

THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD STRIKE OF 1877

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BY early August of 1877 "the most extensive and deplorable workingmen's strike" ever to take place "in this or any other country"¹ was over, less than three weeks after it had begun. Railroad employees, and their sympathizers among canal men, miners, box makers, sawyers, and longshoremens, who were allowed to reclaim their jobs were reporting again for work. Only the intractable anthracite miners, many of them in the railways' captive pits, held out in Eastern Pennsylvania. Respectable people were relieved that the "first gun of the Commune" had been silenced, the eruption of the "labor volcano" controlled, "the insurrection" suppressed.² In seven states Federal troops relaxed their vigil, and in these and others, state militia slowly disbanded. Ten major and several small railroads, mainly eastern trunk lines, triumphantly began running their trains on time and, happily for speculators and investors, the prices of railway securities remained high.³ A score of rail terminals, relay and marshaling centers, meanwhile, counted more than a hundred trainmen, laborers, bystanders, and tramps dead, and uncounted hundreds were injured or wounded. Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Chicago, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Harrisburg, Reading, Scranton and a dozen smaller communities calculated property damage in millions of dollars, surveyed destruction in their midst and remembered hours of violence and terror. With the strike over, however, there was time to reflect on the tragedy.

Armed with hindsight, observers easily detected the tinder that had fed the holocaust of July and August, for 1877 started off as

¹ Editorial in *The Nation*, July 26, 1877.

² See Allan Pinkerton, *Strikes, Communists, Tramps, and Detectives* (London, 1878), p. 147. Baltimore *American*, July 23, 1877. *The Locomotive Engineers Monthly Journal*, XI (1877), 415.

³ *The Nation*, Aug. 2, 1877.

a year of deep disturbances. As background for the pervasive atmosphere of alarm there loomed the great political event itself. In March, amid electoral frauds and railroad lobbying, sectional logrolling and personal bargains—all linked with expectations of civil conflict—the disputed presidential contest was finally compromised and Rutherford Hayes was uneasily installed in the White House. The nation, the compromise, and the Republican economic policies over which Hayes presided, however, were not more secure. Nor could they have been. Currency agitation, strikes, business failures, and agricultural unrest continued.⁴ Although a handful of Molly Maguires, the very symbols of social disorder, was hanged in June, their departure reminded many men of "dangerous classes" and of the industries packed with social dynamite. Hence when General Sherman told New York's Chamber of Commerce that American government could not subsist without the Army, that without this force the people would become another mob, it was hard to tell, given the times, whether this was special pleading for Army appropriations or a prophetic warning.⁵

Overriding other causes of crisis, nonetheless, were two harsh facts: the nation was entering its fourth year of hard times, and the country's major industrial interests, the railroads, were complaining that the depression was proving to be an unsupportable incubus.

Whatever achievements or shortcomings historians may attribute to particular railroads, several things were true of the railroad industry generally in 1877.

First, all roads had complex financial problems which they had not mastered. There were difficulties, despite generous subsidies, in meeting construction costs and in some places making lines pay, difficulties in competing with rival roads and pernicious practices, difficulties resulting from the then merely debatable practice of stock watering, from over-capitalization, from unwise speculation and investment.

Second, railroad relations with several important groups were on the whole bad. Many stockholders had been swindled or treated with irresponsible disregard. Numerous farmers were still

⁴ For general background see, C. Vann Woodward, *Reunion and Reaction* (Boston, 1951).

⁵ Baltimore *Sun*, July 23, 1877, citing the General's speech of May. Also, see *American*, June 22, 1877.

opposed to rate and storage policies, and granger agitation remained significant. Certain business interests, too, such as Mid-western grain dealers or small mine operators in Eastern coal fields, feared the roads' privileged position as carriers. And, not the least of the dissident groups were workingmen who under duress of the depression protested against what they considered high-handed, patronizing, or paternalistic policies of railway managers and the "unfairness" of company wage and promotional plans.

Third, despite, or perhaps because of special privileges from chartering states, railroad leaders seldom questioned their rights to the exercise of great power. There were few of them who did not regard themselves as free to interpret the economic laws of the day to suit their predilections or as entitled to serve as masters and guardians of the nation's economic destiny.

Fourth, and finally, the railroads wielded in state and national circles a political as well as an economic influence that was probably second to none. Indeed, it was so vast that Henry Adams would later suggest, and William Allen White would confirm, that a whole generation and many of its legislators, for better or for worse, were figuratively mortgaged to the railroads.⁶

The history of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, it was once noted, could be divided into three stages: "before Garrett, Garrett, and after Garrett."⁷ Certainly John W. Garrett impressed both his friends and his enemies enormously, and this was not due solely to his great physical bulk. In many respects Garrett almost fits the stereotype of the "captain of industry": dynamic among his peers, commanding, forceful and resourceful in the face of problems. During the war he participated in Lincoln's cabinet meetings and a high valuation was placed on his services to the Union. Afterwards, under his aegis the B & O was weaned away from possession by the State of Maryland. Its empire was ex-

⁶ On the preceding points see, *Final Report of the Industrial Commission* (Washington, 1902), XIX, 259-481. *U. S. Senate Committee upon the Relations between Labor and Capital* (Washington, 1885), I, 317, 605-610, 1080-1083; II, 469-500, 746-747, 964-981. *U. S. Bureau of Labor, 3rd Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor, 1887. Strikes and Lockouts* (Washington, 1888), pp. 1067-1072. Thomas Cochran, *Railroad Leaders: 1845-1890* (Cambridge, 1953). Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams* (New York, 1928), p. 240. *The Autobiography of William Allen White* (New York, 1946), pp. 149, 177-178, 184-185. Stewart Holbrook, *The Story of American Railroads* (New York, 1947).

