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Alexander Vassiliev's Notes on Anatoly Gorsky's December 1948 Memo
on Compromised American Sources and Networks
October 2005

Alexander Vassiliev, a former KGB officer, coauthored *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America -- The Stalin Era* with Allen Weinstein. Under an agreement with the SVR (successor to the KGB), Vassiliev has access to a segment of KGB records dealing with Soviet espionage in the United States. While he could not remove copies from the archive, he could make notes. One of the documents he made notes about was a December 1948 memo written by Anatoly Gorsky. Gorsky was a senior official of the Committee of Information (KI), the agency then supervising Soviet foreign intelligence.

Portions of the notes were quoted in *The Haunted Wood*. The notes were made public as a part of *Vassiliev v Frank Cass & Co Ltd.*, a 2003 libel case in the United Kingdom. David Lowenthal obtained a copy and provided it to Eduard Mark who provided a copy to John Earl Haynes in January 2005. David Lowenthal cites the document as: transcript of KGB file 43173 vol.2 (v) pp. 49-55, attached to Alexander Vassiliev to Hartwig, 1 February 2002, in Alexander Vassiliev and Frank Cass & Co Ltd, High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division Claim No. HQ1X03222, Amended Particulars of Claim.

Images of Vassiliev's handwritten notes can be found here:

[Vassiliev's notes page one](#)

[Vassiliev's notes page two](#)

[Vassiliev's notes page three](#)

Russian linguists Harold Leich and Ronald Bachman prepared both a transcription of Vassiliev's handwritten notes in Russian (Vassiliev's handwriting is not always clear) to typed Cyrillic Russian as well as a translation to Latin alphabet English.

[Transcription to typed Cyrillic Russian](#)

[Translation to Latin alphabet English](#)

In the fall of 2005, Alexander Vassiliev came across this site. Noting the difficulty that others had had in reading some of his handwritten notes on the Gorsky document, he forwarded his own transcription to typed Cyrillic Russian and translation to Latin alphabet English.

[Vassiliev's own Transcription to typed Cyrillic Russian](#)

[Vassiliev's own Translation to Latin alphabet English](#)

John Earl Haynes prepared an annotated version of the Bachman-Leich English translation along with comments on the significance of the document and a comparison of cover names (code names) in the memo with those in the deciphered cables of the Venona project.

[Annotated English Version](#)

[Comments by John Earl Haynes](#)

[Comparison of Cover Names](#)

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Alexander Vassiliev's Own Translation of his Notes on
Anatoly Gorsky's December 1948 Memo on
Compromised American Sources and Networks
October 2005

In the fall of 2005 Alexander Vassiliev came across this site. Noting the difficulty that others had had in reading some of his handwritten notes on the Gorsky document, he forwarded his own translation to Latin alphabet English.

Collapses in USA (1938-48)

Karl's group

1. Karl – Whittaker Chambers, former editor-in-chief of Time Magazine. Traitor.
2. Jerom – Barna Bukov (Altman), our former cadre officer. Now in the USSR.
3. Leonard – Alger Hiss, former State Department official.
4. Junior – Donald Hiss, former official of the internal affairs' ministry.
5. 104 – Henry Wadleigh, former State Department official.
6. 118 – F.V. Reno, former official of Aberdeen range.
7. 105 – Henry Collins, former official of the ministry of agriculture, presently the director of the American-Russian institute in New York.
8. 114 – William Pigman, former official of the Standards Bureau.
9. Storm – Joseph Peters (aka Isidor Burstein). Former member of the CPUSA Central Committee.
10. Vig – Lee Pressman, former legal adviser of the Congress for Industrial Organization.
11. 116 – Harry Azizov, former employee of a steel company in Chicago.
12. 101 – Peter Maclean, journalist and photo reporter, his use was stopped in 1937.
13. 103 – David Carpenter, newspaper employee.
14. 107 – Felix Nislerman, place of work unknown.
15. 113 – Harry Rosenthal, an employee of an insurance firm in Philadelphia.
16. 115 – Lester Hutm, former employee of Frankfurt arsenal.
17. "Ernst" – Noel Field, former State Department official.
18. Rupert – V.V. Sveshnikov, former official of the War ministry.
19. Richard – Harry White, former assistant to finance minister Morgenthau, died in 1948.
20. Eleron – D. Silverman, former head of the Air Force planning and statistical department.
21. Ruble – Harold Glasser, former head of the currency department of the finance ministry.

Redhead's group

1. Redhead – Hedviga Gumperz, Vatssek's wife. In 1938 sent to the U.S. to carry out our missions. Traitor since 1948.
2. Vatssek – Paul Massing, scientific employee of the Institute of Social Studies of the Columbia University. Traitor.
3. Oscar – Oscar Bernstein, lawyer, was used for organizing covers for our workers in the U.S.
4. Prince – Laurence Duggan (aka 19), former State Department official. Suicide.
5. Yeursch (Ruff) – Franz Neumann, former advisor of the OSS research and analysis department.
6. Vardo – E. Zarubina, our former cadre officer. Now in the USSR.

Buben's group

1. Buben – Louis Budenz, former member of the CPUSA Central Committee, former editor of The Daily Worker newspaper, presently professor in the Fordham Catholic University.
2. Bob – Robert Menacker, traveling salesman of various trading firms.
3. Liberal – Frank Palmer. Place of work unknown. Former CPUSA member, broke with the communist party

in 1937. Buben was recruited with his help.

4. Chap – Franklin Zelman, no definite employment. Rita's husband. Was used as a courier.
5. Rita (aka Satyr) – Sylvia Coldwell, technical secretary of a Trotskists' group in New York.
6. Harry – Rabinovich, our former cadre officer. Now in the USSR.

