

that day showed its power. When the second bank was established, with a capital of thirty-five millions, the number of State banks did not exceed 124; and their capital was not over \$29,972,497. Patriotic fear of its dangerous power was then also entertained. If there was any cause for fear on those occasions, how ought Republicans to feel now, when it is proposed to put near one million of individuals, and more than \$500,000,000 under the substantial dominion of one corporation? The President of the late Bank of the United States testified, upon a public occasion, that there were few of the State banks which it could not have crushed had it been so disposed. The power of the proposed new bank will be greater, and every new State bank which has been or may be established, will add to its power by increasing the number of its dependants, and enlarging the sphere of its influence.

What, under such a system, is to become of the independence of the several States, and their right and power to regulate and control their own institutions? Will the State banks be governed by the States which created them, or will they look for their superior to the monarch of the great bank credit system on whom the insupportable and inevitable laws of credit and trade confer the power to crush or create them, according to his uncontrollable will.

Every year increases the danger of establishing such an institution; for every year adds to the number of State banks, which must of necessity be its subordinate and dependants. If it ever be established, every bank within the States will necessarily become the ally and coadjutor of its central power. Sure it is enough that the unchangeable laws of credit and trade subject the distant State banks to the influence of one common centre. That consequence is inevitable, and unless trade would be more extensively diffused, must be borne.

But, as friends of the rights and independence of the States, can we desire to see this subjection made more absolute and degrading by artificial regulations? Least of all can we desire to see the administration of the laws of credit and trade placed in hands which are not only independent of the States, but of all that is popular in the General Government? When a guarantee can be discovered against the frailties of our nature, mankind may be safe under absolute dominion. When the directors of banks can be selected from a superior race, then the existence of a Bank of the United States may be compatible with the rights of the States, and the liberty, prosperity, and happiness of the American people.

That there are some advantages to be derived from a Bank of the United States cannot be denied. A species of paper, and so nearly uniform in value as to be available at par throughout the Union, is, for many purposes, a great public convenience. But what Republican would purchase it at the hazard of an effective substitute may be obtained without it? It may be doubted whether such a bank could be of any real utility in equalizing any domestic exchanges.

That which is now very generally called the difference of exchange, is, in reality, but a difference in the value of the prevailing paper currency at different points. To put an end to that requires no Bank of the United States. It is now vanishing as fast as the banks resume specie payments, and, we trust, will soon cease throughout the Union, without the agency of any coercive power whatsoever. The real difference of exchange will then remain, consisting of the cost of transporting specie or specie funds from one place to another. In this business there has been heretofore, and will soon be again, vast competition, which will reduce the expense to the lowest amount for which the operation can be performed. For the country, this is the safest basis on which it can rest. If a great National Bank be established, having, as it must, the mastery of the whole banking system of the Union, it will be strong enough to prescribe the rates of exchange, and drive competition out of the market, not by reducing the price, but by a wave of its sceptre.

It is to be indicated to the State banks that exchange was considered its own appropriate harvest field, in which it was not agreeable to have a competitor, they must necessarily submit to the will of this legal superior, and withdraw from the business. Would it be safer to have exchange regulated, and the price fixed by the president of a bank, whose first object is to make as much money as possible, than by the general laws of trade, which know no selfishness, and have no favourites? Not only would it be more safe, but it can scarcely be doubted that a general competition among banks and individuals, now that the whole process and the necessary machinery is well understood, would secure to the country lower rates.

The same state of things renders a bank less useful to the Government, as an agent to transfer its funds from one section of the Union to another, than it was when the late Bank of the United States was established, and for many years afterwards. Competent agents for this purpose may now be found in the State banks multiplying even more rapidly than the growth of our country. This argument in favour of a National Bank has, therefore, ceased to have the weight to which it was formerly entitled, and goes but a little way to counterbalance the many fatal objections to such an institution. It can only be said, with truth, that it would save some trouble to the officers and clerks of the Treasury Department; and that is the only just extent of the argument.

