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Another claim for unicameralism, of course,
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it brings the lobbyist out in the open. We covered that.
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MR. SCANLAN: How is that? I don't follow
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that conclusion. Why does it bring them out in the open
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any more?
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DR. MICHENER; The claim here is based on
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the reasoning that in two houses the legislator is sub-
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jected to influence from the lobbyists, again at the con-
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ference committee, and you do not know just why or how the
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final version is arrived at.
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In a unicameral house, where the votes are
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on public record, demanding the votes for or against the
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amendment, and if he is voting consistently in accord with
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the wishes of the lobbyists, this will soon become apparent
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This is not apparent in a bicameral legislature because
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there are too many ways to exert influence not out in the
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open. Even if you have open, recorded votes every day,
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you still have the possibility of prior arrangements, that
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the two chambers will vote different ways and you have to
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have something come out of conference. It may come out of
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conference in a fashion not passed exactly -- I should say
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