

learned of the resolution when he heard Moynihan telling Barbara Walters about it on the NBC *Today* show.

The State Department was laggard too. The resolution would, as Moynihan declared, abandon the U.N.'s "selective morality" and ask for amnesty in all countries, not just in such objects of Third World indignation as South Africa and Chile. But in order for the U.S. not to be accused of selective morality, its delegation first had to be able to vote with the U.N. majority in condemning Chilean human-rights violations. Chile is a sensitive subject for Kissinger; as National Security Adviser he participated in Nixon Administration decisions to undermine former President Salvador Allende. Approval for the U.S. delegation now to vote against Chile was delayed and delayed in Washington. On the last day, Kissinger was finally reached by phone while en route to a speech in Pittsburgh, and instructions authorizing a vote against Chile were rushed to the American delegation with just six minutes to spare. The amnesty resolution, introduced the next day, was deformed by hostile Third World and Communist amendments and withdrawn by the U.S. the following week, without a vote. No credit to U.S. diplomacy, it succeeded only in worsening relations between Moynihan and the State Department.

Lame Duck. Last week's showdown at the White House did not bury Moynihan's differences with Washington, and the announcement made no mention of how long Moynihan would stay in his post. At the U.N. many considered him a lame duck, his effectiveness curtailed. This would please his critics but not settle the question: How should the U.S. view the U.N., as a place for conciliation or for confrontation?

Third World radicals, notably the Cubans and some Arab and African extremists, are not interested in conciliation. But Third World moderates are interested, and they claim that Moynihan has made it harder for them. Europeans, while agreeing with Moynihan on the basic point that developing countries can no longer abuse the Western democracies in public and seek their aid in private, are still worried about keeping their lines open to African, Arab and Asian countries, where they retain important economic ties.

Kissinger has insisted to *TIME* that he and Moynihan have had "no policy disagreements, only disagreements over the use of adjectives." With another U.N. ambassador, those adjectives might change, but not the fast-crystallizing American attitude toward the U.N. that Moynihan voices: "We will just not be rolled over."


REPUBLICANS

Revolt from the Center?

"People tend to want to follow the beaten path. The difficulty is that the beaten path doesn't seem to be leading anywhere."

Slightly apologetic about his boldness, Republican Senator Charles McCurdy ("Mac") Mathias told a group of Washington reporters last week that he may run as a "third force" independent for President. Reason: he fears both parties are plodding along a "beaten path" that leads toward winning elections—or losing them—but not to solutions of national problems. To be sure, the Maryland moderate's greater concern is over the course his own party is taking. He is appalled at President Ford's skewing

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MARYLAND SENATOR CHARLES MATHIAS
Never ducking the hard ones.

to the right to counter Ronald Reagan's appeal to conservatives. Moreover, he thinks Ford has done this in such a fumbling way that Reagan will probably win the nomination.

With only 21% of the voters identifying themselves as Republicans in the Gallup poll, Mac Mathias is concerned that the G.O.P. may so narrow its base as to "sign its own death warrant." He sees himself as a "centrist" able to appeal to independents and middle-of-the-road voters disenchanted with both parties. But why not fight from within his own party for the nomination? Because that, he believes, would only pour "water on Reagan's wheel." The entrance of any moderate or liberal Republican would undoubtedly draw more G.O.P. votes away from Ford than Reagan, thus increasing Reagan's chances of embarrassing Ford in the primaries.

In heavily Democratic Maryland,

Mathias, 53, has won four terms to the House and two to the Senate by garnering votes from independents and moderates of both parties. But he is relatively unknown nationally. Before he decides whether to run, he plans to travel "to find out who the independents are." He doubts that most of them consider appealing either the negativism of a George Wallace or the left-wing populism of a Fred Harris, but he has yet to see a poll "sophisticated enough to say where the uncommitted voters are." Wherever they are, Mathias feels the independents will soon spurn both parties. Thus he predicts that a third force in 1976 or later "will bear fruit, and it is very important to measure the dimensions of it now."

Affable, witty and widely respected in Congress, Mathias was first elected to the House in 1960. He and F. Bradford Morse, then a Massachusetts Congressman, founded the Wednesday Club—Republican moderates in the House—in 1963. A group meeting regularly to exchange ideas, the club often antagonized the party leadership. Mathias led fights within his party for civil rights legislation, supported such welfare programs as the Job Corps and aid to Appalachia, and questioned the growth of defense budgets.

Public Jobs. Elected to the Senate in 1968, he helped to organize a similar Wednesday Club in that chamber. As early as 1969, he sent a prophetic message on behalf of Republican moderates to President Nixon, who had been ignoring them. Mathias warned, "You don't need us now, but you will later." Mathias was an early critic of the Viet Nam War. With Pennsylvania's Richard Schweiker, he was one of only two Republican Senators on Nixon's celebrated enemies list—a point in which he now takes pride.

Mathias emphasizes the need to put more people to work, on public jobs if necessary. Fuller employment, he argues, is urgently needed to help cut welfare costs and ease racial problems. He defends busing to integrate schools as "a temporary need while we seek a solution."

Mathias recognizes that any quest for the presidency would be quixotic. He has no organization, no campaign fund, practically no support from other congressional Republican moderates. He would have to get on the 1976 ballot through the difficult petition requirements of each state. And if he did, he might simply siphon some votes away from whoever seemed the more moderate of the major-party candidates.

So is Mathias really serious? "Well," he replies, "what in the world is the use of spending your life fighting for a position of some influence and then abdicating? I have not tried to duck the hard ones." Mac Mathias could not have chosen a harder one than the fomenting of a political uprising from the middle.