The same reasons which oppose the establishment of a Bank of the United States, are equally hostile to a Treasury Bank, or any machinery in the nature of a bank, attached to the Treasury Department. The former would be the creation of an independent and irrespon-

sible power in the country, whose inclination and interest would generally prompt it to support a friendly Executive, and whose power would almost certainly be great enough to overthrow the laws which were made. The latter would at all times act in concert with the Executive, with power to give him strength in proportion to its capital and the extent of its machinery. Both alike are calculated to enlarge Executive power; and although a Treasury Bank would, in theory, at least, be more controllable by the popular will, constituting a part of the Government; both are to be dreaded and rejected alike by those who would preserve the simplicity and purity of our institutions. But as we do not know of any advocate, in the Republican party, of a Treasury Bank, though such a scheme is most unjustly imputed to them, we deem it unnecessary to multiply arguments against it.

The cheapness of our system of Government, compared with the monarchical systems of the old world, has been one of its chief recommendations to the favour of mankind. This is one of its characteristics which every Republican will strive to maintain. Injudicious legislation, and the spirit of speculation in merchandise and the public lands, had, within a few of the last years, brought into the Treasury a redundancy of revenue. As a natural consequence, this influx has been followed by loose and extravagant appropriations by Congress, and an increased expenditure. It is an inevitable law of our system of Government, and perhaps of every other, that if it collects much, it must expend much. It could not be safely tolerated, if it were practicable, that the Government should collect hundreds of millions from the people, and that it should expend what it collects. It must always expend what it collects. The only effective remedy, therefore, for an extravagant expenditure, is to reduce the supply. For the accomplishment of this great object, the country must look to those who strive to reduce the receipts of the Government to its absolute wants; to preserve the purity of the public agents by keeping them out of temptation; to preserve the economy, by making it impossible for the Government not to be economical.

It is in vain to oppose the appropriations of money when there are millions of surplus in the Treasury. If there be a surplus it must be expended, and to be expended it must be appropriated. Keep the money out of the Treasury, and leave it in the pockets of the people, its rightful owners; multitudes of projects for expending it would then never be thought of, and others would never be pressed.

While, therefore, we do not think it the duty of every Republican to oppose unnecessary appropriations and expenditures we look to a proper regulation of duties and taxes, to be levied and collected from the people, as the only effective remedy and preventive of public extravagance. Duties on imported merchandise, though paid in the first instance by the merchants, come finally out of the pockets of the people, as much as if they were a direct tax laid on lands and personal property. We hold that it is the duty of Congress to ascertain, as nearly as practicable, what an economical administration of the Government ought to cost; to graduate the duties or taxes, in such manner as not to produce a surplus beyond that sum, and to vary them in conformity with that principle, as the changing circumstances of the country may require. We hold, that when Congress establishes, or suffers to exist, a system of revenue which collects from the people more money than the public service, economically managed, necessarily requires, they pervert the Government from its true object, violate their duty to their constituents, and commit upon them the same wrong which monarchs perpetrate upon their subjects when they seize on their money or goods to support unnecessary wars, or minister in their pleasures, their tastes, or their passions.

At present, we have no surplus in the Treasury, and the receipts of the Government are scarcely equal to its necessary expenditures. It is our earnest desire and determination, as far as our opinions and appropriate acts can avail, to cut off the possibility of any surplus hereafter; not by extending the expenditures, but by lessening the receipts. And whenever the expenditures can be lessened, also, without palpable injury to the public service, we are in favour of diminishing them, and the receipts in an equal degree, making our Government as cheap to the people as possible, and as powerful for mischief as it shall be cheap in its administration.