Zvuk-Myrna group

1. Zvuk (Sound) – Jacob Golos (Raisin), our former illegal officer in the U.S. Died in 1943.
2. Myrna – Elizabeth Bentley, former vice-president of the U.S. Service and Shipping Corporation. Traitor since 1945.
3. Tan – Harry Magdoff, former official of the Trade ministry.
4. Ted – Edward Fitzgerald, former official of the Trade ministry.
5. Krot (Mole) - Charles Kramer, Senator Pepper's former adviser.
6. Izra – Donald Wheeler, former OSS official.
7. Sid – Allen Rosenberg, former official of the Foreign Economics Department.
8. Dan – Stanley Graze, official of the State Department's intelligence service.
9. Arena – Gerald Graze, Dan's brother, former official of the War ministry.
10. Boy – Charles Flato, former official of the Foreign Economics Department.
11. Raid – Victor Perlo, former official of the War production department.
12. Robert – Gregory Silvermaster, former official of the financial corporation for reconstruction in the Trade ministry.
13. Vim (aka Page) – Lauchlin Currie, former assistant to President Roosevelt.
14. Pick – Frank Coe, former head of the currency department of the finance ministry.
15. Zholid' (Acorn) – Bella Gold, former official of the Trade ministry.
16. Zhenya - Sonya Gold, former secretary of the head of currency and research department of the Finance ministry.
17. Tino – Irving Kaplan, former employee of the Foreign Economics Department.
18. Sax – Solomon Adler, former employee of the U.S. Finance ministry.
19. Pilot – Ludwig Ullman, former employee of the U.S. War ministry.
20. Buck – David Whintraub, former employee of the UNRRA.
21. X – Joseph Katz, our veteran agent, group handler, co-owner of a cover created by us – a gloves' factory. Now he is in Italy, where by our assignment he is organizing a firm with the purpose to cover our illegal courier line between Europe and U.S.
22. Adam – Eva Guetsov, employee of the Jewish Welfare Board.
23. Zayats (Hare) – Maurice Galperin, OSS former employee.
24. Kokh – Duncan Lee, OSS former employee.
25. Muza (Muse) – Helen Tenney, OSS former employee.
26. Flora – Ruth Rivkin, former employee of the UNRRA.
27. Mon – Bernard Redmont, former employee of the Rockefeller Committee.
28. Mirage – Robert Miller, former official of the State Department.
29. Dir – Mary Price, former secretary of Lippman, American journalist.
30. Gor – Joseph Gregg, former official of the Rockefeller Committee.
31. Fedya – William Remington, former official of the War production department.
32. Ostorozhniy (Careful) – Julius Joseph, OSS former employee.
33. Echo – S. Schuster, employee of the CPUSA Central Committee apparatus.
34. Irma – Ray Elson, former vice-president of the U.S. Service and Shipping Corporation.
35. Green – John Spivak, journalist, before 1941 was used on Trotskists.
36. Vadim – A.V. Gorsky, former station chief of the MGB of the USSR in Washington. Now in the USSR.
37. Lyucya – Mrs. Pravdin, Amtorg former employee, wife of Serguey, former station chief in New York. Now in the USSR.
38. Serguey – V. Pravdin, former station chief of the MGB of the USSR in New York. Now in the USSR.
39. Schtock – our cadre officer M. Shalyapin. Now in the USSR.
40. Guennady – G.B. Ovakimyan, former station chief of the MGB of the USSR in New York. Now in the USSR.
41. Albert – A. I. Akhmerov, former illegal station chief of the MGB in New York. Now in the USSR.
42. Elsa – Mrs. Akhmerov, American, Soviet citizen. Now in the USSR.
43. Gruzid' (Milk Mushroom) – Willard Parp, former employee of the Rockefeller Committee.
44. Charlie – Cedrik Belfridge, former employee of a station of the British intelligence service in New York. Presently a journalist.

Berg-Art group

1. Berg – Alexander Koral, former engineer of the New York municipality.
2. Art – Heken Koral, Berg's wife. House-wife.
3. Son – Richard Koral, son. Student.
4. Dlinniy (Long) – Horman Hight, engineer of Sperry Gyroscope Co in New Jersey.
5. Smart – Elliot Goldberg, engineer of an oil equipment producing firm in New York.
6. Guron (Huron) – Byron T. Darling, engineer of the firm Rubber.
7. Teacher – Melamed, pedagogue in a musical school in New York.
8. Kora – Emma Philips, house-wife.
9. Lock – Sylvia Koral, former employee of the secret ciphering section of the War information department.
10. Chizh (Siskin) – Eduardo Pecchio, businessman in Caracas (Venezuela).
11. Gonets (Messenger) – Richard Setaro, journalist, writer, former employee of Columbia Broadcasting System. Presently in Buenos Aires.
12. Artyom – A. Slavyaguin, our cadre office. Now in the USSR.
13. Twen – S.M. Semenov, station chief of the technical intelligence of the KI in Paris. Presently on holiday in Moscow.
14. Alexey – A.A. Yatskov, our cadre officer, now in the USSR.
15. Julia – O.V. Schimmel, our cadre officer, now in the USSR.
16. Shakh (Shah) – K.A. Chugunov, our cadre officer, now in the USSR.

