n.47. The 1837 amendments provided for
 the direct election of state senators (one senator per county and one for
 Baltimore City) and a "permanent" proportional representation system in the
 House of Delegates whereby the smallest counties elected three delegates and
 larger counties elected four, five, or six delegates depending on their
 population. Study Documents, supra note 4, at 402-08.
 
   The 1851 Maryland Constitution retained the county as the basic unit of
 representation and retained the direct election of one senator per county and
 for Baltimore City. Md. Const. of 1851, art. III, 2. The 1851 Constitution
 mandated that the House of Delegates reapportion itself according to the
 population of each county, but that there could be no more than eighty
 delegates, nor fewer than two delegates per county. Id. 3.
 
   Under the short-lived 1864 Constitution, Baltimore City was divided into
 three districts. Md. Const. of 1864, art. III, 2. Each county, and each of
 Baltimore's districts, were permitted one state senator. Id. 3. A new formula
 for proportional representation in the House of Delegates was established, id.
 4, but never took effect. See Michener, supra, at 143 n.66. The 1867
 Constitution retained the general outlines of the 1864 Constitution's
 apportionment, but doubled the representation for the smallest counties and
 capped the number of delegates permitted to represent Baltimore City. Md. Const.
 of 1867, art. III, 2, 3. From 1867 until 1967, there were relatively minor
 adjustments to the inequitable, county-based formula. Act of Apr. 7, 1900, ch.
 469, 1900 Md. Laws 750 (ratified Nov. 5, 1901) (adding a fourth district in
 Baltimore City) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 2
 (1981)); Act of Mar. 1, 1922, ch. 7, 1922 Md. Laws 11 (ratified Nov. 7, 1922)
 (adding a fifth and sixth district to Baltimore City) (codified as amended at
 Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 2 (1981)); Act of Apr. 22, 1949, ch. 226, 1949
 Md. Laws 596 (ratified Nov. 7, 1950) (freezing apportionment formula to 1940
 levels to prevent further losses by large counties and Baltimore City) (codified
 at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 5 (Supp. 1998)).
 
   Even after the United States Supreme Court applied the principle of "one
 person/one vote" to state legislatures in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
 the Maryland General Assembly attempted to retain the county as the basic unit
 of representation. Md. Ann. Code, art. 40, 42 (1962). For a complete history of
 legislative reapportionment in Maryland from 1635 to 1967, see Michener, supra,
 at 131. See also Bell & Spencer, supra note 124, at 11-28.
 
   n129. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
 
   n130. Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 74 (quoting Committee Memorandum,
 LB- 1, November 1, 1967).
 
   n131. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 141-42 (3.03-.06); see also
 Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 71-73 (describing the substance of the
 proposed single-member district change); id. at 176-81 (explaining the
 divisiveness of the proposed single-member district change).
 
   n132. Comparison, supra note 75, at 142 (3.05). The proposed membership of
 the Redistricting Committee consisted of two appointees from the presiding
 officer and minority leader in each house, plus one gubernatorial appointee to
 serve as chairperson. The Redistricting Commission also served a similar
 function with respect to congressional redistricting. Id. at 143 (3.08).
 
   n133. The governor's role in receiving the redistricting plan from the
 commission and transmitting the plan to the General Assembly appears to have
 been merely ceremonial, and not an opportunity for the governor to intervene in
 the redistricting process. Although the convention had among its materials a
 model state constitution, which proposed a more active role for the governor,
 the convention rejected this model in favor of a system with no active
 gubernatorial involvement. Garrett Power, Extraordinary Powers of the Governor,
 in Study Documents, supra note 4, at 151, 152-53.
 
   n134. Comparison, supra note 75, at 142 (3.06).
 
   n135. Id.
 
   n136. Id.
 
   n137. Act of May 21, 1969, ch. 785, 1969 Md. Laws 1684, 1685 (ratified Nov.
 3, 1970) ("The ratio of the number of senators to population shall be
 substantially the same in each legislative district; the ratio of the number of
 delegates to population shall be substantially the same in each legislative
 district.") (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 2-6 (1981 &
 Supp. 1998)).
 
   n138. Act of May 26, 1972, ch. 363, 1972 Md. Laws 1213 (ratified Nov. 7,
 1972) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 2-5) (1981 & Supp.
 1998)). This amendment also set the current membership of the General Assembly:
 47 Senators and 141 Delegates. This section was modified, but not substantively,
 by Act of Apr. 26, 1977, ch. 681, 1977 Md. Laws 2743 (ratified Nov. 7, 1978)
 (deleting language governing transition from prior system) (codified as amended
 at Md. Code Ann., Decl. of Rts. arts. 23-24, 46; Const. art. I, 1-11; art. III,
 5-6, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19, 37, 41, 53, 59; art. IV, 1, 1A, 3, 4A, 6, 12, 14, 18,
 20, 22, 40, 41-I, 44, 45; art. V, 5-7, 11; art. VI, 1; art. VII, 1; art. XI-A,
 2, 5; art. XI-D, 1(a); art. XIII, 1, 2; art. XV, 2, 3; art. XVI, 2, 6; art.
 XVII, 1, 3- 9 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
 
   n139. Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 5 (1981).
 
   n140. Id.
 
   n141. Id. The current apportionment is codified as Md. Code Ann., State Gov't
 2-202 (1995).
 
   n142. Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 5 (1981).
 
   n143. For a history of the legislative apportionment in Maryland during the
 1960s, see Michener, supra note 128.
 
   n144. Act of Mar. 28, 1916, ch. 159, 1916 Md. Laws 268 (ratified Nov. 7,
 1916) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 52 (1981 & Supp.
 1998)). Hooper S. Miles, Maryland State Treasurer (1935-1963), described the
 historical background that led to the adoption of the executive budget system:
 
 

    It was customary, under the former method, for the Governor to appear in
 person before a joint meeting of the members of the House of Delegates and the
 Senate, at the beginning of every regular session of the Legislature, and to
 address them on "the condition of the State," - in the course of which he was
 expected to direct their attention to the essential needs of the State, and to
 specifically recommend to their consideration such measures as he judged
 necessary. Having thus discharged the responsibility imposed upon him by the
 Constitution, the Governor must thereafter await the final disposition of his
 recommendations by the Legislature, whose members were free to adopt, alter or
 entirely ignore any or all of them, except in so far as the Governor, by virtue
 of his prestige and his influence with the members of the Legislature, might
 affect the course of his recommendations through the Legislature.
 
   It is true, the Governor then had the "power to disapprove of any item or
 items of Bills making appropriations of money" and to thus void the items which
 he disapproved. However, his use of this veto power on individual items had to
 be exercised with rare discrimination and with an intimate understanding of the
 temper of the Legislature, to avoid the danger of antagonizing powerful groups
 in the Legislature, and thereby jeopardize all of his recommended measures.
 Consequently, he was ever conscious of the fact that, in addition to the
 complete discretion vested in the Legislature in its consideration of his
 proposals, it also could "proceed to reconsider" and repass, any of the vetoed
 items, by the affirmative vote of "three-fifths of the members elected" to each
 "House," viz: The House of Delegates and the Senate.
 
   The power to fix the fiscal policies and determine the course of the fiscal
 operations of the State was, therefore, exclusively vested in the Legislature,
 subject only to the mild restraint of the limited veto powers of the Governor,
 and whatever power of persuasion he might be capable of exercising with
 individual members of the Legislature.
 
   The old method often witnessed "logrolling" or "you help me and I'll help
 you" tactics among many of the members of the Legislature in their efforts to
 insure passage of the particular appropriations in which they had some selfish
 or political interest. It was not unusual for excessive appropriations to result
 from such tactics and also from the pressure of political and professional
 lobbyists; and, almost as frequently, some of the most important activities or
 needs of the State were either overlooked or sadly neglected in what was
 commonly termed, the "Pork Barrel" scramble.
 
   The present Budget System, which is technically known as the "State Executive
 Budget System," was designed to correct these conditions, and to impose upon the
 Governor the primary responsibility of controlling the fiscal policies and
 operations of the State.
 
 

    Hooper S. Miles, The Maryland Executive Budget System and a Review of its
 Administration: 1916-1941, at 8-10 (1942) (citation omitted); see also McKeldin
 v. Steedman, 203 Md. 89, 96-103, 98 A.2d 561, 536-67 (1953) (examining
 Maryland's executive budgetary system and considering the events that led to its
 adoption); George C. Doub, Jr., The Budget Amendment, in Study Documents, supra
 note 4, at 231, 231 (explaining how Maryland, by enacting the 1916
 constitutional amendment, "became one of the first states to adopt an executive
 budget system" as a remedy to a "piecemeal" appropriations process).
 
   n145. See Doub, supra note 144, at 231-37 (comparing the traditional
 legislative process to the executive budget system).
 
   n146. See id. at 233.
 
   n147. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 198 (6.09).
 
   n148. See infra notes 152-153 and accompanying text (examining the allocation
 of power between the executive and legislative branches in the budget process).
 
   n149. See, e.g., Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 867, 1974 Md. Laws 2896
 (establishing minimum rates for certain types of foster care in terms of a
 percentage of other types of foster care) (repealed 1984); see also Maryland
 Action for Foster Children, Inc. v. State, 279 Md. 133, 136, 367 A.2d 491, 493
 (1977) (citing this enactment).
 
   n150. See Maryland Action, 279 Md. at 151, 367 A.2d at 499 ("The Legislature,
 by enacting statutes specifying minimum spending limits, cannot deprive the
 Governor of the discretion which the Constitution explicitly vests in him.").
 
   n151. Id. at 152-53, 367 A.2d at 501-02.
 
   n152. Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 971, 1978 Md. Laws 2811 (ratified Nov. 7,
 1978) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 52(11), 52(12)
 (1981 & Supp. 1998)). The preamble to the constitutional amendment suggests the
 strength of the General Assembly's disagreement with the Court of Appeals's
 holding:
 
 

   WHEREAS, The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Maryland Action for Foster
 Children, Inc. v. State, 279 Md. 133[, 367 A.2d 491] (1977), has held that
 Section 52 of Article III of the Constitution of Maryland does not authorize the
 General Assembly to enact legislation (other than an appropriation bill) which
 requires the Governor, in the preparation of the annual budget, to provide for
 the funding of specified programs at specified levels; and
 
   WHEREAS, The inability of the General Assembly to mandate minimum funding
 levels of State programs so emasculates the policy-making function of the
 legislative branch that it is imperative that the Constitution of Maryland be
 amended so as to authorize the General Assembly to enact legislation (other than
 an appropriation bill) requiring the Governor, in the preparation of the annual
 State budget, to provide for the funding of specified programs at specified
 levels, contrary to the holding of the majority opinion and consistent with the
 holdings of the minority opinions in that case ....
 
