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TRIAL OF JOHN W. WEBSTER. 299
The ordinary feelings, passions, and propensities under which parties
act, are facts known by observation and experience; and they are so
uniform in their operation, that a conclusion may be safely drawn, that
if a person acts in a particular manner he does it under the influence of
a particular motive. Indeed, this is the only mode in which a large
class of crimes can be proved. I mean crimes, which consist not merely
in an act done, but in the motive and intent with which they are done.
But this intent is a secret of the heart, which can only be directly known
to the Searcher of all hearts; and if the accused makes no declaration
on the subject, and chooses to keep his own secret, which he is likely to
do if his purposes are criminal, such criminal intent may be inferred,
and often is safely inferred, from his conduct and external acts.
A few other general remarks occur to me upon this subject, which I
will submit to your consideration. Where, for instance, probable proof
is brought of a state of facts tending to criminate the accused, the
absence of all evidence tending to a contrary conclusion is to be con-
sidered,-though not alone entitled to much weight; because the burden
of proof lies on the accuser to make out the whole case by substantive
evidence. But when pretty stringent proof of circumstances is produced,
tending to support the charge, and it is apparent that the accused is so
situated that he could offer evidence of all the facts and circumstances
as they existed, and show, if such were the truth, that the suspicious
circumstances can be accounted for consistently with his innocence, and
he fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion is, that the proof if
produced, instead of rebutting, would tend to sustain the charge. But
this is to be cautiously applied, and only in cases where it is manifest
that proofs are in the power of the accused, not accessible to the prosecu-
tion.
To the same head may be referred all attempts on the part of the
accused to suppress evidence, to suggest false and deceptive explana-
tions, and to cast suspicion, without just cause, on other persons: all or
any of which tend somewhat to prove consciousness of guilt, and, when
proved, to exert an influence against the accused. But this considera-
tion is not to be pressed too urgently; because an innocent man, when
placed by circumstances in a condition of suspicion and danger, may
resort to deception in the hope of avoiding the force of such proofs. Such
was the case often mentioned in the books, and cited here yesterday, of
a man convicted of the murder of his niece, who had suddenly 4isap-
peared under circumstances which created a strong suspicion that she
was murdered. He attempted to impose on the Court by presenting
another girl as the niece. The deception was discovered and naturally
operated against him, though the actual appearance of the niece alive,
afterwards, proved conclusively that he was not guilty of the murder.
One other general remark on the subject of circumstantial evidence is
this; that inferences drawn from independent sources different from
each other, but tending to the same conclusion, not only support each
other, but do so with an increased weight. Ta illustrate this, suppose in
the case just mentioned of the wad of a pistol consisting of part of a
ballad, and the other part in the pocket of the accused. It is not abso-
lutely conclusive that the accused loaded and wadded the pistol himself;
he might have picked up the piece of paper in the street. But suppose
that by another and independent witness it were proved that that indi-
vidual purchased such a ballad at his shop; and further, from another
witness, that he purchased such a pistol at another shop. Here are cir-
cumstances from different and independent sources, bearing upon the
same conclusion, to wit,-that the accused loaded and used the pistol;
and they, therefore, have an increased weight in establishing the proof
of the fact.
I will conclude what I have to say on this subject, by a reference to a
few obvious and well-established rules, suggested by experience, to be
applied to the reception and effect of circumstantial evidence.
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