⁷ Edward Hungerford, *Story of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad*, 2 vols. (New York, 1928), I, 325.

tended to the Mississippi, then beyond to Chicago, and out of its shops at Mt. Clare and its technical school came engines and engineers that are still the pride of the railroad industry. Furthermore, under Garrett's direction the B & O increased its pre-eminence as the first industry of the State. Merely in the process of operating the road its president exerted an influence as great as that of any other individual in Maryland.⁸

In the summer of 1877 John Garrett's policies represented a series of reactions against the depression. Succinctly, they might be described as encompassing retrenchment and economy. Pursuing this course, the B & O announced on Monday, July 11, that a ten per cent wage reduction would become effective the following week. Four of its competing roads, the Pennsylvania Railroad, the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad, the Erie and Pennsylvania Railroad, and the Northern Central Railroad, had previously announced their wage cuts. Only George Wilkins, superintendent of the latter road, a small line which ran into Baltimore, felt any compulsion to explain to his men in advance why the step was essential.⁹

B & O reductions, to be sure, affected all employees, including company officers, but they were designed primarily to require workingmen to carry their share of the depression burden. Although the B & O's daily wage rate was lower than the Pennsylvania Railroad's, for instance, company officials felt that despite earlier cuts it still compared favorably with the earnings the men could command in other industries. They believed, moreover, that philanthropy and economy had already been too long combined. Tom Scott of the Pennsylvania Railroad spoke for the industry when he declared that "many establishments have been kept in operation simply that men might be employed . . . often . . . without one iota of profit to the owner," and he left no doubt that this was the case with the railroad companies. Many respectable men, viewing matters in this light, regarded the wage cuts as fair. "The only injustice a railroad can inflict on its men is to neglect

⁸ J. Thomas Scharf, *The Chronicles of Baltimore* (Baltimore, 1874), pp. 449, 602, 661, 686, 693, 715. J. Thomas Scharf, *History of Maryland* (Baltimore, 1879), III, 402, 416, 517, 530, 656, 729-731. Brantz Mayer, *Baltimore: Past and Present* (Baltimore, 1871), p. 261.

⁹ For wage comparisons see *American*, July 17, 1877, and *Annual Report of the Secretary of Internal Affairs of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Part III, Industrial Statistics* (Harrisburg, 1882), Vol. IX, 1880-1, 360-361. Hereafter cited as *Annual Report, Pa.*

paying them," wrote one prominent editor, while another argued that if corporations could not follow the dictates of the market they would be ruined. Among the rare dissenting voices raised was that of Charles Francis Adams, Jr., whose association with the railroad industry was as intimate as John Garrett's or Tom Scott's. His call for a ten per cent *increase* in wages, nevertheless, came too late.¹⁰

Whatever the wisdom of Garrett's decision, he undoubtedly realized that it entailed a measure of risk. The effects of wage cuts within the industry were known to every manager. On February 12, for example, reductions drove engineers and firemen off their jobs with the Boston and Maine Railroad. There was not any trouble breaking the strike, but it so crippled industries in parts of New England that the Massachusetts Railroad Commission planned a conference on the subject of profits, wages, and employee relations. Ironically, invitations were to have gone out on July 16th, the day the great rail strike began.¹¹

The lowering of wages on the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, as President Garrett knew, had likewise been a source of trouble. In March, engineers and firemen had asked Franklin Gowen's general manager for a twenty per cent increase in pay to compensate for earlier cuts. The company refused to bargain on grounds that the request emanated from the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, an organization allegedly behind the Boston and Maine strike, and it set out to destroy this body entirely. Actually the Brotherhood was a provident society whose conservative president, Peter Arthur, had squelched thirteen potential strikes by its members since 1876. Faced with the choice of either abandoning the union or being fired, however, seventeen per cent of the Philadelphia and Reading men struck. Since the labor market was crowded with unemployed men there was no delay in replacing them.¹²

Finally, President Garrett had evidence of the Pennsylvania Railroad's experience in wage cutting. When on June 1 President Scott announced the second ten per cent reduction since 1873, a

¹⁰ Thomas Scott, "The Recent Strikes," *North American Review*, CXXV (Sept., 1877), 351-362. *The Nation*, Aug. 30, 1877. *American*, July 17, 1877. *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, July 28, 1877.

¹¹ *Annual Report, Pa., Part III, Vol. IX*, 317-324. *The Nation*, Sept. 6, 1877.

¹² *Locomotive Engineers Monthly Journal* (Oct., 1877), XII, 463. *Annual Report, Pa., Part III, Vol. IX*, 317-324.

number of distressed engineers waited on him. While Scott persuaded this group to continue working, the proposed cut provoked the formation of the Trainmen's Union at Allegheny City on June 2. Led by the Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Fort Wayne Railroad brakeman, Robert Ammon, organizers were soon recruiting members on five eastern trunk lines including the B & O. Preparations were made for a strike against these lines on June 27 but railway officials learned of the union plans and wrecked them before they matured. The abortion of the strike may well have proved as painful to the people of Pittsburgh three weeks later as would its birth, for the defeated men nursed their frustrations.¹³

In brief, Garrett realized wage cuts added to workingmen's hardships, provoked strikes, and had stimulated the growth of one union and the formation of another. Similarly it was evident that the strikes, short as they were, could be costly to the roads involved and the public. On the other hand, the strikes had been speedily broken and the men easily replaced. There was every reason to assume that labor lacked unity and was, thanks to the depression, amenable to company discipline. Setbacks of the railroad unions indicated that he not only had little to fear from them but might possibly have the opportunity to destroy them utterly.¹⁴ Character, predilections, and the experiences of the railway industry, all led John Garrett to expect that he could master events, that there would be no serious trouble for the B & O. He was mistaken; there was serious trouble. Ultimately his judgment was vindicated insofar as he successfully regained control of the situation, but only after his railroad and society had paid a heavy price.

Evidence indicates, contrary to all past accounts, that the great rail strike did not begin in Martinsburg, West Virginia. It started, rather, at Camden Junction, two miles from Baltimore where the old main stem to Mt. Clare connected with the Washington line—a critical point through which passed all trains leaving Baltimore for Washington or the West. Shortly before noon, Monday, July 16, the day the B & O wage cut was to become effective, the

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 322-324. For descriptions of events in Pennsylvania see *Pennsylvania: Report of the Committee . . . to Investigate the Railroad Riots in July, 1877: Legislative Doc. 29*, pp. 1-1,000. Also see the highly colored account by J. A. Dacus, *Annals of the Great Strikes* (Philadelphia, 1877), pp. 89-143.

¹⁴ Almont Lindsay, *The Pullman Strike* (Chicago, 1942), p. 7. Lindsay suggests that managers of the eastern roads felt 1877 an auspicious time to destroy the "powerful Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers" which I think makes too much of their concern with the union.

fireman on Engine 32 deserted his train at this junction and other firemen soon joined him. While company agents quickly hired replacements, the strikers remained nearby to persuade their comrades to leave the trains idle.