A. Gorsky (December 1948)

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Comments on Vassiliev's notes on Gorsky's "Failures in the U.S.A. (1938-48)"

October 2005

by John Earl Haynes

The Gorsky memo, "Failures in the U.S.A. (1938-48)," is of value for several reasons. First, just the sheer volume of Soviet sources identified is impressive. Second, it allows the identification of a number of cover names found in the deciphered Venona messages that could not be connected to real names by NSA/FBI analysts. Third, it reinforces the view that Soviet espionage in the United States took a heavy blow immediately after World War II with the defection of Bentley and what followed. Fourth, while the credibility of Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley has been amply corroborated by other evidence, and the Gorsky memo adds just an additional bit, that of Louis Budenz and Hede Massing also had corroboration but not as ample; here the Gorsky memo, consequently, is of greater weight.

One point to be kept in mind: as the title above states, these are Alexander Vassiliev's *notes* on Gorsky's memo entitled "Failures in the U.S.A. (1938-48)." The original is still held in a closed archive and Vassiliev's notes are all that is available. Obviously, one would prefer to have the original, but that option is not at present available. Historians must work with what is available, not with what one would like to be available. Still, that these are notes rather than the original adds the possibility of error by way of a garble or a missed or omitted item. Additionally Vassiliev's notes in are handwritten in Russian and the handwriting is not always clear.

As background, after the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Intelligence Service (SVR), successor to the foreign intelligence arm of the KGB, shaken by the end of the Soviet order and in need of cash, made a deal with Western publishers to partner a Western author and a Russian with a KGB background to write on certain topics. The Russian coauthor was able to examine the KGB's archives to extract selected documents on specified topics. The KGB veterans' association received a generous payment from the publishers. Once the SVR regained its footing in the new Russian state in the mid-1990s, it ended the arrangement and closed the small window that had opened on the KGB archive. Nonetheless, from the earlier opening, limited as it was, four books emerged. One of

these was *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America -- The Stalin Era* authored by the American historian Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, a former KGB officer.^[1]

Under the agreement with the SVR, Vassiliev has access to a segment of KGB records dealing with Soviet espionage in the United States. While he could not remove copies from the archive, he could make notes. The information Vassiliev extracted from the KGB archive was cited and quoted in *The Haunted Wood*. However, not all of Vassiliev's notes were used. The Gorsky memo, under discussion here, was not quoted or cited, although portions of the material on the same page of Vassiliev's handwritten notes reproduced here, material preceding the start of Gorsky's memo, was quoted in *The Haunted Wood*.^[2] Vassiliev's notes on Gorsky's memo were made public as a part of *Vassiliev v Frank Cass & Co Ltd.*, a 2003 libel case in the United Kingdom. David Lowenthal obtained a copy and provided it to Eduard Mark who provided a copy to John Earl Haynes in January 2005.^[3] David Lowenthal cites the document as: transcript of KGB file 43173 vol.2 (v) pp. 49-55, attached to Alexander Vassiliev to Hartwig, 1 February 2002, in *Alexander Vassiliev and Frank Cass & Co Ltd*, High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division Claim No. HQ1X03222, Amended Particulars of Claim. David Lowenthal makes this statement about the notes themselves:

Vassiliev's handwritten pages give no hint of when he redacted the Gorski Memo from the KGB files. His witness statement of 14 July 2002 reads: "I started researching the files in January or February of 1994 ... with the operational correspondence files which contain letters and cables between the Centre (Moscow) and stations in other countries covering all operational matters, as well as copies of documents written in the Centre for internal correspondence.... In 1995 it became more difficult for me to obtain files... In early 1996 I was denied access to the files." That year he left Moscow for London. "At an early stage of my research I found a list of real names and code-names of many American agents composed by a high-ranking intelligence officer Anatoly Gorsky in December, 1948." He later altered that to "a list of names and code-names of American agents AND SOURCES ... prepared by Soviet operatives" and "composed in connection with [Elizabeth] Bentley's defection", although that had taken place three years previously. Vassiliev's 3-page handwritten transcription of the Gorsky Memo was sent to the Court on 1 February 2002, identified as pp. 49-55 of "operational correspondence file 43173 vol.2(v), which contains letters, cables, memos, etc. written in the 1940s." The first page also includes Vassiliev extracts from pages 46, 47,

and 48 of that file. These memoranda, reproduced in translation at the start of the document as posted here, are unrelated to the Gorsky Memo, but crucial for an understanding of its later dissemination, as shown below.

Just how - and hence how accurately - the Gorsky document was transcribed is uncertain. Vassiliev said (16 Apr 2002) he "made summaries or verbatim transcriptions from the [KGB] files in his note-books which he kept at home," but he did not say whether these transcriptions had done so at the press bureau or at home. If done at the press bureau, it would have been difficult, not to say dangerous, to remove his notes from the bureau premises without submitting them for declassification. If done at home from rough notes or memory, his transcriptions must have been subject to considerable error. Moreover, the Gorsky Memo given to the High Court and reproduced in this list is almost certainly not from Vassiliev's original notebook but a later transcription. "My notebook file is in Russia because I didn't think I could smuggle them through the customs. So I put all my stuff on floppy discs. What I smuggled was floppy discs." Thus we don't have the Gorsky memo, only what Vassiliev extracted. Nor do we have even that at first hand. As noted in my 5 January H-DIPLO posting, it is unclear how he acquired and transcribed what he presented. His handwritten pages could be (a) original notes smuggled out in that form, (b) a transcription from the smuggled disks, (c) edited or altered versions of the originals or the retranscriptions. I think (b)^[4]

However, Alexander Vassiliev, after reading the comment above on the web, stated that Mr. Lowenthal had misunderstood his comments. He also said the remark attributed to him, "My notebook file is in Russia because I didn't think I could smuggle them through the customs. So I put all my stuff on floppy discs. What I smuggled was floppy discs," was not stated at the trial but in 1999. Vassiliev explained that he had only brought out his disks when he fled Moscow in 1996 but had arranged for the transfer of his original notebooks from Moscow to London by the time of libel trial. Consequently, the Gorsky memo notes were photocopies taken from his original notebooks, not a transcription from his disks or a reconstruction of any sort.^[5]

