

and Rezan roads; but having made occasional movements on the same line, according as the enemy's operations appeared to point to either flank.

In the meanwhile the enemy, by his own 20th bulletin, and by his conduct, seems to have been for some time uncertain of the position of the Russian army. As soon as it was ascertained, a considerable portion of the army under Murat, occupied the intermediate country between Moscow and the Pokbra.

It was presumed that the French, having it in their power to bring forward their whole force to either flank of Murat's position, would endeavour to manoeuvre so as to induce marshal Kutusoff to retire behind the Oka, in order to procure a more extensive theatre of ground, with the convenience of moving either on Kalouga or Smolensk; to avoid which, and with a view to preserve a more certain conveyance for provisions and reinforcements from the south and at the same to hold the command of the Smolensk, the Russian army began its march to occupy the position behind the river Nara, changing its front to the right, upon our parallel to the old Kalouga road.

This position strong in itself, and strengthened by art, was not likely to be attacked in front; but it was of course foreseen, that if it were to be attacked, a previous disposition must be made by the enemy on the new Kalouga road, to turn the left and rear of this position and the marshal professed his readiness to meet the enemy upon that ground.

The movement was completed on the 3d of October; on the fourth of Oct. a smart affair of advanced guard took place with most decisive success on the side of the Russians, which was followed on the 5th of Oct. by the flag of truce sent by Buonaparte, with an overture to obtain an armistice and open a negotiation which was rejected.

At this period, several considerable detachments were made to harass the enemy, which appear to have been conducted with equal skill and success; the most important of these was the one against Verren, which place was taken by assault on the 14th of Oct.

On the 16th of Oct. several regiments of Cossacks having arrived, it was proposed to attack Murat; the attack did not take place till the 18th of Oct.

The enemy after this affair, of which I had the honour to transmit to your lordship a report in my despatch, retreated behind the little river Moza.

Buonaparte was not heard of out of Moscow or its vicinity till after this period.

The only detachment of any importance made by the French, in a northern direction was the one stationed at Demetrioff, which was recalled in great haste, as soon as the evacuation of Moscow was determined on. The Russians occupied the latter city on the 22d of Oct. with the loss of lieutenant Winzingerode most treacherously carried off, with his aide-camp, captain Narishkin, while advanced with a flag of truce to remonstrate against a protracted and unnecessary resistance on the part of the rear guard.

On the 24th of Oct. the French army was reconnoitred by an officer of Cossacks belonging to the corps of Moscow, who saw four camps, one on the new Kalouga road, near Borofsk, and three on the left bank of the Protva.

In the night of the 24th Oct. gen. Dorocoff was ordered to occupy Mala Jarosloff, a post-town on the new Kalouga road, between Borofsk and that place; that general already found it occupied in force by a French detachment; a very obstinate conflict immediately took place, in the course of which the troops on both sides were reinforced, and the town was taken and retaken 11 times. The marshal in the mean while, put his army in motion by the left, and arrived at Mala Jarosloff, establishing his head quarters two wersts to the south ward of that town, which was burned, and detaching a considerable corps under general Platow, to Medina, on his left, where he took 11 pieces of cannon, and left the ground covered with dead.

The obstinacy of this contest for Mala Jarosloff, with other circumstances, tended to confirm the field-marshal's opinion, that the object of the enemy was to force a passage to the southern provinces; and as they there were also strong grounds to believe that he was prepared to attempt a retreat upon Smolensk, and by Vilna to the Niemen, yet the

marshal deemed it necessary to direct his principal attention to the roads pointing to the southward; and with a view to obtain more complete command of them, retired to a position within 40 wersts of Kalouga, near Gorki.

Finding the enemy was moving by Verren, on Mojaiko, he again advanced upon Medina, and having received intelligence that the French head quarters were on the 30th of Oct. at Colokoi, a monastery not far from Borodino, he formed his disposition to attempt to intercept him near Smolensk.

Platow and the Cossacks having been detached for the purpose of harassing and surrounding the enemy, marshal Kutusoff reinforced gen. Millaradovitch's corps upwards of 13,000 men, and directing him to march by his left towards Viasma, the marshal himself proceeded by Spaskoi and Celinka, in a parallel direction to that allotted to general Millaradovitch, the main road forming an arch; these parallel lines of march were shorter, but exposed to greater difficulties, the roads being less practicable.

The head of gen. Millaradovitch's column reached the main road first, near Viasma; the head quarters of marshal Kutusoff were established at the village of Bikovia, a little to the southward of Viasma.