We rejoice to see the many of the recent great causes of taxation are fast disappearing. The public debt is now fully paid, and the people are entirely relieved from that burden. The extinguishment of the Indian titles to lands within the States and Territories; the removal of the Indians to the west of Mississippi; and the Indian wars, in which the United States have been recently engaged, have necessarily produced a great expenditure of the public treasure. These will, no doubt, shortly be brought to a close; and this heavy drain upon the Treasury of the United States, of course, cease—and many other causes of expenditures are rapidly terminating.

One of the strongest temptations for the collection of large revenues, and the continuance of which is most to be guarded against, would be the deposit of the public money in the banks.

If deposited in banks nominally for safe keeping but really to be lent out to their customers the banks will have an interest in swelling the amount, because by lending they receive a profit upon it; and their customers will have an interest in the same policy because they can borrow more money, and get more indulgence by it. By these means money may be wrongfully taken from its true owners by the Government, not for the

public service, but to be devoted to private purposes exclusively.

The people may be taxed that the banks may have more money to lend, and their customers more to borrow. We are opposed to taxation for such purposes. We deny the rights of the Government to take the money of the citizen and hand it over to the banks to be used by them, and their customers, in their private transactions. The taxing power was not granted for such purposes; and when such are its results, reform should be the watchword of every Republican.

We are in favour of such changes in our financial system, as will effectually prevent the application of the public money to private purposes. The means of accomplishing this great reform, are of less importance than the end to be obtained. We, however, perceive no means so effective and certain, as to let the Government keep its own money, by the instrumentalities of its own officers, who shall be put under bonds, with heavy securities, not to use or lend it; and in addition, making it highly penal in them so to do. It is not perceived why the Government cannot make its money as secure as a bank. All the usual means of security enjoyed by the banks are within its reach; in addition to which, it has absolute power over the persons of its agents, which the banks have not; banks cannot by regulations, punish their cashiers and clerks for faithlessness and crime with the penitentiary or otherwise; but the Government can. It may command all the buildings, walls, vaults, bolts, and other safeguards which the banks can; and in addition, may dispose of the personal liberties of its faithless agents according to its will, expressed through its legislative and judicial authorities. Why, then, may it not keep its own money as safely as the banks can keep theirs, or that deposited with them? That it can do so, under proper regulations, is too obvious to be doubted. Besides, at places where it might be more convenient, the use of the bank buildings themselves could be secured, still preserving the public money from private uses.

Why, then, should not the Government keep its own money? It is objected that the keeping of its own money would dangerously increase the patronage of the Executive. Is it possible any one can believe that the appointment of ten or twenty officers and clerks, involves a more extensive and dangerous influence than the power directly to affect the pecuniary interests of the eight hundred and twenty thousand stockholders, and the six hundred and fifty-three thousand debtors? The Executive has, so long as he is authorized to place the public money in banks to be lent out for private purposes, all that the banks cannot be depositors. All that the banks find their interest in an extension of the credit system, by the aid of the public money; and in addition thereto, all are subject, under such a system, to the influence of the President or Secretary of the Treasury. It is not by keeping the public money power, but by spending or lending it. One man has a million of dollars to lend; another has a million to keep, being forbidden to lend a dollar of it. Which will be the most courted, and have the most influence among his neighbours? The answer is too obvious to need suggestion. It is thus with the Executive. If you would curtail his influence in the most effectual manner, require him inflexibly to keep the public money for public purposes. If you would extend his influence in a manner the most alarming, authorize him to lend the public money, or cause it to be lent, by depositing it in banks, or otherwise.

The idea that the actual custody of the public money by public officers appointed under the authority of Congress would place it more under the control of the President than it is heretofore been, is wholly deceptive and fallacious.

