

Maryland & America

1940 TO 1980

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with lemonade and cookies, proud that one of their own, Thurgood Marshall, had been the landmark case's chief attorney. The next day Governor McKeldin and Mayor D'Alesandro issued statements hailing the decision and promising to uphold the law. A week later Superintendent Fischer called the school board into session and gave them a carefully prepared plan for compliance, not for 1955, as required, but for the fall of 1954. The board consulted with the state attorney general to make sure the Supreme Court outranked the city ordinances, and on June 3 the board voted unanimously to proceed. The following day the Catholic archbishop announced that the state's Catholic schools would voluntarily comply, and two weeks after that the University of Maryland announced it would accept undergraduate blacks to its classes and dormitories. It seemed as though the Supreme Court had encouraged state leadership to do what it had wanted to do anyway.¹⁹

That fall integration in Baltimore proceeded fairly easily, as about two hundred blacks entered white schools widely scattered through the city. Hundreds of photographers and reporters flocked to the first city in the nation to comply with the Court's order; the news magazines published profiles of the city, and CBS made a special documentary. After a month pickets appeared around several schools in the blue-collar area of south Baltimore, white high school gangs urged a student strike, and crowds around the schools became unruly. The pride of civic leaders was stronger than the protest, however. Churches and media denounced the mobs. The police arrested strike leaders, the courts issued injunctions against picketing, and the protest collapsed. The abortive protest had come either too late or too early, but it seemed to have cleared the air. The middle-class liberals had triumphed. Opposition had been crushed, and integration in Baltimore proceeded with little incident, slowly increasing momentum. The following year, 1955, about 7 percent of the city's black pupils attended school with whites; in 1956, 14 percent; and in 1957, 26 percent.²⁰

With the *Brown* decision, and with Baltimore leading the way in implementation, the period of litigation and behind-the-scenes leadership was ready to give way to something larger. The quiet hope of an oppressed people was about to burst forth into a crusade.

The Movement, 1955-1968

The civil rights movement—The Movement, as participants like to say—was a wave of almost religious sentiment shared by blacks and whites together in favor of justice for all people. It lasted for about thirteen years, from 1955 to 1968, beginning with the black bus boycott in Alabama, gaining imperus from the Gandhi-like sit-ins that spread to Maryland in the early 1960s, culminating in the march of a million people to Washington in the summer of 1963 to hear Martin Luther King proclaim his dream and in the enactment of the federal and state civil rights laws of 1964 and 1965. Blacks led the movement, demanding justice, but it was equally a white movement, especially of the educated middle class, inspiring idealism and brotherhood. "We

Shall Overcome" was the movement's hymn. It was the triumph of hope; it was the birth of bitterness and despair.

The movement had its beginning in Montgomery, Alabama, on December 5, 1955, when Rosa Parks, who was black, sat down in the wrong bus seat and stubbornly decided not to move. The next Sunday her hitherto unknown preacher, Martin Luther King, urged blacks in the city to boycott the buses, and for almost a year blacks walked or made up carpools to get to work, until the bus company neared bankruptcy and decided that blacks could sit anywhere. The boycott was an old weapon, one Lillie May Jackson had used, but the serene dignity of Rosa Parks and the inspiring benevolence of Dr. King's sermons were new weapons, and they were aimed at the nation's conscience.

In Maryland the transition to popular crusade came slowly. It began to appear in community pride over the first school integration, in newspaper and television coverage of the Alabama boycott, and in public support for accelerating local change. The determinedly upper-middle-class *Sunpapers* reflected the mood. In the 1920s they were outspokenly hostile to blacks as a source of crime, a threat to middle-class values. By the 1930s the anti-black stance faded, but the papers still pandered to prejudice by conspicuously identifying miscreants by race and by conspicuously ignoring black achievements. By the 1940s this attitude in turn had evolved to patronizing sympathy, and by the mid 1950s to full support. The major dailies in Washington and Wilmington followed a similar course, as did the national news magazines and networks, with the small-town Maryland newspapers lagging by about a decade. In 1955 the *Sunpapers* launched a major front-page series entitled "The City We Live In," which was an exposé of injustice to blacks.²¹ The papers gave sympathetic coverage to the Alabama bus boycott. Society pages began to cover black weddings, and sports-page editors launched a small crusade for the integration of athletic teams and facilities.

