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| 4, WORLD COMJNISM U. S. S. R. and U» S. A. As this report is being written, the failure of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers dramatizes the great differences which have arisen between the Soviet Union and its allies* The failure of the Conference came as a shock only because Communist propaganda had success- fully conditioned the American public into believing that all was well behind the "iron curtain" in Europe. Readers of the publications noted above would hardly be surprised at the denouement. As a result, a sharp divergence be- tween Eastern Europe and the Western World is now apparent to all. It would be hazardous to speculate upon the ultimate result of this conflict. Best- informed government opinion expects increasing crises and an"eventual show-- down when one group or other must yield. During this period, American Communists will act as a Soviet fifth column* Already they are denouncing their own ^government in bitter language* At the present moment, the ITestern democracies enjoy a military edge because of mastery of atomic energy. Apparently, according to President Truman's recent speech, the uniqueness of our position is not so much posses- sion of a formula, but rather the acquisition of the industrial resources and "know-how" needed to exploit a formula which may be known to other powers. General Arnold hints of aviation developments which surpass those known to other nations. In the light of this information, we might well ponder the statement made by the former Soviet official, Victor Kravchencko, in the October 1945 American Mercury* There he writes of a document presented t« Soviet officials in America. "It was in effect a detailed set of instruc- tions on the kind of military and economic data about the United States we must look for, how to gather it, how to cover' our traces. Although in general it merely reiterated instructions,given to me, and to all others, before we left Russia, it was obviously intended as a refresher course and as a reminder." (pp. 455-456) If such is the situation as described by a former Soviet official, and confirmed by others such as Alexander Barmine, it is not pleasant to con- template serious differences between the U. S. A. and the U.S.S.R. If Soviet consulates throughout the land are to be reinforced by listening posts manned by pepresentativeis of the "democratic" nations of Eastern and Southern Europe, opportunities for observation and propaganda will be multiplied. One might even wonder if there is some connection between these facts and the sudden discovery by the Daily Worker on October 3, 1945 that Soviet scientists have been working almost exclusively on atomic energy since 1930. Speculation on such subjects v/ould be useless. Revelation of facts is the task of those whose business it is to safeguard national security against potential enemies. In this connection, it must be noted that Kravchenko made no mention of a connection between Soviet diplomats and American Communists. Actually contacts between top Communist leaders and top Soviet diplomats are rare and extremely indirect. In this country at least, the Comintern does not ordinarily use top diplomatic channels. It is a matter of public record that in conflicts of policy between the Soviet Union and the United States, the interests of the former prevail with American Communists. A compilation of the reactions on the part of the Daily \Vorker, fronir groups, and controlled unions to such conflicts would be an interesting study. Informants who attended the National and New York |