His power over it would not be at all increased by this measure. The President could not, under the old or proposed system, draw from the Treasury a single dollar, not even for the payment of his own salary. That operation is effected by the warrant of the Secretary of the Treasury upon the Treasurer's check or order to a bank or other depository. It is through these means that the President, and every other executive officer receives even his salary. If the Treasurer had the actual custody of the public money, instead of keeping it in banks, the President would be obliged still to get a warrant from the Secretary of the Treasury before he could receive his salary. It is said the President had the actual custody of the money, the President might compel him to put it in his possession by the exercise of his authority and power over an officer of his authority and power, by the exercise of the same authority and power, to compel the Treasurer to draw a check on a bank? And could not the President or his instrument obtain the money from a bank on such a check just as easy as he could draw it from the Treasurer's actual possession? Would it not, indeed, be a little easier to compel the Treasurer to draw a check, than to count out a large sum of money? As for the banks, they never have claimed the right to dispute the Treasurer's check, their duty being merely to pay it. When there was thirty or forty millions of dollars in the Treasury, there was nothing in the law, in the structure of the system, to prevent the executive officers from checking every dollar of it out of the banks, if inclined to apply it to improper objects. Indeed, until 1829, there was no practical restraint upon the Treasurer whatsoever; the sole authority upon which the banks paid out the public money, was his individual check; and the restraint then imposed in requiring that the warrant of the Secretary of the Treasury should accompany the Treasurer's check, was one of Executive regulation, and not of Congressional legislation. The dangers con-

ferred from this source are therefore altogether imaginary.

The union of the purse and the sword, so much deprecated by our English ancestors, was altogether a different matter. By them the power to raise an army was called the sword, and the power to levy and collect taxes to support it was called the purse. The English Constitution conceded to the Executive the power to raise an army, or the power of the sword, but reserved to Parliament the power to raise taxes to support it, or the power of the purse. It was the attempt of Charles the First to raise taxes for the support of his army without the consent of Parliament, thereby uniting the purse and the sword, which produced a bloody revolution and brought him to the block.

Our Constitution concedes to the Executive neither of these powers. He can neither raise an army, nor collect taxes to support it, without the consent of Congress. In their hands are both the purse and the sword, and the Executive is but an instrument to carry their determination into effect. He wields neither the purse nor the sword otherwise than as the subordinate of the legislative power.

Hence it will be perceived that the union of the purse and the sword is a very different thing from the custody of the public money by Executive officers. In every Government under the sun, the most free as well as the most tyrannical, the keeping and paying out of the public treasure under the authority of law has been considered an Executive function. When before was it thought to be dangerous to liberty? Do we find a trace of such danger in the ancient Republics of Greece and Rome; in the modern; among the Greeks, in Rome, in Switzerland or in Holland? Was such a question ever raised among the jealous patriots of England? Is it now a ground of jealousy or alarm in any other Republic of Europe, or in any limited monarchy of Europe? No such danger was ever perceived, nor such question ever heard of. To originate it required the inventive faculties of our own ingenious countrymen, stimulated by ambition, and pecuniary interest. It is not extraordinary that those who wish to profit by the use of the public money pronounce it unsafe in any other hands, nor that those who are in eager pursuit of the prize of power join in the cry. But an impartial people, who have no interest in being deceived; will only give due weight to the argument and appreciate the motive in which it originates.

What would be said in England if some sensitive patriot, to prevent a union of the purse and the sword, should propose to keep the money of the United Kingdom in the Treasury of Belgium, Hanover or Holland? Those nations are scarcely more independent of the British Government and nation than our banks are of the Government and people of the United States; nor are they, on some occasions, more hostile than a portion of the banks. Is it possible that a Government which puts its means so completely beyond its own control, can, on all occasions, perform its engagements, keep its faith, or protect the people by whom it is established, and whose money supports it? It has heretofore been deemed enough that the legislative power can, at will, diminish the amount of money to be collected, and prescribe the regulations under which it shall be kept. It has not been considered necessary to establish an independent branch of the Government for that purpose, and least of all to introduce foreign powers, totally irresponsible to the people, often strong for the Government, and always devoted to making money out of all circumstances and vicissitudes. To make keepers of the public money out of such materials, is in character with those kingly notions which would give to our State banks a monarchic corporation to a master, upon the plea that the people cannot control them.