In regard to the French army, it appears by the papers of a commissary general, who was made prisoner, that they victualled twelve thousand men, but their efficient force was reduced to 85,000 at the period of their evacuation of Moscow; and that Buonaparte has contracted with a company of Jews for a supply of provisions in the line of his retreat. His guards and some select corps, have been nursed with peculiar care, and kept as much as possible out of action, and these corps appear to have preceded the retreat of the remaining troops.

It is reported that Buonaparte travels in a coach, accompanied by Murat, who has received a contusion in his knee, and Berthier.

It is hardly to be conceived that the rear guard at least can continue its march without halting, in which case, with the assistance of the light troops, the Russian army will be enabled to overtake them. They have before them the gallant and active count Wittgenstein, whose character for zeal and enterprise is so well established; and they have also on the Minsk road, to encounter admiral Tchichagoff, with the Moldavian army, which it is to be hoped may have time and notice either to unite with count Wittgenstein to wait for them on the above named road, or to move to either flank.

Marshal Kutusoff has sent out among others, a considerable detachment which was at Elnee, nearer to Smolensk, under lieutenant Shepetoff on the 1st of November, and which may have the means of intercepting delay.

Thus the fruits of the incursions of the French to Moscow, at the expense of the lives of so many brave officers and men, seem to have been limited to the burning and destruction of that city and to the ruin and desolation of the inhabitants and proprietors near the great road, and in the vicinity of Moscow; while on the other hand it will, to the latest period of history reflect lustre on the spirit and patriotism of the Russian empire.

The last accounts from Count Wittgenstein are dated the 3d of November at Tchasnik, two stages east of Lepel. After the affair of Polotzk, that general detached a corps to observe Macdonald, whilst he sent gen. Steinhill on the road to Vilna, who after having cut off the Bavarian corps from that of St. Cyr, and entirely dispersed it with the loss of cannon and colours, joined count Wittgenstein who proceeded to attack the remainder of the French under the command of Le Grand, marshal St. Cyr having retired on account of his wound. The corps was reinforced by marshal Victor at the head of 15,000 men, and having taken post near Tchasnik, was there defeated on the 31st October, by count Wittgenstein, who considering the enemy's position a good one for himself has continued to occupy it, detaching a corps to take possession of Witepsk.

Admiral Tchichagoff's last despatches of the 22d of October from Breslittow, report the success of a detachment under gen. Tchaplitz, who on the 20th October, took the Polish gen. Kenokoff with the whole of the 2d regiment of Hussars of the French guard.

Prince Schwartzenberg had crossed the bog without giving the admiral

an opportunity of bringing him to action.

Admiral Tchichagoff and count Wittgenstein had reciprocally sent detachments to ascertain each others position.

Sir Robert Wilson with his usual activity, has been in every action, and has contrived to see every remarkable occurrence: his last despatches are dated at Viasma, the 4th of November; his accounts tally with the official bulletins which have been published here.

Lord Tyrconnel has joined adm. Tchichagoff, by whom he has been received with every possible attention; his letters of the 22d October have been received by sir R. Wilson at Viasma, and by myself. His lordship speaks in high terms of the condition of all the corps of that army, which he had not until then had the means of seeing.

Having obtained the emperor's permission for major gen. Doroberg to serve as a volunteer in the army under gen. count Wittgenstein, I have given to that general officer instructions similar to those of sir Robert Wilson and lord Tyrconnel, and I expect by the next courier to have the pleasure of learning his safe arrival at the head quarters of that army.

I have the honour to be, &c.
GATHCART.

LONDON, Dec. 8.

What a change in the face of affairs has taken place in the short space of three months! what a change in the fate of that man who seemed born to control fortune, and to be almost above those vicissitudes to which the human race are subject! He entered Russia at the head of a force, perhaps including the Polish reinforcements, of not less than 300,000 men. And all this army formidable as it was in number, was rendered still more so by its science its discipline, and its experience.— This mighty army was thrown upon an empire earnestly wishing to avoid war and seeking only for neutrality, the wish to avoid war was not accompanied with the fear of encountering it, and the most determined valor was sustained and supported by the most devoted patriotism. We all recollect the language that was held by a party in this country when Russia dared to enter the list again with her tremendous opponent—no cheering hope was indulged; no generous sentiment expressed—no success anticipated—no honorable result deemed possible—her councils were sneered at—her emperor ridiculed—her generals treated with contempt—her population described as a race of slaves and barbarians and final ruin and ruin confidently predicted to her arms.

