Jackson v. State of Maryland:

Groundbreaking Litigation or the Culminating Moment of a Movement?

On May 19, 1911, the city of Baltimore enacted landmark legislation, which would forever leave an indelible print upon the conscious of its citizens and American at large. It was on this day that the city's stewards decided that the city could best ensure its interest in public safety by depriving its citizenry of the opportunity to establish and maintain racially diverse communities. More specifically, it was on this day that city's leaders enacted Ordinance No. 692, which is more commonly known as the city's housing segregation or "Curtis" law.1 This law (although not new in character) was the first of its kind in the nation, and as a result, pitted familiar foes against one another in untested territory -- the real property arena.

Segregationist and the integrationist had met on many fronts throughout the development of the nation. The two parties engaged one another in areas such as government employment, education and military service. However, never before had the parties engaged in battle over the complexion and composition of residential communities. For the first time in its history, Baltimore had prompted the nation to examine its position on blacks and whites not only engaging one another in public forums, but how they were to pursue engaging one another in the private arena of property interest. As a result, Jackson v. State -- and its numerous compliment cases -- serve as more than just judicial interpretation of the law.2 Rather, these cases document the evolutionary engagement of America's conflicting philosophical beliefs – which have and continue to manifest themselves in the everyday lives of its citizens. Much of the evolutionary engagement between these conflicting philosophical beliefs has ultimately been arbitrated in the nation's courts of law, and much like its predecessor and descendant cases, the Baltimore segregation statute created a philosophical struggle that invoke action from the highest courts and most esteemed legal minds of this nation.

Therefore, as one embarks upon a study of Jackson v. State, he or she must bear in mind that to pursue an adequate understanding of this case requires inquiry far beyond that of the Maryland Court of appeals decision.3 Rather, the reader should understand and consider that what is being examined is the legal manifestation of philosophical beliefs and associated social movements. Jackson v. State of Maryland represents much more than a final court decision. Rather, this decision represents one of the significant culminating moments in the ongoing struggle between two conflicting philosophical and social movements in America – segregation and integration.

History of the Litigation

The facts, which serve as the genesis of this litigation, are relatively few and simple. As was stated earlier, in May of 1911, the City Council and Mayor (J. Barry Mahool at the time) enacted a segregation in housing law. While this initial 1911 enactment of the law was not the law under which the appellant, Thomas S. Jackson, was criminally prosecuted – it did serve as the starting point for segregation in housing legislation. The appellant was actually criminally prosecuted under the enactment of Baltimore City Ordinance No. 339, which was a revised and allegedly Constitutionally valid statute fostering segregation in residential neighborhoods.4 Under Ordinance No. 339, the city's lawmakers had followed the judicial suggestion of the Maryland Court of Appeals in attempting to draft segregation legislation that would pass Constitutional muster. The Court had laid out its statutory requirements to the city's lawmakers in the Gurry v. State of Maryland decision.5 This case, and others related to it, will be discussed later in the text. At this point, it should suffice to say that the appellant in Jackson v. State was initially prosecuted under Ordinance No. 339, which was enacted by the Baltimore City Council and Mayor (James H. Preston was Mayor at that time) on September 25, 1913.

The appellant's prosecution in this case resulted from a contract that he entered into on October 13, 1914 to purchase the home of Mrs. Amanda Bagnall (white woman), via her agent Mr. Charles Morton. The home was to be purchased for a price of $1,050 and required a deposit of $25. The home was located at the corners of Mount and Baker Streets. The house was specifically addressed at 1633 Baker Street, which was a block entirely inhabited by blacks. The problem in this case arose because of the following circumstances. The appellant's prospective home, while addressed on the entirely black block of Baker Street (the houses only entrance was on Baker street), faced Mount Street – which as a block entirely inhabited by whites. As a result of these circumstances, Baltimore City and Mr. Jackson's prospective neighbors, viewed his home as being on an all white block – which was in clear violation of city Ordinance 339. As a result, Mr. Jackson was subsequently imprisoned and fined for his actions.