It is objected that this is a measure of hostility to the banks. The Government is not to be a hoarder of money. What it collects it soon expends; and it has seldom occurred in our history that it has had on hand, at the same time more than six or eight millions of dollars. It ought not to continue any system of revenue which will enable it to hold a regular surplus exceeding five millions. This is not more than a large bank finds it necessary to retain to carry on a safe business. The late bank of the United States frequently had from ten to fifteen millions. For years to come, it is probable that the whole amount of money in the Treasury will not average three millions, and will scarcely be equal to one week's recent importation of specie. It is idle to suppose that this can materially affect the operations of the banks. The only mode in which their operations will be affected, is that they will no longer have the privilege of lending out money which is not their own. Is the withdrawal from them of this privilege necessarily an act of hostility? A farmer has been in the habit of depositing his money in a bank, but as he could not get it to pay his hired hands when he wanted it, the bank having stopped payment, he concluded that it was more safe, and more just to his creditors, to keep it himself. Was there any hostility to the bank in that? It is just so with the Government. The banks had lent out the public money, and could not collect it. With millions nominally in the Treasury, the Treasury Department could scarcely pay a dollar in the legal currency of the country. It does not desire to be again placed in such a situation. It does not wish to be dependant on those whom its experience has taught it are not always to be depended upon.

The Government only desires to manage its own business in its own way; to let the banks alone, and to be let alone by them when the public interest and safety require it, but not to be compelled to use them to the public detriment. Is it just to charge every citizen with

hostility to the banks who does not keep his money in them? The idea is absurd, but not more so than that a Treasury independent of the banks is in hostility to them.

It is objected that it is a measure of hostility to a sound currency. The reverse of this proposition is true. It will prevent the inflation of our paper currency, which arises from the use of the public money, and, in that degree, tend to prevent fluctuations and suspensions of specie payments. By exhibiting an inflexible determination on the part of the Government to recognize nothing as money but specie, or its equivalent, not by the excess of their issues to endanger that standard. In fine, it will leave the banks to be sustained by their own capital and prudence, without tempting them with the uncertain and dangerous aid of a fluctuating public deposit.

It is objected that this measure is hostile to the rights of property, and essentially levelling in its character. The reverse of this is true. The money of the Government is the property of the people. The object of an Independent Treasury is to preserve this property for the use of the true owners, instead of handing it over to those to whom it does not belong, to be lent out for their emolument. Its tendency is to protect individual property also. Nothing is more destructive to the rights of property than fluctuations in the standard by which its value is measured. The tendency of this measure is, to prevent those fluctuations, by preventing, in some degree, the expansions and contractions produced by the over issues of banks, and thus give stability to property.

It is alleged that this measure is part of a scheme to force on the country a currency purely metallic. This is unfounded. A specie currency for the ordinary daily transactions of life, and such a specie basis for paper as will always ensure its convertibility into specie, when required by the holders, is what is contended for; and such is the only tendency and real design of the measure proposed, so far as the banks are concerned. A purely metallic currency is no part of the Independent Treasury plan, as proposed by the Administration, and supported by its friends. In fine, with the exception of a very small number, who are in favour of depositing the public money specially in banks, the question at issue between us, and those who favour a deposit in the banks, may be stated thus: They wish to have the public money deposited in banks, not to be kept by them, but to be lent out for private uses. We are opposed to lending out the public money for private uses, and, effectually to prevent it, are in favour of having it kept by public officers, under heavy bonds and securities not to use it, or suffer it to be used for any private purpose whatsoever, and to pay it out only in pursuance of appropriations made by law, as prescribed in the Constitution.

We do not think that to furnish the banks with money to lend or to accommodate the customers of banks with the use of the public money or property, is one of the purposes for which the power to lay duties and taxes was delegated to the Congress of the United States.

