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THE WHARF CASE. 375
all persons may lawfully come for the purpose of lading or unlad-
ing their goods, he may be allowed by law to demand and receive
certain specified and reasonable tolls for its use; because of his
having expressly undertaken to be at all the charge of maintaining
and repairing it. But in all cases, where the entire right of soil
has been vested in the public, or where the wharf itself, or the
place on which it has been built by public authority, has been con-
demned, or dedicated in any way to the use of the public, there no
toll of any kind can be demanded; for, a toll is in the nature of a
tax upon the people; and no tax of any description can be levied
without the express sanction of the General Assembly, (a) Such
a wharf may, however, be so regulated as to be made most gene-
rally and equally beneficial to all. (b) And where a wharf, like a
road, or a street, has been once laid open and made free to all, no
toll of any kind can afterwards be charged for the use of it, by any
individual or body politic, who may happen to be the owner of the
soil on which the wharf has been erected, or over which the road
or street passes, (e) Nor, upon the principles admitted, in regard
to the tonnage or port duties imposed by the before mentioned acts
of Assembly, for the benefit of the port of Baltimore, and assented
to by Congress, can the Legislature of the state, after a wharf or
street, along the shore of a port, had been once dedicated to the
public, free of all charge, impose any toll so as to infringe upon
the rights secured, or the power granted to the federal govern-
ment; which authorizes the charging of wharfage for the landing
of articles other than the productions of this state, (d)
In this case, therefore, it is not only important as regards the
interests of these contending parties themselves, that the title to
charge wharfage for the use of these wharves should be clearly
shewn; but it is also necessary that the right now claimed should
be distinctly ascertained for the benefit of the people at large, and
to prevent the federal and state governments from being brought
into collision, by means of a wharfage duty collected under a state
authority, pushing aside, or interfering with those on importations
proposed to be collected under the federal government.
(a) Warrington v. Mosely, 4 Mod. 320; Brett v. Beales, 22 Com. Law Rep.
349; 1744, ch. 22, s. 15; 1753, ch. 28; 1803, ch. 64, s. 4 and 11; 1813, ch. 48;
1816, ch, 257; 1818, ch. 164; 1819, ch. 108; 1820, ch. 72; 1821, ch. 64 and 200.—
(b) 1817, ch. 71, s. 7.—(c) Hale de Portibus, 77, 78; The King v. Winstanley, 3
Exch. Hep. 344; 1817, ch. 71, s. 7, and ch. 225, s. 7.—(d) 1827, ch. 162, s. 4; Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 196; Brown v. The State of Maryland, 12 Wheat 442;
The Steam Boat Company v. Livingston, 1 Hopkins, 209.
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