Upon reaching the Criminal Court Baltimore City, Mr. Jackson had been charged with violating the city's segregation ordinance. Mr. Jackson's attorneys submitted Mr. Jackson's case, on an agreed statement of the facts, to Judge Bond. During the trial proceeding Judge Stump presided, and he found Mr. Jackson on violation of the law. In addition to Mr. Jackson's proceeding, Charles Morton – the real estate agent – was also indicted of being in violation of the city's segregation law. Mr. Morton had been occupying the residence on Baker and Mount Streets, on behalf of Mr. Jackson, during Mr. Jackson's incarceration. Having anticipated that the criminal court would find Mr. Jackson guilty, his attorneys – William C. McCard, Ashbie Hawkins and Cornelius Fitzgerald planned upon taking an immediate appeal to the decision.

Mr. Jackson's appeal was originally set to be heard by the Maryland Court of Appeals during the October term of 1915. Initial oral arguments had been made on the original briefs filed by counsel. Counsel for the appellant argued that his client was not in violation of the city ordinance, and that if the court found that was in fact in violation of the ordinance, that the ordinance lacked constitutional validity because it was an arbitrary and unreasonable deprivation of Constitutional rights. More specifically, counsel cited that Ordinance 339 was passed in direct response to the Gurry v. Maryland decision, which declared the Curtis Ordinance invalid. Counsel also noted that the court recognized that the exercise of police power by states and cities may differ, but that the court didn't find cause to limit the city's power.6 However counsel also noted that the court found Ordinance 692 so unreasonable that it violated the General Welfare Clause if the City Charter, ignored all vested property rights existing at passage of the ordinance, and lacked sufficient notice of which blocks were white or colored.7

Counsel for the appellant goes on to argue that Ordinance 339 still fails to address the very thing decided in State v. Gurry. They specifically cite that 339 does not meet all vested property rights an owner may have, because it only addressed the right to occupy. This left unsettled blacks right to inherit property or to construct new property. Counsel also cited that Ordinance 339 still lacked any public notice of a block's racial designation. The Jackson case was an especially good case for illustrating this deficiency in the law, since his house was so uniquely positioned at the crossroads of a black and white community. The appellant also argued that the unreasonableness of Ordinance 339 was evident due to its effort to exempt mixed blocks, many of which were throughout the city. Counsel for the appellant argued that there was no need for legislation of this nature if large numbers of people from the black and white race are already living together in diverse communities. Finally, attorneys for the appellant argued that Ordinance 339 placed an undue economic burden upon blacks in Baltimore. More specifically, as a result of the ordinance the housing stock for blacks in Baltimore was significantly decreased, which resulted in increased rents and purchase prices for sub-par facilities.

An interesting analogous argument was also put forth by counsel for the appellant. The appellant's counsel utilized Asian-American residential separation case precedent to bolster the argument about the violative nature of the ordinance.8 In these cases Asian-Americans were relegated to certain areas of many western U.S. cities in the interest of maintaining public safety. Counsel additionally went on to argue that when an enactment seeks to secure public comfort that enactment can not invade the rights of persons and property under the guise of police power when it is not such in fact.9 As a result, counsel for the appellant posed the question as to whether or not the Baltimore City Council adopted its ordinance in exercise of a reasonable discretion, or as a mere excuse for unjust discrimination. Furthermore, counsel suggested that the answer to such an inquiry is one that should be supervised by the courts of law – citing several cases in which this sort of judiciary oversight had been invoked.10 It was the final position of the counsel for the appellant that the courts would find the Baltimore enactment to be a form of class legislation, which was in direct conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.11

Counsel for the appellee, City Solicitor S.S. Field, argued that the ordinance was in compliance with all of the statutory mandates set forth by the appellate court in Gurry v. State of Maryland, and should therefore be found Constitutionally valid. The case had remained undisposed of for a considerable amount of time. The court set forth reasons why it had not yet disposed of the case in a March 9, 1916 Order of the Court. It seemed that members of Maryland's highest court were conflicted as to the validity of the statute, and as a result felt that it would be best to wait upon other decisions in other pending litigation to guide their opinion. More specifically, the court reasoned that it would be best to wait upon the case of Buchanan v. Warley – which was a segregation ordinance case (in the city of Louisville, KY) that was pending before the Supreme Court of the United States.12

During this interim period, the counsel for both parties were provided with an opportunity to file Supplementary Appellate briefs. These briefs had been requested by City Solicitor Fields, and both sides had their costs paid for by the city. In their supplemental briefs the court asked counsel to address 4 specific points:

1.)	What is the effect of supplemental Ordinance 355?

