Jackson v. State of Maryland:

Groundbreaking Litigation or the Culminating Moment of a Social Movement?

Introduction

On May 15, 1911, the city of Baltimore enacted landmark legislation. This legislation would place an indelible print upon the conscious of Baltimore's citizens, by them of the right to establish and maintain racially diverse communities. The Baltimore ordinance that was enacted was known as Ordinance No. 692, and represented the city's first official effort to segregate housing in the city.1 Not only did this ordinance mark new legislative territory for the city, but it also represented new legislative precedent nationally.

The nation's segregation and integration proponents had met on many fronts throughout the development of the nation. The two interest had engaged one another in areas such as government employment, education and military service. However, never before had the parties engaged in a battle over the composition of residential communities. Baltimore's ordinance prompted the nation, for the first time, to examine its position on blacks and whites engaging one another in the private arena of property interests.

While the Constitutionality of racial segregation in residential neighborhoods was ultimately settled by the Supreme Court in a 1917 case initiated in Louisville, Kentucky2, the city of Baltimore was not without its own significant legal challenges to segregation legislation. The Maryland case of Jackson v. State played an integral part in the development of a social and legal movement that resulted in the Supreme Court's 1917 decision – abolishing government ordinances promoting racial segregation in residential communities3. As a result, a close study of Jackson v. State offers more than a simple legal opinion. A careful study of Jackson v. State provides insight into the ongoing social, political and legal dynamics between two competing interest in America – segregation and integration.

Housing in Baltimore Prior to 1911: The Rise of Housing Segregation Law

In order to understand the events that led up to the passage of Baltimore's segregation ordinances, and the eventual litigation of Jackson v. State, we must begin with a brief discussion of the housing situation in Baltimore – prior to 1911. Throughout the early nineteenth century Baltimore housing was not racially segregated, and even following the Civil War, blacks lived in all of Baltimore's twenty political wards. Although the majority of blacks resided in the city's central, southern and eastern sections, there was no Negro quarter or ghetto.4

As Baltimore became more of an industrialized urban, city many blacks began to migrate to the area. Many of these individuals migrated north from the south, and possessed few professional or trade skills. The population increase in Baltimore had a significant impact upon the housing opportunities. One legal scholar has documented the transformation of housing opportunities in Baltimore, at the turn of the century, as follows:

" Urbanization was to modify this fluid mixture. In 1860 only 4.2% of all Negroes in the United States were city dwellers; by 1890 it had risen to almost 20%, as blacks joined whites in a rush to cities. Between 1880 and 1900 Baltimore's black population increased 47% from 54,000 to 79,000. During this same period, the city's white population was increasing by 25,000 people, the proportion of blacks in the population was on a slight decline.

Negro newcomers with little money and limited job opportunities sought out the cheapest housing in town. They rented shanties and doubled up in small houses, resulting in Baltimore's first sizeable slums. The first slum to reach maturity was "Pigtown" in Southwest Baltimore."5

In addition to considerable population increases, Baltimore was also struggling with an economy that was slowing.6 This severely impacted Baltimore's black migrant population, because in times of distressed economic conditions blacks were less likely to be hired. As a result, many African-Americans were either unemployed or underemployed. Furthermore, the city's infrastructure was not adequately equipped to accommodate the influx of new unemployed city dwellers. Affordable housing had not yet been made available to much of the city's poor, and citizens had to increasingly move into over-crowded, sub-standard housing in order to minimize expenses. A related outcome of these sub-standard living conditions, was the increase of illnesses in communities with concentrated populations of poor.7

Associated with the rapid decline in adequate housing was the rise of crime and degradation in communities that had high concentrations of poor. Many politicians and social activist became concerned with addressing the issue of sub-standard housing, citing that the need to eliminate these areas should be characterized as a moral obligation.8 Commissioned investigations were conducted by powerful social elites, such as the Gilman Charity Society. The Gilman Charity Society commissioned study, entitled Housing Conditions in Baltimore, found that the perception of Baltimore slums in 1902-1907 was indeed a reality. The report proposed that a wide array of measures be taken to alleviate the conditions plaguing these slums. Unfortunately, the report's recommendations, which included: forcing landlords to improve existing tenements; imposing regulations protecting health, safety and morals; condemning uninhabitable alley houses; and prohibiting the erection of additional alley houses – ultimately worked against the interest of poor blacks.9 The imposition of such regulations upon property owners would minimize property, and thus decrease the quantity of low income housing available to blacks and other slum dwelling groups.

As the conditions in the city's low-income and minority communities continued to worsen, middle-class whites and affluent blacks began to leave these areas. Many blacks began to move into Northwestern portions of the city in high concentrations.10 Despite the best efforts of whites to oppose the migration of blacks to more affluent portions of the city, blacks were able to make significant inroads into what had traditionally been considered white communities. Probably the most noted migration of an affluent black into a white community was that of George W. McMechen. Legal professor Garret Power, documents McMechen's move as follows:

" In the summer of 1910, George W.F. McMechen purchased a house at 1834 McCulloh Street, McMechen, a Yale law graduate and a practicing attorney, moved with his wife and children from his former house on Prestman Street, ten blocks to the west. McMechen was celebrating his professional success by moving into one of the most fashionable neighborhoods in Baltimore. The move is memorable only because McMechen and his family were black. He had crossed the eastern boundary of the Negro district and purchased a house in the Eutaw Place neighborhood.