In terms of the Gorsky memo, it is necessary to remember that it is dated December 1948. In the autumn of 1947 the Soviet government reorganized its foreign intelligence agencies. What historians usually refer to as the KGB (and its institutional predecessors MVD, MGB, NKGB, NKVD, OGPU, GPU, Cheka) was then the foreign intelligence directorate of the MGB, Ministry of State Security.^[6] In the fall of 1947 the MGB foreign intelligence directorate was combined with the foreign intelligence arm of Soviet military intelligence (GRU,

Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye or Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff) to form an entirely new combined agency, the Committee of Information or KI. The MGB remained as a separate agency but with only domestic responsibilities. The new KI not only combined the human intelligence arms of the former MGB and GRU, it also combined the MGB's Fifth (cipher) Directorate with the GRU's cipher arm to form the Seventh Department of the KI.

The KI was not, however, a happy merger. The Soviet military argued strongly that it needed a dedicated foreign military intelligence agency as well as a combat and battlefield intelligence arm. In the summer of 1948 the military personnel in KI were returned to the Soviet military to reconstitute a foreign military intelligence arm of the GRU but under guidelines to stick strictly to military matters. KI sections dealing with the new Soviet dominated Eastern European regimes as well as Soviet emigres were returned to the MGB in late 1948. Finally, in 1951 the KI's foreign intelligence functions were returned to the MGB, and the latter evolved into the KGB in 1954. (One should also note that briefly in the late 1930s there was a similar quasi-merger when in 1937 the foreign intelligence arm of the GRU was transferred from Commissariat of Defense to Commissariat of Internal affairs, NKVD, which, of course already had a foreign intelligence arm. Just as in 1948, the Red Army succeeded in getting its the foreign intelligence arm back, but in the process losing some of its officers, sources, and networks to the increasingly powerful NKVD, later the KGB. Even earlier, in 1919-1921, Red Army military intelligence lost its autonomy to the KGB's predecessor, the Cheka, for a time.^[7])

The point here is that at the time Gorsky wrote this memo Soviet intelligence organization was in flux. The Gorsky memo is a Committee of Information, KI, memo, a memo of an agency that had been created with a mandate of combine and coordinating all Soviet intelligence and briefly did control both GRU and what became the KGB.

The memo's author, Anatoly Veniaminovich Gorsky, joined the predecessor to the KGB in 1928 and worked in its internal political police section until he transferred to foreign intelligence in 1936. He became deputy chief of the KGB's station in London in 1936 and chief in 1940. In this position he managed the "Cambridge Five" and the initial KGB penetration of the British atomic bomb project. He returned to the USSR in 1944 for work at the central KGB headquarters but was then hastily sent to Washington to become chief of the KGB station in the U.S. after the sudden recall of Vasily Zubilin. In the U.S. Gorsky, using the name Anatoly Gromov, officially held a position as a senior Soviet diplomat at the Soviet embassy in Washington. He returned to Moscow

in 1947 to take a supervisory position in foreign intelligence and in 1953 shifted to internal security work. He attained the rank of colonel and was awarded the Orders of the Red Banner, the Red Banner of Labor, Badge of Honor, and the Red Star.

Vassiliev's notes do not state the context for Gorsky preparing this memo in late 1948, and the context might not have been apparent from the memo itself. The subject, however, is clear. The five lists of groups are preceded with the title "Failures in the U.S.A. (1938-48)," and there is no doubt that Soviet espionage in the United States took severe blows from a series of defections. The groups are not listings of espionage networks, although several networks such as the Silvermaster and Perlo apparatuses managed by Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers' own network are encompassed. Rather, the groups are lists of Americans who consciously cooperated with Soviet intelligence as well as the Soviet intelligence officers who worked with them who were compromised or likely compromised by a defector (Whittaker Chambers, Elizabeth Bentley, Louis Budenz, and Hede Massing) or an agent who broke under FBI interrogation (Alexander Koral).

It should be noted that there would be no reason for Gorsky to list persons who were innocent contacts, unconscious sources, or somehow innocently cooperated with Soviet intelligence as compromised or part of a collapsed network. Chambers, Budenz, Bentley and Massing in their work and social life met hundreds of persons who might innocently provide some information or assistance. Anatoly Gorsky would have been unconcerned about now a defection would have affected such innocent contacts if he even knew of them at all.

The sensitivity of Soviet intelligence for its sources who had been compromised by a defection is also brought home by the note for Laurence Duggan in Redhead's group that he had killed himself. The KGB had lost contact with Duggan in 1945 when many of its officers were withdrawn in the wake of Bentley's defection. However, in 1948 the KGB station in the U.S. attempted to revive Duggan and approached him initially in July but received a brush-off. (To be precise, it was then the New York KI station.) What the KGB did not know at that time, but learned after his death, was that Hede Massing in 1947 had identified Duggan to the FBI as one of her mid-30s recruits in Washington. The FBI then interviewed Duggan on December 11, 1948. Duggan denied that he had been a spy but gave a confused statement in which he admitted he had been approached about spying for the Soviets but could not explain why he had not informed his State Department superiors of the approach. Then on December 15th the KGB again approached Duggan and attempted to reopen contact. He killed himself five days later. Immediately, the American media, Edward R. Murrow of CBS in particular, blamed his death on FBI

harassment and ant-Communist smears of a totally innocent man, but the KGB knew better. Duggan had been compromised, and the stress of the KGB's attempt to reopen contact with him when he was also under FBI pressure may have been too much for him. Gorsky's noting Duggan's suicide underlined the sensitivity the KGB needed to exercise in dealing with a source who had been or might have been compromised by a defector.^[8]