 

    Id. at 2812.
 
   n153. See Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 52 (1981 & Supp. 1998) (setting
 forth the procedure for appropriations).
 
   n154. See infra notes 283-308 and accompanying text (discussing the
 relationship between the state and local governments).
 
   n155. As originally framed, the 1867 Constitution provided for biennial,
 90-day sessions. Md. Const. of 1867, art. III, 14 ("The General Assembly shall
 meet on the first Wednesday of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-eight, and on
 the same day in every second year thereafter...."); id. 15 ("The General
 Assembly may continue its Session so long as, in its judgment the public
 interest may require, for a period not longer than ninety days ...."). In 1948,
 a limited 30-day session was added during alternate years. Act of Apr. 16, 1947,
 ch. 497, 1947 Md. Laws 887 (ratified Nov. 2, 1948) (codified as amended at Md.
 Code Ann., Const. art. III, 14.15.52 (1981 & Supp. 1998)). In 1964, the
 constitution was amended to create an annual 70-day session. Act of Apr. 7,
 1964, ch. 161, 1964 Md. Laws 413 (ratified Nov. 3, 1964) (codified as amended at
 Md. Code Ann., Const. art. II, 1, 3, 13; art. III, 14, 15, 27, 52(3) (1981 &
 Supp. 1998)). See generally Bell & Spencer, supra note 124, at 34-35 (discussing
 the limitations on the number and duration of legislative sessions in Maryland).
 
   n156. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 146 (3.15).
 
   n157. Act of May 5, 1970, ch. 576, 1970 Md. Laws 1671 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970)
 (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. II, 1, 3, 13; art. III,
 14-15, 27, 52(10) (1981 & Supp. 1998)). An earlier effort to extend the
 legislative session to 90 days, 1969 Md. Laws, ch. 788, was aborted by the Court
 of Appeals of Maryland's decision in Cohen v. Governor, 255 Md. 5, 14, 255 A.2d
 320, 325 (1969) (per curiam). The same amendment was then repassed in 1970. See
 Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 216.
 
   n158. Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 74; see also Bell & Spencer,
 supra note 124, at 68-69.
 
   n159. Even if Maryland were to adopt a full-time legislature, it is
 improbable that the problem of end-of-session logjams would abate. One
 frequently hears of the United States Congress rushing to pass a bill before its
 summer or winter recess. Perhaps this waiting until the deadline is an
 instinctive part of human nature and cannot be controlled by constitutional
 reform.
 
   n160. See Alexander, supra note 21, at 75 (stating that earlier Maryland
 commissions studying the operation of the executive branch "recommended that the
 administrative authority of the governor be strengthened" and that the "
 Constitutional Convention Commission [built] upon the work of these commissions"
 and even "went a step further"). Strengthening the offices of governor
 throughout the various states was a national priority for the National Municipal
 League. See Model State Const., supra note 80, 5.01 & cmt., at 65- 66 ("The
 typical governor is often not the master of the state executive establishment
 yet he is held responsible politically. The Model seeks to give him the power to
 make that responsibility real."); see also Bennett M. Rich, The Governor as
 Administrative Head, in Salient Issues, supra note 83, at 98, 98 (commenting
 that "for years, scholars, reformers and governmental study commissions have
 urged the ... strengthening of the governor"). It was believed that such a
 change would invigorate state government.
 
   In Maryland, however, the choice to strengthen the office of the governor was
 probably a misstep. Historically, Maryland has had a stronger governor than
 other states, particularly because of the power of the executive budget system.
 See supra notes 144-153 and accompanying text. Thus, strengthening the governor
 was less important in Maryland then it might have been elsewhere. Moreover,
 strengthening the office of the governor gave opponents of the constitution a
 powerful rhetorical criticism. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 202
 (quoting an opponent of the constitution as stating "I am not ready to ... vote
 for the coronation of Spiro the First").
 
   n161. See infra notes 182-194 and accompanying text (discussing the proposal
 to reduce the number of statewide officials).
 
   n162. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 160 (illustrating in section 4.25 the
 proposed reduction in the power of the Board of Public Works).
 
   n163. Id. at 162-63 (expanding governor's appointment power in section 4.29
 and reorganization power in sections 4.26-.27).
 
   n164. The office of attorney general predates statehood. See 1 Archives of
 Maryland, supra note 101, at 6 (listing attorneys general from 1657 to 1776).
 Maryland's first constitution provided for this office by having the governor
 appoint attorneys general with the advice and consent of the governor's council.
 See Md. Const. of 1776, art. XLVIII. The position was abolished by
 constitutional amendment in 1817, but immediately re-instated by statute in
 1818. See Amendments to the 1776 Constitution, in Study Documents, supra note 4,
 at 396; see also 1 Archives of Maryland, supra note 101, at 23. The Maryland
 Constitution of 1851 provided that the duties of the attorney general would be
 performed by the state's attorneys. Md. Const. of 1851, art. V, 3. The 1864
 Maryland Constitution created the modern, elected office of attorney general,
 Md. Const. of 1864, art. V, 1, and the 1867 Maryland Constitution retained this
 office, Md. Const. of 1867, art. V, 1.
 
   n165. The office of the comptroller of the treasury was created as an
 elective office by the Maryland Constitution of 1851. Md. Const. of 1851, art.
 VI, 1. The 1864 Maryland Constitution shortened the term of office from four
 years to two. Md. Const. of 1864, art. VI, 1. The 1867 Constitution subsequently
 re-extended the term to four years. Md. Const. of 1867, art. VI, 1.
 
   n166. The comptroller is chosen by the qualified electors of the state for a
 four-year term. Md. Code Ann., Const. art. VI, 1 (1981). If the office becomes
 vacant, the governor, by and with the consent of the Senate, fills the vacancy
 by appointment, to continue until another election and until the qualification
 of the successor. Id.
 
   n167. The attorney general is elected by voters of the State for a four-year
 term. Md. Code Ann., Const. art. V, 1 (1981). If the office becomes vacant, the
 governor appoints a person to the office for the remainder of the term. Id. 5.
 
   n168. See Report, supra note 6, at 147 n.82 ("'The greatest single impediment
 to executive unity lies in the constitutional designation of top officials who
 obtain office by popular election or by legislative election.'" (quoting Bennet
 M. Rich, State Constitutions: The Governor 13 (National Mun. League ed.,
 1960))).
 
   n169. Md. Code Ann., Const. art. VI, 1 (1981). The General Assembly has
 elected the treasurer since the adoption of the first Maryland Constitution. Md.
 Const. of 1776, art. XIII. Originally, there was a treasurer from both the
 Eastern and Western Shores. Id. The office of the treasurer of the Eastern Shore
 was abolished in 1843, and the duties transferred to the treasurer of the
 Western Shore. Act of 1841, ch. 200 (passed Mar. 3, 1842). The 1851 Constitution
 created a single, statewide office of the treasurer. Md. Const. of 1851, art.
 VI, 1. This position has been retained through the Constitutions of 1864 and
 1867. See Md. Const. of 1864, art. VI, 1, 2; Md. Const. of 1867, art. VI, 1.
 
   n170. Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XII, 1 (1981).
 
   n171. Report, supra note 6, at 150.
 
   n172. Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 167-73 (describing the proposal
 to abolish the comptroller as one of the three issues that was so "sharply
 divisive" that it "threatened to wreck the convention").
 
   n173. Id. at 173-75.
 
   n174. See Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XII, 1 (1981) (prescribing the duties of
 the Board of Public Works).
 
   n175. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 78 (stating that "the board
 ... originally was set up to watch over state investments in railroad and canal
 companies"); Report, supra note 6, at 152 (stating that the "principal
 constitutional function of the Board of Public Works was that of safeguarding
 and protecting these investments [in private corporations engaged in building
 railroads, canals, and other public works] of the state").
 
   n176. Report, supra note 6, at 152.
 
   n177. Id. (describing the Board as "a three-man board, two of the members of
 which are to the same degree, at least, independent of the governor").
 
   n178. See id. at 153 ("omitting ... one reference to the Board of Public
 Works"); see also Comparison, supra note 75, at 160 (proposing in section 4.25 a
 new Board of Review of restricted scope); Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at
 79 (remarking that "strong pressures developed both in the commission and the
 convention for significantly changing this arrangement [of the Board] and
 centralizing in the governor control over the executive branch").
 
   n179. For an excellent review of the history of the Maryland Board of Public
 Works, see Alan M. Wilner, The Maryland Board of Public Works: A History (1984).
 
   n180. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 80 (stating that "the
 administrative structure [of executive agencies] is at present wholly determined
 by the General Assembly").
 
   n181. Commission for the Modernization of the Executive Branch of the
 Maryland Government, Modernizing the Executive Branch of the Maryland Government
 5-6 (1967).
 
   n182. Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 80.
 
   n183. Md. Const. of 1867, art. II, 10 (stating that "[the governor] shall
 nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint all
 civil and military officers of the State, whose appointment or election is not
 otherwise herein provided for; unless a different mode of appointment be
 prescribed by the Law creating the office").
 
   n184. Id. 15 (applying this removal provision to "all civil officers who
 received appointment from the Executive for a term of years").
 
   n185. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 81 (explaining that executive
 department heads were given "a significant degree of independence" because "the
 terms of such officials are set by law and are not coterminous with the term of
 the governor").
 
   n186. See id. at 82 (noting that the convention generally opposed
 multi-headed departments in favor of a principal department headed by a single
 executive).
 
   n187. Id. at 81 (noting that "this sprawling bureaucracy ... prevents the
 governor from functioning as chief executive").
 
   n188. See Report, supra note 6, at 147 (stating that "primary attention
 [should] be given to strengthening the office of governor"); infra note 160
 (discussing the constitutional convention's emphasis on strengthening the office
 of the governor).
 
   n189. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 81 (discussing this
 proposal).
 
   n190. Id.
 
   n191. Comparison, supra note 75, at 162 (setting forth section 4.27, which
 states that "the General Assembly from time to time by law may reallocate
 offices, agencies, and instrumentalities among principal departments" and "the
 governor may make changes in the organization of the executive branch").
 
   n192. Id.
 
   n193. See id. (referring to section 4.28, which states that "the head of each
 principal department of the executive branch shall be a single executive unless
 otherwise prescribed by the General Assembly by law or by the process of
 executive reorganization"); id. at 163 (noting section 4.30, which requires that
 "each person serving as the head of a principal department ... shall serve at
 the pleasure of the governor").
 
   n194. Id. at 163 (stating in section 4.30 that "the governor, immediately
 upon taking office following his election, may appoint at least one-half of the
 members of each board and commission").
 
   n195. See Act of May 21, 1969, ch. 790, 1969 Md. Laws 1705 (ratified Nov. 3,
 1970) (codified at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. II, 24 (1981)); see also Md. Code
 Ann., State Gov't 8-201 (1995 & Supp. 1998) (enumerating the "principal
 departments of the Executive Branch of the State government"). For details about
 the ratification of the 1969 constitutional amendments, see generally Cohen v.
 Governor, 255 Md. 5, 9, 255 A.2d 320, 322 (1969) (per curiam) (noting that
 chapter 790 was one of those amendments proposed for ratification by Chapter 76
 of the Laws of Maryland, 1969, which called for an election that failed to
 qualify as a "general election" as required by the Maryland Constitution).
 