Encouraged by Governor McKeldin and Mayor D'Alesandro, other politicians began to discover that liberal racial stands were popular not only with black voters but with a growing number of whites, as well, and the bureaucracy began to take up the cause of black civil rights. In 1955 the Baltimore City Council authorized publication of a 249-page book, *A City in Transition*, boasting of the city's progress in civil rights and openly promoting the need for more. The leadership was leading. The following year, after long debate, the council passed a far-reaching equal employment ordinance, patterned after a similar one in Philadelphia, which outlawed racial discrimination for employment by city or private firms within Baltimore. There was no means of enforcement, but the ordinance created a small city bureaucracy to publicize violations and to lobby for still stronger legislation. In 1956 Governor McKeldin ended the separate listing of black and white applicants for state jobs. In 1959 there were at least thirty antisegregation bills and resolutions offered in the General Assembly, most of them introduced by delegates from Baltimore, the Washington suburbs, and the western counties.²²

The newspapers and the state civil rights bureaucracies kept a run-

ning box score of their victories. The great efforts here involved not so much the behind-the-scenes manipulation that was evident in the early 1950s, but more the development of public opinion.

- 1955 Baltimore department stores allow blacks to try on clothes
McKeldin ends segregation in the National Guard
- 1956 Baltimore Equal Employment Ordinance
McKeldin eliminates separate lists for state job applicants
- 1957 Most Montgomery County restaurants agree to serve blacks
Most state professional organizations (except dentists) agree
to accept black members
- 1958 Most Baltimore movies open to blacks
Most Baltimore first-class hotels accommodate blacks
- 1959 Prince George's and western Maryland restaurants begin to
integrate²³

Blacks remained the center of the movement in Maryland, but whites also poured in, organizations multiplied, and leadership diffused. Mostly white organizations dedicated to ending segregation included the Council of Churches, Clergymen's Interfaith Organization, Commission on Human Relations, Americans for Democratic Action, AFL-CIO, the League of Women Voters, Panel of American Women, and the American Civil Liberties Union. Lillie May Jackson's NAACP swelled with white members. Mostly black organizations, like the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), also appeared. The black organizations particularly emphasized political action, and the first statewide black political leaders emerged. In 1954 Harry Cole from Baltimore became the first black delegate to the General Assembly, and in 1958 Verda Welcome and Irma Dixon were elected. There were major black voting registration drives in 1957 and 1960, adding at least 50,000 black voters to the rolls, and by 1968 ten blacks were delegates in the General Assembly.²⁴

The movement's grandeur grew in proportion to the bigotry of its opponents. In 1957 the nation watched federal paratroopers in battle gear escort frightened black children to school through the howling mobs of Little Rock. In February 1960 people watched while black college students in coat and tie waited to be served at the Woolworth lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina, while white hoodlums poked at them and jeered. Here was precisely the Gandhi-King technique: civil disobedience to unjust laws, dramatizing the gulf between justice and injustice, gaining attention to promote reasonable negotiation. Within weeks college students everywhere had discovered the most effective way yet to promote the cause of racial justice.

In Maryland, just one month after Greensboro, black students from Morgan State College, joined by whites from Johns Hopkins and Goucher, staged a sit-in that won desegregation of the lunch counters in the Northwood Shopping Center near the Morgan campus in Baltimore. Warmed by their easy victory, they moved downtown to picket the major department stores to employ black clerks. Black students

from Maryland State College began integrating Salisbury lunch counters that fall, and restaurants and movie theaters the following spring. White students in College Park launched a boycott of the Little Tavern, which was the last town eating establishment to refuse black customers, and then they began an intermittent three-year picketing campaign to get black clerks in the local stores and banks. In Baltimore and the Washington suburbs, students were thrilled to discover and pounce on a recalcitrant merchant.²⁵

The most publicized sit-in was organized by mostly white clergy to protest black exclusion from the Gwynn Oak Amusement Park in Baltimore County. Baltimore rabbis seem to have made the first contacts; the Presbyterian president of the World Council of Churches, Eugene Carson Blake, arrived from New York to participate; and Baltimore's Roman Catholic Cardinal Lawrence Shehan provided a pastoral letter saying, "We [Catholics] have a special obligation to place ourselves in the forefront to remove the injustices and discriminations which remain." On July 4, 1963, the clergy led protestors to the park, where 275 were arrested, including 36 clergy. Three days later the protestors reappeared for another 100 arrests, this time including 7 clergy. Newspapers and television featured the story, sermons rang out all over the world, and a month later, after publicized negotiations, the amusement park welcomed blacks.²⁶