All of the lists include at least one "cadre colleague," a Soviet intelligence officer who had been compromised by the defector.^[9] For "Buben's Group," for example, it is the KGB officer Gregory Rabinovich. "Buben's Group," one should note, is not Louis Budenz's (Buben's) espionage apparatus. In the late 1930s Rabinovich approached Budenz, then a senior CPUSA official in Chicago, to assist him in recruiting Communists for infiltration into the American Trotskyist movement. Budenz did as requested but he was largely a recruiter and did not "run" an anti-Trotsky infiltration apparatus. Those he recruited were, in fact, widely dispersed: for example Sylvia Caldwell was sent to New York to infiltrate the headquarters of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party while the KGB assigned Robert Menaker to anti-Trotsky work in Mexico and South America. "Buben's Group," then, is not a listing of members of a network but rather a list of those known to Budenz to have assisted Soviet espionage and who, consequently, might have been compromised when Budenz broke with the CPUSA in 1945 and cooperated with the FBI.

Notice also that Gorsky in listing those compromised goes back to defections in the late 1930s (Chambers in 1938 and Hede Massing then or soon after) although it would not be until the late 1940s that they provided a full account to American authorities. Consequently, several of the lists contain names of persons who Gorsky thought were known to these late 1930s defectors as having assisted Soviet intelligence then without regard to their subsequent activities and one, Peter MacLean in Karl/Chambers' group, is listed as having been out of contact with Soviet intelligence since 1937.

"Karl's Group" consists of Soviet sources Gorsky believed were known to Whittaker Chambers in the mid-1930s. Chambers did not precisely "defect" in the spring of 1938 but rather dropped out. He provided some limited information to American authorities in the fall of 1939 and similar limited information in FBI interviews in the early 1940s. But it was not until late 1948 that he provided a comprehensive accounting of his role in Soviet espionage to American authorities. Chambers' did not in the mid-1930s know to which Soviet intelligence agency his network reported. It was only in 1939 when he met Walter Krivitsky, a senior defecting KGB officer who had earlier been a GRU officer, that he learned that his network reported to the GRU, Soviet military intelligence. That

Chambers' network was GRU was later confirmed in the late 1940s by Hede Massing, a KGB defector. Massing had learned of Chambers' GRU network when a member of Chambers's network unknowingly attempted to recruit one of her KGB sources.

Chambers' dropping out of Soviet service in 1938 broke-up the network he had worked with. Fearing that Chambers' might go to U.S. authorities, Joseph Peters, the chief of the CPUSA underground, with whom Chambers had worked closely, was replaced as head of the CPUSA covert apparatus and kept out of clandestine work for several years. Boris Bykov, the GRU officer to whom Chambers' reported, was withdrawn from the United States. It would have been common sense trade craft to cut contact with others members of Chambers' network for a time after telling them to lay low and do nothing until contacted. Further complicating the picture was the then ongoing Stalin purge of his security apparatus that disrupted both GRU and KGB operations in the U.S. in the late 1930s.

However, the cut off of contact did not need to be permanent given the weakness of American counter-intelligence in the 1930s and once the lack of fallout of Chambers' defection was clear: there was no serious government follow-up of even the limited information he provided in the fall of 1939. Subsequent information from Soviet sources and Venona indicates that some of the members of Chambers' network were revived individually by the KGB in the early 1940s (White, Silverman, Glasser, for example) while others resumed GRU contact. (By that time the KGB had displaced the GRU as the chief Soviet espionage agency operating in the U.S., although the GRU retained a sizable presence and some high-level sources.) Some were probably never revived if they were no longer employed in areas of interest to Soviet intelligence or were suspected of having become ideologically disillusioned.

The Russian historian Svetlana Chervonnaya assailed the Gorsky memo on the grounds that:

... the prominent presence of a 'Karl's group' on an OGPU-NKVD 'political list' is a nonsense!

No OGPU-NKGB-NKVD-MGB-KGB-SVR operative - no matter how important - would ever know the operational code names of agents - not to say of whole networks - of their 'neighbors' - e.g. REGISTRUP-RAZVEDUPR-GRU (and vice versa). Even in those rather rare cases when agents of 'the military neighbors' were transferred under NKVD control (like Klaus Fuchs in 1944), they would be assigned a totally new code name (thus Fuchs at that point became REST).

Moreover, due to the rigid compartmentalization even within the same service, the operatives on one line (like atomic or scientific-technical – the so-called “X-line”) would not know even the agents – let alone their code names – who worked on other lines (like the “P-line,” or political line).^[10]

This view of the KGB - GRU relationship is mistakenly rigid for the period when the memo is prepared and in light of the history of the two agencies. To impose on this era the strict separation of KGB from GRU of the later high Cold War is anachronistic. The Gorsky memo is a Committee of Information memo, a memo of an agency that had been created with a mandate of combining and coordinating all Soviet intelligence and briefly did control both GRU and what became the KGB. Additionally, the subject of the memo is the crippling of Soviet intelligence operations in the United States that took place between 1945 and late 1948. At the end of WWII the success of Soviet espionage in the United States was by any standards remarkable in the number of sources that had been developed and the size of its networks. Yet much of this collapsed due largely to five defectors. The number of Soviet sources compromised by these five is astounding. Any KI assessment of this intelligence disaster must include Whittaker Chambers. Gorsky's memo could not leave Chambers out, no matter which agency his network originally reported to in the mid-1930s. An insistence that Gorsky and the KI in 1948 could not have known of Chambers' GRU network and would not have included it in an assessment of what went wrong is not persuasive.

