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1
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and final passage. In the second house, three additional
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2
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checks of the same nature appear. If changes are made in
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3
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the second house, there is a further check in the house
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4
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of origin and even in some cases by conference committee
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5
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action.
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6
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Should the proposed legislation pass, there are other
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7
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checks still available. The governor has a veto and the
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8
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legislature a chance to reconsider and accept or override
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9
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his action. Moreover, in most cases, the law is subject
|
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10
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to popular referendum and to judicial review. If the
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11
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pressures of public opinion and interest groups be added
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12
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to all these, we have a formidable array of obstructions
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13
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indeed.
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14
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How essential is it that all these checks be preserved?
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15
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Specifically, how effective is the two-house system in
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16
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preventing "hasty and ill-considered" legislation? Objective
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17
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tests are difficult to apply. But there are some comparisons
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18
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that can be made and some related data available — enough
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19
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to raise serious doubts as to the value of bicameralism as
|
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20
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a desirable or necessary check to legislation. In a study
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21
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of committee procedure in the Maryland General Assembly some
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