Whatever the nature of the threats hurled, nothing more serious than a minor scuffle ensued at Camden Junction, and there was only a brief delay in the despatching of freights. Nevertheless, relying on the support of Mayor Ferdinand Latrobe,¹⁵ the railroad called in a large force of police. Three strikers were arrested for threatening a riot, a charge which at the time appeared so ridiculous that the men retained no counsel, and police, unsure of their ability to sustain the charge, deferred trial. Additional police were meanwhile stationed strategically along the route from Camden Station to Relay. Beyond their jurisdiction at this last point, City police were ordered away the next day by an indignant Howard County judge. Anxious to nip the strike in the bud, however, the B & O responded by invoking obscure charter rights, whereby it commissioned these City employees as special railway constables and returned them to their posts—a maneuver the press immediately questioned.¹⁶

Throughout the day and into Monday evening, railroad officers, with the police on the alert, remained cheerfully confident despite groups of strikers who loitered near Camden Junction and the Riverside Station in South Baltimore. Before leaving the office for the day the B & O's First Vice President John King, Jr., met with Governor Carroll who felt no troops were needed at the moment. Vice President King then published one further announcement by the company restating and justifying its new wage policy, though this had no mollifying effect upon the men. Thirty-eight unconvinced engineers, in fact, soon joined hands with the striking firemen, and by 6:00 P.M. Baltimore box makers, sawyers, and fruit can makers, unable to secure their wage demands, threw in their lot with the railroad men. Whatever this portended, however, all was peaceful. Passenger trains ran unmolested and before 6:00 P.M. fifteen freight trains in three convoys moved out onto the line.¹⁷

Although these occurrences were intrinsically insignificant, they were revealing. First, and most obviously, the strike was a spontaneous protest of individuals against what they believed to be hard conditions and high-handed methods. Nothing sustains contentions that unionists, as such, played any part in it at all, nor is there cause for claiming the strike in Baltimore, or elsewhere on the line somewhat later, came off as a preconcerted arrangement."¹⁸ Far beyond the narrow ambit of the unions, discontent ran wider and deeper than the complacent realized.

Second, despite the attention they received from the press and later historians, wages were not the only, or narrowly speaking, even the main issue. The strikers nurtured a host of accumulated grievances. The ten per cent reduction was indeed a serious blow, but many of the men, pitifully eager to hold their jobs in the depression, would have taken the cut obediently—except for other circumstances. If, for instance, they could have worked full time, the reduction would have been bearable. As it was, many were getting only two or three days work per week. Firemen and brakemen, moreover, having ridden their trains out on the line were often unable to return at once. They were not allowed to come back to Baltimore as passengers on other trains, for the B & O refused to issue them passes. Consequently, until they caught freight work, which was not plentiful in slack times, they were left miles out to purchase their own board and food on already trimmed wages. Coupled with the company's arbitrary classification of engineers and firemen, its promotion policies, its lack of security provisions, and the extraordinary hazards of the railway industry itself at that time, the desperation of the men is understandable.¹⁹

Third, and very significantly, railroad officials in dealing with the strike even in its earliest hours displayed a hair-trigger willingness to call in the authorities and an enormous confidence in their ability to manipulate them to serve company policy.

Toward 9:00 P.M. Monday matters grew more serious. The B & O's superintendent of telegraph received dispatches from Martinsburg, West Virginia, indicating that the strike had spread

¹⁵ For Latrobe's connections with the B & O see *Baltimore: Its History and Its People* (New York, 1912), II, 396-398.

¹⁶ *American*, July 17, 18, 1877. *Sun*, July 17, 18, 1877. Scharf, *History of Maryland*, III, 728-729.

¹⁷ *American*, July 17, 18, 1877. *Sun*, July 17, 18, 1877.

¹⁸ Scharf, *History of Maryland*, III, 729. Pinkerton, *op. cit.*, pp. 136, 164, 197. *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, July 28, 1877. Dacus, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-76.

¹⁹ See, *American*, July 17, 18, 1877; *Sun*, July 26, 1877; *Locomotive Engineers Monthly Journal*, XII (1877), 448 citing the *Baltimore Gazette* on aspects of the issues.

there. Six hours by train from Baltimore, Martinsburg was an important relay station where engines and crewmen changed off. Late Monday evening more than a score of firemen deserted their engines, apparently after learning of events at Camden Junction from westbound crews. Reports arriving at Camden Station had it that a riot ensued when loyal men refused to join the strike. In addition it was reported that A. P. Shutt, the town mayor, was trying to arrest the strike's ringleaders and that crowds were growing so large that it was impossible to move freights through the yards. Up to 9:00 P.M. there were no reports of damage. Nevertheless, John King, Jr., the B & O first vice president, was alerted at his home, Chestnut Hill, and by 11:30 P.M. he was back in his office at Camden Station. Mr. King was not a man to waste time. He immediately telegraphed Governor Henry Mathews of West Virginia apprising him of the "riot" in Martinsburg, of the fact that local authorities could not suppress it. In view of this situation he asked the Governor to call out the militia to protect B & O property and to enable the company to get its trains running on schedule.²⁰

Since affairs at Martinsburg had serious repercussions elsewhere, it is worth analyzing the decision to call out the West Virginia militia. What was the evidence at Camden Station of a "riot" in Martinsburg? There were no reports of actual arrests or casualties, and the reports stressed that there was no property damage. Since John King telegraphed Governor Mathews less than an hour after his return to Camden Station, no time was lost investigating the situation up the line. It was far from definite that freights were impossible to get out, for the Martinsburg authorities had made no strong attempts to move them. Despite John King's claim that he needed the militia to enable "trains" to run, only eastbound freights were not moving, and there was no way of telling how westbound freights would fare because reports of the strike at Martinsburg and a storm at Harpers Ferry kept them in Baltimore. Apparently, too, the strikers' actions showed that this was a freightman's strike against their particular lot. Crowds, threats, and scuffling there certainly was, but these

things hardly suggest the work of an irrational mob, or that the men were beyond the call of reason or compromise.