From 1960 to 1963 the desegregation movement spread slowly to other parts of the state, notably the fifty-mile stretch of roadhouses along Route 40 between Baltimore and the Delaware line. For years African diplomats traveling between Washington and New York had been discomfited by the segregation, and had lodged protests and received soothing apologies. In March 1961, however, President John F. Kennedy, newly inaugurated, determined to make an issue of this segregation through an elaborate public apology to the *chargé d'affaires* from Sierra Leone. This invited other Africans to make similar complaints, and, willingly enough, the African delegations banded together for a joint protest. Kennedy negotiated with Governor Tawes, who issued a profuse apology and urged the restaurants, at least, to serve black diplomats. Reporters from the *Afro-American* dressed in lion-skin togas to dramatize the absurdity: foreign blacks could usually get service but local blacks could not. Baltimore and Philadelphia students organized freedom rides, by which well-dressed blacks sought arrest and publicity for trespassing in segregated facilities. Dozens were arrested through the summer of 1961, but the climax came in September when three Philadelphia blacks refused to pay their fifty-dollar fine, refused to post bail, and went on a seventeen-day hunger strike to protest their jailing. For weeks the affair made headlines, until the judge relented and released the prisoners.

All this merely fueled the issue. The Kennedy government, still pretending foreign relations were at stake, sent State Department agents into the towns along Route 40 to promote integration. The Congress of Racial Equality called for a freedom ride on November 11 during which two thousand students, black and white, would be willing to accept arrest for trespassing. The restaurateurs, hemmed in by local intransigence and ordinances, begged Governor Tawes to inter-

vene, and after a week of frantic negotiations between Tawes's office, local governments, restaurateurs, the State Department, and CORE, a compromise settlement emerged: thirty-five of about forty-seven restaurants would accept black customers, CORE would call off its march, and Governor Tawes would introduce legislation at the next General Assembly session which would bar discrimination in public accommodations forever.²⁷

Many students were disappointed to be denied arrest for a noble cause, and a group from Hopkins, Goucher, and Morgan rallied to lament their easy triumph and to look for new frontiers. Here was the essence of a revolution: the movement was outrunning its participants, victories were coming faster than the proponents could handle them. The students agreed to contact their colleagues in the Eastern Shore colleges and to launch a spring sit-in offensive in Easton, Chestertown, and Cambridge.²⁸

The time had come by 1962 for political action that would legally eliminate segregation once and for all. Tawes promised it for the 1962 General Assembly, and public opinion seemed to be calling for it. Polls showed the majority of voters still marginally opposed, but opinion was shifting rapidly, and newspapers and volunteer organizations were clamoring for action. The opposition knew theirs was a rear-guard cause. They lacked ideology and organization and largely acknowledged their biases as uncharitable. The opposition was strongest, of course, in the eastern and southern counties, where blacks were most numerous and where racial segregation was not easily replaced by economic segregation.

Tawes, true to his promise, in January 1962, offered his open accommodations bill outlawing segregation in restaurants, hotels, theaters, stores, beaches, and recreational facilities. Legislative leaders, fearful that the issue would deadlock the assembly, agreed to table the bill for a special session of the assembly in March, immediately following regular business. By then the bill was toned down, in Maryland's peculiar way, to apply only to Baltimore and eight counties (Baltimore, Charles, Montgomery, Prince George's, Frederick, Washington, Allegany, and Garrett), omitting the remaining fifteen. Still, probably never since reconstruction had a session been so dramatic, as legislative banter and horseplay gave way to evangelical passion and tears. The bill failed, sixty in favor, forty-three opposed, and nineteen abstaining, lacking two votes to obtain a majority of the votes cast. Proponents of brotherhood wept, but of course they would be back. The Baltimore City Council and the Montgomery County Council, feeling that their people had been rebuffed by the state's reactionaries, passed their own open accommodations ordinances.²⁹

The 1962 setback was temporary, for late that same year came a court-mandated legislative reapportionment that sharply reduced rural power, and early in the 1963 legislative session Tawes's open accommodations bill passed by a vote of ninety-three to twenty-eight. It applied to Baltimore and twelve counties, with Howard, Harford, Cecil, and Anne Arundel added to the list of the previous year. The assembly gave the state Commission on Interracial Problems and Relations power to enforce the act through subpoenas and cease and desist

orders. In the summer of 1963 came the great march on Washington and Martin Luther King's speech, and in the fall came President Kennedy's assassination. In March 1964 the Maryland General Assembly voted eighty-three to fifty to apply open accommodations to the entire state. Finally, three months later, President Lyndon Johnson persuaded Congress to pass a similar law, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, hardly different from the Maryland law. From 1963 to 1968, even while civil rights idealism gave way to violence, state and federal legislation proceeded almost in tandem, with Maryland generally a little bit ahead (see table 7.2).