   n196. Act of Apr. 13, 1995, ch. 114, 1995 Md. Laws 1497 (ratified Nov. 5,
 1996) (codified at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. II, 10A (Supp. 1998)). For a
 history of former Governor Willian Donald Schaefer's "midnight appointments,"
 see John W. Frece & Marina Sarris, Schaefer Gave Friends 11th-hour Appointments,
 Balt. Sun, Jan. 21, 1995, at A1, available in 1995 WL 2418464 (describing seven
 long-time supporters of the governor appointed to positions in the last week of
 Schaefer's term); Peter Jensen, Schaefer Appointee Declines 2 Posts Amid
 Criticisms, Balt. Sun, Jan. 27, 1995, at B2, available in 1995 WL 2422242
 (stating that "a top aide in the Schaefer administration [Robert A. Pascal] said
 ... that he is no longer a candidate for two state jobs to which he was recently
 appointed[,]" and that he was "unhappy that his and dozens of other appointments
 made in the final weeks of Mr. Schaefer's term are being viewed as improper");
 Marina Sarris, Glendening Rejects Nomination, Balt. Sun, Jan. 26, 1995, at A1,
 available in 1995 WL 2421954 ("Unhappy with dozens of last- minute appointments
 by his predecessor, Gov. Parris N. Glendening flatly rejected one of them
 yesterday, and said he is delaying many others for further review."); Marina
 Sarris, Six Proposed Amendments Will Be on Maryland Ballot, Balt. Sun, Oct. 31,
 1996, at B2, available in 1996 WL 6644482 (noting that a proposed constitutional
 amendment would "limit the power of a departing governor to make last minute
 appointments").
 
   n197. Compare Md. Const. of 1864, art. II, 6 (stating that "[a] Lieutenant
 Governor shall be chosen at every regular election for Governor") with Md.
 Const. of 1867, art. II, 6 (omitting all references to the office of lieutenant
 governor and establishing new procedures for filling a vacancy in the office of
 the governor). The story of the first lieutenant governor of Maryland,
 Christopher C. Cox, is an interesting one. The newly adopted constitution of
 1864 provided, for the first time, for a lieutenant governor. Md. Const. of
 1864, art. II, 6. Elections were held on November 8, 1964, and as part of a
 Union party sweep, Thomas Swann of Baltimore City was elected governor, and Cox,
 a Talbot County dentist, was elected lieutenant governor. See Myers, supra note
 55, at 14. Under the express terms of the constitution, however, Swann was not
 permitted to assume the governorship until the expiration of the term of his
 predecessor, Augustus Bradford. Md. Const. of 1864, art. II, 1 (providing that
 "the Governor chosen at the first election under this Constitution shall not
 enter upon the discharge of the duties of the office until the expiration of the
 term for which the present incumbent was elected"). Governor Swann assumed his
 office on January 10, 1866. See 1 Archives of Maryland, supra note 101, at 16;
 Myers, supra note 55, at 40. By this time, the Union party had begun to
 fragment, both in Maryland, id. at 39, and in the country at large. See
 generally Eric Foner, A Short History of Reconstruction 1863-1877, at 104-22
 (1990). From the time of Governor Swann's assumption of power, it became obvious
 that he and lieutenant governor Cox did not agree politically; Cox sided with
 the "Radical Republican" faction of the Union party, while Swann led the faction
 of the Union party that would soon break away to form the
 "Democratic-Conservative" party. Myers, supra note 55, at 40-53. On January 25,
 1867, the Maryland General Assembly elected Governor Swann to the United States
 Senate. Id. at 87. Belatedly realizing that Cox would become governor upon his
 ascendance to the Senate, Swann declined the nomination. Id. at 87-94.
 
   When the 1867 Maryland Constitutional Convention convened, the delegates were
 all from Governor Swann's Democratic-Conservative party because the Radicals had
 failed to nominate candidates. Id. at 113. The constitution produced abolished
 the office of lieutenant governor, Md. Const. of 1867, art. II, 6, "probably on
 account of personal hostility to Dr. Cox and to save the State a small item of
 expense." Myers, supra note 55, at 120. Moreover, although the new
 constitution's traditional provisions permitted Governor Swann to continue to
 serve under the new constitution, Md. Const. of 1867, art. II, 1, no such
 accommodation was made for Lieutenant Governor Christopher Cox. His office
 expired on October 5, 1867, the effective date of the 1867 Constitution, despite
 the fact that Cox's 4-year term of office would not have ended for another 15
 months. See 1 Archives of Maryland, supra note 101, at 20.
 
   n198. Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 82 ("Everybody seemed to want a
 lieutenant governor for Maryland. At least no opposition to creating such an
 office appeared in committee or on the floor."). For an analysis of the office
 of lieutenant governor, see Robert K. Whelan, The Office of Lieutenant Governor,
 in Study Documents, supra note 4, at 160, 160 (tracing the historical roots of
 the office to the colonial era, describing the reasons Maryland adopted and
 later abolished the office, and noting that 39 states had the office in 1967).
 
   n199. The pattern of resignation and succession is worth noting. "Although
 Whyte's term in the Senate would not begin until a year later, or on March 4,
 1875, he resigned at once in order that the Legislature might elect his
 successor while that body was still in session." Frank F. White, Jr., The
 Governors of Maryland: 1777-1970, at 181 (1970).
 
   n200. Despite the recent precedent of Governor Whyte, Governor McLane's
 resignation did not follow that pattern. When McLane resigned on March 27, 1885,
 to serve as President Grover Cleveland's Minister to France, the General
 Assembly was not in session at the time. Id. at 204. Senate President Henry
 Lloyd from Dorchester County served during the interim; when the General
 Assembly reconvened in 1886, Lloyd was elected to fill the remainder of McLane's
 term. Id. at 207-08.
 
   n201. In 1947, the situation was very different. Governor Herbert R. O'Conor,
 twice elected governor (and thus prohibited from succeeding himself), had been
 elected to the United States Senate. William Preston Lane had sought and won
 election as governor for a term beginning January 8, 1947. In order to be sworn
 into the Senate on January 3, 1947, and because of the constitutional
 prohibition against dual office holding, O'Conor resigned five days before the
 expiration of his second term. The General Assembly elected Governor-elect Lane
 to serve out the remaining five days of O'Conor's term before being sworn in
 again to serve his own term. See id. at 280-81.
 
   n202. Governor Groome was a member of the House of Delegates from Cecil
 County when elected to serve out the remainder of Governor Whyte's term. See id.
 at 185-86.
 
   n203. For an account of Governor Lloyd, see id. at 207-09.
 
   n204. For an account of Governor Lane, see id. at 279-83.
 
   n205. See Brugger, supra note 73, at 630 (discussing the contenders for
 Agnew's vacancy); Bradford Jacobs, Thimbleriggers: The Law v. Governor Marvin
 Mandel 85-86 (1984) (noting that Mandel was elected to fill Agnew's vacancy by
 the General Assembly, where Mandel was a commanding figure and where he was not
 hampered by the ethnic prejudice against him that could affect the ordinary
 electorate).
 
   n206. Act of May 5, 1970, ch. 532, 1970 Md. Laws 1298 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970)
 (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. II, 1-7A (1981 & Supp.
 1998)). Candidates for governor and lieutenant governor are now "considered for
 nomination jointly" and thus cannot be from different parties. Md. Const. art.
 II, 18. Additionally, the terms of governor and lieutenant governor are now
 synchronous, and do not permit a hold-over situation like that of Lieutenant
 Governor Christopher C. Cox. See supra note 197.
 
   n207. 1 Archives of Maryland, supra note 101, at 18 (stating that "by letter
 dated June 4, 1977, Governor Mandel notified Lieutenant Governor Blair Lee III
 that Lee would serve as acting governor until further notice"). Although
 Governor Mandel was convicted, disbarred, and eventually jailed, the District
 Court of Maryland subsequently overturned his conviction. See Attorney Grievance
 Comm'n v. Mandel, 294 Md. 560, 562, 451 A.2d 910, 911 (1982) (imposing the
 "ultimate sanction of disbarment" on Mandel for his mail fraud conviction); see
 also United States v. Mandel, 672 F. Supp. 864, 871, 879 (D. Md. 1987) (noting
 that Governor Mandel served 19 months of his 4-year sentence, with the remainder
 commuted, and setting aside his convictions for mail fraud and racketeering),
 aff'd, 862 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1988); Joel McCord, Mandel and Son Win Back Right
 to Practice Law, Balt. Sun, June 30, 1989, at D1. Moreover, the Court of Appeals
 of Maryland reinstated Mandel as a member of the bar.
 
   n208. 1 Archives of Maryland, supra note 101, at 18 n.20 (noting that Lee
 served on January 16, 1979, for the purpose of presiding at the installation of
 Rita C. Davidson as a judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland).
 
   n209. Md. Const. of 1867, art. II, 17 (requiring that all bills be presented
 to the governor "to guard against hasty or partial Legislation"). Professor
 Garrett Power has identified the impetus for adoption of an executive veto:
 
 

   In deciding to write an executive veto into the Constitution, Conservative
 Democrats serving as delegates were undoubtedly swayed by their hostility toward
 the Radical Republican legislatures that had controlled Maryland during the
 Civil War and by their sympathies for President Andrew Johnson in his then
 current difficulties with the federal Congress.
 
 

    Garrett Power, The Veto Power of the Governor, in Study Documents, supra
 note 4, at 156, 156.
 
   n210. The 1867 Constitution did not use the word "veto." Instead, the
 constitution provided that the governor shall "return [a bill of which he
 disapproves] with his objections to the House in which it originated." Md.
 Const. of 1867, art. II, 17. The word "veto" did not enter the constitution
 until an 1890 amendment creating the "line-item" veto. Act of Mar. 27, 1890, ch.
 194, 1890 Md. Laws 211 (ratified Nov. 3, 1891) (stating that "the item or items
 of appropriations disapproved shall be void unless repassed according to the
 rules or limitations prescribed for the passage of other bills over the
 executive veto") (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. II, 17 (1981
 & Supp. 1998)).
 
   n211. Md. Const. of 1867, art. II, 17.
 
   n212. See Power, supra note 209, at 157 (suggesting that "one reason for this
 provision was to compel the legislature to pass laws throughout the session
 rather than saving all important legislation until the end"). For a discussion
 of the problem of the end-of-session rush, see supra notes 155-159.
 
   n213. Robey v. Broersma, 181 Md. 325, 341, 29 A.2d 827, 830 (1943)
 (reaffirming that "a bill could be presented to the Governor after the
 Legislature had adjourned"); Lankford v. County Comm'rs, 73 Md. 105, 114, 20 A.
 1017, 1019 (1890) (holding that a bill "can be constitutionally presented to the
 Governor and signed by him, after the session of the Legislature has closed ...
 provided [that] the bill [is] signed by the Governor within six days from the
 time it is actually presented to him for his approval").
 
   n214. See Richards Furniture Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 233 Md. 249,
 262 n.2, 196 A.2d 621, 628 n.2 (1963) (noting that "it is not necessary, under
 the circumstances of this case, to determine whether the Governor had only six
 days after March 12 within which to sign the Bill ... even if it had been
 formally presented to him on that date").
 
   n215. Md. Const. of 1867, art. II, 17 (requiring a three-fifths vote in each
 House to override a veto).
 