It appears highly probable, moreover, that Mayor Shutt was eager to pass the responsibility for law enforcement onto the shoulders of higher authorities. In fairness it must be said the evidence is circumstantial. Nevertheless the Mayor's actions look like a reaction against his most unenviable position. As mayor of a one industry town, he was dependent on the goodwill of both the strikers and the railway officials, and was perhaps embarrassed by the fact that he and his son owned the Berkeley House, Martinsburg's main hotel, which derived its business from the railroad.

At a higher level, Governor Mathews likewise responded to the B & O summons with alacrity and without more than a cursory examination of the Martinsburg affair. His position was no happier in these circumstances, in fact, than Mayor Shutt's. An ex-Confederate and a Democrat, Mathews was new to office in a state where the B & O was a major economic and political power enjoying numerous special privileges. Whatever may appear to have motivated Governor Mathews, however, it is clear that word from a top official of the railroad stung him to action. Colonel C. J. Faulkner of the Beverly Light Infantry Guards, the Governor's aide-de-camp, received orders to go to Martinsburg and restore order not long after midnight. Somewhat confused about the chain-of-command, Faulkner then telegraphed railroad officers at Camden Station at 1.00 A.M. (Tuesday) that he would obey his orders.²¹

The determination to invoke state authority and use state troops set still more unfortunate events in motion. Early Tuesday, Faulkner's militia arrived in Martinsburg. No precise description of occurrences thereafter is possible but a few things are unmistakably clear and a few others excite curiosity. Two attempts were made during the morning to test the temper of the strikers and to move freights. The first, conducted by Faulkner and volunteer railroad workers, resulted in the fatal shooting of a striker and the wounding of a militiaman at a ball switch, and Faulkner abandoned his attempt; the second, led by the B & O superin-

²⁰ *American*, July 17, 1877. *Sun*, July 17, 18, 1877. George McNeill, *The Labor Movements: The Problem of Today* (Boston, 1888), pp. 154-155. Scharf, *History of Maryland*, III, 728-729. *Annual Report, Pa., Part III, Vol. IX*, 324-325. Pinkerton, *op. cit.*, pp. 147 ff.

²¹ On the foregoing paragraphs see, *American*, July, 18, 19, 1877; *Sun*, July 18, *Movement: The Problem of Today* (Boston, 1888). pp. 154-155. Scharf, *History of Maryland*, III, 729-731; McNeill, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-156.

tendent of trains fared no better, although there was no violence. A large number of trains and cars had piled up at the relay point. These things are clear.

The materials that arouse curiosity are rumors on Tuesday and press reports the next day, that Faulkner and his men were "in sympathy" with the strikers. Exactly what did *sympathy* mean? Reports that Faulkner and the West Virginia Guard had gone over to the strikers do not appear to be true. There may have been a few defections but neither Faulkner nor the rest of the command joined the railway workers at any time. Furthermore, Colonel Faulkner had made two efforts to move freights, and on one occasion a militiaman had not hesitated to fatally wound a striker. Finally, no court martial was ever convened to charge the Colonel or his men with desertion or insubordination. Faulkner probably felt that, while his force was adequate if he wanted to shoot matters out, this would result in unnecessary bloodshed, and better alternatives were still open to him. His force was in no danger. It was a railroad strike, not a civil rebellion, consequently he may have considered it wiser to await reinforcements to make it simpler to overawe the crowd peacefully. In the interim there was a good chance that things might cool down. In short, he plainly wanted time. Railway officials in Baltimore and Martinsburg, on the other hand, probably felt that Faulkner's real failure lay in trying to speak to the crowd and in not moving vigorously enough with his available force. The Baltimore press, which got much of its news from the railroad, commented not only on the sympathies of the militia but also on their "inefficiency."²²

On Tuesday and Wednesday pressure rapidly mounted among the sleepless B & O officials in Baltimore and at Martinsburg to break the strike. Trouble, as the newspapers called it, had reached Grafton and Keyser on the B & O line in West Virginia by Tuesday afternoon, while at Cumberland, Maryland, an assemblage of unemployed men denounced capitalists and bondholders. Governor Mathews had entrained at 1:00 P.M. Tuesday from Wheeling to go to these sensitive points in West Virginia with sixty-five militiamen. He had earlier telegraphed Baltimore, however, about the inadequacy of militiamen at Martinsburg, and company officials were fearful that sixty-five additional men could

²² *American*, July 18, 19, 20, 1877. *Sun*, July 18, 19, 1877. Allan Pinkerton, *op. cit.*, pp. 147 ff. Scharf, *History of Maryland*, III, 729-731. Dacus, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-36.

not guard their property. In Baltimore strikers had been orderly and police at Riverside and Mt. Clare experienced no difficulty. But early Tuesday morning an engine was derailed near Spring Gardens and, despite a complete lack of evidence, sabotage was rumored. Furthermore, several hundred trainmen who were still faithful to the company held a mass meeting at Sharp and Montgomery Streets. Moderation prevailed and they disassociated themselves even from sympathy for the men in Martinsburg. Nevertheless, they promised that unless the B & O was conciliatory about grievances, they would select their time carefully and leave the company in the lurch. Finally, as if to add to these evil omens, a meeting between Governor Mathews, Vice President Keyser and General Sharp, B & O master of transportation, on the one side and the strikers on the other, in both Grafton and Martinsburg, failed. No compromise was offered the men and exhortations did not seem an acceptable substitute.

The tough-minded, ex-Confederate B & O master of transportation, General Sharp, in company with other road officials, thereupon persuaded Governor Mathews to request Federal troops from President Hayes.²³

Because of their seriousness, the dispatches to Washington merit comment. Governor Mathews' first telegram to President Hayes spoke of "unlawful combinations and domestic violence now existing at Martinsburg and other points" along the B & O line and of the need for troops to "protect the law-abiding people of the State against domestic violence, and to maintain the supremacy of the law." On behalf of the President, Secretary of War McCrary wired Governor Mathews that Mr. Hayes "is averse to intervention unless it is clearly shown that the State is unable to suppress *the insurrection*."²⁴ The Governor was told to "furnish a full statement of facts." The full statement of facts sent back to Washington was a telegram of eighty-six words which alleged the sympathy of the militia for the strikers at Martinsburg, stated the indisposition of other militia companies and concluded that there were "no organized militia in the State." Of the strike's course or of specific events in West Virginia there was no factual description whatsoever.²⁵

²³ *American*, July 19, 20, 1877. *Sun*, July 19, 20, 1877. McNeill, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-157. Edward Hungerford, *op. cit.*, I, 323 ff.