2.)	Can the indictment in this case hold-up without language demonstrating that the block was white on 9/25/1915.

3.)	Can Ordinances 339 and 355 together be found violative in lite of the Gurry v. State of Maryland decision?

4.)	Does Ordinance 339's failure to make public record of a block's character invalidate it as unreasonable?

In addition to filing a supplementary brief with the appellate court of Maryland, City Solicitor Fields petitioned the Supreme Court to file a brief amicus curiae, on behalf of Baltimore – presenting the city's point of view in the pending Buchanan v. Warley litigation. The Supreme Court granted Fields petition and also afforded counsel for the appellants the opportunity to file a brief amicus curiae, on behalf of the Baltimore Branch of the NAACP. The court rendered its decision in the Buchanan case on November 15, 1917 – negating the Louisville anti-segregation law on grounds that it unconstitutionally impeded upon citizens Fourteenth Amendment rights.

As a result of this interim activity, counsel for the appellants argued in their supplementary brief that the Maryland Court of Appeals should now be prepared to decided Jackson v. State in a manner that was favorable to their client, and consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court decision in Buchanan v. Wharley. Counsel for the appellants argued that the language of the Louisville and Baltimore ordinances were substantively the same, and sought to effectuate the same outcomes. Interestingly enough, the Attorney General of Maryland (Albert C. Ritchie at the time) and the City Solicitor argued that the Supreme ruling of the Louisville ordinance did not apply to the decision before the Maryland Court of Appeals. However, counsel for the appellant wisely noted that the state's submission of a brief in amicus curiae served as evidence that the interest in the case was sufficient to demonstrate that the Supreme Court's decision would be applicable.

Counsel for the appellant also demonstrated that the Supreme Court was addressing all segregation in housing ordinances by directly citing language of the opinion in its supplemental brief. Counsel for the appellant specifically quoted the following:

" But in the view of the rights secured by the 14th Amendment tot he Federal Constitution such legislation must have its limitations and can't be sustained where the exercise of authority exceeds the restraints of the Constitution. We think these limitations are exceeded in laws and ordinances of the character now before us..........We think this attempt to prevent the alienation of property in question to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, and is in direct violation of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution preventing state interference with property rights except by due process of the law. This being the case the ordinance can not stand."13

On February 27, 1918, the Maryland Court of Appeals was prepared to render a final decision in the case of Thomas S. Jackson. Attorney Cornelius C. Fitzgerald argued the case on behalf of the appellant, and Attorney W. Ashbie Hawkins set forth the concluding argument. In rendering its final decision the court reversed the judgement of the Criminal Court of Baltimore City. The case was decided with only one record from the eight appellate judges. Although favorable to the appellant, the opinion delivered by the court did not appear to be an enthusiastic endorsement of anti-segregation efforts. Rather, the decision seemed to have been rendered more out of an engendered respect for the rule of law and jurisdictional respect. Judge Urner delivered the opinion of the court in the case.

In delivering his opinion Justice recognized that since Buchanan v. Warley had been decided by the Supreme Court in the period while this case was pending, it was no longer necessary to evaluate Ordinance 339 under the judicial standards set forth under the State v, Gurry decision. Justice Urner had concluded, as counsel for the appellant had urged, that the Supreme Court was in fact speaking to all housing segregation ordinances when it decided the Buchanan case. He also agreed with counsel for the appellant that both statutes were essential the same in purpose and construction. It had been argued that the "only" clause in the Baltimore ordinance, versus the "majority" clause in the Louisville ordinance, was sufficient to differentiate the two ordinances. However, Justice Urner found no credence in this argument.