   n216. See Power, supra note 209, at 156. By the language of Md. Const. of
 1867, art. II, 17, presentment of a bill to the governor begins the six-day time
 clock. Presentment is not mere delivery, but involves affixing the great seal
 and a ceremonial delivery by specified legislative officers. See Robey, 181 Md.
 at 339, 29 A.2d at 829 ("To put into effect a valid law, it is necessary in the
 first instance for the Legislature to pass the bill; to have it sealed with the
 Great Seal of the State; and to present it to the Governor."). Although
 presentment was required to be made as soon as practicable after passage, the
 Court of Appeals has construed this in favor of the governor. See id. at 341, 29
 A.2d at 830 (stating that "'practicable' did not mean practicable for the
 officials of the Legislature, but practicable for the proper consideration by
 the Governor").
 
   n217. See Act of May 6, 1949, ch. 714, 1949 Md. Laws 1768 (ratified Nov. 7,
 1950) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. II, 17 (1981 & Supp.
 1998)).
 
   n218. See Act of Apr. 28, 1959, ch. 664, 1959 Md. Laws 1001 (ratified Nov. 8,
 1960) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. II, 17 (1981 & Supp.
 1998)).
 
   n219. Act of Mar. 27, 1890, ch. 194, 1890 Md. Laws 211 (ratified Nov. 3,
 1891) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. II, 17 (1981 & Supp.
 1998)).
 
   n220. See supra notes 144-153.
 
   n221. Act of Mar. 28, 1916, ch. 159, 1916 Md. Laws 268 (ratified Nov. 7,
 1916) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 52 (1981 & Supp.
 1998)).
 
   n222. Power, supra note 209, at 159 (stating that "the [line] item veto
 applies only to supplementary appropriation bills").
 
   n223. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 155 (4.15).
 
   n224. Id.
 
   n225. See supra notes 155-159.
 
   n226. Commentators have suggested that the avoidance of override votes is a
 primary reason that governors have refused to call the General Assembly into
 special session. See Bell & Spencer, supra note 124, at 73 (stating that "the
 provisions regarding the return of vetoed bills are probably a major deterrent
 to the calling of special sessions for any purpose").
 
   n227. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 85 (suggesting that "these
 actions [including the longer regular legislative session and a provision for a
 special session], coupled with the assumption that a restructured legislature
 would proceed at a more orderly and systematic pace, offered hope of achieving a
 proper balance between legislative and executive powers").
 
   n228. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 155 (stating in section 4.14 that
 "the governor may reduce or strike out any item in a supplementary appropriation
 bill").
 
   n229. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 883, 1974 Md. Laws 2949 (ratified Nov. 5,
 1974) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. II, 17; art. III,
 30-31; art. XVI, 1(a), 2, 3(b) (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
 
   n230. Act of May 27, 1988, ch. 793, 1988 Md. Laws 5092 (ratified Nov. 8,
 1988) (codified at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. II, 17; art. III, 27 (Supp.
 1998)).
 
   n231. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 86 (quoting The Institute of
 Judicial Administration, Survey of the Judicial System of Maryland (N.Y. 1967));
 see also Elbert M. Byrd, Jr., The Judicial Process in Maryland 19-37 (1961)
 (tracing the history, jurisdiction, and authority of the various Maryland
 courts).
 
   n232. Jonathan Cottin, Maryland Takes a Giant Constitutional Step, Balt. Sun,
 Sept. 10, 1967, at D3 (stating that the constitutional convention's early draft
 recommended a "thorough overhaul of the judiciary"); Leaders Get Cool Response
 to Call for Convention Vote, Balt. Sun, Sept. 11, 1967, at 26 (noting that
 delegates to the convention would decide "whether the entire courts system of
 Maryland shall be overhauled").
 
   n233. See Swanson et al., supra note 20, at 62 (listing the delegates'
 post-convention perception of the most important issues, first of which was
 "reorganization of [the] court system").
 
   n234. An intermediate appellate court had been authorized by constitutional
 amendment in 1966. Act of Mar. 23, 1966, ch. 10, 1966 Md. Laws 16 (ratified Nov.
 8, 1966) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. IV, 1, 2, 3, 14A,
 14B, 15, 16, 18, 33; art. V, 3, 6; art. XVII, 3, 7 (1981 & Supp. 1998)). See
 William L. Reynolds, II, The Court of Appeals of Maryland: Roles, Work and
 Performance-Part I, 37 Md. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1977) (noting that "the Court of
 Special Appeals was designed, and its jurisdiction enlarged, to ease the
 workload of the Court of Appeals" (footnote omitted)); see also Michael Carlton
 Tolley, State Constitutionalism in Maryland 136-44 (1992) (tracing the history
 of court reform in Maryland).
 
   n235. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 167 (5.01). The Eney Commission had
 proposed a similar four-tiered system, but had suggested naming the courts the
 Supreme Court, the Appellate Court, the Superior Court, and the District Court.
 See Report, supra note 6, at 184. Although the constitutional convention
 eventually rejected the Eney Commission's suggestion of changing the name of the
 Court of Appeals of Maryland to the "Supreme Court of Maryland," legislators are
 still interested in changing the name. During the 1998 session of the Maryland
 General Assembly, the House of Delegates approved a bill that would have made
 the change. See H.B. 187, 412th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Md. 1998). The Senate did
 not act on the bill before adjournment of the 1998 session. See Maryland General
 Assembly Homepage (visited Jan. 15, 1999)
 <http://mlis.state.md.us.1998rs/billfile/bh0187.htm>.
 
   n236. Act of May 24, 1969, ch. 789, 1969 Md. Laws 1696, 1697 (ratified Nov.
 3, 1970) (noting as one purpose of the Act the "creation [of] a system of
 district courts in this State.") (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Decl. of
 Rts. art. 23; Const. art. IV, 1, 2, 4A, 4B, 18, 41A-I (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
 
   n237. See John Carroll Byrnes, Evolution of the Circuit Court for Baltimore
 City 1632-1997, in Histories of the Bench & Bar of Baltimore City 1, 24-25 (John
 Carroll Byrnes ed., 1997) (describing jurisdiction granted to Baltimore City
 Courts under the 1867 Constitution); id. at 30 (describing the 1971 grant of
 appellate jurisdiction to the Criminal Court of Baltimore and the Baltimore City
 Court); see also Byrd, supra note 231, at 67-78 (tracing the history,
 jurisdiction, and authority of the various courts).
 
   n238. See Act of May 20, 1980, ch. 523, 1980 Md. Laws 1869 (ratified Nov. 4,
 1980) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. IV, 1, 4A, 4B(a), 5, 9,
 18, 20, 23, 25, 26 (1981 & Supp. 1998)); see also J.S. Bainbridge, Jr., Ballot
 to Contain a Variety of Referenda, Balt. Sun, Oct. 27, 1980, at C1 (discussing
 the movement to consolidate Baltimore City's courts).
 
   n239. The two exceptions are Montgomery and Harford counties, where Circuit
 Court judges sit as Orphans' Court judges. See Md. Code Ann., Const. art. IV,
 20(b) (1981); see also Act of Apr. 28, 1998, ch. 323, 1998 Md. Laws 1674
 (pending ratification) (permitting retired circuit court judges to act as
 Orphans' Court judges in Montgomery and Harford Counties).
 
   n240. See Act of May 25, 1995, ch. 561, 1995 Md. Laws 3238 (codified at Md.
 Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. 13-701 to -707 (1996)) (abrogated June 30, 1997).
 
   n241. The Commission on the Future of Maryland Courts, Final Report 27 (1996)
 (proposing the unification of the existing Circuit Courts, state funding for
 these courts, and that the chief judge have administrative supervision over the
 whole system).
 
   n242. Id. at 43 (indicating that the Orphans' Courts' "jurisdiction and
 operations should be transferred to the Circuit Court and administered through a
 probate division of that court").
 
   n243. The commission's final report proposed postponing constitutional
 amendment until the 1998 session of the General Assembly. Id. at 78. During the
 1998 session of the General Assembly, however, the executive board of the
 Commission recommended that constitutional amendments regarding court structure
 be delayed again until 2000, a non- gubernatorial election year. Telephone
 Interview with James J. Cromwell, Esquire, Chairman, Commission on the Future of
 Maryland Courts (June 2, 1998).
 
   n244. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 191 (stating in section 5.32 that
 "the cost of the operation and administration of the judicial branch shall be
 borne exclusively by the State").
 
   n245. See, e.g., Eric Siegel, State Asked to Fund Court, Prosecutors, Schmoke
 Says City Will Push the Issue, Balt. Sun, Nov. 5, 1993, at B3, available in 1993
 WL 7397839; Thomas W. Waldron, Governor Supports Courts Takeover; Glendening's
 Stance Seen as Bid to Win Support of Schmoke, Balt. Sun., Oct. 3, 1998, at A1,
 available in 1998 WL 4987367.
 
   n246. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 88 (noting that under the
 1867 Constitution, "whenever a vacancy [in a judgeship] occurs the governor
 makes an appointment, on his own"). There was no intermediate appellate court in
 1967. See Reynolds, supra note 234, at 6 (noting that the Court of Special
 Appeals was established in 1967).
 
   n247. Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 88.
 
   n248. Md. Const. of 1867, art. IV, 40 (as amended in 1956).
 
   n249. Id. 41A (as amended in 1939).
 
   n250. Id. 41B (as amended in 1939); see Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at
 88 (noting that "the judges of the people's courts are chosen for a variety of
 terms ... and in a variety of ways").
 
   n251. Md. Const. of 1867, art. IV, 41C (as amended in 1936).
 
   n252. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 88 (suggesting that "in
 theory the governor appoints trial magistrates and committing magistrates; in
 practice these are political plums for the state senators").
 
   n253. Id. at 87.
 
   n254. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 176-79 (5.15-.22); Magnificent
 Failure, supra note 1, at 87-88.
 
   n255. Id.
 
   n256. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 176-79 (5.15-.22); Report, supra note
 6, at 195- 96.
 
   n257. Exec. Order No. 01.01.1974.23, 2 Md. Reg. 45 (1975).
 
   n258. Exec. Order No. 01.01.1995.10, 22 Md. Reg. 769, 769 (1995) (stating
 that Executive Order 01.01.1974.23 "has been revised eight times and has
 provided a system which is both effective and of material assistance in assuring
 the appointment of qualified persons in the Judiciary of Maryland").
 
   n259. Id. at 769-70.
 
   n260. Id. at 771.
 
   n261. Id.
 
   n262. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 87-88 (noting that, under the
 Niles plan, the election of judges was not contested, but was intended to
 register voter approval or disapproval for continuing in office).
 
   n263. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
 
   n264. Act of May 24, 1969, ch. 789, 1969 Md. Laws 1696, 1701 (ratified Nov.
 3, 1970) ("The Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall
 appoint each judge of the District Court whenever for any reason a vacancy shall
 exist in the office.... Each judge appointed by the Governor and confirmed by
 the Senate shall hold the office for a term of ten years ....") (codified as
 amended at Md. Code Ann., Decl. of Rts. art. 23; Const. art. IV, 1, 2, 4A, 4B,
 18, 41A-I (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
 
   n265. See Act of May 15, 1975, ch. 551, 1975 Md. Laws 2638 (ratified Nov. 2,
 1976) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. IV, 5A (1981 & Supp.
 1998)); see also The Sun's Position on 21 State Questions, Balt. Sun, Oct. 26,
 1976, at A18 (noting The Sun's support for ending "political contention for
 appellate judgeships" by instituting uncontested retention elections).
 