²⁴ Italics mine.

²⁵ Cited in Scharf, *History of Maryland*, III, 730-731. *American*, July 19, 20,

Such was the official intelligence that persuaded Federal authorities to employ *national forces*, a precedent that had far-reaching consequences in the next fifteen years. No doubt strikers illegally infringed on B & O property. Yet when these dispatches were sent to Washington there had been no violence, no casualties, and no injuries since the shooting at Martinsburg in the early morning. While coupling pins had been lifted by strikers at Martinsburg, and threats of injury hurled against men on trains, no company property had been damaged or even seriously tampered with. Loyal men were verbally intimidated but they were not attacked or beaten. If the Secretary of War was under the impression that there was an insurrection, he was mistaken—it was still a strike. Since Governor Mathews was able to make several arrests later on the 18th, how seriously was the supremacy of the law impaired? How urgently did "law abiding people of the State," other than the B & O, need protection against "domestic violence"? How anxious was Governor Mathews to use his powers responsibly and to what extent was he embarrassed by it?

Meanwhile, shortly after Governor Mathews' first telegram to Federal authorities, John Garrett re-entered the picture to buttress the Governor's words with his own lengthier telegram to President Hayes. Garrett also cited the impossibility of moving freights and the open intimidation of and "attacks" on loyal employees. Unless this ceased, he told the President, he apprehended "the greatest consequence . . . upon all lines in the country which, like ourselves, have been obliged to introduce measures of economy in these trying times for the preservation of the effectiveness of railway property." Resuming his old wartime demeanor he then asked the President to keep him informed of the points through which troops would be sent so that there would be no delay, suggested Fort McHenry and Washington as the best starting points, and asked for immediate action so as to "prevent the rapid increase" of "the difficulties." John Garrett's action has not been challenged seriously in subsequent years,²⁶ hence it is worth indicating that at least one railway officer took a dim view of it after the strike was over. "The President of the Baltimore and Ohio Company," wrote H. C. Lord, "ignores both the authority and

ability of the States of Maryland and West Virginia to enforce their own laws, invites the interference of the Federal Government and with characteristic modesty suggests to the President of the United States what he should do under the circumstances."²⁷

Whatever the propriety of John Garrett's telegram, it was effective. President Hayes issued his proclamation and sent troops on the 18th, and eight companies of men under General French arrived the following morning at Martinsburg. There was some difficulty locating *the insurrection*, for the soldiers and strikers met in good humor, laughing and joking with one another in the morning rain. The Army reported no violence and soon announced that it could move trains without any *physical* obstacles to stop them. Only engineers were required to get things rolling. Unfortunately even with troopers alongside the trains, these men did not come forth.²⁸ The alleged insurrection was still an unbroken strike against the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

Because decisions along the B & O line were inseparably linked with the actions and mistakes of railroad, civil, and military authorities, they caused reverberations up and down the road and across the nation. Gathering force, they culminated in the tragic Baltimore Riots of July 20-21 following the actions on the situation at Cumberland.

The "Communitistic madness," as Allan Pinkerton described it, leaped from Martinsburg to Cumberland during Wednesday night, July 18. Disgruntled miners, Chesapeake and Ohio canal men, rail strikers, and their reinforcements from West Virginia and the Pittsburgh area were reported gathering there. Numbering five or six hundred, they were supposedly "armed with every conceivable weapon." Eruption of the strike at Pittsburgh on Thursday emboldened them, while dispatches about Federal troops and John Garrett's paternal gesture to reward faithful employees incensed them.²⁹

Whatever its immediate spark, the first small riot resulting in serious property damage to the B & O occurred in the Cumberland Yards when box cars loaded with perishables were broken open on Friday. No one was hurt but it was a thoroughly lawless

²⁷ Reprinted from a letter to the *Cincinnati Enquirer* this criticism appeared in the *Locomotive Engineers Monthly Journal*, XI (1877), 418-419.

²⁸ *American*, July 20, 1877.

²⁹ See, for instance, Garrett's announcement to his workers in the *American*, July 20, 1877. Dacus. *op. cit.*, p. 96.

1877. *Sun*, July 19, 20, 1877. James D. Richardson. *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (Washington, 1898), VII, 446-448.

²⁶ See, for instance, Scharf, *History of Maryland*, III, 730-731.

demonstration which Mayor Withers and local police would not or could not check. Railway officials believed serious trouble to be in the offing unless the Maryland National Guard was called out. In order to accomplish this objective, therefore, company leaders counseled at 3:00 P.M. Friday with Governor John Carroll at Barnum's Hotel.³⁰

Governor Carroll had already been placed under pressure to call up State troops. B & O officers had twice before during the strike urged him to do so. Less direct, though strong, pressures were also building up among businessmen and merchants, as well as the press, to put an end to the strike. The Governor had no trouble learning that "thousands of dollars were being lost every hour," that trade was being hurt by idled workers and strikers, that coal-oil refineries at Spring Gardens were facing difficulty, and that "not a few cattle, sheep, and hogs (in stalled freight cars) . . . were perishing of hunger and thirst."³¹

Yet the most formidable considerations placed before the Governor of Maryland were without question those of John W. Garrett. The historian of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad correctly assessed the relative positions of the Governors of Maryland and the President of the railroad when he wrote: "Garrett realized he must have a Governor who would be guided by him in all matters pertaining to the affairs of this great property [the B & O]. . . . To that end his agents were busily engaged in politics from one end of the State to the other and to the day of his death, the word of the President of the B & O was law to Governors, all state officials."³² In addition, Governor Carroll had another important interest in the safety of the road, for the State of Maryland in 1877 still possessed a large financial stake in it. Given his circumstances, and the fact that most of his information on the crisis came over the railroad's telegraph, Governor Carroll, on the whole, displayed commendable forbearance in the matter of using the National Guard—more, certainly, than the executives and officials of nearby states.

The decision to order out the Guard for service in Cumberland, at 3:30 P.M. Friday, was not without its ironies. Faced with a riot in Cumberland, the failure of local authority, and threats of

worse things to come, swift, effective use of a trained militia might have curtailed damage or bloodshed. Unfortunately, while opportunities for service beckoned in Western Maryland, the regiments called up were unable to get there. The very fact that they were to be employed set the stage for further trouble, not in Cumberland but in Baltimore.

