Bemis Report of the Webster Trial, 1850 [1897], Image No: 294   Enlarge and print image (69K)           << PREVIOUS  NEXT >>
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Bemis Report of the Webster Trial, 1850 [1897], Image No: 294   Enlarge and print image (69K)           << PREVIOUS  NEXT >>
204 TRIAL Oh` JOHN W. WEBSTER. sequences to homicide so committed, as if done under an actual and declared purpose to take the life of the party assailed. I propose to verify and illustrate these positions, by reading a few passages from a work of good authority on this subject, -a work already cited at the bar,-East's Pleas of the Crown, chap. 5, § § 2, 4, 12, 19, 20. "Murder is the voluntarily killing any person of malice prepense or aforethought, either express or implied by law: the sense of which word malice is not only confined to a particular ill-will to the deceased, but is intended to denote, as Mr. Justice Foster expresses it, an action flow- ing from a wicked and corrupt motive, a thing done males animo, where the fact has been attended with such circumstances as carry in them the plain indications of a, heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent upon mischief. And therefore malice is implied from any deliberate, cruel act against another, however sudden." (See East, P. C., chap 5, § 2.) "Manslaughter is principally distinguished from murder in this; that though the act which occasions the death be unlawful, or likely to be attended with bodily mischief, yet the malice, either express or implied, which is the very essence of murder, is presumed to be wanting; and, the act being imputed to the infirmity of human nature, the correction ordained for it is proportionately lenient." (Sect. 4.) "The implication of malice arises in every instance of homicide amounting, in point of law, to murder; and in every charge of murder, the fact of killing being first proved, all the circumstances of accident, necessity, or infirmity, are to be satisfactorily proved by the prisoner, unless they arise out of the evidence produced against him." (Sect. 12.) "Whenever death ensues from sudden transport of passion or heat of blood, if upon a reasonable provocation and without malice, or if upon sudden combat it will be manslaughter; if without such provocation, or the blood has had reasonable time or opportunity to cool, or there be evidence of express malice, it will be murder." (Sect. 19.) "Words of reproach, how grievous soever, are not provocation sufficient to free the party killing, from the guilt of murder; nor are contemptuous or insulting actions or gestures, without an assault upon the person; nor is any trespass against lands or goods. This rule governs every case where the party killing upon such provocation made use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise manifested an intention to kill, or to do some great bodily harm. But if he had given the other a box on the ear, or had struck him with a stick, or other weapon not likely to kill, and had unluckily and against his intention killed him, it had been but man- slaughter." (Sect. 20.) The true nature of manslaughter is, that it is homicide mitigated out of tenderness to the frailty of human nature. Every man, when assailed with violence or great rudeness, is inspired with a sudden impulse of anger which puts him upon resistance before time for cool reflection; and if during that period he attacks his assailant with a weapon likely to endanger life, and death ensues, it is regarded as done through heat of blood or violence of anger, and not through malice, or that cold-blooded desire of revenge, which more properly constitutes the feeling, emotion, or passion of malice, The same rule applies to homicide in mutual combat, which is attributed to sudden and violent anger occasioned by the combat, and not to malice. When two meet, not intending to quarrel, and angry words suddenly arise and a conflict springs up in which blows are given on both sides without much regard to who is the assailant, it is a mutual combat. And if no unfair advantage be taken in the outset, and the occasion is not sought for the purpose of gratifying malice, and one seizes a weapon and strikes a deadly blow, it is regarded as homicide in heat of blood; and though not excusable, because a man is bound to control his angry passions., yet it is not the higher offence of murder. We have stated these distinctions, not because there is much evidence