   n266. Md. Code Ann., Const. art. IV, 5A (1981).
 
   n267. See id. 5. Repeated proposals to eliminate contested elections for
 Circuit Court judges have been defeated. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Md. Proposal
 Would End Contested Elections for Judges, Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1988, available
 in 1988 WL 2070136 (reporting that "two governors before Schaefer have tried to
 enact the proposal, only to see the judiciary committee turn it down").
 
   n268. Md. Const. of 1776, Decl. of Rts. art. XXX.
 
   n269. For a chart setting forth the exact language of this provision over
 time, see Friedman, supra note 76, at 663.
 
   n270. Md. Const. of 1867, Decl. of Rts. art. 33.
 
   n271. Md. Const. of 1867, art. IV, 3.
 
   n272. Act of May 4, 1965, ch. 773, 1965 Md. Laws 1199, 1200 (ratified Nov. 8,
 1966) ("There is created a commission on judicial disabilities composed of five
 persons appointed by the Governor of Maryland.") (codified as amended at Md.
 Code Ann., Const. art. IV, 4A, 4B (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
 
   n273. Id.
 
   n274. See Report, supra note 6, at 205 (proposing to vest the power to remove
 judges in the supreme court, and allowing the judicial disabilities commission
 to be established by a rule of the supreme court).
 
   n275. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 185-88 (5.26-.30).
 
   n276. Act of May 24, 1969, ch. 789, 1969 Md. Laws 1696, 1699 (ratified Nov.
 3, 1970) (indicating that, when removal is recommended by the Commission on
 Judicial Disabilities, and after a hearing, the Court of Appeals may remove a
 judge for misconduct, failure to perform his duties, or serious disability)
 (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Decl. of Rts. art. 23; Const. art. IV, 1,
 2, 4A, 4B, 18, 41A-I (1981 & Supp. 1998)). In his 1973 State of the Judiciary
 Address, Chief Judge Robert C. Murphy proposed amending the constitution to
 reduce the confidentiality of judicial disabilities proceedings. See Report on
 the State of the Judiciary to the Legislature of Maryland by Robert C. Murphy,
 Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Jan. 31, 1973), 279 Md. XXXVI,
 XLVII-XLVIII (suggesting that "our Constitution mandates too much
 confidentiality [in this area]; [and] that an amendment to the Constitution
 should be proposed ... whereby the Commission would be empowered ... [to]
 disclose the details of its investigation"). This change was accomplished the
 next year. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 886, 1974 Md. Laws 2961, 2962 (ratified Nov.
 5, 1974) (permitting the Court of Appeals of Maryland to regulate by rule the
 confidentiality of judicial disabilities proceedings) (codified as amended at
 Md. Code Ann., Const. art. IV, 4B (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
 
   n277. Act of May 4, 1943, ch. 772, 1943 Md. Laws 1367, 1370 (ratified Nov. 7,
 1944) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. IV, 5, 14, 18, 21 (1981
 & Supp. 1998)); see Act of Mar. 23, 1966, ch. 10, 1966 Md. Laws 16, 17-19
 (ratified Nov. 8, 1966) (empowering the General Assembly to create the Court of
 Special Appeals with judges subject to the administrative control of the Chief
 Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland) (codified as amended at Md. Code
 Ann., Const. art. IV, 1, 2, 3, 14A, 14B, 15, 16, 18, 33; art. V, 3, 6; art.
 XVII, 3, 7 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
 
   n278. Md. Code Ann., Const. art. IV, 18 (1981).
 
   n279. See Report, supra note 6, at 206 (proposing to give "complete
 administrative rule- making power to the highest court for the first time, [so
 that] the chief judge will be ensured [of] having the necessary tools for
 effective judicial administration").
 
   n280. See Act of May 20, 1980, ch. 523, 1980 Md. Laws 1869, 1869 (ratified
 Nov. 4, 1980) (reflecting the consolidation of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore
 City into the Circuit Court for Baltimore City) (codified as amended at Md. Code
 Ann., Const. art. IV, 1, 4A, 4B(a), 5, 9, 18, 20, 23, 25, 26 (1981 & Supp.
 1998)); Act of Apr. 26, 1977, ch. 681, 1977 Md. Laws 2743, 2763-64 (ratified
 Nov. 7, 1978) (renumbering sections of the Judiciary Article of the
 Constitution) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Decl. of Rts. arts. 23- 24,
 46; Const. art. I, 1-11; art. III, 5-6, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19, 37, 41, 53, 59; art.
 IV, 1, 1A, 3, 4A, 6, 12, 14, 18, 20, 22, 40, 41-I, 44, 45; art. V, 5-7, 11; art.
 VI, 1; art. VII, 1; art. XI- A, 2, 5; art. XI-D, 1(a); art. XIII, 1, 2; art. XV,
 2, 3; art. XVI, 2, 6; art. XVII, 1, 3-9 (1981 & Supp. 1998)); Act of May 24,
 1969, ch. 789, 1969 Md. Laws 1696, 1700-04 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970) (reflecting
 creation of statewide District Court system) (codified as amended at Md. Code
 Ann., Decl. of Rts. art. 23, Const. art. IV, 1, 2, 4A, 4B, 18, 41A-I (1981 &
 Supp. 1998)).
 
   n281. See Dennis M. Sweeney, The Murphy Years: A View from the Trial Court,
 56 Md. L. Rev. 636, 643 (1997) (stating that Murphy "jumped into the
 then-nascent field of judicial administration"); Alan M. Wilner, A Humble Giant,
 56 Md. L. Rev. 631, 634 (1997) (noting that the chief judge's function as
 administrative head was only "fully implemented" under Judge Murphy).
 
   n282. Act of Apr. 11, 1955, ch. 343, 1955 Md. Laws 589 (codified as amended
 at Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. 13-101 (1995 & Supp. 1998)).
 
   n283. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 70 (noting the convention's
 "endorsement of the 'shared powers' concept for local home rule").
 
   n284. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 201-10 (7.01-.04).
 
   n285. Id. at 148-49 (stating in section 3.22 that "the General Assembly shall
 enact no public laws except general laws").
 
   n286. Id. at 215 (7.08).
 
   n287. The 1851 Constitution gave Baltimore City limited home rule. See
 Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 98. The other counties gained the right to
 adopt a charter form of government by Act of Apr. 16, 1914, ch. 416, 1914 Md.
 Laws 657, 658 (ratified Nov. 2, 1915) (mandating that "the General Assembly ...
 shall by public general law provide a grant of express powers for such County or
 Counties as may thereafter form a charter under the provisions of this Article")
 (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XI-A, 1-7 (1981 & Supp.
 1998)). See generally Jean A. Spencer, Contemporary Local Government in Maryland
 19-26 (1965) (tracing the history of charter home rule in Maryland).
 
   n288. The following counties adopted charter home rule: Anne Arundel County
 in 1964, Baltimore County in 1956, Montgomery County in 1948, Wicomico County in
 1964. See Report, supra note 6, at 244 n.235.
 
   n289. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 98-99 (stating that "the
 existing home rule provision [in 1967] ... 'permitted the legislature to
 determine what matters [would] be included in such express powers'" of the
 counties); see also Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XI-A, 2 (1981) (establishing that
 at its first session after a county votes to form a charter, the General
 Assembly is to "provide a grant of express powers for such County"). The charter
 counties are further hampered by the application of "Dillon's Rule," a rule of
 judicial construction that states:
 
 

   It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
 corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others:
 First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly
 implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential
 to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, - not simply
 convenient, but indispensable.
 
 

    John F. Dillon, I The Law of Municipal Corporations 89, at 115 (3d ed.
 1881).
 
   n290. Act of Apr. 8, 1965, ch. 493, 1965 Md. Laws 694 (ratified Nov. 8, 1966)
 (codified at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XI-F (1981)).
 
   n291. See id. at 696 (empowering a noncharter county to "enact, amend, or
 repeal a public local law of that county" with certain exceptions); see also
 Spencer, supra note 287, at 28- 29 (discussing code home rule).
 
   n292. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 99. Today, five Maryland
 counties have adopted code home rule: Allegany (1974); Caroline (1984); Kent
 (1970); Queen Anne's (1990); and Worcester (1976). See State Archives, Maryland
 Manual 1996-1997, at 717, 747, 793, 813, 845 (Diane P. Frese ed., 1996)
 [hereinafter Maryland Manual].
 
   n293. Report, supra note 6, at 244 (quoting Carl Everstine, Local Government:
 A Comparative Study 1 (1944)); see Bell & Spencer, supra note 124, at 5 ("The
 time burden on the legislature, the necessary attention of legislators to local
 issues, [and] the placing of responsibility for local legislation in the State
 House rather than in the county ... have all occasioned discussion and
 examination [as problems of local legislation]"); Mester, supra note 124, at 74
 (observing that "the problem of local legislation in Maryland has been one of
 major proportions for many years").
 
   n294. Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 96. One result of state
 involvement in local legislation, however, is reduced accountability. See
 Alexander, supra note 21, at 213 n.11 (noting that "the citizen has difficulty
 in placing responsibility for a piece of legislation or a lack of a particular
 piece of legislation" when the fault might belong either to the state or local
 government). Moreover, the dual sources of legislation leads to a proliferation
 of laws and sources of law. For example, the landlord-tenant relationship in
 Baltimore City is governed by the Real Property Article of the Maryland
 Annotated Code, Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. 8-101 to -501 (1996 & Supp. 1998), the
 Public Local Laws for Baltimore City, Public Local Laws of Baltimore City 9-1 to
 -33 (1980 & Supp. 1991), and the Baltimore City Code, Baltimore City Code 13-46
 to -57 (1983 & Supp. 1995).
 
   n295. Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 101.
 
   n296. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 204 (7.02).
 
   n297. Id. at 210 (7.40). This reversed the traditional "Dillon's Rule." See
 supra note 289.
 
   n298. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 148-49 (3.22).
 
