Bemis Report of the Webster Trial, 1850 [1897], Image No: 144   Enlarge and print image (71K)           << PREVIOUS  NEXT >>
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Bemis Report of the Webster Trial, 1850 [1897], Image No: 144   Enlarge and print image (71K)           << PREVIOUS  NEXT >>
j¢¢ TRIAL Ox!' JOHN W. WEBSTER. 3. That he murdered him, by striking him with his hands and feet, and by beating him against the floor. 4. That he murdered him in some way and manner, and by some means, instruments and weapons, to the grand jury unknown. I ask the attention of the Court and jury, to some of the rules of law, which I conceive to be applicable to the three first of these counts. It is an imperative rule, that, in an indictment for murder, the means of death shall be correctly stated; that is, on the trial, they must be proved as stated in the indictment. There are certain means, or classes of means, by which human life may be overcome, which are recognized by the law as separate, and distinct from each other: for instance, striking with a weapon; striking a man against an object; poisoning; strangling; burning; starving; and various others. Which- ever kind of means the Government allege to be the means used to destroy life, that kind they must prove, beyond reasonable doubt. In this particular case, the Government, in the three counts under consid- eration, allege striking, as the means by which death was produced. In indictments, setting forth this particular means, as I call it, of death, it is usual for the Government to allege, that the striking was committed with some particular weapon. But it is not necessary that the Government should prove the striking to have been by the exact weapon alleged; proof of any weapon, which will produce death by striking, will sustain the allegation. For instance, if a man is indicted for murder, by striking with a. hatchet, and the proof is, that he stabbed with a knife, it is sufficient; the means alleged being by striking, the kind of weapon is immaterial, provided it be one used in the manner alleged to wit, by striking with it. So, too, if a man is indicted for killing another by stabbing with a knife, and 'the proof is, that he ran him through with a spit, or struck him with a stake, it is sufficient: the striking being the gist of the charge, inasmuch as it is the "means." But if the means be not proved, as laid in the indictment, or it appears that the murder was committed by other means, legally acknowledged to be different from the means alleged, he party must be acquitted, for the reason, that the Government must state the means correctly, that is must prove the means to be such as the indictment alleges. And the law recognizes a great many distinct means, by which murder may be committed. ' To !illustrate this, I will cite 2 Hales Pleas of the Crown, p. 185. "An indictment of murder or manslaughter bath these certainties or requisites to be added to it, more than other indictments. For it must not be only felonious, and ascertain the time of the act done, but must also declare how, and with what, it was done. Yet, if the party were killed with another weapon, it maintains the indictment; but if it were with another kind of death, as poisoning, or strangling, it doth not maintain the indictment upon evidence." And the first volume of the second part of Coke's Institutes is referred to, page 319. The same doc- trine is laid down in Hawking's Pleas of the Crown, book 2d, sec. 84, ch. 23. To show the great strictness, required by the law, in this particular, I will cite further, may it please the Court, Rex v. Kelly, Moody's Crown Cases, page 113. In that case, the indictment charged the prisoner, with striking and beating the deceased with a. piece of brick, held an his right hand, and thereby killing him. It appeared probable upon the evidence not, that the prisoner struck with the brick, but that he struck with his fist, and that the death of the deceased was occasioned by the fall upon the brick. So the jury found; and the Court were unanimously of opinion that the means of death were not truly stated:-also, Rex. v. Thompson, Moody's Crown Cases, page 139, where it is decided, that, in the indictment for murder or manslaughter, when the cause of death is knocking down upon a stone or other substance, and the mortal wound is from such substance, the statement should be accordingly;