If its origins were in Cumberland, the immediate causes of the Friday rioting in Baltimore were a series of petty mistakes, the first of which was the manner in which the Fifth and Sixth Regiments were mustered. State and local officials realized that sympathy for the railroad strikers was widespread in Baltimore, that trouble might be aroused if excitement were generated by the mustering-in process. At first Governor Carroll refused to allow "Big Sam" and smaller fire bells to sound out the emergency military call. Nevertheless, General James Herbert, leader of the Guardsmen, was told by a subordinate that the emergency call would speed things up. Herbert and his staff prevailed upon the Governor again and he rather nebulously left the ringing of the 1-5-1 emergency signal to their discretion. Shortly after 6:00 P.M. Herbert, wishing to hurry things along, sounded the alarm. The bells pealed out at the worst imaginable time, as most of the City's men and boys were just leaving work, and crowds of the curious and the angry swarmed to the armories. At Camden Station where only a handful of people were congregated before the call, there were thousands in less than a half an hour.³³

Having passed uneventfully through the crowds near Camden Station with his staff, General Herbert ordered the Guard regiments to march from their armories to join him, but poor judgment marred the handling of the Sixth Regiment. Discipline in the Fifth, it must be noted, was good. Its leader, Captain Zollinger, less than a month earlier had instituted court-martial proceedings against militiamen who refused to take their training seriously, and his command obeyed him. Marching from Richmond Market, the Fifth was heavily stoned near Camden Street but it managed without shooting or injuring any of its attackers to get into the depot. A crowd of several thousand persons had meanwhile gathered before the Sixth Regiment Armory at Fayette and Front Streets, and elements in the mob began an assault.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, July 19, 20, 1877. McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 156. *Sun*, July 21, 1877.

³¹ Scharf, *History of Maryland*, III, 732. *American*, July 19, 1877. H. E. Burchholz, *Governors of Maryland* (Baltimore, 1908), pp. 212-230.

³² Edward Hungerford, *op. cit.*, I, 328.

³³ *American*, July 21, 1877. *Sun*, July 17, 21, 1877. Scharf, *History of Maryland*, III, 732-734. McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

Paving stones from a repaired gas line were thrown, incoming soldiers were mauled, and initial efforts by the troops to march out were turned back. Because of the many men detailed to guard railway properties, police at Central Station were unable to aid the militia, and no call for help from the Fifth Regiment appears to have gone out. Neither did officers of the Sixth think it wise to make a defense from within the Armory. Instead those companies supposed to entrain for Cumberland were piecemeal led out into the mob and were marched on separate routes to Camden Station. Inevitably a series of minor tragedies ensued. Tracked, stoned, believing themselves fired upon by the crowd, the frightened and separated companies, without orders, commenced firing at will. By the time they reached Camden Station in "demoralized" condition, it was discovered that none of their men was shot, and fewer were injured by stones than in the Fifth, but at least thirty-five of the mob, some mere bystanders, were casualties—ten of them dead.³⁴

Under the spires of the B & O headquarters in Camden Station, many of the civil, military, and railroad officials who had contributed to the events stretching back to the previous Monday were together in the subsequent hours of crisis: John King, Jr., and a staff of weary railroad officers, Mayor Ferdinand C. Latrobe, Governor Carroll, General Herbert, and police officials. Outside the Station was a threatening crowd of perhaps fifteen thousand people which reached from Camden Street on the north to Lee Street on the south. Inside there was much understandable confusion. The Mayor and the Governor almost immediately determined to retain the Guardsmen destined for Cumberland, though they probably could not have gone anyway, for there is evidence some tracks had already been torn up in Camden yards. Over the next critical hours it was not the militia, in any event, who kept the situation from becoming disastrous, but the police. Unable because of their dispersement to check the first incidents

³⁴ Descriptions of the Friday Riot are numerous, detailed, and confused. See, *American*, July 21, 22, 1877; *Sun*, July 21, and the Extra of July 22, 1877; Telegrams of G. Abell to Arunah Abell for July 21, 1877 in Maryland Historical Society; John Thomas to General William Barry, U. S. A., telegram 2:30 A.M., July 20 and 11:20 P.M., July 20, 1877 in *Barry Papers*, Maryland Historical Society. Also see, Scharf, *History of Maryland*, III, 734-737; and Scharf's *History of Baltimore City and County* (Philadelphia, 1881), pp. 792-794. There is interesting, though confused, testimony on events in the hearings of the coroner's jury in Baltimore, cited in *American*, Aug. 4, 1877. Dacus, *op. cit.*, Chap. VI.

at the Sixth Regiment Armory that had touched off the calamities earlier, they proved to be the sole effective force at Camden Station. At last, the policy of heavily guarding B & O property was bearing fruit.

A preparatory move by the B & O to call for the use of federal troops in Maryland began even prior to the rioting of 8:00 P.M., since at 4:00 P.M. John King, Jr. had telegraphed General William Barry at Fort McHenry, in behalf of U. S. Collector Thomas, asking that extra vigilance and a "sufficient guard" be used on U. S. Government and B & O bonded warehouses at Locust Point.³⁵ Fire on a passenger platform, destruction of a telegrapher's office and several engines and cars in the yards, plus the menace of the mob, by 10:00 P.M. made a direct appeal for Federal help irresistible. Governor Carroll, as a consequence, telegraphed President Hayes for aid.

The Governor's telegram bears scrutiny for it reflects an accumulation of pressures as well as the exigencies of the moment. President Hayes was informed that the rioters could not be dispersed with any force at Carroll's command, that they had "taken possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad depot, set fire to same, and driven off all firemen who attempted to extinguish the flames." Was that, indeed, the situation? The Governor had a large force of perhaps 300 to 350 policemen and militiamen at his command. Captain Zollinger's men had proven extremely competent and the press later spoke of the way policemen "awed" the crowd. No effort seems to have been made to employ the men in the depot as a force to drive off the rioters. Militiamen as a group were primarily spectators of events from the platforms and from inside the depot. Their presence angered the mob and Governor Carroll appeared unwilling to risk taking responsibility for using them to apply maximum force. Moreover, rioters had not "taken possession" of the depot. There were fires, to be sure, but firemen had with difficulty extinguished them.³⁶ Whatever questions may be raised by the Governor's action, it was politically astute. He had won time, spared himself grave and perhaps in-

³⁵ John King to Gen. Wm. Barry, telegram 4:00 P.M., July 20, 1877 in *Barry Papers*.