On the 14th Sept. the invader sat down in the Palace of the Czars, in the ancient capital of the Empire anticipating the immediate submission of the enemy, and promising to return in triumph and glory with his conquering army to Paris before Christmas. And two months afterwards where is this boasting conqueror—this insulting invader! In disgraceful flight, abandoning all his ideas of conquest, slinking away from his ruined army, and anxious only about his own personal escape and safety. Like Xerxes, he left his Mardonius behind him, to bring off, if possible, the wreck of his army, while he is hastening in fear and dismay over all that territory he had passed but two months before with such pomp and parade, to get back to his own country. Of the 300,000 men he carried with him into Russia, there were but 85,000 efficient firelocks remained when he evacuated Moscow. And here let us take a rapid sketch of the losses and suffering they have experienced since that period.—

The day before Buonaparte quitted Moscow was signalized by the defeat of Murat, who lost 2,500 killed and wounded, 1,000 taken prisoners, 38 pieces of cannon, and 40 wagons.

Two days after the evacuation of Moscow Buonaparte fought the battle of Mala Jarosloff, which cost him 6000 men at least and 16 pieces of cannon, and entirely deranged his plan of retreat. Platow in the mean time detached towards Smolensk, attacked the enemy at Medina on the 25th Oct. and took 11 pieces of cannon. Again, on the 1st, he came up with the retreating enemy at Kolotzk and took great part of their baggage wagons. On the 3d, general Millaradovitch followed them up, gave them a signal overthrow near Viasma, where they lost 6000 taken prisoners 2500 killed, and 63 pieces of cannon. Still

pursuing them through Viasma, he made 1000 more prisoners and took three pieces of cannon. On the 7th he entered Dorogobugsh, and made himself master of 140 wagons. Meanwhile Platow, the indefatigable Platow, with the Cossacks gave the enemy a fresh overthrow between Dorogobugsh and Doughovishina, and took 3000 prisoners, 62 pieces of cannon, besides killing and wounding 12,000.

Whilst the enemy were suffering defeat after defeat in their main army, Wittgenstein and Steinhil were ruining St. Cyr's and Victor's divisions, which lost at Polotzk and in the retreat to Lepel 6000 men taken prisoners 9 pieces of cannon, and 20 wagons.

RECAPITULATION.

Murat's loss on the 18th Oct. killed, wounded and taken,	3500
Battle of Mala Jarosloff	6000
At Medyna on the 25th Oct.	1000
At Koloz on the 1st Nov.	1000
Near Viasma, on the 3d	8500
Beyond Viasma, on the 4th	1000
At Dorogobugsh on the 7th	2000
Beyond Dorogobugsh, on 9th	15000
Near Doughovitchinia	500

Loss of the main army from the 18th Oct. to 10th Nov. 38,500

Loss of Victor and St. Cyr's divisions

At Polotzk and to Lepel	10,000
At Tchasniki	Loss not known.

The number of cannon taken within the same period amounts to 134 pieces besides what the French have buried and destroyed; and of wagons to 270 besides what have been blown up.

Thus, of the 65,000 efficient men carried away from Moscow, nearly one half have been put hors de combat on the road from Moscow to Smolensk, whilst Victor and St. Cyr's divisions, have been entirely ruined.

Thus the whole morale of the enemy is destroyed, whilst the spirits of the soldiers yielding to the pressure of defeat, sickness, and want, have left them incapable of active or vigorous exertions, and Beauharnois, who, we may be sure, draws a faithful picture of his army, declares in the two intercepted letters we have published, that his men "are driven to such desperation as to suffer themselves to be taken by the enemy."

A more deplorable account of the situation of an army cannot be conceived.—And its sufferings are not yet at an end. Beyond Smolensk we know they had not got on the 11th of last month—and before that time Wittgenstein was at Witepsk, and Orsha directly in the front, communicating, no doubt, with the Moldavian army, fresh and entire, under Tormazov and Tchichagoff. On the 9th Kutusoff was at Etna, but three days march from Smolensk, on his road to Krasnoi, which is on the west of Smolensk. Meanwhile Platow and Millaradovitch have driven Beauharnois from Dorogobuz out of the main road to Smolensk, and having forced him to fly to Doughovitchinia have increased the difficulties of his march and lengthened his distance from the French head quarters.

In this situation, full of peril, woe and want, we leave them, remarking, however, that the Austrians seem to be little inclined to share the miseries of the French, having crossed the Bar, with the apparent intention of finding that which their friends are seeking for in vain—comfortable winter quarters.

Of all the French armies—the only one entire and the most numerous (what a change!) is that under Soult. What should hinder him, if he chose, from playing the part of Monk?

MARYLAND GAZETTE.

ANNAPOLIS, THURSDAY, FEB. 4, 1813.