This violation of the color line provoked considerable agitation. Police were necessary to protect the McMechen house from young ruffians. A mass meeting was held on July 5, 1910 and a petition prepared requesting that the Mayor and City Council: 'take some measure to restrain the colored people from locating in a white community, and proscribe a limit beyond which it shall be unlawful for them to go.......' The petitioners were concerned that Negroes intended to plant themselves on Madison Street and Eutaw Place as well."11

In response to this public outcry then Mayor J. Barry Mahool began to move forward in drafting legislation that would prevent blacks from moving into white neighborhoods. Milton Dashiell was the original drafter of the legislation. Dashiell was a Dorchester, Maryland native who had studied at St. Johns College, and practiced in both Kentucky and Maryland.12 Dashiell lived at 1110 McCulloh Street, which was in close proximity to the Negro community – thus he had a powerful impetus for ensuring that blacks were confined to the communities in which they currently resided. Milton drafted legislation that essentially sought to achieve the following:

1.	No person of one race could move into a block which was already more than 50% inhabited by residents of the opposite race.

2.	If the person did so, the violation was punishable by a fine of up to $100 and/or imprisonment from 30 days to a year.

3.	The bill did not force individuals currently living in a majority opposite race block to move.

4.	The ordinance was to apply to all blocks within Baltimore.13

After having the ordinance deemed constitutional by then City Solicitor, Edgar Allan Poe, Mayor Mahool signed the ordinance into law.14 The City Council and the Administration realized that blacks would challenge the legitimacy of the legislation. However, the unexpected backlash came from that of white real estate brokers – who felt that the legislation's imposition upon the transferability of property owned by whites worked an undue hardship upon their economic interests.15 In addition the bill failed to adequately address how the city should deal with property rights that had already vested in violation of the ordinance.

As a result of Ordinance 610, twenty-six criminal cases were scheduled for prosecution.16 In the first case that was tried, the court found the ordinance to be invalid. The court's finding of invalidity of the ordinance was not believed to be the result of legal deficiencies, but rather a failure to place a title upon the bill – as was required by law.17 Based upon the court's actions, Councilman Samuel L. West asked the highly touted attorney William L. Marbury to draft a segregation bill that would withstand judicial scrutiny.18 The major substantive change that Marbury made to the bill was to leave Baltimore's presently mixed blocks as they were, which would also quell the economic concerns of the city's real estate interests. Mayor Mahool signed this ordinance on April 7, 1911.19

About a month after signing Ordinance 654 into law, a procedural technicality required the City Council to repeal the ordinance and re-introduce the measure. The Ordinance was then reenacted as Ordinance 692, and signed into law by Mayor Mahool on May 15, 1911.20

Challenging Housing Segregation in Baltimore: The Gurry Case and its Impact

The first significant legal challenge to Baltimore's segregation laws was initiated in the 1913 case of State v. Gurry.21 John H. Gurry was a colored man who had been charged with violating Baltimore City Ordinance 692, which had now become known as the West law. More specifically, Gurry was convicted of violating section two of Ordinance 692, which read as follows:

" That from and after the passage of this ordinance it shall be unlawful for any colored person to move into or use as a residence or place of abode any house, building or structure, or any part of any house, building or structure situated or located on any block, as the same is hereinafter defined in section 4, the houses, buildings and structures on which block, so far as the same are occupied or used as residence or places of abode by white persons, otherwise than as provided in section 3 hereof. Such a block shall be deemed a white block for the purposes of this ordinance."22

Gurry's attorney in criminal court was Ashbie Hawkins. Hawkins motioned the trial court for a demurrer in the case, and the judge sustained his motion. The criminal court judge, Judge Elliott, reasoned that the demurrer should be sustained because the uncertainty of the statute's language in section 2 rendered the ordinance unenforceable.23 More specifically, Judge Elliott felt that the statute ambiguously defined the term "block" – thus negating the validity of the law. The state immediately took appeal to the criminal court's decision in the Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Judge Elliott's decision to pronounce Ordinance 692 invalid created a great deal of concern amongst white property owners in districts where "negro invasion" was feared.24 Many people in the white community were calling for the City Council to draft a new version of the ordinance, in anticipation that the Maryland Court of Appeals would agree with the Elliott decision. Adding to the sense of urgency in the white community was a report that Negroes had made plans to invade one of the city's most fashionable uptown districts in the event that Judge Elliott's decision was upheld. An excerpt from the Evening Sun describes the plan as follows:

"..... As the story goes, several negroes, possessing considerable means, have gotten together and organized a company which will purchase property in the fashionable district referred to and build an apartment house for colored people unless their plans are blocked."25

During the period that hearings were being demanded, Councilman Curtis -- of the City Council's Second Branch – was in charge of the Joint Committee on Police and Jails. As a result Curtis was to be responsible for any City Council action on the ordinance. Councilman Harry S. Cummings, representative from the predominantly black Seventeenth Ward, successfully lobbied Councilman Curtis to delay holding a hearing on the drafting of a new segregation ordinance for one week.26 Evidence would suggest that Councilman Cummings was seeking sufficient time to organize sufficient public opposition to the new segregation measure. In fact, many social activist in the black community did later appear before the Joint Committee on Police and Jails to protest the measure.27

The white community had not reached a consensus of opinion on the action that the City Council should take while the State v. Gurry appeal was pending. The prominent segregationist attorney, William L. Marbury, believed that the West law would be held valid by the Court of Appeals and that the city leaders should focus their energies on securing a court decision. The City Solicitor at the time, S.S. Field, agreed with the Marbury position.28 Field also felt that the ordinance should be fully enforced in the interim period awaiting the Court of Appeals decision. On the opposite side of the issue, Milton Dashiell had already drafted a new ordinance that was awaiting consideration by the City Council's Joint Committee on Police and Jails.

