672 THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.

constitutionally effected by the whole General Assembly, may
nevertheless be fairly brought about by either the Senate, or the
House of Delegates alone.

There is a consistency and a harmony in our constitution, which
can, in no respect, be disturbed without being productive of some
pernicious consequences. The several parts, and the whole toge-
ther, have been, and are still further susceptible of being amended,
improved, and re-invigorated; but, the collision of one part against
another, has never failed to be attended with the most serious mis-
chief. The breaking of a single chord produces the harshest disso-
nance throughout. The Declaration of Rights declares, " that the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government ought to
be for ever separate and distinct from each other." This division
and separation is the peculiar characteristic and great excellence of
our government. It is the grand bulwark of all our rights, and
every citizen has the deepest interest in its most sacred preserva-
tion. Each of these several departments should be kept, and
should feel it to be its highest honour, to keep strictly within the
constitutional boundaries assigned to it. The legislature should
not encroach upon the judiciary, nor upon the executive; nor
should either of those departments trench upon each other, or
upon the legislative.

Commissions during good behaviour, and salaries secured dur-
ing the continuance of those commissions, constitute that strong
well marked boundary between the judiciary and the other two
departments. Thus founded and sustained, the judges are, and
can be—and without it they cannot be—a firm, efficient, co-ordi-
nate check and balance in the government. It is this indepen-
dency of character, that enables the judiciary to shield the citizen
against unconstitutional legislation; and against unwarranted wrong
and violence from the wealthy and the influential.

But, it would be a mockery to expect of judges who are depen-
dent upon legislators for their continuance in office, perhaps for
their bread, a firmness -and independency necessary for such pur-
poses. No judge, thus dependent, would have the boldness to
thwart a House of Delegates in their most ill-advised and wanton
sports with the constitution. The sage declaration of the patriots
of 1776, "That all persons invested with the legislative or execu-
tive powers of government are the trustees of the public, and as such
accountable for their conduct," would be smothered or forgotten.
The Senators would not dare to consider themselves as a co-ordi-