   n299. Id. at 215 (7.08-.09). Wheeler and Kinsey indicated that the General
 Assembly had already established bi- and multi-county agencies; these agencies
 included the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, the
 Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Upper Potomac River Commission, the
 Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, the Washington Suburban Transit
 Commission, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. Magnificent
 Failure, supra note 1, at 107. Currently there are a number of these intercounty
 agencies: the Baltimore Metropolitan Council, created by Act of May 5, 1992, ch.
 201, 1992 Md. Laws 2213 (codified as amended at Md. Ann. Code art. 78D, 1-7
 (1995 & Supp. 1996), Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-301 (Supp. 1998)); the
 Tri-County Council for Western Maryland, created by Act of May 27, 1986, ch.
 861, 1986 Md. Laws 3493 (covering Allegany, Garrett, and Washington counties)
 (codified as amended at Md. Ann. Code art. 20A, 1-101 to 3-102 (1997)); the
 Maryland Lower Eastern Shore Tourism Center Advisory Committee, created by Act
 of May 29, 1984, ch. 716, 1984 Md. Laws 3347 (codified as amended at Md. Ann.
 Code art. 83A, 4-301 (1997)); the Tri-County Council for Southern Maryland,
 created by Act of May 15, 1984, ch. 373, 1984 Md. Laws 2361 (covering Calvert,
 Charles, and St. Mary's counties) (codified at Md. Ann. Code art. 20, 1-106
 (1998)); the Northeast Maryland Waste Disposal Authority, created by Act of May
 27, 1980, ch. 871, 1980 Md. Laws 3174 (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann.,
 Nat. Res. I 3-901 to -928 (1997 & Supp. 1998)); the Washington Suburban Transit
 Commission, created by Act of May 4, 1965, ch. 870, 1965 Md. Laws 1418 (codified
 at Mont. County Code 72-4 (1965)); the Upper Potomac River Commission, created
 by Act of Apr. 29, 1935, ch. 409, 1935 Md. Laws 891; the Maryland-National
 Capital Park & Planning Commission, created by Act of Apr. 26, 1927, ch. 448,
 1927 Md. Laws 833 (codified as amended at Md. Ann. Code art. 28, 1-101 (1997));
 the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, created by Act of Apr. 10, 1918,
 ch. 122, 1918 Md. Laws 248 (codified as amended at Md. Ann. Code art. 29, 1-102
 (1997)).
 
   n300. The authors of Magnificent Failure speak to this phenomenon:
 
 

   Confronted with all of the pressing problems of central cities - vast fiscal
 needs, increasing Negro population, rising crime rate, inadequate public
 services, Baltimore City was pictured by county opponents of the proposed
 constitution as poised to strike the suburbs once the new constitution presented
 the opportunity.... [It was suggested that] Baltimore City officials would move
 immediately to absorb Anne Arundel County ....
 
 

    Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 204. Ironically, the General Assembly,
 under its plenary powers, had already created multi-county agencies, see supra
 note 299, and the new proposal gave no additional powers to the General
 Assembly.
 
   One commentator has disputed the claim that opposition to multi-county
 governmental units played on racist fears. See Thomas G. Pullen, Jr., Why the
 Proposed Maryland Constitution Was Not Approved, 10 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 378, 380
 (1968) ("Neither race nor religion played too large a part in the people's
 thoughts about the proposed Maryland constitution.").
 
   n301. Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 207.
 
   n302. A series of amendments were approved allowing county voters to vote for
 co-council members by councilmanic, rather than election, district. See Act of
 May 27, 1986, ch. 707, 1986 Md. Laws 2660 (ratified Nov. 4, 1986) (affecting all
 charter counties) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XI-A, 3A
 (Supp. 1998)); Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 694, 1986 Md. Laws 2593 (ratified Nov.
 4, 1986) (affecting Harford County) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann.,
 Const. art. XI-A, 3A (Supp. 1998)); Act of June 1, 1982, ch. 729, 1982 Md. Laws
 3792 (ratified Nov. 2, 1982) (affecting Montgomery County) (codified as amended
 at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XI-A, 3A (Supp. 1998)); Act of Apr. 22, 1980, ch.
 136, 1980 Md. Laws 895 (ratified Nov. 4, 1980) (affecting Anne Arundel County)
 (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XI-A, 3A (1981 & Supp.
 1998)); Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 682, 1977 Md. Laws 2783 (ratified Nov. 7, 1978)
 (affecting Prince George's County) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const.
 art. XI-A, 3A (1981 & Supp. 1998)); Act of May 15, 1975, ch. 785, 1975 Md. Laws
 3365 (ratified Nov. 2, 1976) (affecting Howard County) (codified as amended at
 Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XI-A, 3A (1981 & Supp. 1998)); Act of May 6, 1971,
 ch. 358, 1971 Md. Laws 761 (ratified Nov. 7, 1972) (affecting Baltimore County)
 (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XI-A, 3A (1981 & Supp.
 1998)).
 
   There have been other changes as well. In 1969, a constitutional amendment
 provided a second, easier method for a county to become a charter county. See
 Act of May 21, 1969, ch. 786, 1969 Md. Laws 1686 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970)
 (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XI-A, 1A (1981 & Supp.
 1998)). A 1972 amendment required local governments to publish proposed
 legislation. See Act of May 26, 1972, ch. 371, 1972 Md. Laws 1231 (ratified Nov.
 7, 1972) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XI-A, 3 (1981 &
 Supp. 1998)). In 1992, the time for a charter board to prepare a charter was
 extended from 12 to 18 months. See Act of May 5, 1992, ch. 207, 1992 Md. Laws
 2226 (ratified Nov. 3, 1992) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art.
 XI-A, 1, 1A (Supp. 1998)).
 
   n303. The following Maryland counties have adopted charter home rule since
 1967: Harford County (1972); Howard County (1968); Prince George's County
 (1970); and Talbot County (1973). See Maryland Manual, supra note 292, at 782,
 787, 805, 829. On May 2, 1998, Carroll County voters considered adopting charter
 home rule, with strong editorial endorsement by the Baltimore Sun. See Carroll
 County Needs Home-Rule Powers, Balt. Sun, Apr. 26, 1998, at L2 (arguing that
 charter home rule government would be "better equipped to manage affairs into
 the 21st century" and that "home rule offers a clear division of powers and
 accountability"); One Head is Better Than Three, Balt. Sun, Apr. 27, 1998, at A8
 (suggesting that a charter home rule government would be one of "increased
 accountability and responsibility, more firmly built on local control [and] is
 the one Carroll countians should choose"); What Is Local Control Worth?, Balt.
 Sun, Apr. 28, 1998, at A10 (opining that charter government would not create
 bigger government and higher taxes in Carroll County because "political reality,
 more than the structure of government, [would] restrain county leaders and
 budgets from excess"). Nonetheless, Carroll County voters rejected the proposed
 charter by a vote of 11,107 to 7227. See Mary Gail Hare & James M. Coram,
 Carroll Voters Reject Change, Balt. Sun, May 3, 1998, at B1.
 
   n304. See Maryland Manual, supra note 292, at 429.
 
   n305. Act of Apr. 30, 1963, ch. 753, 1963 Md. Laws 1548 (repealed by Act of
 May 25, 1989, ch. 736, 1989 Md. Laws 4106).
 
   n306. Act of May 15, 1984, ch. 373, 1984 Md. Laws 2361 (codified at Md. Ann.
 Code art. 20, 1-106 (1998)).
 
   n307. Act of May 25, 1989, ch. 736, 1989 Md. Laws 4106 (repealed by Act of
 May 5, 1992, ch. 201, 1992 Md. Laws 2213).
 
   n308. Act of May 5, 1992, ch. 201, 1992 Md. Laws 2213 (codified as amended at
 Md. Ann. Code art. 78D, 1-7 (1995 & Supp. 1996), Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.
 Proc. 5-301 (Supp. 1998)).
 
   n309. See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Baltimore Metropolitics (1997); David Rusk,
 Baltimore Unbound (1997).
 
   n310. Rusk, supra note 309, at 3-6.
 
   n311. Id. at 14-15.
 
   n312. Act of Apr. 25, 1947, ch. 618, 1947 Md. Laws 1552 (ratified Nov. 2,
 1948) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XIII, 1 (1981 & Supp.
 1998)). For an historical analysis of the constitutional amendment limiting
 annexation, see Gilbert Sandler, Annexation Pixilation, Balt. Sun, July 2, 1991,
 at A9.
 
   n313. Rusk, supra note 309, at 91. Rusk seems to avoid the use of the state
 constitution to implement his plan precisely because of the majoritarian nature
 of state constitutions, and because he knows that a majority of voters would not
 vote to adopt this scheme of regional government. This is not a criticism of
 Rusk for the antimajoritarian nature of his plan, but rather a simple
 recognition of that fact.
 
   n314. Id. at 103-19.
 
   n315. Id. at 122-23.
 
   n316. See Report, supra note 6, at 229 ("The Commission's inquiry into the
 concept and operation of the present executive budget system has convinced it
 that the system is fundamentally sound, both in theory and practice."); see also
 Act of Mar. 28, 1916, ch. 159, 1916 Md. Laws 268 (ratified Nov. 7, 1916)
 (establishing the current executive budget system) (codified as amended at Md.
 Code Ann., Const. art. III, 52 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
 
   n317. See supra notes 144-153.
 
   n318. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 116 (noting that, after the
 difficult experience Maryland had in fulfilling its debt responsibilities in the
 nineteenth century, "the constitutional convention of 1850 produced stringent
 restrictions on the state's power to incur debt"); Alfred S. Niles, Maryland
 Constitutional Law 187-88 (1915) (noting that the struggle the state had to pay
 its debt obligation after making a number of disastrous loans during the early
 nineteenth century was "fresh in the minds of the framers of the Constitution of
 1851 and the [provisions relating to debt in the Constitution were] adopted by
 them to prevent the repetition of [those] bitter experiences"); Report, supra
 note 6, at 214-15 ("The [provisions of the 1867 Maryland Constitution relating
 to state debt] were the product of public reaction against the nearly disastrous
 extent to which the General Assembly had loaned the credit of the State ... from
 1820 to 1850.").
 
   The problem began with the rush of westward development in the early
 nineteenth century. Maryland, like many other states, sought to encourage
 internal developments by assisting and subsidizing such companies as the
 Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. The state
 government subscribed to the stock of these companies to finance their
 construction projects. In order to finance the stock purchases, the state issued
 long-term bonds backed by the full faith and credit of the state. By 1840, the
 state had incurred almost $ 15 million in state debt to finance the construction
 projects undertaken by these private companies. The internal improvements,
 principally the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal, failed to produce expected revenues.
 The entire obligation was thrown upon the state, which had failed to appropriate
 any money for repaying the bonds. The state tried to sell its interest in the
 railroad and canal companies, but there were no investors. Finally, in 1846, in
 order to save the state's credit, the General Assembly was forced to pass a
 substantial tax increase on both real and personal property. Id. Of course, many
 other states engaged in such risky financial behavior during this time period,
 leading generally to similar results. See Fletcher M. Green, Constitutional
 Development in the South Atlantic States, 1776-1860: A Study in the Evolution of
 Democracy 255-56 (Da Capo Press Reprint 1971) (1930) (explaining that because of
 the heavy debts incurred by many state governments, "the people found themselves
 burdened with heavy taxes just when they were least able to pay ... [and] began
 to demand that constitutional restrictions be placed upon state indebtedness and
 the loaning of state credit to private corporations").
 
   n319. See 1 Debates and Proceedings of the Maryland Reform Convention to
 Revise the State Constitution 338-57, 369, 375-79, 411, 414-49 (1851) (reporting
 delegates' concerns about state financing of internal improvements); 2 Debates
 and Proceedings of the Maryland Reform Convention to Revise the State
 Constitution 339-47 (1851) (same).
 
   n320. Md. Const. of 1851, art. III, 22.
 
   n321. Id.
 
   n322. Id.
 
   n323. Id.
 
   n324. See Md. Const. of 1864, art. III, 33 (eliminating the $ 100,000
 ceiling).
 
