274 a group of these organizers devised a plan to take PUL in a more explicitly political and socialist direction. PUL, they felt should take up "independent political action" by running and independent PUL slate of local candidates with a socialist program in the 1934 election. The organizers contrasted the PUL as a massive interracial organization present in every working-class neighborhood of the city, with the all white Socialist Party and its six "struggling" ward clubs. They argued that, while PUL members were open to socialism and the General Council would very likely endorse Socialist Party candidates, PUL members were loyal to PUL and could not be mobilized en masse for the SP. Additionally, they were concerned that PUL's nonpartisan stand was allowing major party candidates to visit locals and build bases of support; they were particularly concerned about the attraction of Black members to the Republican Party. The idea of a slate of candidates officially endorsed by PUL would end the major party threat in the organization. Finally, the PUL militants proposed that the independent ticket would be a coalition effort — one in the spirit, they said, of SP's Continental Congress — and that they could get backing from the ACW and from groups in the Black community.™* Given the heightened level of struggle in the working class in 1933 and 1934, and the re-emergence of the Black freedom movement as a major force in those same years, the plan for independent socialist political action in the election of 1934 may well have resulted in a united front of progressive Blacks, labor, and unemployed, and provided the foundation for the later development of a local left electoral party. This was not, however, to be. In early March 1933, Frank Trager wrote Norman Thomas to get his support for the plan, and Thomas wrote back warily. By mid-April, the plan was dead: local SP leaders were, according to Trager, "unsympathetic," undoubtedly fearing the competition of an independent political form. Even Elisabeth Gilman, usually a close ally of the younger militants, saw no "compelling reasons" for independent electoral action.*^ How far could the militants' plan have gone if it was instituted? No one can