"	The fact that the former deals with city blocks which are occupied wholly by white or colored residents, while the latter relates to blocks in which the white or colored inhabitants are merely in the majority, does not create any essential difference in principle or purpose between the two ordinances."14

The remainder of the opinion simply reiterated pertinent portions of the Supreme Court's Buchanan opinion, delivered by Justice Day, which examined Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment violations of the segregation ordinances. By citing the Supreme Court the Maryland Court of Appeals essentially consented that the Baltimore ordinance denied a white man the opportunity to contract upon the disposal of his property. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated the following:

" And in 1870, by Ch. 114, Sec. 16, 16 Stat. 144 (Rev. Stats Sec. 1977), that: 'All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have that same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property and is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses and exactions of every kind, and no other'

".......In the face of these Constitutional and statutory provisions, can a white man be denied, consistently with due process of law, the right to dispose of his property to a purchaser by prohibiting the occupation of it for the sole reason that the purchaser is a person of color intending to occupy the premises as a place of residence?"15

In addition to recognizing the Supreme Court's finding that segregation ordinances deny whites the right to dispose of their property as they see fit, the Court also cited that housing segregation laws violated the 14th Amendment for blacks to acquire property. The Supreme Court specifically stated the following:

" The statute of 1866, originally passed under sanction of the Thirteenth Amendment, 14 Stat. 27, and practically re-enacted after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 Stat. 144, expressly provided that all citizens of the United States in any State shall have the same right to purchase property as is enjoyed by white citizens. Colored persons are citizens of the United States and have the right to purchase property and enjoy and use the same without laws discriminating against them solely on account of color......... The Fourteenth Amendment and these statutes enacted in furtherance of its purpose operate to qualify and entitle a colored man to acquire property without State legislation discriminating against him solely because of color."16

While the Maryland Court of Appeal recognized that the Baltimore Ordinance was violative of Constitutional provisions, the court was equally quick to point out that the Supreme Court did not necessarily strike down all segregation law. Specifically, the Court cited that segregation laws have been sustained in cases which separated the races on the basis of equal accommodations in public conveniences. As a result, while the Supreme Court decision – and other consistent cases – protected the interest of blacks in housing segregation it failed to address other persistent problem frontiers such as hotel, restaurant and school accommodations. The court justified its distinction between valid statutory segregation and invalid statutory segregation by citing that the valid arenas of statutory segregation provided for separate but equal accommodations – which was not applicable in housing segregation law.

Other, less prominent arguments, were also addressed in the opinion. Specifically, the court briefly discussed the rationale that state police power should justify the institution of housing segregation law. The Maryland Court reiterated the Supreme Court's opinion that the public peace can not be promoted by denying Constitutional rights. In closing, the court reaffirmed that it is well settled that housing segregation laws can not meet Constitutional muster. The court made brief reference to closely related cases, which also struck down housing segregation ordinances – one of which was a federal district court ruling on the Baltimore segregation ordinance.17

While the ruling of the Court of Appeals effectively brought closure to the housing segregation cases in Baltimore, and throughout the nation, the case can not properly be disposed of without also examining the social context under which the case transpired. In addition, to considering the social context, one must also consider the impact that the decision has had upon the subsequent development of civil rights law. The text will attempt to consider these developments in the following sections.

Social Context of the Litigation

As was stated earlier, the litigative evolution pertaining to housing segregation law did more than simply ignite the engines of the judiciary – the legislation also incited a vigorous social movement amongst anti-segregationist across the nation. A considerable amount of this movement was extensively documented in news periodicals such as The Afro-American Ledger. The Ledger was the major literary voice of the black community at the time, and extensively covered all facets of black life. As a result, much of the academic discourse, litigative activity, and related social perspectives all ascertainable upon review of these documents.

Even prior to the enactment of the 1913 version of the segregation ordinance, the Afro-American Ledger was actively engaged in educating black Baltimore residents about the impact of the law and the need to mobilize in opposition to it. Not only did the black media protest the law, but the black community also cast formal protest to the law before the City Council Committee on Police and Jail. Well known local ministers also openly opposed the law, via church social activism organizations such as the city's Ministerial Alliance. In addition to church leadership, social organizations such as the NAACP joined forces with the church early in the struggle. These initial coalitions, particularly in Baltimore, did a tremendous job of organizing large numbers of citizens. The group was committed to instilling a sense of civil outrage and a commitment to fight the segregationist objectives of the Baltimore City Council and the city administration.