As a result, when the time came for the Committee to hold hearings on the matter of the new segregation ordinance they found themselves entertaining dissent arguments from two distinctly different factions. First, the committee heard from black residents who felt that the segregation ordinance's objectives were not ones that should be pursued by the city. Secondly, the committee heard arguments from white residents who believed that the passage of a new segregation ordinance should be delayed until the State v. Gurry case had been resolved.29

The Appellate Court was not expected to render a decision in the State v. Gurry case for quite some time. One of the factors contributing to the delay in the Court of Appeals decision may have been the fact the Supreme Court was considering the constitutionality of the Federal "civil rights" act of 1875. The Federal Civil Rights Act of 1875 imposed criminal penalties for discrimination against negroes. It can be postulated that the Maryland Court of Appeals wanted to know how the Supreme Court would rule upon acts of discrimination against negroes before it attempted to render a decision in State v. Gurry. In June of 1913, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Federal "Civil Rights" Act of 1875 was unconstitutional because it was not applicable uniformly throughout the country.

Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision, corresponding news accounts began to question the effect that the decision would have upon state discrimination laws.30 Many of the state's legal experts commented that the Supreme Court decision would have no impact upon the state's ability to impose "Jim Crow" laws. One such person was Maryland Attorney General McReynolds, who commented in the following fashion:

"My interpretation of the decision is that it, in effect, repeals a law which was already to all intents and purposes a dead letter............The Court declared years ago that the 'civil rights act' was not operative in the States."31

The Attorney General further commented that the only thing negroes had left to rely upon was the constitutional amendment, prohibiting race discrimination, because of "race, color, or previous conditions of servitude." He went on to cite that none of the State "Jim Crow" laws had been finally tested in the Supreme Court, and that until a "test case" of a State law discriminating against negroes was brought before the Supreme Court, the State laws would stand.32 Ultimately the line of reasoning set forth in the Attorney General's comments is consistent with the legal strategy utilized by the leading civil rights lawyers of the time.

While the Gurry decision remained pending in the Court of Appeals, the segregation interests in the city continued to expand their efforts to separate the city's black and white citizens. In July of 1913, Councilman West began to study the implementation of a new phase of his segregation plan – segregation of the races in public parks.33 West argued that the law would lessen the growing antagonism between the races. Many of West's Thirteenth Ward constituents complained that blacks were crowding park band stands during concerts and co-occupying park benches with white people. West proposed designating specific park benches for negro citizens.

In August of 1913, the Maryland Court of Appeals issued a preliminary opinion which resolved the debate over whether or not the City Council needed to draft a new ordinance to replace the West housing segregation law.34 The Court of Appeals informed the city that they found the West law invalid on technical grounds. The primary technical fault that the court cited in the West Ordinance was its failure to address vested property rights.35 Despite the ordinances technical difficulties, the Maryland Court of Appeals indicated a willingness to endorse the basic principle of segregation -- under the guise of the city exercising its police power authority. The court stated that it would issue a more complete opinion at a later date, in hopes that the full opinion would provide the city with greater direction in drafting new legislation.

The preliminary endorsement of segregation by the Court of Appeals strengthened the resolve of the city's segregationist. The segregationist were eager to immediately begin working upon new legislation that would comply with the impending Maryland Court of Appeals full opinion. The primary reason that segregationist wanted to start on the work of passing new legislation immediately was to prevent blacks from taking advantage of any lapse in the law – arising from the interim period between invalidation of the West ordinance and passage of a new segregation ordinance.36 Mayor Preston was prepared to call a special session of the City Council to work upon drafting and passing the new ordinance. These plans were to be pursued without having even received the full opinion of the Maryland Court of Appeals. Most councilman agreed with the Mayor, but Councilman West felt that the Council should wait until it had the Court of Appeals' full opinion.

Mayor Preston conceded to Councilman West's wishes and planned upon awaiting the full opinion before calling a special session of the City Council.37 The court promised the Mayor that it would issue a full opinion as soon as possible. The Mayor and the City Administration were under considerable pressure from their constituents to begin working upon the passage of a new segregation ordinance.38 Unfortunately, for the Mayor and his Administration the court made it known that its full opinion would not be prepared before September 1, 1913.39 Based upon this added time pressure, the segregationist forces on the Council decided to join forces and stand untied behind one version of newly proposed ordinance.40 The ordinance was to be drafted by the city's legal office.

Despite the best efforts of the segregationist to be united, and their insistence upon the issuing of a final decision, the movement of blacks into white communities continued. A black man was noted as having purchased a property in the 700 block of Madison Avenue, which he intended upon making his home and place of business.41 Additionally, white Baltimore residents were up in arms over the fact that Morgan College – a black higher learning institution – was contemplating the acquisition of property in the exclusive white community of Mt. Washington.42 Without an opinion from the Court of Appeals, the city fathers were virtually powerless to stop these efforts of the black community.