³⁶ Italics in all above quotations are mine. The dispatches are cited in Scharf, *History of Maryland*, III, 737. Carroll's telegram on that page should be dated July 20 not July 28. *American*, July 21, 22, 1877. *Sun*, July 21, 22, 1877, Richardson, *op. cit.*, VII, 448.

humane decisions, and also followed railroad policy. How aware of this he was at the time, however, can never be known.

In perspective, Federal assent to Governor Carroll's request appears to have been the turning point in the course of the B & O strike. Support by Federal troops, first in West Virginia, then in Maryland, meant that the B & O could not lose the contest. Federal intervention in these critical states provided the key to railroad labor difficulties. It hardly mattered that the emergency at Camden Station was so short-lived that by 1:30 A.M. Saturday morning, less than three hours after the call for help went out, the mob had departed, or that Carroll modified his policy and announced the restoration of order at 3:00 A.M. before any Federal troops arrived.³⁷

During the next ten days the strike in Maryland slowly petered out. To be sure, Saturday evening (the 21st) brought another riot at Camden Station, attacks on railway property at several points in the City, and considerable damage. Likewise, the same night it inspired a number of dramatic telegrams from the authorities in the Station to General Barry at Fort McHenry. But with Federal power standing by, police handled the mob effectively and rounded up its ringleaders—none of whom were strikers—in droves. On Sunday between 1,200 and 2,000 Federal soldiers were concentrated in or near Baltimore, while local forces had been swelled by citizen recruits. That evening at 7:00 P.M. Arunah Abell, who was being kept alert to all developments, learned by wire that the worst was over and that public sentiment for law and order was being strongly asserted. Railroad officials, subsequently, had little trouble identifying public safety with the safety of railway property, or in manipulating Federal troops accordingly. When General French, commander of the Federal soldiers in Western Maryland, refused to be ordered about by Colonel Sharp, the B & O's master of transportation, and by company agents, he was replaced and thereafter all went well. Troops were kept busy by numerous incidents as they shuttled from place to place opening the line, but towards the end of the week, Vice President Keyser of the B & O, fully confident that the strikers were beaten, began explaining to them why the company could not yield to their demands. Baltimore businessmen

³⁷ G. Abell to Arunah Abell, telegram, July 22, 1877 in the Maryland Historical Society. *American*, July 21, 1877. Scharf, *History of Maryland*, III, 736.

sensed a full settlement—and they were not disappointed. On the 25th all along the line men were coming back. The following Wednesday, August 1, John Garrett stated that nearly all lines were operative, and Thursday, with 125 trains on the B & O road, all was normal.³⁸

A local affair at its inception, the B & O strike influenced similar strikes in fourteen states. In two weeks it had assumed all the characteristics of a major national problem. A phenomenon of these proportions deserves some overall analysis.

Reviewing the courses pursued by railroad officials, it is evident that their intransigent stand on wages and grievances touched off, sustained, and prolonged the strike, that throughout the conflict their decisions were oriented around the persistent search for public authority sufficiently powerful to crush the strike without concessions.

This assuredly does not warrant conclusions, however, that the actions of these leaders were sinister, on the one hand, or a tough-minded defense of economic liberty on the other. Men's motivations and the strike itself were too complex to yield such simple judgments. More to the point, what must pass as public sentiment in 1877 was divided in its evaluation of the affair. As might have been expected, there was applause from financial and business interests for the position taken by the B & O and other embattled roads. Criticisms about these stands seemed to one editor merely a part of the "inevitable prejudice against corporations."³⁹ But sanction for railroad policy also came from liberal sources. *The Nation* declared editorially that, "What is to be feared is that through some weakness on the part of the companies, the strikers may come out of this struggle with an appearance of victory," adding, "We are not likely to see soon again a crisis in which liberty and civilization are both more at stake than they are now."⁴⁰ Conversely there was at least one vocal railroad official who believed that "the fault lies with the railway managers who have defied all established maxims . . . of business procedure . . . who have quarreled among themselves and inaugu-

³⁸ See accounts in *American* and *Sun*, July 22-Aug. 6, 1877; *Barry Papers*, July-August, 1877; *Annual Report, Pa., Part III, Vol. IX*, 324-365; Pinkerton, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-364; McNeill, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-162; *The Nation*, July 26, 1877; Telegrams of G. Abell to A. Abell in Maryland Historical Society.

³⁹ *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, July 28, 1877.

⁴⁰ *The Nation*, July 26, 1877.

rated a policy . . . of rivalry and competition. destructive of the property they were pledged to protect," who "practice a false economy" and refuse to "reform themselves."⁴¹ On both sides there were mixed emotions and cherished principles.

Conclusions reached by a Pennsylvania legislative body after investigations of the strike in that State may well point up the dominant strain of thought elsewhere. To the suggestion that any corporation has the right to pay wages as it pleases, and to require such services for the money paid as it chooses, the investigators replied, "This rule must be received with considerable modification in the case of a great corporation, receiving special privileges from the State, and employing thousands of men scattered from one end of the State to another."⁴² Going a bit further in the same direction, a Republican State Convention in Ohio—where the B & O strike affected several cities—heard pleas for an end to reckless railway competition and adopted a plank calling for the assumption by Congress "of general supervisory authority over railroads."⁴³ In Pennsylvania, a Democratic Convention charged capital was too heavily favored in the nation and urged state control of railways.⁴⁴ It was years before these trends crystallized in practical form but in places like Cumberland where food grew short, in Baltimore where trade atrophied, or in Anne Arundel and other countries where melons and produce could not be shipped, men awoke to the growing interdependence of their lives.⁴⁵

Because of the rapidity and violence with which it grew, the strike momentarily revealed to nearly everyone the hardships not only of railway workers but of many others as well. Articulate people, including railroad leaders, all realized that the depression brought great suffering. Despite loose denunciations of the strikers as "communists" or of their actions as "war" and "insurrection," a Baltimore merchant probably expressed the more commonly held view when he declared: "The strike is not a revolution of fanatics willing to fight for an idea. It is a revolt of workingmen against low prices of labor which have not been

⁴¹ *Locomotive Engineers Monthly Journal*, XI (Sept. 1877), 419.