Maryland's 1965 Fair Employment Act passed without fanfare and took effect before the federal statute outlawing job discrimination both in hiring and promoting by both public and private employers. Two years later the state passed an Open Housing Act, more than a year ahead of corresponding federal legislation, which outlawed discrimination in the sale of new houses and apartments. Voters petitioned the act to referendum and defeated it, 343,447 to 275,781, but the referendum made no difference, for by then the federal law was in effect. More important than the state or federal housing law was the Maryland law, hardly noticed, which forbade lenders from discriminating against house buyers, even of older houses. For Maryland and the nation, legislation marked the high point of civil rights sentiment, even though the legislation came after that sentiment was sharply on the wane. Legislation lagged behind opinion, and opinion lagged behind events.³⁰

From the beginning the movement had been led by blacks, and the reasons were simply that blacks demanded a better place for themselves, that affluence in World War II provided an economic base for take-off, that black ballots were effective, that legal breakthroughs like the *Brown* decision made progress feasible, and that each success in the movement fueled the next one. It was also, however, a white movement. White court decisions and executive action allowed blacks to secure better jobs, to ride the buses, and integrate the schools. Within twenty years after World War II, whites accepted economic,

Table 7.2. Civil Rights Legislation

Date	Maryland	United States
1963	Open Accommodations for twelve counties	
1964	Open Accommodations for entire state	Civil Rights Law: Open Accommodations and Fair Employment after one year
1965	Fair Employment effective immediately	Voting Rights (did not apply to Maryland)
1967	Open Housing (passed by assembly but defeated by voter referendum)	
1968	Open Housing for home financing (lenders cannot refuse blacks in white areas)	Open Housing

educational, and social integration in a way that had been inconceivable twenty years before. The reasons for the change in white opinion are harder to explain.

Partly the answer lay in the Western world's embarrassment over Hitler's racism and in the changed conclusions of social scientists who once supported but now denounced notions of racial inferiority. Maybe part of the answer lay in the vague concept of cyclical idealism, which had reoccurred in the abolitionist movement of the 1850s, in the populism of the 1890s, and in the New Deal of the 1930s. This concept gained support from the civil rights movement's close association with the fervid antiwar, antipoverty, and environmental concerns of the 1960s. One of the most interesting explanations of the civil rights movement was essentially Marxist—the idea that the middle class was so secure by the 1950s that it no longer needed a subservient class, that machinery had reduced the number of unacceptable jobs so that subjugation was no longer necessary (that dishwashers and frozen foods, in other words, had eliminated the need for black servants), that the middle class, as a result of its security and comfort, was willing for those on the bottom rung to rise as high as they could. Whatever the reasons, America was experiencing a change of revolutionary proportions.

*The Violent Phase,
1963–1968*

Revolutions, however, usually turn violent and devour their own, and this, too, happened in Maryland. In June 1963, in the little Eastern Shore town of Cambridge (population 11,000), the hitherto peaceful sit-ins erupted into the movement's first urban rioting. The significance of Cambridge was that it signaled the transition of blacks from victims to part-instigators of violence. *The scene of action was shifting from the South, where peaceful demonstrations promoted legislation that ended segregation, to the North, where blacks protested because they were poor and where protests did little to alleviate poverty. Beginning in Cambridge, the black goal of integration mixed with the new black goal of separation. "We Shall Overcome" evolved into "Burn, Baby, Burn."*

Salisbury and Cambridge, the two largest towns on the Eastern Shore, had been progressing toward integration almost as admirably as Baltimore and the Washington suburbs. Although the Eastern Shore towns were generally of southern traditions, and both were one-third black, they were proud of recent progress. In Salisbury, sit-ins of black students from nearby Maryland State College brought lunch counter integration in 1960 and general restaurant integration in 1961. Cambridge, if anything, had a better record. A token black had served on the city council since 1900, attending all meetings except the annual banquet, from which he was excluded. His colleagues sent his dinner on a paper plate to his home. Similarly, one or two establishment blacks served on the school board, hospital board, housing authority, and zoning commission, and three served on the police force. *The town establishment considered itself realistic, even progressive.* Unemployment was moderately high, for the seafood packing industry was in a depression, but nine small manufacturers had arrived

between 1958 and 1963, and all accepted black workers. A town-sponsored Equal Opportunity Commission actively promoted jobs for blacks. In 1962 three of the town's four major restaurants accepted blacks, although the movie theater, bowling alley, and about eighteen quick-food lunch counters were still negotiating or were firmly segregated. In January 1963 about twenty students, black and white, arrived from *Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania and other colleges* in New York and Baltimore to stage a sit-in and lead demonstrations. The outside element was a little different, stimulating local opposition, but still not alarming.³¹

What was different in Cambridge was the emergence of Gloria Richardson, a strong woman, like Lillie May Jackson in many ways, but of a younger and angrier generation. Richardson was scion of the town's black establishment, granddaughter of Maynaidier St. Clair, who had been the black city councilman for fifty years. She was the daughter of Charles St. Clair, who was a funeral director and probably the town's richest black. She was one of the few blacks from the town to have gone away to college—to Howard University, where she was a brilliant student—and one of the few college graduates to have returned. But things went badly. She wanted to teach, but for reasons of discrimination or depression there were no jobs. Her marriage failed. For a while she was on unemployment, and then she obtained a job in a factory and was fired for lack of manual dexterity. She was one of the ablest persons in the county, but she was a failure, and she was angry.