Unable to continue to wait upon the Court of Appeals, City Councilman Franklin P. Curtis called a special meeting of the Joint Council Committee on Police and Jails.43 Curtis believed that the new ordinance could be drafted and enacted, with the possibility of future amendments – if the full opinion of the Court of Appeals dictated such. Curtis justified his action in the following fashion:

" As nearly a month and a half has elapsed since the opinion was delivered, and there does not seem to be any immediate prospect of an opinion being delivered by the Court of Appeals before it meets upon the first Monday in October, and as I believe that further delay on the part of the Mayor and City Council may result in injury to the city, I feel that it is only right and proper that some ordinance should now be passed by the Council in order to protect the people pending the publication of the full text of the opinion of the court of Appeals. If any ordinance which may now be passed is found to be at variance with the views of the Maryland Court of Appeals, of course a new ordinance may be framed in conformity with those views."44

Curtis' actions placed pressure upon the Mayor's administration and caused them to begin work on their own draft of a new ordinance – without the benefit of the Court of Appeals full opinion.45

The Administration faced additional pressure to get a segregation ordinance passed, because the movement of blacks into white neighborhoods was now leading to civil disobedience and relative violence. When a colored family moved into 1740 East Madison Street, several residents declared that they would move, and several neighborhood youth stoned the premises.46 A black family that moved into 1324 Mosher Street, in Northwest Baltimore, had to be accompanied by police – in an effort to avoid any violent retaliation from the white community.47 A race-related incident did, in fact, later occur at the 1324 Mosher Street home; however, the black residents of the home were undaunted.48 Later race-related ruckuses broke out at 828 North Stricker Street.49 A major act of civil disobedience occurred when a crowd of 25 negroes gathered in an alley on Carey street near Lafayette Avenue at about 1 a.m., and when they were approached by authorities, they exclaimed "Kill Him". The Officer further testified that two black men fired four shots at him.50 The 25 negroes involved in this incident had made racially motivated attacks upon white homes in the 1200 block of Mosher Street at about 11:00 p.m. that evening.

In the midst of all this activity Mayor Preston and the City Council passed the city's new segregation ordinance – Ordinance 339.51 The ordinance was passed without the benefit of the Court of Appeals Full opinion in the State v. Gurry case. The full opinion of the court in the State v. Gurry case was issued on October 7, 1913.52 Therefore, while it is often widely believed that the City Council followed the guidance of the Court of Appeals in drafting Ordinance 339, the truth of the matter is that the city only partially followed the dictates of the court. Without the full opinion it was simply not possible that Ordinance 339 could be drafted in strict compliance with the full opinion of the Maryland Court of Appeals.

Ordinance 339 provided the following major points:

1.	Section 1: This section provided that it was unlawful for any white person to occupy any structure in a black block. The section also provided that it was unlawful for any black person to occupy any structure in a white block. The section may exceptions for opposite servants who lived on the premises of their employer. The section also exempted individuals who already had vested property rights in an opposite race block, prior to enactment of the ordinance. Finally, the section exempted mixed blocks entirely.

2.	Section 2: This section defined a "block" as a portion of any street or alley, upon both sides between the two intersecting cross streets. The section also provided that corner houses shall be deemed to located in the block in which they are numbered. The section further provided that for a block to deemed black or white it must be inhabited exclusively by members of one race. The section defined a resident as anyone who occupied a sleeping room, that was not deemed to be transitory in nature. Transitory nature of a stay was typically proven by the occupant having another fixed place of abode.

3.	Section 3: This section established that a violation of Ordinance 339 was a misdemeanor criminal offense. Each day an individual violated the ordinance, they were subject to a fine between $5 and $50 – or imprisonment of 30days to a year. The discretion of penalty was left entirely to the court. Finally, the section provided that any owner, or agent of the owner, that facilitated violation of the ordinance was subject to the same criminal penalties as the original violator.53

The City Council and the Administration anticipated an imminent challenge to Ordinance 339 in the courts. In fact, Councilman Harry S. Cummings made clear his intentions to bring a "test case" to challenge the ordinance.54 Even prior to the enactment of Ordinance 339, the Afro-American Ledger was actively engaged in educating black residents of Baltimore about the impact of the law and the need to mobilize in opposition to the ordinance.55 By October 2, 1913, just seven days after passage of Ordinance 339, a major black community meeting was held urging an organized mobilization effort against the segregation ordinance.56 The meeting was held at the Pennsylvania Avenue A.M.E. Zion Church. Many of the community's most prominent leaders were urging blacks to combat all racially oppressive measures. Dr. F. N. Cardoza, president of the local branch of the NAACP; W. Ashbie Hawkins, prominent Baltimore attorney; Rev. Dr. W.M. Alexander, prominent Baltimore minister and others were in attendance. A committee, headed by Rev. J.W. McDonald, was appointed to protest to the authorities against mob violence. The NAACP took up $106 in a collection designed to aid in the work against segregation. The association also employed Attorneys W.C. McCard, W.T. McGuinn and W. Ashbie Hawkins to tend to the legal efforts against segregation. The actions taken at this meeting, particularly as it pertains to the taking up of a collection, and assignment of a legal team, gives an indication that the test case to Ordinance 339 was being developed. The warnings of City Councilman Harry S. Cummings were now imminent. Almost exactly one year later the case of State v. Jackson was initiated.

Prior to State v. Jackson: Late Fall of 1913 - Fall 1914, A Year Spent Building the Critical Mass

The socio-political activities in the year leading up to the initiation of the State v. Jackson litigation were critically important to the final outcomes in that case. The leaders of the anti-segregation movement spent a considerable amount of time building a national social movement, and legal strategy, that would increase their chances of success. A considerable portion of this social maneuvering was extensively documented in The Afro-American Ledger. The Ledger was a major literary voice of the black community at the time. As a result, much of the academic discourse, litigatious activity and related social perspectives are ascertainable upon review of these documents.

