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HERE are some arguments of a popular kind, which they who advance them do not themselves believe. Of this sort is that argument made use of by our enemy, to induce the states of Europe to arm themselves against France. That she is ambitious, and aspires to universal monarchy. This is not a new date; nevertheless, because it was once believed, it may be still believed, and therefore it is judged proper still to advance it. We shall take the liberty to examine the ground of this charge, and to see with what justice it has at any time been brought, or may now be brought, against our ally.

From the middle of the fifteenth century, when Charles V. had united in himself the successions of the house of Burgundy and Castile to his paternal inheritance, the house of Austria had become the dominant power of Europe; and, like "a stone cut from the mountain," rolled down with great rapidity, and bid fair to destroy every power that stood in the way of it. Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, possessing all those qualities that constitute the hero, at the head of the most powerful and warlike nation of the North, and assisted by the subsidies of France, had opposed the formidable bulk of this power, and commenced hostilities the 24th of June, 1630, in the city of Rugen. But though his war was long and glorious to the Swedes, and many noble captains signified themselves in the contention, yet the battle of Northlingen, September 6, 1634, gave to the emperor a decided superiority, and from this time France alone remained to oppose, by her councils and her arms, this power, which, though divided into two branches, the empire under Ferdinand III, Spain and its dependencies under Philip IV, the one the brother, and the other, the son of Charles V. yet continued one in interest, and united in affection, and might be justly styled the rising power of Europe. France alone opposed this power, and for more than half an age was the bulwark against it. What liberty exists in that quarter of the globe was kindled, kept alive, and defended by her. She gave liberty, and independence to the states of Holland, in which they were established by the famous treaty of nine years, concluded at Antwerp, April, 1609. She preserved the possessions, and the liberty of the princes and the states of Italy, who were ready to be swallowed up by that power which now occupied the kingdoms of Naples and of Sicily. She secured the balance of the empire, in giving vigour to its ancient laws, in precluding limits to the sovereignty of the emperor, in obtaining to the states the liberty of making alliances amongst themselves and with strangers, by which means the parts of the empire were rendered free.

It was not till about the middle of the sixteenth century, that France began to take the ascendancy in Europe, and having greatly humbled the power of Austria, to be herself the object of jealousy with other powers. Cardinal Mazarine, who was then minister to Louis XIV. far from moderating the ambition of the young monarch, rather inflamed it, and France, clad with her past success, and the reputation of her generals, and trusting to that order which began to be established in her finances, and to the progress of her commerce, continued till to say that it was necessary to humble the house of Austria, which had been already humbled sufficiently. The death of Philip IV. served for a pretext of the war which she desired. Louis pretended, that the queen his wife had the right of inheritance of the Low Countries, and, in 1667, he entered there, to take possession of those provinces which the court of Madrid had refused to cede to him.

The success of the French arms was rapid, and the triple alliance between the states of Holland, England, and Sweden, was the fruit of that confederation which was produced by them. The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, which followed quickly after, somewhat calmed their fears.

Nevertheless, there still remained in the minds of men some apprehensions of the rising power of France. The former fears sprang up again in all their force when Louis XIV. renewed his claim and made war upon the states in 1672. They were industriously propagated through all the courts of Europe. It was said that the ambition of the court of France threatened them with the same dangers that the successors of Charles V. had called them to apprehend. These rumours spread every where by the prince of Orange, and those engaged in his interest, were at the same time supported by the courts of Vienna and of Madrid. This was the origin of that idea which afterwards so greatly prevailed, that France had aspired to universal monarchy.

The prince of Orange who in the revolution of 1688 in England was placed on the throne of that kingdom was the avowed enemy of France. In the year of 1672 he had published that there was an end of the liberty of Europe in the French monarchy was not immediately retained, and kept within that degree of power in which it had been placed at the treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659. There was nothing heard, but of opposing the house of Austria to the house of Bourbon, and of balancing their credit and their success, as how, them in equilibrium, but after the revolution in England, the prince of Orange, now William III. took up other principles, and thought no longer of retaining, but of ruining the power of France.

In this spirit was associated that treaty concluded at Vienna, May 25, 1683, between the emperor and the states general, and afterwards called the grand alliance, because all the enemies of France acceded to it. By this treaty it was stipulated that no sort of the contracting parties should admit any proposal of accommodation, until each had received a full satisfaction for the wrong which they had believed themselves to have sustained. The government of Louis was too intelligent to expect to rise from this insubstantial union of so many opposite interests had thrown it, by any other means than by procuring a dissolution of this union. While therefore the war was carried on with vigour, a negotiation was let on foot with the several powers. The success was equal to the prudence of the measures, and the peace of Nimuegen comprehending the states general, Spain, Sweden, and the empire; the king of Denmark, the elector of Brandenburg, the duke of Brunswick Lunenburgh, Zell and Woollenbutte, and Frederick William elector of Brandenburg, was concluded in 1678 and 1679.

The ambition of Louis XIV. and his resentment to the powers combined against him, were the true causes of the war of 1688. The rights of the dukes of Orleans, to the succession of her brother the elector palatine, and those of cardinal Fullenberge to the archbishopric of Cologne, were but pretexts for it. In order to disconcert the projects of his enemy, Louis thought it necessary to prevent them, and to suspend the progress of the imperial in Hungary, and to raise the confidence of the Turks after the taking of Belgrade.