Returning to the substance of the Gorsky memo, “Redhead's Group” consists of Soviet sources Gorsky believed known to Hede Massing [Gompertz or Gumperz]. She and her husband dropped out of Soviet service in 1938. (It is not precisely clear when the Massings dropped out. She put it at 1938 but there is some indication that the Massings retained some occasional link to Soviet intelligence into World War II.) Hede Massing did not provide an account of her role in Soviet espionage until 1947. She later testified at the Hiss trial regarding Hiss's inadvertent brush with her and her network.

The Berg – Art Group was not linked to any particular espionage apparatus at all. Berg (Alexander Koral) and Art (Helen Koral) worked as couriers between a variety of American sources and KGB officers over a number of years. The FBI observed Alexander Koral, a secret CPUSA member and building maintenance engineer working for the New York City public school system, meeting with several persons suspected of being Soviet sources. Confronted by the FBI in 1947, Koral admitted that from 1939 to 1945 he had worked as a clandestine courier. He attempted to conceal his Communist loyalties and explained that he had been paid generous sums by

someone known to him only as Frank to travel to different cities to pickup and deliver small packages and envelopes to different persons. Despite attempts to minimize his activities, he eventually identified a number of persons with whom he had had contact.

The longest list of those compromised by a defector was that of the “Sound and Myrna Groups.” Elizabeth Bentley (Myrna) turned herself in to the FBI in the fall of 1945 and quickly provided the FBI with a lengthy account of her work that identified dozens of Soviet sources. Her defection galvanized FBI focus on Soviet espionage. It also came at a time when with the end of World War II, the FBI was in a position to shift its counter-intelligence resources from concern with German, Japanese, and Italian espionage to the Soviet threat.

Gorsky provided forty-four names for the “Sound and Myrna Groups,” i.e., the two large networks (one headed by Victor Perlo and the other by Gregory Silvermaster) and a number of independent sources put together by Jacob Golos (Sound) drawn from secret Communist party members working for the U.S. government and covert CPUSA networks in Washington established in the 1930s. Golos’s several apparatuses and independent sources were taken over after his death in 1943 by his assistant Elizabeth Bentley. After her defection in the fall of 1945 the FBI found convincing corroborative evidence, albeit largely indirect and circumstantial, of the truth of her story of Soviet espionage. (The KGB quickly learned of Bentley’s defection and immediately informed its potentially compromised sources that contact was being cut and they should cease espionage activity and destroy any incriminating evidence.) Documents from newly opened Soviet archives and, even more, the Venona decryptions released in the 1990s later provided ample documentation and direct confirmation of her truthfulness.

The majority of those Bentley identified as Soviet sources were directly identified as such in Venona. The Gorsky list fills in most of the rest. Of the forty-four names on the Gorsky list for the “Sound and Myrna Groups,” Elizabeth Bentley discussed thirty-eight in her statement to the FBI or later testimony. The six not discussed included two KGB personnel: Vladimir Pravdin and Michael Shaliapin. Bentley in her statement discussed one Soviet officer known to her only as John that has not been clearly identified. The only four American sources on Gorsky’s list that Bentley did not identify to the FBI are Eva Getzov, David Weintraub, and the Graze brothers, Stanley and Gerald. Additionally, three persons (Harry White, George Silverman, and Harold Glasser) Bentley identified as working with her networks during World War II are not listed by Gorsky under the “Sound and Myrna Groups” but under “Karl’s Group” because they had worked earlier with Chambers in the mid-1930s. She also told the FBI that one member of her network, Glasser, had for a time worked for a network she

knew little about except that it was run by a man named “Hiss” at the State Department. Both Alger and Donald Hiss, both working for the State Department, are also listed under Karl’s group.

The Gorsky list’s confirmation of Bentley’s story further discredits two generations of historians who have variously ridiculed, mocked, laughed at, dismissed, or studiously ignored Bentley’s story and depicted her as a paid liar, fraud, or delusional hysteric. The depiction of the role of Soviet espionage and of the CPUSA in espionage that prevailed in academic history from the late 1960s to the mid-1990 was that Soviet espionage, to the extent any existed, was a minor matter and, emphatically, the CPUSA was innocent of involvement in what little espionage that might possibly have occurred. This view was profoundly wrong. The determined refusal of leading historians to take Bentley’s testimony serious was symptomatic of a broader failure of the scholastic judgment of the historical establishment of that era to understand the nature of the American Communist movement of the 1930s and 1940s and of the aggressive nature and broad scope of the Soviet espionage offensive against the United States in that era. Contemporary historians should not only now get the story right but also reflect on the ideological blinders and surrender to partisanship that led their predecessors to profoundly misunderstand the history of the period.

The defection of Elizabeth Bentley in late 1945 as well as coming forward of other defectors not only compromised and rendered unusable a large number of Americans who had cooperated with Soviet espionage, it also compromised a number of Soviet intelligence officers who were withdrawn from the United States: the illegal ones hastily in 1946 while those with diplomatic cover left more orderly in 1946 and by 1947. These officers had by 1945 become highly experienced in working in the United States, many spoke excellent English, and had developed a wide array of contacts. It took the KGB several years to replace this experience cadre with new officers, and most of the initial replacements lacked the language skills and cultural sophistication of those compromised by the multiple defections. Eventually Soviet espionage would recover from these disasters, but it is well to remember that just as the Cold War got underway in the late 1940s Soviet espionage in the United States sustained a crippling blow.