As a result of initial mobilization sessions, groups began to seriously examine the social and economic effect of segregation and other race repressive measures. Many legal and social scholars chimed in with their perspectives on how these laws would impact the future economic development of the race. Many of these scholars, like New York Evening Post editor – Oswald Garrison Villard – felt that these measures represented a significant step backward in the future development of the race. Other scholars viewed these legislative actions as a brutal and uncivil attack upon blacks and civilization at large. Williams Pickens, a Yale law graduate and professor at Talladego College, chimed in with the following assessment:

" Segregation of any kind constitutes the most serious menace to the freedom and progress of the American Negro, next to slavery itself. For have you noticed one constant principal of American segregation or 'jim crowism'? It is this: it always gives the Negro the worst end of it be it a car or a government office. Reverse this principle, and you could be sure, that white people would be most bitterly opposed to segregation and 'jim crowism'.57

Interestingly, however, there was not a complete sense of unanimity upon the impact that racial segregation would have upon the black community. Many race conscious scholars and business owners posited that segregation could actually be utilized to serve as an opportunity to bolster minority-owned business enterprises and economic development centers.58

By the Fall of 1913, the impending legal struggle over race segregation in Baltimore had reached a critical mass. It was now widely held that white politicians were keeping alive race prejudice in order to maintain their status in political office. The state of Maryland was still a largely Democratic state, and due to the large segregationist interests in the state, many blacks from across the country were watchfully anticipating how anti-segregationist would overcome the challenges they faced. In addition to the black social and political interests, many other parties began to take an active interest in the liberation of the black race. Many from the liberal media and the Hebrew community began to join in the active pursuit of racial equality.

While a great deal of the segregation debate was taking place in Baltimore, there were many other cities pursuing segregationist agendas throughout the country. Many cities followed Baltimore's lead in instituting segregation ordinances. Cities such as Norfolk, Va., Richmond, Va., Louisville, Ky., Atlanta, Ga., and Winston-Salem, NC. were also waging legal and statutory battles of their own. By the time the movement had become nationally acknowledged, you no longer simply had isolated scholars and social advocates addressing the issues. Major institutions of higher learning were joining forces to support one another in the fight to abolish segregation laws. One example of such a partnership was the collaborative efforts of Johns Hopkins University and the Hampton Institute. Hopkins and Hampton co-
hosted symposiums and meetings, which made Baltimore residents privy to the work that Hampton was doing in this area.59 In February of 1914, Dr. William H. Welch presided over a meeting which brought Major R. Moton to Johns Hopkins to discuss the evils of segregation. Both black and white citizens attended the event. The general theme of the meeting was "How Can Hampton Institute Aid Baltimore?". Other parties also supporting these events included Reverend George A. Griffith, the rector of St. Mary's Episcopal Church.

By late 1913 and early 1914, Dr. G. E. Haynes was touring the country discussing the condition of the negro in urban centers.60 Haynes was the National Director of the Urban League and a professor at Fisk University. Dr. Haynes noted that one of the greatest social movements of this period had been the migration of the Negro to major cities in the North and South. However, as a result of segregation laws, these migrations of the Negro to major cities had been concentrated into small areas, thus creating undue hardships upon the industrial, housing, health and educational quality of life for black city residents. Dr. Haynes also recognized the desire to have Negroes of upward social mobility to move out of conditions that placed a strain upon their quality of life – and he believed that they should have the fundamental right to pursue increases in their standard of living.

Dr. Haynes also cited that the American Negro also suffered from many personal shortcomings that hindered his ability to successfully adapt to urban life. More specifically, Dr. Haynes cited four fundamental factors which were placing African-American communities behind that of mainstream America, they were as follows:

1.	The masses that move to the city are unprepared to meet the exciting requirements of modern industry and to face keen competition for laborers.

2.	Educational facilities to train the aspiring, struggling searches for better conditions are not provided in any Negro neighborhood of any northern or southern city.

3.	Mixed in with the inefficient are the lazy and vicious. These people have so long been deferred reward that their hearts no longer respond.

4.	The white establishment is more concerned with blaming the Negro, rather than understanding him and providing them with ample opportunity to overcome his deficiencies.61

By the mid-summer of 1914, the movement against racial segregation had moved beyond the point of grassroots organizing and transformed into a well-focused national strategy. In July of 1914 an effort was initiated in Louisville, Kentucky to rid the nation of housing segregation laws for good. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and Talladega College sponsored a series of meetings to raise money to mount a legal challenge to the housing segregation ordinance in Kentucky. This Kentucky meeting was very similar in nature to the October 4, 1913 meeting that had been called in Baltimore. Chaplin Brinsmade, of New York City attended the Louisville meeting. Chaplin Brinsmade served as counsel for the National Headquarter of the NAACP, thus evidencing that black organizing in opposition to housing segregation had become a national effort. This national effort was led in large part by the NAACP. Chaplin Brinsmade had the following to say about the NAACP's efforts in Louisville:

" The result in Louisville will be of utmost importance in determining whether or not the Negro is to be segregated. Louisville has drawn its ordinance very carefully, and the men who did the work had before them all the other similar ordinances and were able to profit by the defects. They believe that they have avoided all technical defects, and so all other cases will hinge on the Louisville one."62

The focus upon the Louisville ordinance represented a significant shift in both the anti-
segregation and segregationist organizing efforts. Many of the original anti-segregation organizers began to play an active role in the Louisville litigation. Cities had begun to lessen their insistence upon segregation laws – in anticipation of the decision that would be rendered in Louisville. For example, the city of Birmingham, Alabama sought to enact a segregation law, but opted not to after civil protest from colored business and professional men. Some cities were actively amending their ordinances. In September of 1914, the City of Richmond passed an ordinance amending its Vondelder segregation law. This was done in an effort to prevent the Lehigh Street M.E. Church from securing property in a white section of town.63

While the litigation in Louisville had garnered the attention of the National Branch of NAACP, and somewhat shifted the focus from Baltimore, anti-segregation organizers in Baltimore were still busy pursuing their legal strategy. By October of 1913, Baltimore's legal challenge to Ordinance 339 was underway. On October 5, 1913 a mass meeting was held at Grace Presbyterian Church. The purpose of the meeting was as a follow-up to a September 30, 1914 meeting at Sharp Street Church. During the meeting at the Sharp Street Church $20 had been raised in support of the legal challenge. The meetings also provided an opportunity for organizers to explain the legal strategy they had developed for challenging the segregation law.64

The strategy implemented by the anti-segregation organizers was two fold in nature. The organizers had selected two test cases, and chosen to file those cases in two different venues. The first case was to be brought to Federal District Court. The facts of the case involved a Hebrew that had moved into a store/dwelling at 1929 Etting Street, a block that was entirely occupied by blacks.65 The property was leased to the Hebrew by the black Rev. W.A.C. Hughes.

