section one of the convention bill implies
everything that is contained in this oath.
The only difference is this: that in the one
case it is drawn out in the form of an oath,
while in the other case it was left to the judgment
of the judges of election to draw out
the very same thing by as many questions as
they pleased. And it is well known that a
great many of the judges had question upon
question printed, which they put to the
voters. And if those questions were an-
swered under oath, they would amount to
more than this oath. One of the questions
which I am told some of the judges asked of
the voters, was, if the two armies came to
fight, which army would they prefer to see
succeed? Now I ask whether that is not the
precise point reached by this oath, whether
they have expressed a desire for the triumph
of the enemy? Therefore I say this is no
broader than the other. On the contrary,
you gave the judges more power under the
convention bill, which did not deline what
questions they might ask a voter, than you
do under this oath, which does define what
is to be asked. I make that as an argument,
in addition to what has already been urged
by the gentleman from Baltimore county (Mr.
Ridgely.)
I wish now to reply to one argument urged
here again and again by the gentleman from
Prince George's (Mr. Clarke.) He made the
same argument when he made his first speech,
and he made it again to-day, in reference
to the status of a man who had been in the
rebel army, he look the ground that because
the supreme court of the United States, in
their decisions in reference to the prize cases,
had said that the southern confederacy; or
those in armed rebellion against the govern-
ment were belligerents, therefore they occu-
pied the position of foreigners, and could not
vote by virtue of that very position. I say
that the supreme court of the United States
have made no such decision, because that
point was never before them. The court was
called upon to decide whether the laws of war
applied to a civil war so far as vessels en-
deavoring to run the blockade were con-
cerned. The court did decide that the laws
of war did apply to the property, but not to
the persons, except so far. as to acknowledge
that they were belligerents for the time being,
in order to enable the government to enforce
the right of blockade. My point is this, that
white they have decided that those in armed
rebellion were belligerents for the time being,
in order to enforce the right of blockade,
they also decided that these belligerents still
owed allegiance to the government of the
United States, and could be punished as
traitors. Now, if the position is true, and I
will show that that is the construction upon
that decision by Hon. Reverdy Johnson,
one of the most eminent lawyers of the Uni-
ted States, that they are only belligerents
64 |
for the time being, then I ask how can you
deprive them of the right to vote, until you
have by due course of law, convicted them
as traitors? If they are still held to be sub-
jects, and to owe allegiance to the govern-
ment of the United States, then they can re-
turn and claim and exercise all their rights
under that government until they have been
properly prosecuted, and judgment of con-
demnation entered against them.
1 beg leave to read a few extracts from that
decision. It will be found in Black's Re-
ports, vol. 2, page 667, &c. In that decision
Justice Grier says:
"They claim to be in arms to establish
their liberty and independence, in order to
become asovereign State, while the sovereign
party treats them as insurgents and rebels,
who owe allegiance, and who should be pun-
ished with death for their treason."
That he states to be their status. Then he
goes on to quote Vattel :
'"A civil war,' says Vattel, 'breaks the
bands of society and government, or at least
suspends their force and effect; it produces
in the nation two independent parties, who
consider each other as enemies, and acknowl-
edge no common judge. These two parties
therefore, must necessarily be considered as
constituting, at least for a time, two sepa-
rate bodies, two distinct societies. Having
no common superior to judge between them,
they stand in precisely the same predicament
as two nations who engage in a contest and
have recourse to arms.' "
On page 669 he says:
" It is not the less a civil war, with bellig-
erent parties in hostile array, because it may
be called an ' insurrection ' by one side, and
the insurgents be considered as rebels or
traitors."
Not the less a civil war because they are
rebels or traitors, showing that the govern-
ment has always held them las rebels or trai-
tors, and not as public enemies except for the
purposes of that decision.
'? It is not necessary that the independence
of the revolted province or State be acknowledged,
in order to constitute it a party bel-
ligerent in a war, according to the law of
nations."
But I will not take up further time with
that.
Now I wish to read the opinion of Hon.
Reverdy Johnson, on the point of the status
of these people after this war is over, to show
how utterly inconsistent it is with the posi-
tion of the gentleman from Prince George's
(Mr. Clarke.) Mr. Johnson, in a speech de-
livered in the senate of the United States,
April 5, 1864, says :
"He (Mr. Sherman, of Ohio,) tells us, and
in this he was, as I think, partly correct, but
for his object substantially incorrect, that the
supreme court of the United States, at the
last term, in what are called the prize cases, |
