Bemis Report of the Webster Trial, 1850 [1897], Image No: 343   Enlarge and print image (67K)           << PREVIOUS  NEXT >>
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Bemis Report of the Webster Trial, 1850 [1897], Image No: 343   Enlarge and print image (67K)           << PREVIOUS  NEXT >>
TRIAL OF JOHN W. WEBSTER. 343 son, J., in Amherst v. Hadley, 1 Pick. 41,-a capital trial. So of irregu- larity in the choice of the foreman of the traverse jury. Case last cited. I will add to these the citation of a class of cases,-all capital cases, -involving very nearly the same point as is raised here, in regard to the supposed irregularity of transmission of the indictment from the lower Court. In Shoemaker v. The State, 12 Ohio R., 43, where a statute required that the clerk of the lower Court should send up the original indictment, and with it a transcript of the proceedings upon it, and the clerk made no certificate upon his transcript or the original indictment, that he had deposited those papers in the clerk's office of the Upper Court, (though he actually made the deposits,) it was held that it was no omission, or that it had been waived by the prisoner's going to trial. So in Holliday v. The People, 4 Gilm. (111.) R. 111, where, under a similar statute provision in regard to transmitting indictments to the superior Court, as referred to in the Ohio case just cited, the clerk of the inferior Court had omitted, in sending up with the original indictment and a transcript of the record, to transmit also a certificate that the transcript was a true one, it was held, after verdict, that the omission did not vitiate the proceedings; especially as the objection had not been taken at an earlier stage. In Beauchamp v. The State, 6 Black. 299, the statute (of Indiana) had provided, that, upon a change of venue from one county to another, the papers in a capital case should be sent to the Court having cognizance of the cause, and that the clerk of this last-named Court should thereupon docket them: where, under this pro- vision, the prisoner being arraigned and pleading not guilty in the Court where the indictment was found, and then obtaining a change of venue, went to trial and was convicted in the latter Court, and then raised the objection that the indictment was not recorded in the former Court, it was held that the omission did not vitiate the verdict. And in the State v. Williams, 3 Stew. (Ala.) R. 454, under a similar proceed- ing, growing out of a change of venue, where a prisoner capitally indicted, after pleading not guilty and obtaining a continuance in one Court, obtained a change of venue to another, and there, after two con- tinuances, was convicted, and raised the objection that it did not appear how the papers had been transmitted from the first Court, (they being simply found on file in the second Court, without any certificate or authentication of the manner of their transmission,) it was held that the objection came too late. If the omissions complained of in the present case do not come directly within the scope of these decisions, they certainly are of the same nature, and should only be regarded as abatable in their character. The plain intent and scope of all the requsitions of the statute of 1844, c. 44, are merely to furnish the prisoner with notice of the prospective pro- ceedings against him; and if he has any complaint to make of surprise or informality, when actually taking notice and going to trial in this Court, he should make it at the time of arraignment, and before the fixing of the time of trial. It is not necessary to say anything upon the point of curing the supposed defects of the doings of the Municipal Court, as a complete record has been produced on the part of the petitioner himself. Upon the point of the informality of the sentence, a single sugges- tion is sufficient to dispose of it; that, as the manner of entering judg- ment only is drawn in question, it is perfectly competent for the Court to correct any supposed errors in that regard, at any time during its present term,-it being the same at which the conviction was had. 6 East. 237; 2 Gab. Cr. L. 554. But, independently of this, I apprehend that the argument of the learned counsel proceeds upon an entirely erroneous basis. We do not understand that the Court contemplated any definition or prescription of the place of execution in their sentence. When they