Bemis Report of the Webster Trial, 1850 [1897], Image No: 246   Enlarge and print image (70K)           << PREVIOUS  NEXT >>
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Bemis Report of the Webster Trial, 1850 [1897], Image No: 246   Enlarge and print image (70K)           << PREVIOUS  NEXT >>
246 TRIAL OF JOHN W. WEBSTER. you are not, therefore, to stop its wheels. Because men have been scalded to death or torn to pieces by the bursting of boilers, or mangled by wheels on a railroad, you are not to lay aside the steam-engine. "Innocent men have, doubtless, been convicted and executed on cir- cumstantial evidence; but innocent men have sometimes been convicted and executed on what is called positive proof. What, then? Such con- victions are accidents, which must be encountered; and the innocent victims of them have perished for the common good, as much as soldiers who have perished in battle. All evidence is more or less circumstantial, the difference being only in the degree; and it is sufficient for the purpose when it excludes disbelief,-that is, actual and not technical disbelief; for he who is to pass on the question is not at liberty to disbelieve as a juror, while he believes as a man. "It is enough that his conscience is clear. Certain cases of circum- stantial proofs to be found in the books, in which innocent persons were convicted, have been pressed on your attention. Those, however, are few in number; and they occurred in a period of some hundreds of years, in a country whose criminal code made a great variety of offences capital. The wonder is, that there have not been more. They are constantly resorted to, in capital trials, to frighten juries into a belief that there should be no conviction on merely circumstantial evidence. But the law exacts a conviction, wherever there is legal evidence to show the prisoner's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and circumstantial evidence is legal evidence. "If the evidence in this case convinces you that the prisoner killed her child, although there has been no eye-witness of the fact, you are bound to find her guilty. For her sake, I regret the tendency of these remarks; but it has been our duty to make them, and it will be yours to attend to them." I now proceed, Gentlemen, to the statement of certain principles of law applicable to this case, which I shall address to the Honorable Court in your hearing. They are all involved in the inquiry we are now making. We rely, may it please Your Honors, upon the well-settled principles of the common law, as recognized in this Commonwealth, in the case of Peter Yorke, subsequently affirmed by this court in the case of Wash- ington Goode, and more recently in that of William E. Knowlton.-A homicide being proved, unless it appears by a preponderance of the testi- mony to have been committed under reasonable provocation such as the law recognizes, is presumed to be malicious; and with this presumption, whether express malice is or it not shown, it is murder. The distinctions between express and implied malice, which were properly taken, and upon the authorities so fully illustrated by the opening counsel for the defence, I do not propose to discuss. I concur ill every proposition which was stated upon the subject of express malice. If the jury find there was premeditation in the mind of the prisoner, that ends the inquiry. That fixes it, upon all the authorities cited, as a case of murder. But, if there should be no satisfactory proof of actual pre- meditation, the law presumes, in the absence of any controlling evidence, that there did exist the implied malice, and it is equally murder. Therefore, Gentlemen of the Jury, the proof of the homicide alone will be quite sufficient for sustaining this charge against the prisoner, whether you are satisfied of any proofs of the premeditation, or not, unless the proof in the defence shall satisfy you, that when the prisoner and the deceased came together, there was not merely irritating and provoking language, but that there was a provoking blow on the part of Dr. Parkman, which led to another from the prisoner, and which proved fatal to the deceased; because, in implied malice, the provocation which the law recognizes cannot be a provocation of language, no matter how exasperating or irritating it may be. And if exasperating words were used, and a sudden blow were given by the prisoner with an instrument