" That the Negro must fight courageously and use all honorable means to combat race repressive measures was urged by speakers at a largely attended mass meeting held under the auspices of the local branch of the Association for the Advancement of Colored People at the Pennsylvania Avenue A.M.E. Zion Church Thursday night....... Dr. F.N. Cardoza president of the local branch presided. He briefly told of the work that the association is doing in combating the prejudicial measures of the present and urged that the people cooperate.......Rev. Dr. W.M. Alexander told of his efforts during the past thirty years in fighting for the rights of the race and strongly urged that the only way for the race to be treated as other people was to fight all measures aimed against the Negro......W. Ashbie Hawkins declared that the race must fight now for its rights."18

As a result of these initial mobilization sessions, groups began to seriously examine the social and economic effect of segregation and other race repressive measures. Many legal and social scholars chimed in with their perspectives on how these laws would impact the future economic development of the race. Many of these scholars, like New York Evening Post editor Oswald Garrison Villiard, felt that these measures represented a significant step backward in the future development of the race. Other scholars viewed these legislative actions as a brutal and uncivil attack upon blacks and the civilization at large. These scholars viewed this measures simply as an effort to establish slavery under another name. William Pickens, a Yale graduate and professor at Talladego College, chimed in with the following assessment:

" Segregation of any kind constitutes the most serious menace to the freedom and progress o the American Negro, next to slavery itself. For have you noticed one constant principal of American segregation or 'jim crowism'? It is this: it always gives the Negro the worst end of it be it a car or a government office. Reverse this principle, and you could be sure, that white people would be most bitterly opposed to segregation and "jim crowism".19

Interestingly enough, however, was that there was not a complete sense of unanimity upon the impact that racial segregation would have upon the black community. Many race conscious scholars, and business owners, posited that segregation could actually be utilized to serve as an opportunity bolster minority-owned business enterprises and economic development centers.20

By the fall of 1913, the impending legal struggle over race segregation in Baltimore had reached a critical mass. It was now widely held that white politicians were keeping alive race prejudice in order to maintain the status in political office. The state of Maryland was still are largely Democratic state, but it was a Democratic party that was more readily known as the "Dixiecrat" party. As a result many of its representatives at the time represented the interest of segregationist. As a result, most politically active blacks at the time were a part of the Lincoln Republican party. Due to the large segregationist interest in the state of Maryland many blacks across the country were watchfully anticipating how the anti- segregation social and legal establishment in the city would overcome the challenges they presently faced. In addition the black political, legal and social institutions many other parties began to take an active interest in the liberation of the black race. Many from the liberal media and the Hebrew community began to take an active interest in the pursuits of racial equality.

It is important to note that the anti-segregationist was entirely without a voice in the mainstream political establishment. One of the most prominent allies that the movement had was that of Councilman Harry S. Cummings, the first black to ever sit on the Baltimore City Council. Councilman Cummings was on the record as bitterly opposing the segregation legislation, and its amendments, stating that the validity of the law would continue to be successfully challenged.21 Councilman A.C. Binswnager also went on record in opposition to the amended forms of the legislation, citing that the ordinances inability to meet the Discipline of the Court of Appeals – as outlined in the Gurry case – would lead to the legislation's demise. Councilman Binswagner also noted that the measure was based upon race prejudice and foreign to the ideals of the republic.

While a great deal of the center stage segregation debate was taking place in Baltimore, there were many other cities pursuing segregationist agendas throughout the country. Many cities had followed Baltimore's lead in both instituting segregation ordinances, and revising those ordinances in an attempt to meet Constitutional muster. Cities such as Norfolk, Virginia; Richmond, Virginia; Louisville, Kentucky; Atlanta, Georgia; and Winston-Salem, North Carolina were also waging legal and statutory battles on how to best achieve their race relations objectives. Many of the courts in rejecting these statues recognized that the rights that the ordinances sought to deprive blacks of could just as easily be applied to work against other parties representing various social and religious interests.

By the time the battling movements had become nationally acknowledged, you no longer simply had isolated scholars and social advocates addressing the issues. Major institutions of higher learning wer joining force to support one another in the fight to abolish segregation legislation. One example of such a partnership was the collaborative efforts of Johns Hopkins University and the Hampton Institute, as evidenced by symposiums and meetings hosted by Hopkins, which made Baltimore citizens privy to the work that the Hampton Institute was doing in this area. In February of 1914, Dr. William H. Welch presided over a meeting which brought Major R. Moton to Johns Hopkins to discuss the evils of segregation. Both black and white citizens of the city attended the event. The general theme of the meeting was "How can Hampton Institute Aid Baltimore".22 Other parties included in support of this event Reverend George A. Griffith, the rector of St. Mary's Episcopal Church.