On the contrary, we look upon the employment of it, knowingly and deliberately for such a purpose, or where such is known to be the natural and necessary result, as an abuse of the most aggravated character. It is taking one man's property and delivering it over to another, under false pretences, and may justly be denounced, (not as a levelling operation, but) as an exercise of arbitrary power, wresting money and property from those to whom it belongs, for the use of those to whom it does not belong. We oppose this practice, as one of injustice. We are in favour of collecting only as much money from the people as may be necessary for public purposes, leaving the rest to be used by those to whom it belongs. We are not the enemies of the banks, but we are not so much their friends as to take money out of the pockets of our constituents, and deposit it with them to swell their active capital, and increase their profits. Let them be content, as every honest man ought to be, with using that which properly belongs to them.

We look upon the withdrawal of the public deposits from the banks, as a measure beneficial to the banks themselves, and calculated to promote stability in the business and currency of the country. So long as the public money are made the basis of bank issues, they will necessarily produce fluctuations in credit and currency. As the deposits accumulate, bank loans and bank notes increase in number and amount; as the deposits diminish, bank accommodations are curtailed, and the circulation is so trampled. Not reflecting man can doubt that the immense surplus in the Treasury two years ago, being all lent out by the banks, was one cause of the overtrading and speculation which ended in a general suspension of specie payments. Ought the banks to desire the continuance of a temptation which experience has shown that they have not the firmness to resist? Ought the people to permit a return to, or a continuance of, a system which not only takes from them a portion of their property for the use of their customers, but tends to render the rest unstable and insecure, by unsettling the standard of value, banishing the coin of the country from circulation, and deluging the land with an irredeemable, and, to a great extent, a fraudulent paper currency? To avoid these evils, we must remove their causes. One of the most potent is the use of the public money for private purposes. By putting a stop to that mischief and administering the Treasury Department wholly independent of the banks, the people of the United States will have done much, through their Government, to fill the country with the precious metals, to secure a constitutional currency, to keep the public faith, to preserve the public morals, to give confidence to credit and stability to trade, and, above all,

to preserve the rights of the States and the liberties of the American people.

The subject of abolition has assumed a character so formidable in its appearance, and so destructive in its tendencies, as to call for a brief exposition of our views.

The existing relation of master and slave between the two races inhabiting the Southern portion of the Union, existed when the Constitution was formed, and is recognized in the apportionment of members in the House of Representatives, as well as in the imposition of direct taxes, and the clause guaranteeing the delivery up of persons held to service or labour in one State and escaping into another.

It is manifest that the power over this subject is one of those not delegated to the General Government, and, of course, is one of the reserved powers; as such, it is under the entire control of the respective States, within whose limits the institution may exist, and within which neither this Government, nor that of the other States, nor their citizens, have any more right to interfere, directly or indirectly, than with the existing slavery in Cuba, or any other foreign country.

From this it follows that any such interference on the part of this Government, would be without authority, and a manifest breach of the Constitution. It would, in breach of truth, be more than a simple breach of that instrument; it would be destructive of the primary object for which the Government was instituted, which was to preserve and protect more effectually the domestic peace and tranquillity of the States, and their citizens.

It also follows, that such interference on the part of the other States, or the citizens, would be in violation of the national compact, which they mutually pledged themselves to each other to preserve inviolate on entering into the Union.

It also follows, that the States, separately and individually, where slavery exists, are alone responsible for it, either for good or evil; and the impression that any other State or its citizens are responsible, in any way, for its existence, originates in the gross and mischievous Federal conception, that ours is a great national consolidated Government, where the whole is responsible for the parts, just as the States are for counties, instead of a Federal Republic, composed of sovereign and independent States, united together for their mutual advantage, tranquillity, and security.

Such, and so formidable, are the barriers against an interference with this dangerous subject within the limits of the States. Nor will those against an interference by the General Government, in any manner in this District, be found less formidable, when duly considered.