By casting a retrospective glance over the history of our country for the short period of 16 or 18 years past, we shall observe in the conduct of our great men the greatest inconsistency, and apparently the most wonderful changes in their political opinions. Measures which they then asserted bore the stamp of despotism, and were thought to be subversive of every thing like rational liberty, and which they exerted all their talents to frustrate, are now recommended as the only sheet anchor of our national salvation. Measures which seemed to excite the most lively apprehensions, have entirely lost their effect; and those which were viewed as absurdities, we are now told by the same men, are the greatest maxims of wisdom. It is well

known that when our countrymen were groaning in the dungeons of Barbary, and smarting under the lashes of Turkish slavery, these very men, with Jefferson and Madison at the head, exerted all their influence against an appropriation for six frigates, when it was evident that it was with a naval force only, that we could support our rights on the ocean, against that piratical nation, and chastise them for the unending barbarities inflicted on our unprotected fellow-citizens. A navy was pronounced as an idle expense, and it was better to purchase a frigate, than to expend a few thousand dollars in establishing ourselves to protect our growing commerce. When force was found necessary to be employed against France for depredations committed on the coast and insults offered to the dignity of this government, the tocsin of alarm rang in ten thousand peals through all the democratic presses, and every faction demagogus seemed to entertain the most lively apprehensions for the liberties of the great commonwealth.—These men left no stone unturned by which it was likely to render odious the federal administration; and every act, however reasonable and necessary in its nature, was tortured by ingenuity into an infringement of the rights of the people, and yelped abroad for the purpose of exciting discontent against the government. They attacked the passions of the people with the artillery of sophism, until they were subdued into belief that their public servants were no longer entitled to confidence. An army was represented as useless; an army of 5000 men dangerous; and secret sessions of congress as the certain road to despotism. Labouring in this way, they effected the grand object they had in view, viz. their own personal aggrandizement, and that only by poisoning the minds of the multitude. "Crowned heads (say they) who are machinating designs subversive of the rights of man and the happiness of nations, may well cover with an impenetrable veil their dark transactions; but republics should have no secrets; in republics the functionaries being the servants of the people, acting solely for their benefit, ought to transact all national affairs in open day." We do not pretend to say, but in the course of legislative proceedings there are occasions when secrecy may be required; but if it were wrong at that day, it would be a fair conclusion that it is so still. But as the power is shifted into other hands, the tables are completely turned, and what was vicious in the one, we are told is the maximum of virtue in the other. It could scarcely have been supposed that the apostles of democracy would ever have been compelled to the adoption of measures which but a short time before they professed so heartily to reprobate.

At the same time it was obvious to every wise and intelligent politician, that the clamours which were raised were only intended as bugbears to frighten the people, and that if the situation should again be reduced to the situation, whatever set of men held the reins of government, must resort to the same or similar mode of defence. As to carrying on a war without a navy, an army, or money, it is all ideal. Disastrous experience has long since taught administration that their fancied improvements on the art of war have proved altogether speculative, and that it is only on the ocean that the American people can ever expect to support the dignity of their national character with a transatlantic foe. They, therefore, begin to show some symptoms of returning reason, by making appropriations for an increase of our naval establishment. But an army! an army, they cried, is a dangerous weapon in the hands of republican governments; and a force at that time of 5000 men was productive of the most serious concern. Washington, said they, in heart is a tyrant, and is placed at the head of Adams's army only that he may trample on the necks of the people. Military establishments at this day are not looked on with that dread that formerly were, and now an army of 55,000

an army will be the envy of O than that with w's Stubeon," can lose terrific phantoms doubled the imagination has likewise any thing appear strange, metamorphosis of democracy We were to be rights; reduced to tion, and burdens ary exactions of d cause the rupture do it necessary trow the sum of Now, a loan ons, with the ex ceasing from thir annually, during t at, does not start or appear to ha em. Loans ma be exigencies of t hoever expects t necessity of taxati system of measur and themselves g hall then have th ratio grievances eign of terror" The army, navy, gain come into vo ect is brightening

A law has late Congress autho raise, by loan billions of dollar ed before the p onsequence of no entum. Finally with the pres ready in want o projects into exte ed not expect l about the terms. ey know very v ne government, they will lend fo they can as read ent—Therefore, will soon return t ber case which i acedision much administration of lison is a favour clamours of dem will in this case show a determ him in all his se be the expense, quences.

Mr. Gales, th as well attempt white, as to con that spy benefit 20,000 men that twelve months entertained some of this act, but e given in debate tory. It is sup this number will states contiguous from that class be unwilling to than one camp these are the ment it is not c can be very fi the probability sures us, that t consists of this if the war is eo fair make us appreciable labour eastern states v paign the last bers than they Placed at home enjoying the fi expeditions to e cient induceme ures, and the government, in only throwing of their patri every man of some number a successful when the g added to the