   n325. Md. Const. of 1867, art. III, 34 (exempting St. Mary's, Charles, and
 Calvert counties from the prohibition on bond-financed internal improvements).
 
   n326. Act of Apr. 9, 1924, ch. 327, 1924 Md. Laws 910 (ratified Nov. 4, 1924)
 (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 34 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
 
   n327. Act of Mar. 24, 1959, ch. 234, 1959 Md. Laws 300 (ratified Nov. 8,
 1960) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 34 (1981 & Supp.
 1998)).
 
   n328. See Maryland Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth. v. Meadow-Croft, 243 Md. 515, 525,
 221 A.2d 632, 638 (1966) (finding that a statute, although purporting to pledge
 the faith and credit of the state in violation of article III, section 34 of the
 Maryland Constitution, did not actually do so, and was therefore
 constitutional); Lacher v. Board of Trustees, 243 Md. 500, 512, 221 A.2d 625,
 631 (1966) (holding that the use of revenues collected from existing buildings
 of two state colleges to pay the interest and principal of bonds to be sold to
 create additional facilities at those colleges did not create a debt of the
 state, as described in article II, section 34 of the Maryland Constitution);
 Lerch v. Maryland Port Auth., 240 Md. 438, 462, 214 A.2d 761, 774 (1965)
 (holding that the Maryland Port Authority's issuance of revenue bonds for the
 creation of an international trade center did not constitute a debt under
 article III, section 34 of the Maryland Constitution because there was no pledge
 of existing property and only cash was used from the general funds of the
 Authority); Melvin v. Board of County Comm'rs, 199 Md. 402, 405, 86 A.2d 902,
 903-04 (1952) (holding that Anne Arundel County's sale of bonds and remittance
 of the funds to a local hospital did not constitute a loan of credit to the
 County, as prohibited by article III, section 54 of the Maryland Constitution);
 Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Williams, 199 Md. 382, 401, 86 A.2d 892, 901-02 (1952)
 (holding that article III, section 34 of the Maryland Constitution did not
 prohibit the state from borrowing money and giving the proceeds as a gift to an
 educational institution); Castle Farms Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Lexington Mkt.
 Auth., 193 Md. 472, 483-84, 67 A.2d 490, 494 (1949) (holding that an Act
 authorizing the Lexington Market Authority to issue revenue bonds did not
 constitute a debt of Baltimore City, or a pledge of its faith and credit, as
 prohibited by article XI, section 7 of the Maryland Constitution, because they
 were to be secured only by the revenues of the market and not a mortgage of it);
 Wyatt v. Beall, 175 Md. 258, 266, 1 A.2d 619, 622-23 (1938) (holding that
 revenue bonds issued by the state to finance the construction of highway bridges
 did not constitute a debt of the state, as prohibited by article III, section 34
 of the Maryland Constitution, because there was no pledge of existing property,
 but only a pledge of property that would come into existence as a result of the
 issuance of the bonds); Welch v. Coglan, 126 Md. 1, 8, 94 A. 384, 387 (1915)
 (holding that an Act authorizing the state Board of Health to require counties
 and cities to establish sewer and drainage systems did not violate the
 constitutional prohibition against state involvement in works of internal
 improvement); Bonsal v. Yellott, 100 Md. 481, 508, 60 A. 593, 597 (1905)
 (holding that an Act authorizing state aid for the construction of roads by
 counties did not conflict with the constitutional provision prohibiting state
 involvement in works of internal improvement). But see Baltimore & Drum Point
 R.R. Co. v. Pumphrey, 74 Md. 86, 111-12, 21 A. 559, 562 (1891) (holding that the
 issuance of railroad negotiable bonds by the County Commissioners of Anne
 Arundel County, in payment for a subscription to the stock of that railroad
 company, violated Article III, 54 of the Maryland Constitution, which prohibited
 a loan of the credit of a county).
 
   n329. Report, supra note 6, at 220.
 
   n330. Id. at 221. The New York Constitution requires that when the
 legislature fails to appropriate sufficient funds for the service of a
 particular debt, the comptroller must designate money sufficient to service the
 debt from the general fund. See N.Y. Const. art. VII, 16.
 
   n331. Comparison, supra note 75, at 196 (6.06).
 
   n332. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 116 (noting that, with
 respect to the acquisition of debt, the proposal to extend the maturity period
 caused "the greatest concern").
 
   n333. See id. at 117-18.
 
   n334. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 197 (6.07).
 
   n335. Act of May 26, 1972, ch. 372, 1972 Md. Laws 1232 (ratified Nov. 7,
 1972) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 34 (1981 & Supp.
 1998)).
 
   n336. Id. at 1233.
 
   n337. Act of May 17, 1976, ch. 551, 1976 Md. Laws 1449 (ratified Nov. 2,
 1976) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 34 (1981 & Supp.
 1998)).
 
   n338. Act of June 1, 1982, ch. 600, 1982 Md. Laws 3505 (ratified Nov. 2,
 1982) (codified at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 34 (Supp. 1998)).
 
   n339. Report, supra note 6, at 220.
 
   n340. See JoAnna Daemmrich, Goldstein is Missed at Bond Sale; Maryland Event
 Occurs for First Time in 40 Years Without the Comptroller, Balt. Sun, July 9,
 1998, at B2, available in 1998 WL 4974979 ("The interest rate [on Maryland
 General Obligation bonds] is relatively low chiefly because Maryland - one of
 only eight such states - has a AAA bond rating ....").
 
   n341. See Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 24 (1981); Md. Const. of 1867, art.
 III, 24; Md. Const. of 1864, art. III, 23; Md. Const. of 1851, art. III, 28; Md.
 Const. of 1776, art. X.
 
   n342. See Md. Ann. Code art. 19, 30-34 (1966) (establishing the position of
 state auditor), repealed by Act of May 7, 1968, ch. 456, 1968 Md. Laws 810.
 
   n343. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 118-19.
 
   n344. See Report, supra note 6, at 149 ("Reason would seem to dictate that,
 if the post- audit review function is to be separately performed, it should be
 performed by a person either appointed or elected by, and responsible only to
 the legislative branch."); see also Comparison, supra note 75, at 150 (proposing
 in section 3.24 that the General Assembly require post audit of the state
 finances to be done by an agency of the General Assembly).
 
   n345. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 119.
 
   n346. Md. Code Ann., State Gov't 2-1202 (Supp. 1998) (establishing the
 Department of Fiscal Services as a legislative department); Md. Code Ann., State
 Gov't 2-1217 to -1227 (Supp. 1998) (creating an office of the legislative
 auditor and defining its duties).
 
   n347. See Md. Const. of 1867, art. III, 36 (providing that "no Lottery grant
 shall ever hereafter be authorized by the General Assembly").
 
   n348. See Cottin, supra note 232 (predicting that the proposed elimination of
 the constitutional ban on state lotteries would be among the most debated
 proposals).
 
   n349. See Report, supra note 6, at 323 (indicating that the commission's
 draft constitution omitted the prohibition of lotteries found in the Maryland
 Constitution of 1867, article III, section 36, as it then existed).
 
   n350. Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 110-11.
 
   n351. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 201 (retaining the ban in section
 6.17).
 
   n352. See Md. Const. of 1867, art. III, 36; Md. Const. of 1864, art. III, 35;
 Md. Const. of 1851, art. III, 37.
 
   n353. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 201 (6.17) ("Neither the State nor
 any unit of local government shall operate or authorize a lottery for the
 purpose of financing any expenses of government.").
 
   n354. See Act of May 26, 1972, ch. 364, 1972 Md. Laws 1218 (ratified Nov. 7,
 1972) (codified at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 36 (1981)); see also A Legal
 Lottery Is a Bad Tax, Balt. Sun, Oct. 18, 1972, at A12 (arguing that a legalized
 lottery would be "no more than a taxing gimmick"). In ending the constitutional
 ban, Maryland was part of a national trend toward establishing state-run
 lotteries in the early 1970s. See Ronald J. Rychlack, Lotteries, Revenues and
 Social Costs: A Historical Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L.
 Rev. 11, 45 (1992) (explaining that by 1974, 11 states had established
 lotteries). Professor Rychlack's article also provides cogent criticism of state
 run lotteries, based on promotional techniques employed, id. at 62-63,
 compulsive gambling, id. at 64-69, effect on children, id. at 69-70, impact on
 crime, id. at 70-71, and disproportionate effect on the poorest people, id. at
 71-74. Professor Rychlack concludes that state run lotteries have generally
 accomplished their goals of raising revenues, but that to minimize negative
 social consequences, states should adopt severe limitations on lottery
 advertising including, "at the minimum: 1) advertisements should not be
 misleading; 2) advertisements should not compare the lottery to secure financial
 investments; 3) advertisers should not target low-income markets, and; 4)
 television advertising should be restricted to time slots where children are
 less likely to be watching." Id. at 80.
 
   n355. It is estimated that the lottery will produce revenues of $ 408.6
 million in fiscal year 1999. Report of the Maryland Board of Revenue Estimates
 on Estimated Maryland Revenues: Fiscal Years Ending June 30, 1998 and June 30,
 1999 (Submitted to Governor Parris N. Glendening, Dec. 15, 1997), Table 9, at
 35. After $ 32 million is provided to the Maryland Stadium Authority, $ 376.6
 million will be available to General Funds. Id. This represents 4.65% of all
 State revenues. Id. Table 4, at 21.
 
   n356. Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 745, 1973 Md. Laws 1573, 1573 (ratified Nov.
 5, 1974) (mandating that "the budget bill as submitted by the Governor,
 supplemented by the Governor, and amended by the General Assembly contain
 proposed appropriations not in excess of total estimated revenues, relating
 generally to the contents and totals in the budget bill") (codified as amended
 at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 52 (1981 & Supp. 1998)). Scholars view the
 effectiveness of state balanced budget requirements differently. Compare David
 Lubecky, Comment, The Proposed Federal Balanced Budget Amendment: The Lesson
 from State Experience, 55 U. Cin. L. Rev. 563, 572 (1986) (arguing that states'
 fiscal conditions and recent surveys of state executive and legislative fiscal
 officers suggest that balanced budget requirements have been relatively
 successful) with Donald B. Tobin, The Balanced Budget Amendment: Will Judges
 Become Accountants? A Look at State Experiences, 12 J.L. & Pol. 153, 193 (1996)
 (asserting that state balanced budget requirements create "fiscal
 straightjackets" by requiring states "to seek alternative methods for dealing
 with budgets in order to function").
 
   n357. Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 52(5a) (1981 & Supp. 1998).
 
   n358. Id.
 
   n359. Md. Const. of 1867, art. II, 21 (setting the governor's salary at $
 4500 annually).
 
   n360. Md. Const. of 1867, art. V, 3 (setting the attorney general's salary at
 $ 3000 annually).
 
   n361. Md. Const. of 1867, art. VI, 1 (setting the treasurer's salary at $
 2500 annually).
 
   n362. Id. (setting the comptroller's salary at $ 2500 annually).
 
   n363. Md. Const. of 1867, art. III, 15 (paying members of the General
 Assembly $ 5 per day).
 
   n364. Md. Const. of 1867, art. IV, 24 (setting the salary of appellate judges
 at $ 3500 annually).
 