While the voices crying our against segregation continued to crescendo, there was still a constituency of blacks – particularly in the South that continued to make the most of segregation laws. These individuals and communities continued to encourage the African-American race to see segregation as a mandate to build strong and autonomous communities. Unfortunately, it seemed that these voices did not have a clear and consistent voice in the anti-segregationist movement – particularly since they did not neatly fit the paradigm of inclusion. Despite the lack of serious consideration to these voices in the community, there did not seem to be any apparent open dissension amongst blacks at this time. It was as if the "nationalist" faction of the black community was simply a suggestion that was heard, but unheeded, without a great senses of debate or resentment in either direction. One comment made by Colonel Midnight, a regular columnist in the Afro American ledger, was one of the most poignant statements made in capsulizing the sentiment of the black "nationalist" response to segregation.

" Nobody respects a pauper, a beggar or the like, Just say a man is a scholar, with wealth and the world seeks to know him, and the doors fly open at his touch, but say he is a beggar and the door is closed in his face. Such is life in this world. He who would be respected must first respect himself."23

By 1914, Dr. G. E. Haynes and the National Urban League had also chimed in on the issue of racial segregation and poor housing stock in black communities. Dr. Haynes was the National Director of the Urban League and a professor at Fisk University. Dr. Haynes noted that one of the greatest social movements of this period had been the migration of the Negro to major cities in the North and South. However, as a result of segregation laws these migrations of the Negro to major cities has been concentrated into small areas, thus creating unde hardships upon the industrial, housing, health and educational quality of life for black city residents. Dr. Haynes also recognized the desire to have Negroes of upward social mobility to move out of conditions that placed a strain upon their quality of life – and he believed that they should have the fundamental right to pursue increases in their standard of living.

Dr. Haynes also cited that the American Negro at the time also suffered from many personal shortcomings that hindered his/her ability to successfully adapt to urban life – thus establishing strong urban communities. More specifically, Dr. Haynes cited four fundamental factors which were placing African American communities behind that of mainstream American, they were as follows:

1.	The masses that move to the city are unprepared to meet the exciting requirements of modern industry and to face keen competition of more efficient laborers.

2.	Educational facilities to train the aspiring, struggling searchers for better conditions are not provided in any Negro neighborhood of any northern or souther city.

3.	Mixed in with the inefficient are the lazy and the vicious. These people have so long been deferred reward that their hearts no longer respond.

4.	The white establishment is more concerned with blaming the Negro, rather than understanding him and providing them with ample opportunity to overcome his deficiencies.

At this point, in the mid-summer of 1914, the movement against racial segregation had move beyond the critical mass and come to a point where it required a well-focused course of action. On July 14, 1914, in Louisville, Kentucky an effort was initiated to rid the nation of housing segregation laws, and its amendments for good. The national Association for the Advancement of Colored People and Talladega College sponsored a series of meetings to raise money to mount a legal challenge to the housing segregation ordinance on the books in Kentucky. This Kentucky meeting was an outgrowth of earlier meetings in Baltimore where the plan was first originated.24 Chaplin Brinsmade, of New York City, attended the Louisville meeting – serving as counsel for the National Headquarters of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Chaplin Brinsmade had the following to say about the efforts in Louisville:

" The result in Louisville will be of utmost importance in determining whether or not the Negro is to be segregated. Louisville has drawn it ordinance very carefully, and the men who did the work had before them all the other similar ordinances and were able to profit by the defects. They believe that they have avoided all technical defects, and so all other cases will hinge on the Louisville one."25

It was at this point in the anti-segregation movement that the focus had shifted from the city of Baltimore to the city of Louisville, Kentucky. It was now an opportunity for those that had led the charge in Baltimore to take those experiences to Louisville, where they could help to defeat what was alleged to be the most effective all of this legislation throughout the land. This would in turn allow them to arm themselves with the decisions they need to in turn topple the segregationist apple cart back at home. Cities had begun to weaken their insistence upon segregation laws at this point, in anticipation of the decision that would be rendered in Louisville, Kentucky. The city of Birmingham, Alabama sought to enact a segregation law, but opted not at the civil protest of many colored profession and business men. I would submit that this would not have transpired in Alabama had it not been for the organized efforts that had brought this issue before the national scene in years prior. Nonetheless, some cities remained undeterred in their efforts to implement legislation that would severely limit the ability of blacks to move and acquire property as they chose. In September of 1914, the City of Richmond passed an ordinance amending its Vondelder segregation law. This was done in an effort to prevent the Lehigh Street M.E. Church from securing property in a white section of the city.26