No arrest had been made in the case, and the organizers did not feel that the police would enforce the segregation law against a white person moving into a black community. As a result, the organizers planned upon having black residents of the community press the issue by bringing the violation to the attention of authorities. The authorities responded by telling the Hebrew store owner that he could run his business on the premises, but that he and his family could not live there.66 The Hebrew stated his willingness to move, but stated that Rev. Hughes had bound him to a one year lease.

As a result of the authorities action, Rev. Hughes filed an injunction in Federal District Court restraining the Mayor, City Council and the police, from interfering with his right to rent his property and for his tenant to peacefully reside at the premises. The injunction allowed anti-segregationist to bring the issue of a man's right to use his property as he sees fit before the Federal Courts.67 The case was to be argued by C.C. Fitzgerald (pro-bono), NAACP attorneys and a prominent white Baltimore attorney. It was highly unusual for a black attorney to serve as co-counsel with a white Baltimore attorney, because it is well documented that much of the early Black legal establishment was disregarded by the White bar as incompetent and lacking professional credibility.68

In conjunction with bringing the Federal case, organizers of the Baltimore anti-segregation movement also had a test case for Ordinance 339 in the state courts. It appears that the legal strategy at the local level was to demonstrate the legal and practical irrationality of Ordinance 339 -- thus making it invalid. The legal arguments would be made in the initiation of the State v. Jackson litigation. One factor which strongly supports the argument that this case was an integral part of the organizers legal strategy, is that the defendant Jackson entered into a contract to purchase the property violating the ordinance just two days prior to the final organizing meeting at Grace Presbyterian Church. Other factors, which are discussed below, provide further indica that State v. Jackson was purely a test case.

State v. Jackson: Challenging Baltimore's Segregation Ordinance Again, at the Local Level

On October 3, 1914 Thomas S. Jackson entered into a contract to purchase the home of Ms. Amanda Bagnall, who was a white woman. Ms. Bagnall sold her home to Mr. Jackson via her white agent, Charles Morton.69 The home was to be purchased for a price of $1,050 and required a deposit of $25. The home was located at the corners of Baker and Mount streets. The house was specifically addressed at 1633 Baker Street, which was a block entirely inhabited by blacks. Under Ordinance 339, this did not present a problem for Jackson, since section 2 of the ordinance provided that corner houses shall be deemed to be located in the block in which they are numbered.

The problem in this case arose because of the following circumstances. The appellant's prospective home, while addressed on the entirely black block of Baker Street, faced Mount Street. Mount Street was an entirely white block, thus technically violating section 1 of Ordinance 339 – which prohibited blacks from living on an entirely white block. The only entrance to the house was on Baker Street. As a result of these circumstances, Baltimore City and Mr. Jackson's prospective neighbors, viewed his home as being on the all white block of Mount Street. Based upon the peculiar positioning of the Jackson home it can be further argued that Jackson's purchase of this home was a part of the anti-
segregation organizers legal strategy.

Mr. Jackson was subsequently imprisoned and fined for his actions. Upon reaching the Criminal Court of Baltimore City, Mr. Jackson's attorney – who was prominent in the anti-segregation movement – agreed to the statement of facts in the case. Mr. Jackson was represented by Ashbie Hawkins in the trial proceedings. During the proceedings Judge Stump presided, and he found Mr. Jackson in violation of the ordinance. In addition to Mr. Jackson, Charles Morton was also found to be in violation of the city's segregation law. Morton was found culpable under section 3 of Ordinance 339, which provided that anyone found to have facilitated the violation of the ordinance would be held to the same culpable standard as the primary offender. Having anticipated that the criminal court would find Mr. Jackson guilty, William C. McCard and C.C. Fitzgerald joined Ashbie Hawkins in representing Mr. Jackson on appeal. Mr. Morton occupied the residence of Mr. Jackson while the litigation was pending.

Mr. Jackson's appeal was originally set to be heard by the Maryland Court of Appeals during the October term of 1915. Initial oral arguments were made on the matter. Briefs were submitted by both sides. Counsel for the appellant argued that his client was not in violation of the Ordinance 339, due to the fact the house was numbered on Baker street. Counsel additionally argued that if the court found Jackson in violation of the ordinance, that the court should strike down the ordinance as unconstitutional. Counsel for the appellant argued that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it represented and arbitrary and capricious deprivation of personal rights.

More specifically, counsel for Jackson argued that Ordinance 339 possessed the same statutory deficiencies that the Court had found unconstitutional in its earlier State v. Gurry decision.70 In the Gurry decision the court held that the city's segregation Ordinance 692 was so unreasonable that it violated the General Welfare Clause of the City Charter. The court further found that the ordinance considered under Gurry ignored all vested property rights existing at passage of the ordinance, and lacked clear and sufficient notice of which blocks were white and which were colored. Counsel's most convincing argument, particularly as it applied to the facts of this appeal, was the fact the Ordinance 339 still did not provide a sufficient public notice of a block's racial designation. Finally, attorneys for the appellant argued the Ordinance 339 placed an undue economic burden upon blacks in Baltimore. More specifically, as a result of the ordinance the housing stock for blacks in Baltimore was significantly decreased, resulting in increased rents and purchase prices for sub-par facilities.