We hold in the first place, that to attempt to abolish slavery in this District, as an intermediate step to abolishing in the States themselves, by this Government, or the non-slaveholding States, or their citizens, would be as clearly and manifestly liable to all the objections in their full force, to which a direct attempt to abolish it in the States themselves would be. It is the *motus et objectus* of the act. There is no code of morals which justifies the doing of that directly which is forbidden to be done indirectly. If it be unlawful to burn one neighbour's house it would be equally unlawful to fire another, or even our own, with the intention of burning it. If there be a difference, the latter, by adding craft to guilt, is of a deeper dye.

We also hold that, whatever may be the individual opinions of public men as to the character of the domestic institutions of the slaveholding States, they have no right when acting in public stations under the Federal Government, by any of their acts, to discriminate between their institutions and those of the other States. It must be borne in mind that ours is a Federal Republic, as has been already stated, formed by sovereign and independent States, for their mutual security and happiness; and that they instituted this Government, and clothed it with its powers to carry into effect these important objects. Such being the character and object of our system, 'tis clear that this Government can have no right whatever to give a preference to the institutions of one portion of the Union over those of another, or to use its power to abolish one or establish the other; and to do so, by the pretext what it may, would be directly subversive of the object for which it was established, by destroying that which it was intended to promote. Instead of preserving peace and tranquillity, it would become an instrument in the hands of the strongest portion of the Union, for assailing the institutions of the weaker, and engineering thereby the bitterest feelings of hostility, which in the end, would destroy the Union itself.

Resting on these broad and incontrovertible principles, we hold it to be clear, beyond dispute, that Congress has no right to abolish slavery in this District, with a view of abolishing it in the States, or to exercise any of its powers with that intention. Nor do we deem it material, in coming to this conclusion, to inquire what is the extent of its powers over this District; be they what they may, they are all conferred for special purposes, to be exercised, like all such powers, in subordination to the known objects to which they were granted, for to pervert them to any other purpose inconsistent with the object of the grant, would be a violation of

the Constitution, no cause not expressly

This regarding Government, it is sufficient to say that the Government has no power to give any special institutions of over those of another. It is on this broad conclusion followed by the Constitution, that we are to be pursued by the existing and dangerous here only can a state progress, give peace, and permanency stand be made; and their country, and to take their stand minor differences.

In addition to would remind our faith of this Georgia and Maryland property possessors in this District, witness by these States to progress. We would consider that a General Government become the recipient from all the north we have witnessed, with deep regret, the questions; and in the ask our fellow citizens agitation.

Thus, fellow citizens a full and frank opinions and frank vindicate and maintain they are free conviction is, that the peace, and the people, and the our Confederacy.

REUEL WILLIAMS GARRETT D. WILLIAMSON WILLIAM S. WILLIAMSON Committee in District.

FRANCIS THOMAS J. W. JONES ISAAC TOUCHE J. J. MCKAY W. W. POTT JOHN P. RICHMOND AMOS J. PARRISH ISAAC E. CRANFORD ARCHIBALD COMMITTEE IN DISTRICT

Committee in District.

FRANCIS THOMAS J. W. JONES ISAAC TOUCHE J. J. MCKAY W. W. POTT JOHN P. RICHMOND AMOS J. PARRISH ISAAC E. CRANFORD ARCHIBALD COMMITTEE IN DISTRICT

Committee in District.

FRANCIS THOMAS J. W. JONES ISAAC TOUCHE J. J. MCKAY W. W. POTT JOHN P. RICHMOND AMOS J. PARRISH ISAAC E. CRANFORD ARCHIBALD COMMITTEE IN DISTRICT

Committee in District.

FRANCIS THOMAS J. W. JONES ISAAC TOUCHE J. J. MCKAY W. W. POTT JOHN P. RICHMOND AMOS J. PARRISH ISAAC E. CRANFORD ARCHIBALD COMMITTEE IN DISTRICT

Committee in District.