⁴² *Annual Report, Pa., Part III, Vol. IX*, 360.

⁴³ *The Nation*, Aug. 9, 1877.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Aug. 30, 1877.

⁴⁵ For instance see, *Sun*, July 26, 1877 and *American*, July 22, 26, 30, 1877.

accompanied with correspondingly low prices of food, clothing, and house rent."⁴⁶

It by no means followed that recognition of suffering brought respect for the manner in which labor bore its cross. On the contrary, even among trade unionists, the opinion was almost unanimous that the strike was foolish and likely to increase the misery of the workingman's lot. Peter Arthur, leader of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers put the case very strongly, insisting railroad workers had "no cause for such a course," and charging that they had embarked upon a "cowardly policy" by taking "so powerful advantage as such dishonorable action would give." Moreover he threatened the expulsion of all engineers who joined the strikers and promised the public: "they shall be punished."⁴⁷ From no quarter, of course, was there sanction for the "saturnalia of violence and pillage" that came in many places as a concomitant of the strike, nor did sympathizers with hardpressed workers hesitate to make it clear that pity for the rioter was "not incompatible with the sternness that meets him with bullets."⁴⁸ Fortunately, before the strike was over, there was general agreement that the rioting was not the work of railroad men or of unionists (as arrests in Baltimore, for instance, proved) but the deed, rather, of congenital troublemakers and toughs.⁴⁹

No conditions were more pitilessly bared to public scrutiny during the course of events than the divisions between workingmen. Despite risks and low wages the vast majority of railroad workers remained loyal to the B & O and other companies. It was the critical services of the men who struck, more than their number, that crippled the industry. Never did the companies have trouble hiring as many scabs as they wanted. The wonder is, in fact, that the stoppage of rail transportation was so complete. Furthermore, after the first days of the strike workingmen who had walked off their jobs stood friendless and alone. Given Peter Arthur's views above, there was scarcely any hope of real aid from his union and things were viewed no differently in the few other railway organizations of the day. A young official of the Locomotive Firemen's Union, Eugene Debs, confused and

⁴⁶ *Sun*, July 25, 1877.

⁴⁷ *Locomotive Engineers Monthly Journal*, XII (Oct. 1877), 463.

⁴⁸ *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, July 28, 1877.

⁴⁹ For example see *American*, July 23, 1877.

stung by events, cautioned organized firemen that "a strike at the present time signifies anarchy and revolution."⁵⁰ Even Robert Ammon, the Trainmen's leader whom Allan Pinkerton so heartily vilified, kept trains on his division running, and soon worked so closely with railroad and local officials that his men deposed him.⁵¹ What had begun as a strike of individuals remained so, and the price paid for courage and tenacity was discharge and the blacklist.

Serious as labor's disunity may have been, the public was made aware of the fact that the nation had produced a "native proletariat" and a labor problem that challenged constructive thinking. On August 30, as a result of the strike Charles Francis Adams, Jr., brought forward a program designed to remedy the railroads' neglect of adequate wage, promotion, or benefit policies. Several small Mid-western roads, fearing an outbreak of trouble, actually made concessions to their men and tried to improve their state, while the B & O, perhaps as a result of the strike, set up a relief and benefit department in 1880. Strife quite naturally raised discussion of industrial peace and there were a number of arbitration proposals, one of them proffered by the Baltimore *American* during and after the strike. Politicians were also stimulated to give labor more attention and there was a flurry of "reform" and "workingmen's" candidates in Baltimore and in other cities for the next few years. Inevitably there were a number of political welfare programs cast up. Congressman Hendricks Wright called upon his colleagues to appropriate ten million dollars for immediate distribution among needy workers. Greeted with derision, the plan would have seemed somewhat less ridiculous in the mid-nineteen thirties. Other proposals, of varying degrees of intelligence, sincerity, and practicality, called for the payment of minimum wages, profit-sharing, co-operation, and the creation of a National Bureau of Industry. Regardless of their intrinsic merit, and it was not invariably great, these ideas at least served as a temporary antidote to complacency.⁵²

Tested at all levels by the strike, Government became a major

⁵⁰ Ray Ginger, *The Bending Cross: Biography of Eugene Victor Debs* (New Brunswick, 1949), p. 24.

⁵¹ *Annual Report. Pa. Part III, Vol. IX, 345-347. Pinkerton, op. cit., p. 293.*

⁵² *The Nation*, Aug. 2, 9, 16, 30, 1877. *American*, July 22, 25, 1877. *Locomotive Engineers Monthly Journal*, XII (Oct. 1877), contained a variety of suggestions. Scharf, *History of Maryland*, III, 741-743.

focus of debate. Controversy for the most part revolved around the extent of governmental inefficiency and failure. Since the railroads operated interstate empires and were forced to cope with an interstate strike, their managers and directors almost instinctively felt that local authorities were useless for railroad purposes. Well satisfied when Federal aid arrived, rail officials nevertheless deplored the time they had been obliged to wait. Doubtless speaking for many others in the industry, the president of the Pennsylvania Railroad wrote after the strike that a larger and better dispersed Federal Army was essential and that Congress should provide a law permitting courts to issue injunctions or to call out Federal troops as soon as rail traffic was interfered with by "unlawful combinations." If Baltimore was typical, there were many other businessmen who showed surprising readiness to invite Federal interposition. Some observers challenged these approaches by reviving traditional fears of military usurpation, but there was wide agreement in Maryland and outside of the State as well, that civil government had proven a failure in the crisis, that police, despite yeoman service in Baltimore, were inadequate in numbers, and militiamen thoroughly unreliable. A few critics implied that railroads were, ironically, reaping what they had sown and blamed the anemia of the civil authorities on their selection and domination by rail chieftains. Practically no one commented on the surprising vigor displayed by law-abiding Baltimoreans and ordinary citizens elsewhere as they squelched rioting and buttressed civil order, nor on society's good fortune that the unrest was not directed against existing social and political institutions.⁵³

⁵³ See comments in the *Sun* and *American*, July 23-Aug. 6, 1877. *The Nation*, Aug. 2, 9, 1877. Scharf, *History of Maryland*, III, 742. *Annual Report. Pa. Part III, Vol. IX, 360-365.*