Gorsky’s listing for “Redhead’s Group” provides confirmation of Hede Massing’s 1947 identification to the FBI of Laurence Duggan as a Soviet source she and her husband had recruited. Its listing of Franz Neumann as a recruit of the Massings is not surprising: Neumann was a member of the German neo-Marxist “Frankfurt School” as was Paul Massing.

Gorsky's description of "Buben's Group" confirms Louis Budenz's story that Soviet intelligence enlisted him as a talent spotter and recruiter for its late 1930s anti-Trotsky work, a fact that should discomfort several generations of American historians who confidently dismissed Budenz as a fraud. This, of course does not mean that Budenz, particularly from the late 1940s onward, did not exaggerate, embellish and perhaps falsify on some points, but Budenz's basic story and his early statements ought to be taken seriously.

In March 2005, H-HOAC, the Historians of American Communism e-mail/web historical discussion list (part of H-Net) held a symposium on Vassiliev's notes on Gorsky's memo. The messages posted during the symposium can be found on the web at H-HOAC archive available at <<http://www.h-net.org/~hoac/>> (click on "Discussion Logs"). The symposium included three lengthy comments on the Gorsky memo by David Lowenthal, Eduard Mark, and John Earl Haynes, all on March 14, 2005. A number of other comments and exchanges followed before the symposium ended on March 20, 2005. Some of the comments of Svetlana Chervonnaya, a critic of Vassiliev and the document, have been noted; worth reading as well are comments by Mark Kramer and Leo Gluchowski.

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[1]. Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America--the Stalin Era* (New York: Random House, 1999). The other three were: John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, *Deadly Illusions* (New York: Crown Publishers Inc., 1993), Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, *The Crown Jewels: The British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB Archives* (London: HarperCollins, 1998), and David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey, *Battleground Berlin: CIA Vs. KGB in the Cold War* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997).

[2]. Weinstein and Vassiliev, *The Haunted Wood*, 296–97. The quoted portions are from the first ten lines of the attached translation.

[3]. David Lowenthal is the brother of the late John Lowenthal whose article in a journal published by Frank Cass was the subject of the legal action: John Lowenthal, “Venona and Alger Hiss,” *Intelligence and National Security* 15, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 98–130.

[4]. “Gorsky Memo Symposium: Comment by David Lowenthal,” H-HOAC, 14 March 2004, archived at <<http://www.h-net.org/~hoac/>>. David Lowenthal, contrary to the view advanced in this essay that the Gorsky memo is basically a list of compromised sources and agents, judged it a list of “sources: some spies, others whose espionage is contested, some communists who were not spies, some non-communists few if any think were spies, and many Russians (not all spies).”

[5]. Vassiliev to Haynes, 13 August 2005.

[6]. For simplicity, the title “KGB” will be used in notes and commentary to refer not only to the KGB, officially coming into existence in 1954, but to the foreign intelligence arms of its predecessors: Cheka, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, NKGB, MVD, KI, and MGB.

[7]. See Leo Gluchowski, “Gorsky Symposium: Gorsky Memo & KI,” H-HOAC, 17 March 2005, archived at <<http://www.h-net.org/~hoac/>>.

[8]. The KGB’s attempt to reestablish contact with Duggan in 1948 is discussed in Weinstein and Vassiliev, *The*

Haunted Wood.

[9]. The term “*kadrovyy sotrudnik*” is here translated as “cadre colleague.” There are other translations but all refer to a full-time professional intelligence officer or operative.

[10]. Svetlana Chervonnaya, “Gorsky Symposium: Gorsky memo,” H-HOAC, 15 March 2005, archived at:
<<http://www.h-net.org/~hoac/>>.

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Comparative Analysis of Cover Names (Code Names) in the Gorsky Memo
and Cover Names in Venona.
October 2005
by John Earl Haynes

Cryptonyms Identified in the Gorsky Memo that Match Venona identifications
Total: 42^[1]

ACORN = Bella Gold
ADAM = Eva Getsov [Rebecca Getzoff]
AILERON = Abraham George Silverman
ALBERT = Iskhak Abdulovich Akhmerov
ALEXEY [ALEKSEY] = A. A. Yatskov
ART = Helen Koral
BERG = Alexander Koral
BOB = Robert Menaker
CAUTIOUS = Julius Joseph
CHAP = Franklin Salmond [Zalmond Franklin]
DIR [DEAR] = Mary Price
ECHO = Bernard Schuster
ELZA (ELSA) = Akhmerova [Helen Lowry]
EXPRESS MESSENGER = Richard Setaro
GENNADY = Gaik Badelovich Ovakimian.
HARE = Maurice Halperin
INFORMER = Joseph Katz
IZRA = Donald Wheeler
JULIA = O. V. Shimmel^[2]
KOCH = Duncan Lee
MYRNA = Elizabeth Bentley
PAGE = Lauchlin Currie
PAL = Gregory Silvermaster
PEAK = Frank Coe
PILOT = Ludwig Ullmann
PRINCE = Laurence Duggan
RAID [RAIDER] = Victor Perlo
RICHARD = Harry White
ROBERT = Gregory Silvermaster
RUBLE = Harold Glasser
SATYR = Sylvia Caldwell [Sylvia Callen]
SERGEI = Vladimir Pravdin
SHAH = K. A. Chugunov
SOUND = Jacob Golos
STOCK = Mikhail A. Shaliapin
TED = Edward Fitzgerald
TWIN = S. M. Semenov

VADIM = Anatoly Gorsky
 VARDO = E. Y. Zarubina
 VIM = Lauchlin Currie
 X = Joseph Katz
 ZHENYA = Sonya Gold