FRANCIS THOMAS J. W. JONES ISAAC TOUCHE J. J. MCKAY W. W. POTT JOHN P. RICHMOND AMOS J. PARRISH ISAAC E. CRANFORD ARCHIBALD COMMITTEE IN DISTRICT

Committee in District.

FRANCIS THOMAS J. W. JONES ISAAC TOUCHE J. J. MCKAY W. W. POTT JOHN P. RICHMOND AMOS J. PARRISH ISAAC E. CRANFORD ARCHIBALD COMMITTEE IN DISTRICT

Committee in District.

FRANCIS THOMAS J. W. JONES ISAAC TOUCHE J. J. MCKAY W. W. POTT JOHN P. RICHMOND AMOS J. PARRISH ISAAC E. CRANFORD ARCHIBALD COMMITTEE IN DISTRICT

Committee in District.

FRANCIS THOMAS J. W. JONES ISAAC TOUCHE J. J. MCKAY W. W. POTT JOHN P. RICHMOND AMOS J. PARRISH ISAAC E. CRANFORD ARCHIBALD COMMITTEE IN DISTRICT

Committee in District.

FRANCIS THOMAS J. W. JONES ISAAC TOUCHE J. J. MCKAY W. W. POTT JOHN P. RICHMOND AMOS J. PARRISH ISAAC E. CRANFORD ARCHIBALD COMMITTEE IN DISTRICT

Committee in District.

FRANCIS THOMAS J. W. JONES ISAAC TOUCHE J. J. MCKAY W. W. POTT JOHN P. RICHMOND AMOS J. PARRISH ISAAC E. CRANFORD ARCHIBALD COMMITTEE IN DISTRICT

Committee in District.

FRANCIS THOMAS J. W. JONES ISAAC TOUCHE J. J. MCKAY W. W. POTT JOHN P. RICHMOND AMOS J. PARRISH ISAAC E. CRANFORD ARCHIBALD COMMITTEE IN DISTRICT

Committee in District.

FRANCIS THOMAS J. W. JONES ISAAC TOUCHE J. J. MCKAY W. W. POTT JOHN P. RICHMOND AMOS J. PARRISH ISAAC E. CRANFORD ARCHIBALD COMMITTEE IN DISTRICT

Committee in District.

FRANCIS THOMAS J. W. JONES ISAAC TOUCHE J. J. MCKAY W. W. POTT JOHN P. RICHMOND AMOS J. PARRISH ISAAC E. CRANFORD ARCHIBALD COMMITTEE IN DISTRICT

Committee in District.

FRANCIS THOMAS J. W. JONES ISAAC TOUCHE J. J. MCKAY W. W. POTT JOHN P. RICHMOND AMOS J. PARRISH ISAAC E. CRANFORD ARCHIBALD COMMITTEE IN DISTRICT

Committee in District.

FRANCIS THOMAS J. W. JONES ISAAC TOUCHE J. J. MCKAY W. W. POTT JOHN P. RICHMOND AMOS J. PARRISH ISAAC E. CRANFORD ARCHIBALD COMMITTEE IN DISTRICT

Committee in District.

FRANCIS THOMAS J. W. JONES ISAAC TOUCHE J. J. MCKAY W. W. POTT JOHN P. RICHMOND AMOS J. PARRISH ISAAC E. CRANFORD ARCHIBALD COMMITTEE IN DISTRICT

Committee in District.

FRANCIS THOMAS J. W. JONES ISAAC TOUCHE J. J. MCKAY W. W. POTT JOHN P. RICHMOND AMOS J. PARRISH ISAAC E. CRANFORD ARCHIBALD COMMITTEE IN DISTRICT

Committee in District.

FRANCIS THOMAS J. W. JONES ISAAC TOUCHE J. J. MCKAY W. W. POTT JOHN P. RICHMOND AMOS J. PARRISH ISAAC E. CRANFORD ARCHIBALD COMMITTEE IN DISTRICT