While the legal process was gaining additional momentum, the grassroots social impetus was continuing to expand. Now the social discourse was not only focused upon expanding housing opportunities for blacks, but also upon addressing the immediacy of housing needs in the existing black community. One such group focused upon these issues was the Negro Civic League. The league initiated a city-wide crusade to address sanitary, moral and civic conditions which existed in certain parts of the city presently inhabited by colored people. The organization sought to mobilize religious institutions around this issue, as well as promote greater citizen involvement in the political process (i.e. voter registration drives). John W. Rich was the chairman of the group, and several other prominent Baltimoreans affiliated themselves with the group.

Concurrent to this local effort, the Baltimore political machine was beginning to test the litigative waters in opposition to the Curtis Law – which was the immediate predecessor to Ordinance 339. A mass meeting was held at Grace Presbyterian Church to raise money to mount a legal challenge to the law. The test case actually did not involve a black defendant, but in fact involved a Hebrew defendant. The defendant had moved into a store at 1929 Etting Street, which was a entirely black block. Since a white moving into a black block was not as poorly looked upon as a black moving into a white block the police did not make any arrest in the case. Nonetheless, many anti-segregationist felt that it would be a good test case since it utilized a white defendant, and they were confident in their abilities to once again defeat the validity of the law.27 Cornelius C. Fitzgerald served as the attorney in the case, on a pro-bono basis. He also had co-counsel in the case. Mr. Fitzgerald had the support of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's legal team, and that of a prominent white Baltimore lawyer – Mr. Charles F. Stein. This was highly unusual for a black attorney to serve as co-counsel with a white Baltimore attorney, because it is well documented that much of the early Black bar in Baltimore was disregarded by the white bar as incompetent and lacking credibility in the profession.28

It should be noted that this case was the case that was discussed earlier in the text, which was brought before the Federal District Court Justice Rose, and was ultimately decided in the interim period between the Jackson v. State case and the Supreme Courts Buchanan v. Warley case. The case initiated in federal court with the plaintiff, Rev. W.A.C. Hughes (who actually owned the store that was leased to the Hebrew man), filing for an injunction against the Mayor and City Council, the Board of Police Commissioners, the Marshall of Police and Captain George G. Henry, of the Northwest Police District.

By January of 1915, the ful economic impact of racial segregation laws that had been predicted years earlier had surfaced. One Afro-American ledger article is quoted as summarizing the problem as follows:

" Segregation is a costly thing for the colored people of Baltimore in the it forces those of the race who wants desirable property to pay at least 20 percent more rental than would be charged white families..... While whites have always charged colored people more for houses than they have charged their own people, the segregation law practically confines the colored people to territory occupied by them at the time of the passage of the law. This restricted area has to serve the race and those who want good homes have to pay dearly for the same.....Many of the houses that colored people are now paying extortionate rentals for are badly in need of repair. The landlord or his agent expects his rent weekly, but always promises about repairs.........The owners like the weekly payers better because the receive thereby four weeks more rent in a year than when paid by the month........the houses will be crowded with tenants, thus increasing the likelihood of disease and paving the way for the entrance of undesirable persons into the neighborhoods....In short, a restricted residential area for the race tickles the wallets of some of the whites, makes some whites rich and impoverishes colored people who have lie Jews in Russia, to live without a pale."29

By April of 1915, the litigation that is the subject of this text had been initiated in Criminal Court, before Judge Stump. While all parties eagerly awaited the outcome of the case, everyone knew that in all likelihood Mr. Jackson would be found guilty and the appellate process would decide the question.30 Coinciding with the increased activity in the testing of the laws in Baltimore, the citizens of Richmond, Virginia had mounted a significant challenge to the validity of their cities segregation laws. The movement in Richmond, which was led by Rev. E. M. Mitchell of the Washington M.E. Conference, had connections to Baltimore in the sense the Rev. Mitchell had once lived in Baltimore for several years.31