An interesting analogous argument was also put forth by counsel for the appellant. The appellant's counsel cited Asian-American residential separation case precedent to bolster the argument about the violative nature of segregation ordinances.71 In these cases Asian-Americans were relegated to certain areas on many western U.S. cities in the interest of maintaining public safety. Counsel additionally went on to argue that when an enactment seeks to secure public comfort that enactment can not invade the rights of persons and property under the guise of police power when it is not such in fact.72

As a result, counsel for the appellant posed the question as to whether or not the Baltimore City Council adopted its ordinance in exercise of a reasonable discretion, or a mere excuse for unjust discrimination. Furthermore, counsel suggested that the answer to such an inquiry is one that should be supervised by the courts. Counsel cited several cases in which this sort of judiciary oversight had been invoked.73 It was the final position of counsel for the appellant that the courts would find the Baltimore enactment to be a form of class legislation, which was in direct conflict with the Fourteenth amendment.74

Counsel for the appellee, City Solicitor S.S. Field, argued that the ordinance was in compliance with all of the statutory mandates set forth by the appellate court in Gurry v. State of Maryland, and should therefore be fond constitutionally valid.

The case remained unsettled for a considerable amount of time. The court set forth reasons why it had not yet disposed of the case in a March 9, 1916 Order of the Court. It seemed that the members of the Maryland Court of Appeals were conflicted as to the validity of Ordinance 339. As a result, the court felt that it would be best to wait upon decisions in other pending litigation to guide their opinion. More specifically, the court reasoned that it would be best to await the decision of the Supreme Court in Buchanan v. Warley.75 Buchanan v. Warley was the segregation litigation that was initiated by the NAACP in Louisville, Kentucky.

Jackson v. State: In the Interim Period

During the interim period in Jackson v. State, counsel for both parties were provided with an opportunity to file supplementary appellate briefs on the case. These briefs had been requested by Solicitor Fields, and both sides had their costs paid for by Baltimore City.

In addition to filing a supplementary brief with the Maryland Court of Appeals on Jackson v. State, City Solicitor Fields petitioned the Supreme Court to file an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the City of Baltimore in the Buchanan v. Warley case. The brief was to convey the city's position in the Buchanan litigation. The Supreme Court granted Fields' petition, and also afforded counsel for the appellants the opportunity to file a brief amicus curiae – on behalf of the Baltimore Branch of the NAACP. The court rendered its decision in the Buchanan case on November 15, 1917 – negating the Louisville anti-segregation law on grounds that it unconstitutionally impeded upon citizens Fourteenth Amendment rights. This decision was delivered before the parties in State v. Jackson had an opportunity to submit their supplemental briefs to the Maryland Court of Appeals.

With the Buchanan decision in hand, Ashbie Hawkins and C.C. Fitzgerald used their supplemental brief in the State v. Jackson case to urge the Maryland Court of Appeals to now decide the matter. The attorneys argued that the court's decision in Jackson should be favorable to their client, and consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court decision in Buchanan v. Warley. The appellant attorneys argued that the Louisville and Baltimore ordinances were substantively the same, and sough to effectuate the same outcomes.

Attorney General of Maryland, Albert C. Ritchie, and City Solicitor Fields argued that the Supreme Court ruling upon the Louisville ordinance did not apply to the State v. Jackson case. However, Hawkins and Fitzgerald wisely noted that if the Louisville decision did not apply to Baltimore, then why did the City Solicitor request the opportunity to file a brief amicus curiae on behalf of the city in the Buchanan litigation.

Hawkins and Fitzgerald also sought to demonstrate that the Supreme Court was addressing all segregation housing ordinances by directly citing language of the Buchanan opinion in their supplemental brief. Counsel for the appellant specifically quoted the following:

" But in the view of the rights secured by the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution such legislation must have its limitations and can't be sustained where the exercise of authority exceeds the restraints of the Constitution. We think these limitations are exceeded in laws and ordinances of the character now before us.....We think this attempt to prevent the alienation of property in question to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, and is in direct violation of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution preventing state interference with property rights except by due process of the law. This being the case the ordinance can not stand."76

Jackson v. State: Anticipation Builds, Time for The Maryland Court of Appeals to Decide

The anti-segregation movement had now achieved a major victor in its struggle by securing a victory in the Buchanan case. As a result, the local media and civil rights activist in Baltimore and abroad were curios to know the impact the decision would have upon state segregation laws. Warner T. McGuinn prepared a review of the Buchanan decision and commented upon how he believed it would impact Baltimore segregation laws. Mr. McGuinn made the following remarks:

" When Justice Day penned.....the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, he not only pronounced, but sealed the doom of the segregationist throughout the land. The Federal Constitution and laws passed within authority are by the express terms of that instrument made the supreme law of the land.....There remains now no legal contraption which their fertile minds can devise by which the provisions of the Constitution, as set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment can be overridden......as long as the 14th Amendment remains a part of the Constitution, segregation is dead. There is only one appeal from this decision and that is to an arbitrament of arms.....The police power of a State — the gate through which so much has entered to nullify the plain provisions of the Federal Constitution has finally been halted by the stern declaration that the 14th Amendment protects life liberty and property from invasion by the states without due process of law. The Federal Constitution did not create these rights; the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property are original rights.....There can be no doubt that the ruling of the highest court in the land will be followed."77

On February 27, 1918, the Maryland Court of Appeals was prepared to render a final decision in the case of Thomas S. Jackson. Attorney Cornelius C. Fitzgerald argued the case on behalf of the appellant, and W. Ashbie Hawkins made the concluding argument. In rendering its final decision the court reversed the judgement of the Criminal Court of Baltimore City. The case was decided with only one record from the eight appellate judges. Although favorable to the appellant, the opinion delivered by the court did not appear to be an enthusiastic endorsement of anti-segregation efforts. Rather, the decision seemed to have been rendered more out of respect for the rule of law. Judge Urner delivered the opinion of the court in the case.

