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sentative of the State shall show probable cause for its action.
We have a paper which purports to be an order of removal
by the Governor of Maryland, in the exercise of our unusual
authority against the Police Commissioners of Baltimore; I
admit the fact of such an order. It is served on Thursday ;
on Friday commissions are given to Messrs. Young and Val-
iant. They take the prescribed oaths, and, full of these pur-
poses, Mr. Valiant says, in answer to certain questons that
they have resolved on Saturday morning to ask Messrs.
Hindes and Wood to vacate their office. If they didn't do it
they will turn them out by a posse. A. posse is a body of men
to exert force. Messrs. Hindes and Wood had 2,000 men,
armed, at their backs, to support them. Against these the
posse would not go unarmed, but armed to the teeth. If these
are not sufficient, then they will call upon the army of the
United States. That is an agreement between Young and
Valiant to use force to turn these parties out of possession.
The declared purpose of both is that a posse is to be sum-
moned to put them in forcible possession. Not finding the
commissioners, they publish a proclamation, arrogating to
themselves the power of police commissioners. That is an
overt act. They authorize the sheriff to swear in two thous-
and men to assist them. They impose unlawful oaths upon
these men. Are not these overt acts in furtherance of their
conspiracy? You find the commissioners arrested. You find
the sheriff arrested. Still, the officers of the Sheriff continue
to swear in that posse, almost within view of the court. Is
not that evidence of the sheriff's conspiracy. There was no
evidence of actual riot, but there was an unlawful assemblage
about his office, and they were being sworn in, in the execu-
tion of this conspiracy. A grand jury could indict him as a
principal in this conspiracy. He was implicated in overt acts
tending to accomplish the object of the conspiracy. That was
sufficient grounds upon which the court could hold him under
bpnds to keep the peace. These warrants were the usual pro-
cess looking to the ultimate action of the grand jury. But
the commitment is final judgment, and no further action is to
be taken until the party gives security to keep the peace.

Where is the case that will justify you in going behind
those commitments in default of security to keep the peace ?
In the case of Maulsby, the commitment was until he produc-
ed certain papers. But the grand jury having expired, the
function of the commitment was ended. You did not ques-
tion the validity of the warrant at the time of the commit-
ment. The commitment ought to be for life. If the party is
contumacious, and will not obey the order, he ought to be rej
tained in confinement. Upon all the analogies of the case
—a refusal to give bail to keep the peacr—the commitment
is in the nature of final execution. The party would be re-
lieved at the next term ef the court, if the grand jury did not