During the winter and spring of 1963 the protestors grew increasingly strident. The local black establishment recoiled from them, denouncing the protests as counterproductive, as worsening race relations rather than improving them. *To the activists, however, harmony was not a goal, and the protests were obviously gaining more support from heretofore nonpolitical street blacks than they were losing from moderates.* Intellectually, the movement was evolving from acceptance of a few to rights for all—to militance and black pride. Lillie May Jackson's Baltimore NAACP withdrew from Cambridge and was replaced by leaders from the more militant Philadelphia NAACP and by leaders from CORE and SNCC who came from Baltimore, New York, and Atlanta. The forms of protest included sit-ins, picketing, parades, and boycotts—unmixed with negotiations, as in the past, centering not on the moderate establishments that might yield but, defiantly, on the most intransigent. The purpose of the demonstrations changed; they no longer were meant to impress others with the justice of a cause, they were to vent generations of anger. Integration was less important than the discovery of pride in standing up to whitey. It was in this atmosphere that Richardson emerged, not as the instigator, originally, but as the toughest, smartest, most militant, most admired among the other protestors, the person who knew the area best, the natural leader. People around her called themselves the Non-Violent Action Committee. Delegates from the Philadelphia NAACP, CORE, and SNCC waited for Richardson's orders.³²

Black militance bred opposition, but not primarily in the city council. Opposition was represented by the police chief, Brice A. Kinna-



Gloria Richardson, proud and angry, gained control of black protesters in Cambridge in 1963 by passionate rhetoric and disdain for the bayonets. *Courtesy of the Baltimore News American.*

mon, and by aggressive whites, who were also often unemployed, often from the rural countryside and attracted into the little town, like blacks, for the excitement that mass emotion provided. *Tempers flared, fights broke out, arrests mounted—all this caused the black movement to grow in size and intensity. As the black movement outgrew its instigators, its most outspoken participants emerged as leaders.*

The reasons for the transformation from idealism to anger, then, lay mostly in the process by which it occurred. It lay in the frustration of blacks in the middle and northern states for whom integration was not enough. It lay in the anger of unemployed blacks and the shift in participation from students to the unemployed. It lay in the evolution of leadership from people with attainable goals to the crowd itself. Idealism died when the protest grew larger than the aim it was meant to achieve.

From March to June the transformation from prayerful sit-ins to

riots was evident almost from day to day. The city government accepted sit-ins as long as they were not disruptive, and pickets as long as they did not impede access, but many whites were resentful and taunting, and the protestors grew increasingly aggressive, and police made arrests. By mid-May about seventy blacks and five whites had been arrested. On May 15 a swelling crowd of blacks surrounded the city jail, and the police, claiming to feel threatened, arrested sixty-two more. Mayor Calvin Mawbray called for the state Commission on Interracial Problems to investigate and make recommendations, and he called on Richardson to curtail demonstrations in exchange for a moratorium on arrests, but Richardson angrily refused, and the demonstrations and arrests continued. On a balmy June 10, loudspeaker trucks toured the mostly black second ward calling for a massive turnout, and that night there were twenty-five arrests. The enraged or excited prisoners destroyed the plumbing and mattresses in their cells.³³

The following night black youths began stoning white cars and smashing white-owned store windows, and the first shooting began. During the next two days, five whites were wounded by gunfire, five stores and the home of the moderate black on the school board were firebombed, and many blacks and whites were hurt by rocks and fighting. The city petitioned Governor Tawes to declare martial law, and 475 troops arrived with fixed bayonets.³⁴