   n365. Id. (setting the salaries of trial judges not serving in Baltimore City
 at $ 2800 annually).
 
   n366. Id. 31 (setting the salaries of Baltimore City trial judges at $ 3500
 annually).
 
   n367. Md. Const. of 1867, art. XV, 1.
 
   n368. The set salary of the treasurer was deleted from the constitution and
 instead was allowed to be prescribed by law. Act of Apr. 29, 1966, ch. 428, 1966
 Md. Laws 725 (ratified Nov. 8, 1966) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann.,
 Const. art. VI, 1 (1981 & Supp. 1998)). This Act proves false the claim made by
 Jonathan Cottin that "the State treasurer, who disburses $ 1,000,000,000 a year,
 can be paid only $ 2,500 under terms of the constitution." See Cottin, supra
 note 232.
 
   n369. Act of Apr. 11, 1912, ch. 663, 1912 Md. Laws 1001 (ratified Nov. 4,
 1913) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. V, 3 (1981)).
 
   n370. Act of Mar. 26, 1956, ch. 99, 1956 Md. Laws 258, 264 (ratified Nov. 6,
 1956) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. I, 1, 5; art. II, 2,
 13; art. III, 2-7, 58; art. IV, 14-19, 24-25, 37, 40-41; art. V, 1, 7; art. VII,
 1-2; art. XII, 2; art. XIV, 2; art. XV, 1, 7; art. XVII, 3-4 (1981 & Supp.
 1998)).
 
   n371. Id. at 269.
 
   n372. Act of May 4, 1965, ch. 641, 1965 Md. Laws 895 (ratified Nov. 8, 1966)
 (setting the governor's salary at $ 25,000 annually) (codified at Md. Code Ann.,
 Const. art. II, 21 (1981)).
 
   n373. Act of Apr. 7, 1964, ch. 161, 1964 Md. Laws 414 (ratified Nov. 3, 1964)
 (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. II, 1, 13, 13; art. III,
 14-15, 27, 52(3) (1981)).
 
   n374. Act of Apr. 29, 1966, ch. 431, 1966 Md. Laws 729 (rejected Nov. 8,
 1966).
 
   n375. Comparison, supra note 75, at 20 (4.24). The office of treasurer is not
 listed because the proposed constitution would have abolished it. See id. at 81
 (4.20).
 
   n376. Id. at 26 (3.12).
 
   n377. See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
 
   n378. See Act of May 17, 1976, ch. 543, 1976 Md. Laws 1431 (ratified Nov. 2,
 1976) (codified at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. II, 1A, 21-21A (1981)); see also
 The Sun's Position on 21 State Questions, supra note 265 (supporting the
 initiative to remove the provision in the constitution setting the governor's
 salary and instead to create a compensation commission to recommend to the
 General Assembly the governor's salary).
 
   n379. See Act of May 5, 1970, ch. 576, 1970 Md. Laws 1671, 1673-74 (ratified
 Nov. 3, 1970) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. II, 1, 3, 13;
 art. III, 14, 15, 27, 52(10) (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
 
   n380. See Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 15(3) (1981) ("Within 15 days after
 the beginning of the regular session in each fourth year ..., the Commission by
 formal resolution shall submit its determinations for compensation and
 allowances to the General Assembly."). The governor's annual salary is currently
 set at $ 120,000. Md. Code Ann., State Gov't 3-102 (1995 & Supp. 1998).
 
   n381. Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 15(3) (1981).
 
   n382. Id.
 
   n383. See Tawes, supra note 9, at vii (asserting that the present Maryland
 Constitution was "very restrictive to the successful operation of an efficient
 state government and entirely too clumsy and ineffective as a document of basic
 law").
 
   n384. Report, supra note 6, at 6-7.
 
   n385. See Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 57.
 
   n386. Id. (quoting Edward G. Pickett, Delegates Struggle with Words, Balt.
 Sun., Dec. 19, 1967, at C14).
 
   n387. Id. at 120. An additional proposal to streamline the constitution,
 which ultimately raised a lot of opposition, was to delete minor offices from
 constitutional status. See id. at 89-90 (noting how sheriffs, registers of
 wills, and other minor offices were no longer provided for under the draft
 constitution); id. at 120 (explaining how the draft constitution did not mandate
 the existence of a commissioner of the land office, a state librarian, elisors,
 and notaries public); id. at 210-12 (discussing the opposition to these
 proposals).
 
   n388. Cf. id. at 6 ("The principal question that lingers from the entire
 Maryland experience is whether the democratic process will permit extensive,
 one-shot confrontation of broad problems of government, or only patchwork,
 half-way pragmatic solutions to specific problems as they arise.").
 
   n389. Act of May 6, 1971, ch. 357, 1971 Md. Laws 760 (ratified Nov. 7, 1972)
 (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Decl. of Rts. art. 7 (1981)).
 
   n390. Md. Const. of 1867, Decl. of Rts. art. 7.
 
   n391. See Md. Const. of 1867, art. I, 2 ("No person above the age of
 twenty-one years, convicted of larceny or other infamous crime, unless pardoned
 by the Governor, shall ever thereafter, be entitled to vote at any election in
 this State; and no person under guardianship, as a lunatic, or as a person non
 compos mentis, shall be entitled to vote.").
 
   n392. Act of May 26, 1972, ch. 368, 1972 Md. Laws 1227, 1228 (ratified Nov.
 7, 1972) ("The General Assembly by law may regulate or prohibit the right to
 vote of a person convicted of infamous or other serious crime or under care or
 guardianship for mental disability.") (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann.,
 Const. art. I, 4 (1981)).
 
   n393. Act of May 17, 1976, ch. 550, 1976 Md. Laws 1448 (ratified Nov. 2,
 1976) (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XIII, 1 (1981)).
 
   n394. Act of Apr. 26, 1977, ch. 681, 1977 Md. Laws 2743, 2743 (ratified Nov.
 7, 1978) codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Decl. of Rts. arts. 23-24, 46;
 Const. art. I, 1-11; art. III, 5-6, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19, 37, 41, 53, 59; art. IV,
 1, 1A, 3, 4A, 6, 12, 14, 18, 20, 22, 40, 41-I, 44, 45; art. V, 5-7, 11; art. VI,
 1; art. VII, 1; art. XI-A, 2, 5; art. XI-D, 1(a); art. XIII, 1, 2; art. XV, 2,
 3; art. XVI, 2, 6; art. XVII, 1, 3-9 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
 
   n395. Act of May 20, 1982, ch. 321, 1982 Md. Laws 320 (ratified Nov. 2, 1982)
 (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. III, 38 (Supp. 1998)).
 
   n396. See Wood, supra note 53, at 273-82 (discussing the American idea of a
 constitution as "fundamental law").
 
   n397. See Md. Const. of 1776, art. LIX.
 
   n398. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the
 constitutional provisions governing the calling of a constitutional convention);
 supra note 56 (discussing Maryland's history of constitutional conventions).
 
   n399. See Comparison, supra note 75, at 224 (stating in section 10.04 that
 "the General Assembly by law may call a constitutional convention at any time or
 may submit the question of calling a constitutional convention to the voters of
 the State at any time").
 
   n400. Magnificent Failure, supra note 1, at 150.
 
   n401. Critics saw the proposals of the constitutional convention in a
 different light. The Save Our State Committee argued that the proposal made
 calling a constitutional convention too easy and possibly too frequent. Save Our
 State Committee, supra note 15, at 111 ("The best interest of the public
 requires that Constitutional Conventions be held only if a real majority of the
 electorate desires this and only at stated periods. Otherwise, there is the
 likelihood of frequent changes in the fundamental law of the State with its
 attendant legal and other dislocations.").
 
   n402. Act of May 26, 1972, ch. 367, 1972 Md. Laws 1226, 1226 (ratified Nov.
 7, 1972) (proposing that this requirement not be construed to prevent the
 General Assembly from proposing multiple amendments in one bill for the purpose
 of correcting obsolete language, or from embodying multiple articles of the
 constitution in a single amendment if they concern a single subject) (codified
 as amended at Md. Code Ann., Const. art. XIV, 1 (1981)).
 
   n403. See supra notes 394-395 and accompanying text.
 
   n404. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
 
   n405. A similar view is expressed by convention delegate Dr. Thomas J.
 Pullen, Jr.:
 
 

   I am confident that many of the constitutional changes proposed in our
 convention will be put into effect as statutes enacted by the General Assembly
 of Maryland. The serious need for some of these changes was clearly demonstrated
 by the discussion in the constitutional convention, and in time the people will
 want them. When the people really want them, the General Assembly will act and
 as expeditiously as the people desire.
 
   ... I feel confident that the Constitutional Convention of Maryland of 1967-
 68 justified itself by throwing into bold relief, for the people of Maryland,
 problems and suggested solutions in respect to state and local government. The
 issues were clear cut. Within a reasonable time, I am confident that these
 problems will be settled by the General Assembly either through statutes or by
 referral of constitutional amendments to the people.
 
 

    Pullen, supra note 300, at 390-91.
 
   n406. I leave for the political scientists the task of counting proposals,
 subsequent adoptions, and computing a percentage of success. That is why I left
 political science.
 
   n407. For a scholarly analysis of the reasons to prefer constitutional
 conventions to piecemeal constitutional amendment by legislative initiative, see
 John P. Wheeler, Jr., National Mun. League, The Constitutional Convention: A
 Manual on its Planning, Organization and Operation XIV-XV (1961).
 
   n408. Maryland voters refused to authorize a new state constitutional
 convention in 1990. See Constitutional Convention Question is Rejected, Balt.
 Evening Sun, Nov. 7, 1990, available in 1990 WL 4108712 (noting that "some 60
 percent of the state voters were against the question that would have mandated a
 state constitutional convention"); Do We Need a Constitutional Convention?,
 Balt. Evening Sun, Oct. 24, 1990, available in 1990 WL 4105529 (providing
 arguments both for and against authorizing a constitutional convention); John W.
 Frece, Ballot Question Will Decide Fate of Constitution, Balt. Sun, Oct. 28,
 1990, available in 1990 WL 4106393 (predicting that a new constitutional
 convention would not be authorized because it would require approval by a
 majority of voters who vote in the entire election, and few voters were aware
 that the question would appear on the ballot); State Questions, Balt. Sun, Nov.
 1, 1990, at A22 (arguing that because the process of amending the state
 constitution has worked reasonably well, there is no need to call a
 constitutional convention).
 
   n409. While I cannot deny that some of my desire for constitutional revision
 is aesthetic (and that I think that the proposed constitution of 1967-1968 was a
 beautiful document), it is also true that a simpler, cleaner, better organized
 constitution, written in positive simple language, would have many benefits
 beyond the aesthetic. It would make government more understandable and
 accessible to citizens; it would make it easier for students to study the
 Maryland Constitution; it would make the job of writing laws easier for the
 General Assembly; it would make the job of evaluating the constitutionality of
 laws easier for judges.
 
   n410. This is provided, of course, that there is no change in the present
 mechanism for calling a constitutional convention. See Md. Code Ann., Const.
 art. XIV, 2 (1981).
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