Cryptonyms Identified in the Gorsky Memo that Supply Identifications for Cryptonyms that are
 Unidentified in Venona
 Total: 18 / 21

CHARLIE = Cedric Belfrage^[3]
 CORA = Emma Phillips
 DAN = Stanley Graze
 FLORA = Ruth Rivkin
 GOR [HOR?] = Joseph Gregg
 HURON = Byron T. Darling
 MIRAGE = Robert Miller
 MOLE = Charles Kramer
 MON = Bernard Redmont
 MUSE = Helen Tenney
 REDHEAD = Hede Gompertz [Gumperz] [Hede Massing]
 RUFF = Franz Neumann
 SAX = Solomon Adler
 SISKIN = Eduardo Pekino [Pequeño?]
 SMART = Elliot Goldberg
 STORM = Joseph Peters
 TAN = Harry Magdoff
 TEACHER = Melamed [cover name has female ending]

There are three other cryptonym identifications that flow logically from these seventeen for a total of twenty. The Gorsky memo's identification of CORA as Emma Phillips not only provides identification of an unidentified cover name in Venona, "CORA," it also provides identification of two other unidentified cryptonyms, AMPERE and ROY. The Venona cables about AMPERE and ROY identify him as CORA'S husband. The identification of HURON as Byron Darling also supplies an identification for the unidentified Venona cryptonym ERNEST in as much as in October 1944, the HURON cryptonym was changed to EARNEST, only to be changed back to HURON in February 1945 for reasons that are not clear.

AMPERE = Phillips, husband of Emma Phillips
 ERNEST = Darling, Byron
 ROY = Phillips, husband of Emma Phillips

Cryptonyms Identified in the Gorsky Memo that
 Contradict Venona identifications
 Total: 1

ARENA = Price, Mary [Venona]

ARENA = Graze, Gerald [Gorsky Memo]

Arena appears in Venona and was identified by NSA/FBI as the cover name of Mary Price in messages of April and May 1944 and as unidentified in a message of June 1943. Mary Price also appears in Venona under the cover name Dir or Gift in two messages: one in June 1943 and another in July 1944. The Gorsky memo also identifies Gift as Mary Price. In light of this Gorsky memo, NSA/FBI's identification of Arena in the Venona cables as Mary Price appears to be incorrect. It is possible that the contradiction is a confusion due to the KGB having shifted cover names, but in looking at the dates of the Arena and Dir/Gift messages, this seems only a possibility.

Cover Names Identified in the Gorsky Memo that
do not Appear in Venona [Total: 37]

[A number of these cover names are from the "Karl" group and are likely cryptonyms from the mid-1930s, prior to the Venona era.]

19th = Laurence Duggan
 101st = Peter MacLean
 103rd = David Carpenter
 104th = Henry A. Wadleigh
 105th = Henry Collins
 107th = Felix Inslerman
 113th = Harry Rosenthal
 114th = William W. Pigman
 115th = Lester Hubel
 116th = Harry Azizov
 118th = F. V. Reno
 Boy = Charles Flato
 Buben = Louis Budenz
 Buck = David Weintraub
 Dan = Stanley Graze
 Ernst = Noel Field
 Green = John Spivak
 Harry = Rabinovich
 Irma = Ray Elson
 Jerome = Barna Bukov [Boris Bykov]
 Junior = Donald Hiss
 Karl = Whittaker Chambers
 Leonard = Alger Hiss
 Liberal = Frank Palmer
 Lock = Sylvia Koral
 Long = Norman Hite
 Lyucya = Olga Pravdina
 Mushroom = Willard Park
 Oscar = Oscar Bernstein
 Rita = Sylvia Caldwell
 Rupert = V.V. Sveshchnikov

Sid = Allan Rosenberg
 Son = Richard Koral
 Teddy = William Remington
 Tino = Irving Kaplan
 Wacek = Paul Massing
 Wig = Lee Pressman

Cover Names Unidentified in the Gorsky Memo that
 do not Occur in Venona [Total: 6]

Fyodor^[4]
 Guide
 Jack
 Lana
 Rur
 Vladimir^[5]

Unclear cases [Total: 2]

Artem = A. Slavianin^[6]
 Kahn = Avram Landy^[7]

[End]

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^[1]To this total for some purposes one would add, for a total of 43, Allan Rosenberg who occurs in the clear with no cover name in Venona as well as here in the Gorsky memo but with a crytonym.

^[2]Julia occurs in Venona in a number of messages as the cover name of Olga Khlopkova, a Soviet consulate staff member and KGB operative. O. V. Shimmel may be the real name of Khlopkova (note the same first initial).

^[3]The CHARLIE messages in Venona are highly compatible with Belfrage. Belfrage is also identified in Venona under an unbroken cryptonym.

^[4]In *The Haunted Wood* Fyodor is identified as Gyorgi Sokolov.

^[5]In *The Haunted Wood* Fyodor is identified as Alexander Panyushkin.

^[6]Artem occurs in the Venona traffic and is identified as likely the cover name of either G. N. Ogloblin or M.N. Khvostov, two Soviet staffers. A. Slavianin may be the real name of one of the former (KGB personnel often used pseudonyms when assigned to a diplomatic post abroad), NSA/FBI may be in error on the identification of Artem, or this may be a different Artem entirely.

[7] Kahn occurs in the deciphered Venona cables in 1944 and, while unidentified by NSA/FBI, was likely Avram Landy, a senior CPUSA official who supervised party work among ethnic groups. But whether Kahn/Landy of 1944 is this Kahn of 1948 is unclear.