The unprecedented rioting was both exciting and frightening. News and television coverage was mostly sympathetic to the blacks, as civil rights reporting from the South had usually been, thus emboldening Richardson's followers and further disorienting the town's whites. Everyone, especially the town government, talked of negotiations, as if the situation amounted to war. Tawes first invited both sides to Annapolis, and when Richardson refused to attend, he sent delegates to Cambridge with an offer to obtain an open accommodations ordinance through the Cambridge City Council in exchange for a promise to end demonstrations. Richardson would have none of it. Meanwhile United States Attorney General Robert Kennedy was in touch with Mayor Mawbray, and on Sunday morning, June 16, he met in Washington with the Cambridge black leaders: Richardson, her friend Barbara Jew, Philip Savage of the Philadelphia NAACP, and Reginald Robinson of SNCC. Kennedy explained that in exchange for a one-year moratorium on demonstrations, he was able to promise that Cambridge would provide immediate equal service to blacks in its twenty-four eating places, would accept an open accommodations ordinance that would outlaw all types of discrimination, and would integrate its schools for every grade in the fall term; that a biracial commission would be created to seek jobs for blacks in the town; and that the federal government would guarantee a new public housing program. Savage and Robinson were delighted, and Kennedy thought all had agreed. Three days later, at a rally in Cambridge, Richardson announced the gains, boasted of what militance had accomplished, and pointedly denied that she had made any assurances that demonstrations would cease. Kennedy believed Richardson had betrayed him. That evening Tawes dispatched another 500 troops.³⁵

The troops remained for twenty-four months, until May 1965, and racial tension remained great in the little town, but the first Cambridge crisis was over. Integration was general, but grudging. The open accommodations ordinance, proposed as an amendment to the city charter, actually failed. Mayor Mawbray had calculated that he and the white establishment could carry half the white votes, and blacks, who constituted 30 percent of the total vote, would put it over. In fact, almost two-thirds of the whites voted against the ordinance, and with Richardson urging blacks to stay away from the polls, only half of them cast ballots. By that time, however, the matter was moot, for state and federal laws applied.³⁶

What happened in Cambridge could have happened elsewhere, for the climax of idealism everywhere evolved toward anger and resistance. In February 1963 more than four hundred students from Morgan State University were arrested for pressing into suburban theaters, and the following February, Maryland State College protests in Princess Anne, not far from Cambridge, evoked a vicious reaction by white hoodlums and police that sent sixty students to hospitals. At Glen Echo outside Washington, and at Gwynn Oak and Patterson Park in Baltimore, there were demonstrations, rock-throwing, broken windows, fights, and arrests that involved aggression on both sides.³⁷

Even more threatening was the changing rhetoric on both sides that played on fear and hatred. In the spring of 1964 George Wallace, the southern symbol of segregation, entered the presidential primary against Lyndon Johnson and concentrated much of his campaign in Maryland. He pointedly began his Maryland campaign in Cambridge, and for the next two days there was rock-throwing, and the National Guard felt barely in control. Wallace came to the University of Maryland where eight thousand students turned out for the largest political rally the campus had ever staged. Mostly the students jeered, but a few weeks later Wallace received 42 percent of the state's Democratic vote.³⁸

Tension mounted through the summer of 1964, still one year before any significant rioting took place outside of Cambridge, as rumors of violence spread. Governor Tawes and Mayor McKeldin issued a joint statement, heralded by newspaper headlines, that "outside agitators" were descending on Baltimore, that there was danger of "looting, destruction and bloodshed," that police were to remain on alert and judges were to extend maximum penalties for incitement of riot, and that contingency plans were being made for a ban on liquor sales and a curfew.³⁹

Central to the growing sensitivity and to continued progress in black rights was the role of national, state, and local human rights bureaucracies. The state Commission on Interracial Problems had a paid staff of eight by 1965, plus scores of volunteers, and most county and town governments had equivalent organizations. Officially designed to promote good race relations and to enforce the new civil rights legislation, they usually interpreted their role, reasonably enough, to be the promotion of black rights, and the best way to do this, obviously, was by promoting an awareness among blacks of the injustices they were still suffering. The organizations had the budgets

and official standings of professionals, and they had the fervor of amateurs. Through the 1960s the tone of the agencies' reports changed—from pleasure at what had been accomplished to anger at what had not been. The Baltimore Community Relations Committee boasted in 1965 of distributing 149,000 copies of its bitter pamphlet, "Are You Being Discriminated Against?" Other pamphlets spoke of the "seething frustration" of the oppressed and disadvantaged. The posture of the bureaucracy was changing; rather than reacting against injustice, the agencies were actively promoting black progress. Government was almost urging revolution against itself.⁴⁰

Elsewhere in the country black power slogans spread and rioting erupted. Harlem rioted in the summer of 1964, Watts in 1965 left thirty-four dead, Chicago was the major disruption in 1966, and in 1967 tanks rolled through the streets of Newark and Detroit firing machine guns into apartments, killing about one hundred. CORE and SNCC both adopted the black power slogans in 1966, and the Black Panthers emerged with their strange fusion of sensitivity and savagery. CORE held its 1966 convention in Baltimore and announced that this would be its target city for the coming year. Mayor McKeldin bravely addressed the convention, embracing black power for its efforts to improve black living conditions, and promising to cooperate fully. For the rest of the year, for as long as McKeldin was in office, Baltimore maintained its uneasy peace.⁴¹

