Marvin Mandel, Governor                        1855

96)    The Joint Committee on Ethics shall select its own chairman
and vice-chairman, except that both such persons shall not be selected
from members representing the same House. The Committee shall
propose amendments to the Rules of the House of Delegates and the
Senate concerning legislative ethics. The Committee shall adopt regu-
lations specifying a procedure for the disclosure by members of the
General Assembly of any transaction with the State involving a
monetary consideration. A copy of these regulations shall be sup-
plied every member of the General Assembly. After the adoption of
these regulations, no member of the General Assembly shall enter
into any transaction with the State involving a monetary considera-
tion without disclosing such transaction pursuant to the provisions
of these regulations. The Committee, upon request of any member
of the General Assembly, shall render an advisory opinion regarding
the legislative ethics concerning an action taken or contemplated
being taken by that member. This Committee shall be empowered
to meet and render an advisory opinion at any time, including dates
when the General Assembly is not convened in regular or special
sessions. The opinions and findings of the Committee shall be filed
with the Speaker of the House of Delegates, the President of the
Senate and the Secretary of State, and shall be available for public
scrutiny.

97)     (a) A legislator's personal interest conflicts with the public's
interest if it tends to impair his independence of judgment. The
conflict disqualifies him from voting upon any question and from
attempting to influence any legislation to which it relates.

(b)   It is presumed that personal interest tends to impair a legis-
lator's independence of judgment in the following circumstances:

(1)  Having or acquiring a direct financial interest, distinct from
that of the general public, in an enterprise which would be affected
by his vote or proposed legislation.

(2)  When the legislator benefits financially from a close economic
association with a person whom the legislator knows, or from the
facts is presumed to know, has a direct financial interest in an enter-
prise, which enterprise or interest would be affected by his vote on
proposed legislation differently from like enterprises or interests.

(3)  When the legislator benefits financially from a close economic
association with a person who is lobbying or who has employed a
lobbyist to propose legislation or to influence his vote on proposed
legislation.

(4)   Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any gift, loan, or
payment of significant value from a person who would be affected
by or who has an interest in an enterprise which would be affected
by his vote on proposed legislation.

(c)   "Close economic association" includes the individual's em-
ployer, employees, and partners in business and professional enter-
prises, corporations in which he owns 10% or more of the outstand-
ing capital stocks, and corporations in which he is an officer, director,
or agent.

98)     (a) The presumption and disqualification arising under the
above rule are suspended if a legislator with an apparent conflict files
with the Committee his sworn statement which describes circum-