In addition to the Baltimore and Richmond cases, Louisville, Kentucky had just begun upon its journey to the Supreme Court of the United States. On June 24, 1915, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that segregation was not discrimination – thus permitting their segregation legislation to be held as valid. The newspaper accounts of Judge Hannah's decision in the case are as follows:

" Judge Hannah, who wrote the opinion of the court, declared that separation did not mean discrimination, that 'the ordinance was not, designed to segregate' as a measure of imposing stigma, and that the complaint that the segregation law confines colored people to the less desirable sections of the city could be met by the race beautifying those sections. He also added that the more fortunate of the race should be compelled to live with the less fortunate in order to stimulate the latter to upward strides."32

On first glance it can be argued that Judge Hannah's opinion is eerily similar to the logic espoused by black nationalist at the time. However, a closer examination of his opinion goes beyond that of the black nationalist by supporting race segregation not as a suggested means of economic upliftment, but as statutory requirement which negated an individuals inherent property rights and the opportunity to exercise those rights freely.

At the height of state litigation attempting to finally settle the issue of race segregation, the Supreme Court steps into the fray to decide the matter in a final sense. By a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of the United States declared the Louisville, Kentucky segregation ordinance unconstitutional and therefore invalid. It was at this moment that anti-segregationist had one a major victory and that all other pending state litigation would simply topple in the wake of the Supreme Court decision. Warner T. McGuinn prepared a review of the decision and commented upon it would impact the segregationist movement in Baltimore. Mr. McGuinn had the following remarks:

" When Justice Day penned.......the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, he not only pronounced, but sealed the doom of the segregationist throughout the land. The Federal Constitution and laws passed within its authority are by the express terms of that instrument made the supreme law of the land.......There remains now no legal contraption which their fertile minds can devise by which the provisions of the Constitution, as set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment can be overridden.....as long as the 14th Amendment remains a part of the Constitution, segregation is dead. There is only one appeal from this decision and that is to an arbitrament of arms......The police power of a State -- the gate through which so much has entered to nullify the plain provisions of the Federal Constitution has finally been halted by the stern declaration that the 14th Amendment protects life liberty and property from invasion by the states without due process of law. The Federal Constitution did not create these rights; the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property are original rights......There can be no doubt that the ruling of the highest court in the land will be followed "33

As a result of these social, political, economic and legal developments we find ourselves back to the very case that initiated the research of this text – Jackson v. State. It is now quite apparent that the decision in Jackson v. State may not have been significant because of some tremendous individual litigative effort. Nor was the case famous because some difficult legal interpretation hung in the balance. Rather, Jackson v. State can lay its claim to notoriety based upon the fact that it represented a culminating point of victory for a movement. A movement that engaged individuals from all across this great nation, and from every facet of life. Jackson v. State represented the affirmation of a philosophy, a belief or a simple premise. The premise was this that if blacks are indeed citizens of this great nation, they should not have their right to choose where they want to acquire and secure property impinged upon the government in any fashion.

Equally ironic is the manner in which the shifting of the law facilitated the shifting in the moral obligation of many to uphold the law. One such example is the manner in which the changing of the law impacted the man who actually drafted the law – Mr. Milton Dashiell. Mr. Dashiell has been credited with actually drafting the segregation law of Baltimore City. However, shortly after the Supreme Court rendered its judgement Mr. Dashiell actually joined in the fight against efforts to promote segregation in Baltimore city. Mr. Dashiell actually represented a black man who had been tormented by some neighborhood white children for moving into the block. Mr. Dashiell actually cited a moral obligation to put an end to the promotion of segregation, as a display of good citizenship.34

While finding Mr. Dashiell's circumstance to be quite ironic, it in no way speaks to the acceptance of blacks in the broader community in subsequent years. Nor do those circumstances speak to the many other civil rights battles that lied ahead for black people. In terms of future of impact, I believe that what Jackson v, State represents is a model by which subsequent generations could look towards in developing priorities for how to best address racial discrimination. It was the confluence of our communities social, religious, legal and academic institutions – at both the local and national level – that taught and reinforced our ability to effectively organize ourselves to face the battles that lie ahead. So as we move forward in the study of Race and the Law in Maryland, and its accompanying civil rights movements, we can look to many of those predecessors for the clues that are needed to effectively bring about social change in this country.