Again, however, little Cambridge provided the trigger. The National Guard had left in 1965, and extremists on both sides looked to the town as a symbol. In July 1967 the National State Rights party held a racist rally in Cambridge. Richardson, who had been on the sidelines, replied in an angry radio talk, and on July 24 the famous H. Rap Brown, head of SNCC, arrived to deliver what rhetoricians have called one of the great speeches of American history. Standing on the hood of a car in front of a burned-out building, he held the black crowd at fever pitch for almost an hour. Reporters on the edge of the crowd recorded the speech and the cheers. The speech was in the language of the ghetto, vulgar and funny, admiring violence if not actually advocating it, full of hatred and overstatement. Almost immediately after Brown finished there was shooting. Brown left town, but fires began to break out in the black ward. The police chief ordered the fire trucks to watch from a nearby shopping center. Blacks pleaded in vain for help while the black school and two blocks of the district burned to the ground.⁴²

In Cambridge, the blacks were finally crushed. The National Guard returned briefly, but there was no more trouble. Richardson and other militants left town. Brown maneuvered through indictments and trials, jumped bail and went underground, and four years later was killed by police in New York after an apparent robbery. Cambridge had heralded the start of violence, and it also heralded its inevitable conclusion, even though a larger episode was yet to come with Agnew and the burning of Baltimore.

Spiro Agnew was elected governor in November 1966, elected, ironically, as a civil rights liberal over George P. Mahoney, who had captured the Democratic nomination by playing on conservative white



Burn, Baby, Burn! In 1967, H. Rap Brown visited Cambridge and that night the black district went up in smoke while the white fire department watched from a nearby shopping center. Courtesy of the *Baltimore News American*.

racial fears. Actually, Agnew was neutral rather than liberal on racial matters, and he was a conservative on everything else, and he was from the most racially conservative county in the state. Now, in much the same way that Eisenhower and Nixon were freed by their elections to be as liberal as they wanted on communism, Agnew was freed to be as conservative as he wanted on race. His biographers agree that his turning point from neutralism came in late 1967, when he received the recording of the Rap Brown speech. He played it over and over, invited others in to listen, and judged them by their reaction. Moderate black legislators like Verda Welcome and Parren Mitchell and whites like McKeldin were accustomed to the ghetto language of overstatement and were amused, but Agnew's more sheltered friends were shocked, as he was. To Agnew, the world was divided between most blacks and liberals, who half-admired the Rap Brown oration, and conservatives, who saw civilization at stake, and Agnew waited for the chance to strike for civilization.⁴³

The chance came quickly, on April 4, 1968, when about 450 black students from Bowie State College marched on the State House to see



Baltimore, like most industrial cities, erupted in flames after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. In Baltimore, 1,049 businesses were destroyed before 12,000 United States troops established order. Courtesy of the *Baltimore Sun*.

the governor, demanding improved dormitories and classrooms. There was no violence, but Agnew refused to see them and called for the state police to mobilize. The police ordered the students to leave the State House, and then surrounded them and arrested 227. To underline his resolve, Agnew ordered the troops to proceed immediately to Bowie, where they arrived at seven in the evening to close the institution, giving the remaining students five minutes to vacate their dormitories and leave the campus.⁴⁴

Momentarily in Baltimore black moderates and militants came together in dismay and outrage, and tension mounted. That evening Martin Luther King was assassinated in Memphis. Most black communities erupted in one way or another, but now, for the first time, Baltimore was as ready for eruption as any other. It would have happened with or without Bowie, with Agnew or anyone else as governor, for it was mostly senseless black aggression, but now there was particular provocation as well.

The looting began on Gay Street in mid-afternoon, Saturday, April 6, about when it started in other cities, two days after King's death. Teenagers were in the forefront, attacking clothing and grocery stores, adults followed, attacking liquor and appliance stores. Drunkenness and hilarity mixed with anger; looting mixed with stoning cars and firebombing. All Saturday night the rioting increased, spreading over

the entire city, and Agnew called out the National Guard. All day Sunday it continued to grow in intensity, and Agnew called it an insurrection and asked for federal troops. On Monday and Tuesday armored vehicles patrolled the streets, and the rioting grew sporadic and then died. The troops in Baltimore refused to use gunfire, and the death toll was light. Altogether there were 11,900 guardsmen and troops, 5,512 arrests, 1,208 major fires, 1,049 businesses destroyed, and 6 deaths. Washington's statistics were similar: 13,600 troops, 5,310 arrests, 919 fires, 10 deaths. There were few disturbances in the suburbs or in the smaller towns of the state.⁴⁵

