96 BINNEY'S CASE.—2 BLAND.

100 * A grant of the power of eminent domain is one which must be con-

strued strictly; it cannot be exercised for any but a public pur-
pose; and. in general, does not admit of any repetition.

The jurisdiction of this Court in regard to persons or things not within
the State; and the uncontrolled concurrent jurisdiction of the judiciary
of this State, with that of the neighboring States, in some peculiar cases.
(d)

The estate in a canal, being in its nature, fixed realty; though declared to
be personalty, must, nevertheless, be governed by the law of the State
in which the canal is.

The termination of a canal at the tide in a certain district, must mean at
a convenient port in that district.

The usage as to the termination of canals.

The difference between river and canal navigation.

No parol proof, nor any part of the proceedings of either branch of the
Legislature, can be admitted to explain the language of an Act of As-
sembly; except as to private Acts, in which there may be a latent am-
biguity, (e)

ON the 22d of June, 1829, Amos Binney, of Boston, in Massa-
chusetts, filed this bill against The President and Directors
of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company and Isaac McCord,
praying" for an injunction to prohibit the doing of certain
acts, which, he alleged, would be greatly and irreparably injurious
to his rights and property—and, on the same day, an injunction
was granted as prayed; with leave to the defendants to move for
its dissolution, at any time after filing their answers; on giving to
the plaintiff, or his solicitor, ten days notice thereof. Upon which
an injunction was issued accordingly.

On the 15th of July, 1829, the plaintiff filed his petition, in
which he stated, that the injunction after having been served, had
been disobeyed by the defendants—whereupon he prayed an
attachment, upon which, on the same day, writs of attachment
were ordered, and issued returnable forthwith. On the 21st of the

(d) Cited in State v. Railway Co. 18 Md. 213; Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 211.
See White v. White, 7 G. & J. 208, note; Worthington v. Lee, 61 Md. 542.

(e) In U. S. v. R. R. Co. 91 U. S. 79, the Court said: "In construing an
Act of Congress, we are not at liberty to recur to the views of individual mem-
bers in debate, nor to consider the motives which influenced them to vote
for or against its passage. The Act itself speaks the will of Congress, and
this is to be ascertained from the language used. But Courts, in construing
a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of the times when it
passed; and this is frequently necessary in order to ascertain the reason as
well as the meaning of particular provisions in it." In Blake v. Nat. Bank,
23 Wallace, 307, a badly expressed and apparently contradictory enactment
was interpreted by a reference to to the Journals of Congress, where it ap-
peared that the peculiar phraseology was the result of an amendment intro-
duced without due reference to the language of the original bill. In Dis-
trict of Col. v. Market Co. 108 U. S. 254, the Court refused to accept the de-
bates reported as occurring in Congress at the time of the passage of an Act