The war was carried on for many years, with extraordinary efforts on both sides; and the success of the French arms, which in any other conjuncture would have been sufficient to have reduced the allies to ask a peace, or at least not to reject it, answered no other end but to irritate them still more, and to give scope to those principles of jealousy and hatred which had first engaged them in the war. In seeing that the conqueror was weakened by advantages too clearly purchased, the vanquished became obstinate to their disgraces, and patiently supported the decline of their commerce, and the bankruptcy of their finances, now totally exhausted. While they supported armies once or twice more considerable than those which they had before the peace of the Pyrenees, the states richest in men and money must have been reduced. France, though victorious, was reduced to seek expedients and resources to carry on the war, a demonstrative evidence that she was not set up to extend conquests, and that her enemies had no ground to apprehend that she was about to

subjugate Europe. The monarch tired of a war which burthened his subjects, sincerely desired peace. He neglected nothing which could give weight to the advances which he made. He pressed finally the king of Sweden to offer his mediation, and declared, in the most plain, the conditions on which he was ready to make a peace, but Europe was accustomed to be afraid of him, and the more he gave proofs of moderation, the less he persuaded any one. No one would believe that he was sincere, and all the world suspected some design concealed under these offers. The idea of universal monarchy was still in their minds, and whether he made war, or offered peace, it was suspected to be with some view to this great object.

It was not until 1693 that Louis XV. was able to bring his enemies to listen to terms of agreement, and not till three years afterwards, August 28, 1696, that a peace, concluded at Turin, between this court and that of Versailles, became the signal of a general peace, confirmed by the contracting parties, at Ryswick, in 1697.

It was a full evidence, that the prince of Orange, who had first disseminated the ideas of universal monarchy on the part of France, did not seriously believe there was any ground for them, that he himself afterwards, when he became king of England, and was established on the throne, entered into two partition treaties with the court of France, the first of which was signed at the Hague, October 11, 1698; some time before the conclusion of the peace of Ryswick. Louis XIV. had a claim to the succession of the Spanish monarchy, in right of Maria Theresa, his wife, and the Dauphin had married the daughter of the king of Spain. William III. king of England, was anxious to secure a barrier to the Dutch in the Netherlands, and for this reason entered into an agreement with the king of France, to make a partition of the Spanish monarchy. By this treaty, the electoral prince of Bavaria, who, in supposing the validity of the renunciation of Maria Theresa, to her rights, was the nearest heir of Charles II. king of Spain, was to possess the whole inheritance, except some states, which were to be remembered in favour of the Dauphin, and the arch-duke Charles, son of the emperor. To the one was given the two Sicilies, the adjacent isles, the places on the coast of Italy, the marquisate of Anjou, and the province of Guipuzcoa; the other was to enjoy the Italian states, the duchy of Milan, and the duchy of Parma. The death of the young prince of Bavaria, which happened February 17, 1699, made it necessary to change the partition, and a new negotiation was let on foot, and France, England, and the states general agreed by a second treaty of partition, signed at London, March 3, 1700, and at the Hague the 25th of the same month, to add to the provinces already promised to the Dauphin, the duchy of Lorraine and of Bar, by way of alliance to the house of Lorraine. The arch-duke Charles was to possess the remaining part of the succession to the Spanish monarchy. In fine, it was regulated, that the crown of Spain and the Indies should never belong to a prince, who was emperor of King of the Romans, the king of France, or the Dauphin.

It was this partition treaty, entered into by William III. king of England, that rendered it advisable for Charles II. king of Spain, who died in 1704, to leave his crown by testament to the Dauphin. Louis XIV. by accepting this will, ran counter to the wishes of King William, who, as we have already said, had concerted a part of the Spanish Netherlands, to be a barrier to the states of Holland, for whom, as having been their landlord, he had entertained a particular affection, and hoped for more stable support to his views of aggrandisement from them, than from the people of England, who had reduced the prerogative of their princes to narrow limits, and whose affections, he well knew, were fluctuating and uncertain. It was to revenge himself of the French king for departing from the last treaty of partition, that William more excited the ideas of unlimited ambition on the part of France, and brought several of the powers of Europe to engage in war against that monarchy. England was but the dupe of

WARD, 1710. on the 1st, a likely O.M. about 11 let 1100 r large had our's coun- ort waitcoo country clok pair of lea- a Rocking, chended that ver into Vur when a small onu Morton will appo- ward it taken and a further sides aliter- SCOTT. ec. 1719- is to let w t Indies, and and Council, oials as (pa- No Jun. d.) rd. to the first after this no- week; for an effect from ince-George's as Shaw, for am and Ann. DER-ON. E. OTTERY class. Thee vantage to the with the pre- of tickets in the Justice, in this, are n- dication re- of to other. IDSON. REWARD. er 10, 1779. n M. d. l. e. Ki- Tuesday night HOONE, she has been berry, her bot- or new, as ar- over the cab- and min- and have some but the barbe- when Rolan- e robbery wa- who also ca- woman, the small boy of a- cover taking up delivers them- own, shall re- out, and dolla- rson and Mr. PSON. LAWS REWARD. er 16, 1779. a substitute, on- ber instant, a- okl last spring, ind foot white, the torn of a hal- hoofs split, fil- paces and 300. he home to the- Jones, black- 100 dollars re- 1000 160 dol- CopperSmith. nesday the 4th ation of Vachel river, ES, confiding- ren; one of the and understand- w a- Charles-Scow.