In delivering his opinion Justice Urner recognized that since Buchanan v. Warley had been decided by the Supreme Court in the period while this case was pending – it was no longer necessary to evaluate Ordinance 339 under the judicial standards set forth under the State v. Gurry decision. Justice Urner concluded, as counsel for the appellant had urged, that the Supreme Court was in fact speaking to all housing segregation ordinances when it decided Buchanan. He also agreed with Hawkins and Fitzgerald that both the Louisville and Baltimore statutes were of essentially the same purpose and construction. It had been argued by the city that the "only" clause in the Baltimore ordinance, versus the "majority" clause in the Louisville ordinance, was sufficient to differentiate the two ordinances. However, Justice Urner found no credence in this argument. Justice Urner stated the following:

" The fact that the former deals with city blocks which are occupied wholly by white or colored residents, while the latter relates to blocks in which the white or colored inhabitants are merely in the majority, does not create any essential difference in principle or purposes between the two ordinances."78

Having held that the Louisville decision was also applicable to the Baltimore segregation ordinance, the remainder of the Jackson opinion simply reiterated the pertinent portions of Supreme Court Justice Day's opinion in Buchanan v. Warley. As a result, both the Buchanan and Jackson opinions cited the manner in which segregation ordinances violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment. More specifically, both courts recognized that segregation ordinances of this nature deny white property owners the opportunity to contract upon the disposal of their property.79

In addition to denying whites the right to dispose of their property as they see fit, both the Supreme Court and Maryland Court of Appeals held that housing segregation laws violated the 14th Amendment right for blacks to acquire property. The Maryland Court of Appeals specifically quoted the following Supreme Court comments:

" The statute of 1866, originally passed under sanction of the Thirteenth Amendment, 14 Stat. 27, and practically re-enacted after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 Stat. 144, expressly provided that all citizens of the United States in any State shall have the same right to purchase property as enjoyed by white citizens. Colored persons are citizens of the United States and have the right to purchase property and enjoy and use the same without laws discriminating against them solely on account of color......... The Fourteenth Amendment and these statutes enacted in furtherance of its purpose operate to qualify and entitle a colored man to acquire property without State legislation discriminating against him solely because of color."80

Other, less prominent arguments, were also addressed in the opinion. Specifically, the court briefly discussed the rationale that state police power should justify the institution of housing segregation law. Once again, the Maryland Court of Appeals quoted The Supreme Court's opinion in Buchanan v. Warley, stating that the public peace can not be promoted by denying Constitutional rights. In closing, the court reaffirmed that it is well settled that housing segregation laws can not meet Constitutional muster.

The final reference made in the Maryland Court of Appeals opinion was a reference to recently decided – and closely related cases – which also struck down housing segregation ordinances. One of the cases that the Maryland Court of Appeals cited was United States, use of Coleman v. Henry.81 Ironically, this was the case that the Baltimore anti-segregationist attorneys brought in Federal Court. More specifically, this was the case in which Rev. Hughes filed an injunction to allow his property to be leased to a Hebrew store owner. This is a telling illustration of how organized and effective the anti-
segregation attorneys were in pursuing their legal strategy.

Post Jackson v. State: The Impact of the Litigation

While it may be argued that the Jackson v. State decision was not groundbreaking litigation, particularly since the legal issue had been decided by the Supreme Court prior to the final decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals, it can be considered groundbreaking in terms of what it represents in a larger context. Jackson v. State's claim to legal notoriety is as one case, in a line of cases, that represented the victorious culmination of a local and national battle for social equality. The Jackson v. State decision represents a judicial affirmation of a basic belief, held by many courageous black citizens throughout early 1900 Baltimore. Jackson v. State affirmed the basic belief that if blacks are indeed citizens of this great nation, they should not have their right to choose where they will acquire and maintain property impinged upon by a hostile government.

In some respects the Jackson v. State case not only shifted the legal obligation to treat blacks equally in their right to acquire property, but it also shifted the moral obligation. One example of the shift in moral obligation created by the Jackson v. State decision is evidenced is in the instance of Milton Dashiell. Milton Dashiell was credited with actually drafting the original segregation laws in Baltimore. However, shortly after the Maryland Court of Appeals rendered its decision, Mr. Dashiell represented a black man who had been tormented by some white children for moving into the block. Mr. Dashiell actually cited a moral obligation to put an end to the promotion of segregation, as a display of good citizenship.82

While the decision in Jackson v. State may have changed Baltimore's social and legal landscape in some respects, it in no way fostered the wholesale acceptance of blacks in other areas of social interaction. Significant battles lied ahead for future generations of black civil rights attorneys in Maryland and beyond. However, Jackson v. State added strategies and experiences to an emerging social and legal model that would serve future generations well. It is for these reasons that the case of State v. Jackson should be both lauded, and remembered, as groundbreaking litigation in a culminating moment of a social movement.