Agnew insisted on the last word, to add insult to injury. On Wednesday he called in one hundred leaders of the moderate black community of Baltimore: Lillie May Jackson and the ministers, people who were exhausted from walking the streets for days trying to restore order. Instead of thanking them, as they had expected, Agnew berated them as cowards who were secretly allied with the criminals and who shared responsibility for what had occurred. About eighty people in the audience walked out, and Agnew refused to allow those who remained to explain themselves. Black leaders felt as shattered as their communities, all the more that the insult made Agnew famous as the man who had spoken back, the man Richard Nixon and the backlash could embrace for vice-president.⁴⁶

The 1968 riots were the end, so suddenly, of the hope that had blossomed into fervor and then anger. The revolution was over, *exhausted in extremism*. *There could be no more sit-ins or demonstrations for civil rights*. Whites, already pushed out of the movement by black separatism, turned their anger against the war in Vietnam and their idealism to environmentalism and the rights of women, the aged, homosexuals, and Indians. Blacks felt crushed by the riots, they still faced problems of lagging education and poverty, and they were forced to swallow their anger. Still, not much had been lost. Legal rights were secure, schools and jobs were becoming available, and the civil rights bureaucracy was just gearing up.

Affirmative Action, 1965 and After

By the summer of 1968 the impetus to forward motion was gone, but the movement did not go backward. The federal and state civil rights laws that marked the movement's culmination created the bureaucracies that guaranteed it immortality. The federal law created eight major agencies to promote fairness in voting, employment, housing, education, and federal contracts.⁴⁷ Mostly the federal agencies encouraged state and local agencies to undertake the day-to-day enforcement of the laws, but they provided the direction and much of the financial support. The federal agencies took the lead in promoting legislation for other minority groups—women, the aged, and the handicapped—and the federal government provided funds especially for job training programs. Most of all, however, the federal bureaucracy developed the concept of positive initiatives to promote the status of minorities.

The phrase "affirmative action" came from Lyndon Johnson's 1965 Executive Order 11246, in which he instructed government agencies to issue contracts and grants only to those firms that offered a plan,

complete with goals and timetables, in which they demonstrated their positive efforts to enhance the status of minority groups. By 1970 firms were aware that their affirmative actions were an important factor in receiving contracts, and local governments were aware that their plans were an important factor in receiving grants. Suddenly big corporations and local governments were scurrying to find new ways of pleasing the federal bureaucracy. The affirmative actions of the firms doing business with the government became a yardstick of rights against which grievances were brought against smaller businesses. Companies and local agencies which had taken a progressive step by eliminating racial information on employment forms in the mid-1960s reversed themselves in the early 1970s in order to monitor and encourage the employment of blacks.⁴⁸

State agencies were more important than national ones, both for enforcing the civil rights laws and for promoting affirmative action. The central agency was the old Commission on Interracial Problems, which was reorganized in 1968 as the Maryland Commission on Human Relations. Primarily it heard grievances—about two thousand each year—mostly from people with employment complaints, but also in housing and public accommodation matters. The agency lobbied and obtained new state legislation, especially to extend its coverage from race to sex, age, the handicapped, homosexuals, and even the obese. It conducted workshops and issued pamphlets to make people aware of their rights, and it worked with state and local government offices, with unions and professional associations, and especially with private companies, either behind the scenes or through court action, to promote not only nondiscriminatory but also affirmative action programs. It worked with agencies such as police departments that had problems with minorities, and with entire communities that felt abused by a lack of public services, by construction projects, or by unusual ethnic tensions. From 1968 to 1978 its professional staff increased from thirteen to sixty-nine. By 1978 at least half of its attention went to the problems of white minorities. The divergence of the bureaucracy from its original purpose was a loss to blacks, whose condition remained such an overwhelming problem of American life.⁴⁹

Far more important than the federal or state agencies were the affirmative action divisions in almost every personnel office in Maryland—in every department of state government, every county and town, every school system, and almost every major corporation. Operated at department or company expense, the divisions were necessary for demonstrating initiatives in employing and promoting minorities and for allowing employees to file grievances according to their rights under the civil rights laws. Such operations were the price an agency paid for receiving federal contracts and grants. Usually staffed by minorities, the operations were eager and effective. Larger state departments, counties, and institutions like Bethlehem Steel employed from six to thirty affirmative action officers; throughout the state there was one for every thousand or so employees. Few jobs were left unmonitored.⁵⁰

White acceptance of the new programs was surprisingly complai-